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@marekr marekr commented Jan 7, 2014

The SAMA5 and SAMA92x5, SAM9G25 and SAM9G35 and others implement the ability to select the output drive strength for pins. But the pinctrl driver is currently missing the option to set it.

This patch only reserves 3 bits in the pinctrl config(bits 5,6 and 7) for drive strength. The first bit enables setting the drive strength, the other two bits(6,7) set the drive strength to the specified level which is dependent on the chip.

i.e. v9s:
00 = high
01 = medium
10 = low
11 = reserved/undefined

the A5 does
00 = low
01 = low
10 = medium
11 = high

Notes:

  1. Only tested on SAMA5 because I don't have the eval boards for the others :(
  2. The SAMA5 datasheet incorrectly states the default value for drivestrength config is 0x00000000. The real default value is 0xAAAAAAAA or medium strength for all pins. This can be confirmed with the JLINK on the SAMA5EK.
  3. For some reason the Atmel engineers relocated the drivestrength registers between the SAMA5 and the SAM9s by a few addresses. The #if defined in at91_pio.h is a quick attempt to workaround that change depending on cpu.

The SAMA5 and SAMA92x5, SAM9G25 and SAM9G35 and others implement the ability to select the output drive strength for pins. The configuration typically allows low, medium and high power modes with predefined current limits. This patch reserves 3 bits in the pinctrl config(bits 5,6 and 7) for drive strength. The first bit enables setting the drive strength, the other two bits(6,7) set the drive strength to the specified level which is dependent on the chip.

i.e. A9s:
00 = high
01 = medium
10 = low
11 = reserved/undefined

the A5 does
00 = low
01 = low
10 = medium
11 = high

Signed-off-by: Marek Roszko <[email protected]>
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marekr commented Jan 8, 2014

Ah yes, I didn't know what the mailing list was. Would I only put the mailing list as the destination when I email it or do I CC you or someone else?

I went with the ifdef because the alternative is to put the PIO_DRIVER1 and PIO_DRIVER2 defines in the chip specific include files rather than the general at91_pio.h and it seemed more appropriate to keep the PIO defines in one file. It also gets messy because for the SAMA5 build, at91sam9x5.h and sam5d3.h are both included in the build so using the same define name conflicts :/

I wouldn't call them magic numbers but yea the shift math was messy
So a revised define based path:

#define NUM_PINS_DRIVE_STRENGTH_REG 16
#define DRIVE_STRENGTH_MASK  0x3
#define TWO_BIT_PIN_TO_SHIFT( pin )  ( 2*( (pin >= NUM_PINS_DRIVE_STRENGTH_REG ) ? pin - NUM_PINS_DRIVE_STRENGTH_REG : pin ) )
#define TWO_BIT_PIN_TO_MASK( pin )   ( DRIVE_STRENGTH_MASK  <<  TWO_BIT_PIN_TO_SHIFT(pin) )
#define PIO_DRIVER( pin ) ( (pin > NUM_PINS_DRIVE_STRENGTH_REG -1) ? PIO_DRIVER2 : PIO_DRIVER1 )

static int at91_mux_pio3_get_drivestrength(void __iomem *pio, unsigned pin)
{   
    return ( readl_relaxed(pio + PIO_DRIVER(pin)) >> TWO_BIT_PIN_TO_SHIFT( pin ) ) & DRIVE_STRENGTH_MASK;
}

static void at91_mux_pio3_set_drivestrength(void __iomem *pio, unsigned pin, u32 strength)
{
    unsigned tmp = readl_relaxed(pio + PIO_DRIVER(pin));
    tmp &= ~TWO_BIT_PIN_TO_MASK(pin);
    tmp |= strength << TWO_BIT_PIN_TO_SHIFT( pin );

    writel_relaxed( tmp, pio + PIO_DRIVER(pin));
}

which actually does look better heh.

@marekr marekr closed this Jan 21, 2014
@marekr marekr deleted the pinctrl-drivestrength branch January 21, 2014 01:10
noglitch pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 13, 2014
When running the LTP testsuite one may hit this kernel BUG() with the
write06 testcase:

kernel BUG at mm/filemap.c:2023!
CPU: 1 PID: 8614 Comm: writev01 Not tainted 3.10.0-rc7-64bit-c3000+ #6
IASQ: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 IAOQ: 00000000401e6e84 00000000401e6e88
 IIR: 03ffe01f    ISR: 0000000010340000  IOR: 000001fbe0380820
 CPU:        1   CR30: 00000000bef80000 CR31: ffffffffffffffff
 ORIG_R28: 00000000bdc192c0
 IAOQ[0]: iov_iter_advance+0x3c/0xc0
 IAOQ[1]: iov_iter_advance+0x40/0xc0
 RP(r2): generic_file_buffered_write+0x204/0x3f0
Backtrace:
 [<00000000401e764c>] generic_file_buffered_write+0x204/0x3f0
 [<00000000401eab24>] __generic_file_aio_write+0x244/0x448
 [<00000000401eadc0>] generic_file_aio_write+0x98/0x150
 [<000000004024f460>] do_sync_readv_writev+0xc0/0x130
 [<000000004025037c>] compat_do_readv_writev+0x12c/0x340
 [<00000000402505f8>] compat_writev+0x68/0xa0
 [<0000000040251d88>] compat_SyS_writev+0x98/0xf8

Reason for this crash is a gcc miscompilation in the fault handlers of
pa_memcpy() which return the fault address instead of the copied bytes.
Since this seems to be a generic problem with gcc-4.7.x (and below), it's
better to simplify the fault handlers in pa_memcpy to avoid this problem.

Here is a simple reproducer for the problem:

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
	int fd, nbytes;
	struct iovec wr_iovec[] = {
		{ "TEST STRING                     ",32},
		{ (char*)0x40005000,32} }; // random memory.
	fd = open(DATA_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0666);
	nbytes = writev(fd, wr_iovec, 2);
	printf("return value = %d, errno %d (%s)\n",
		nbytes, errno, strerror(errno));
	return 0;
}

In addition, John David Anglin wrote:
There is no gcc PR as pa_memcpy is not legitimate C code. There is an
implicit assumption that certain variables will contain correct values
when an exception occurs and the code randomly jumps to one of the
exception blocks.  There is no guarantee of this.  If a PR was filed, it
would likely be marked as invalid.

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John David Anglin <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # 3.8+
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <[email protected]>
noglitch pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 13, 2014
If the @fn call work_on_cpu() again, the lockdep will complain:

> [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ]
> 3.11.0-rc1-lockdep-fix-a #6 Not tainted
> ---------------------------------------------
> kworker/0:1/142 is trying to acquire lock:
>  ((&wfc.work)){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81077100>] flush_work+0x0/0xb0
>
> but task is already holding lock:
>  ((&wfc.work)){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81075dd9>] process_one_work+0x169/0x610
>
> other info that might help us debug this:
>  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
>
>        CPU0
>        ----
>   lock((&wfc.work));
>   lock((&wfc.work));
>
>  *** DEADLOCK ***

It is false-positive lockdep report. In this sutiation,
the two "wfc"s of the two work_on_cpu() are different,
they are both on stack. flush_work() can't be deadlock.

To fix this, we need to avoid the lockdep checking in this case,
thus we instroduce a internal __flush_work() which skip the lockdep.

tj: Minor comment adjustment.

Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <[email protected]>
Reported-by: "Srivatsa S. Bhat" <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alexander Duyck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
noglitch pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 13, 2014
Commits 6a1c068 and
9356b53, respectively
  'tty: Convert termios_mutex to termios_rwsem' and
  'n_tty: Access termios values safely'
introduced a circular lock dependency with console_lock and
termios_rwsem.

The lockdep report [1] shows that n_tty_write() will attempt
to claim console_lock while holding the termios_rwsem, whereas
tty_do_resize() may already hold the console_lock while
claiming the termios_rwsem.

Since n_tty_write() and tty_do_resize() do not contend
over the same data -- the tty->winsize structure -- correct
the lock dependency by introducing a new lock which
specifically serializes access to tty->winsize only.

[1] Lockdep report

======================================================
[ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
3.10.0-0+tip-xeon+lockdep #0+tip Not tainted
-------------------------------------------------------
modprobe/277 is trying to acquire lock:
 (&tty->termios_rwsem){++++..}, at: [<ffffffff81452656>] tty_do_resize+0x36/0xe0

but task is already holding lock:
 ((fb_notifier_list).rwsem){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff8107aac6>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x56/0xc0

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #2 ((fb_notifier_list).rwsem){.+.+.+}:
       [<ffffffff810b6d62>] lock_acquire+0x92/0x1f0
       [<ffffffff8175b797>] down_read+0x47/0x5c
       [<ffffffff8107aac6>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x56/0xc0
       [<ffffffff8107ab46>] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20
       [<ffffffff813d7c0b>] fb_notifier_call_chain+0x1b/0x20
       [<ffffffff813d95b2>] register_framebuffer+0x1e2/0x320
       [<ffffffffa01043e1>] drm_fb_helper_initial_config+0x371/0x540 [drm_kms_helper]
       [<ffffffffa01bcb05>] nouveau_fbcon_init+0x105/0x140 [nouveau]
       [<ffffffffa01ad0af>] nouveau_drm_load+0x43f/0x610 [nouveau]
       [<ffffffffa008a79e>] drm_get_pci_dev+0x17e/0x2a0 [drm]
       [<ffffffffa01ad4da>] nouveau_drm_probe+0x25a/0x2a0 [nouveau]
       [<ffffffff813b13db>] local_pci_probe+0x4b/0x80
       [<ffffffff813b1701>] pci_device_probe+0x111/0x120
       [<ffffffff814977eb>] driver_probe_device+0x8b/0x3a0
       [<ffffffff81497bab>] __driver_attach+0xab/0xb0
       [<ffffffff814956ad>] bus_for_each_dev+0x5d/0xa0
       [<ffffffff814971fe>] driver_attach+0x1e/0x20
       [<ffffffff81496cc1>] bus_add_driver+0x111/0x290
       [<ffffffff814982b7>] driver_register+0x77/0x170
       [<ffffffff813b0454>] __pci_register_driver+0x64/0x70
       [<ffffffffa008a9da>] drm_pci_init+0x11a/0x130 [drm]
       [<ffffffffa022a04d>] nouveau_drm_init+0x4d/0x1000 [nouveau]
       [<ffffffff810002ea>] do_one_initcall+0xea/0x1a0
       [<ffffffff810c54cb>] load_module+0x123b/0x1bf0
       [<ffffffff810c5f57>] SyS_init_module+0xd7/0x120
       [<ffffffff817677c2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

-> #1 (console_lock){+.+.+.}:
       [<ffffffff810b6d62>] lock_acquire+0x92/0x1f0
       [<ffffffff810430a7>] console_lock+0x77/0x80
       [<ffffffff8146b2a1>] con_flush_chars+0x31/0x50
       [<ffffffff8145780c>] n_tty_write+0x1ec/0x4d0
       [<ffffffff814541b9>] tty_write+0x159/0x2e0
       [<ffffffff814543f5>] redirected_tty_write+0xb5/0xc0
       [<ffffffff811ab9d5>] vfs_write+0xc5/0x1f0
       [<ffffffff811abec5>] SyS_write+0x55/0xa0
       [<ffffffff817677c2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

-> #0 (&tty->termios_rwsem){++++..}:
       [<ffffffff810b65c3>] __lock_acquire+0x1c43/0x1d30
       [<ffffffff810b6d62>] lock_acquire+0x92/0x1f0
       [<ffffffff8175b724>] down_write+0x44/0x70
       [<ffffffff81452656>] tty_do_resize+0x36/0xe0
       [<ffffffff8146c841>] vc_do_resize+0x3e1/0x4c0
       [<ffffffff8146c99f>] vc_resize+0x1f/0x30
       [<ffffffff813e4535>] fbcon_init+0x385/0x5a0
       [<ffffffff8146a4bc>] visual_init+0xbc/0x120
       [<ffffffff8146cd13>] do_bind_con_driver+0x163/0x320
       [<ffffffff8146cfa1>] do_take_over_console+0x61/0x70
       [<ffffffff813e2b93>] do_fbcon_takeover+0x63/0xc0
       [<ffffffff813e67a5>] fbcon_event_notify+0x715/0x820
       [<ffffffff81762f9d>] notifier_call_chain+0x5d/0x110
       [<ffffffff8107aadc>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x6c/0xc0
       [<ffffffff8107ab46>] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20
       [<ffffffff813d7c0b>] fb_notifier_call_chain+0x1b/0x20
       [<ffffffff813d95b2>] register_framebuffer+0x1e2/0x320
       [<ffffffffa01043e1>] drm_fb_helper_initial_config+0x371/0x540 [drm_kms_helper]
       [<ffffffffa01bcb05>] nouveau_fbcon_init+0x105/0x140 [nouveau]
       [<ffffffffa01ad0af>] nouveau_drm_load+0x43f/0x610 [nouveau]
       [<ffffffffa008a79e>] drm_get_pci_dev+0x17e/0x2a0 [drm]
       [<ffffffffa01ad4da>] nouveau_drm_probe+0x25a/0x2a0 [nouveau]
       [<ffffffff813b13db>] local_pci_probe+0x4b/0x80
       [<ffffffff813b1701>] pci_device_probe+0x111/0x120
       [<ffffffff814977eb>] driver_probe_device+0x8b/0x3a0
       [<ffffffff81497bab>] __driver_attach+0xab/0xb0
       [<ffffffff814956ad>] bus_for_each_dev+0x5d/0xa0
       [<ffffffff814971fe>] driver_attach+0x1e/0x20
       [<ffffffff81496cc1>] bus_add_driver+0x111/0x290
       [<ffffffff814982b7>] driver_register+0x77/0x170
       [<ffffffff813b0454>] __pci_register_driver+0x64/0x70
       [<ffffffffa008a9da>] drm_pci_init+0x11a/0x130 [drm]
       [<ffffffffa022a04d>] nouveau_drm_init+0x4d/0x1000 [nouveau]
       [<ffffffff810002ea>] do_one_initcall+0xea/0x1a0
       [<ffffffff810c54cb>] load_module+0x123b/0x1bf0
       [<ffffffff810c5f57>] SyS_init_module+0xd7/0x120
       [<ffffffff817677c2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

other info that might help us debug this:

Chain exists of:
  &tty->termios_rwsem --> console_lock --> (fb_notifier_list).rwsem

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock((fb_notifier_list).rwsem);
                               lock(console_lock);
                               lock((fb_notifier_list).rwsem);
  lock(&tty->termios_rwsem);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

7 locks held by modprobe/277:
 #0:  (&__lockdep_no_validate__){......}, at: [<ffffffff81497b5b>] __driver_attach+0x5b/0xb0
 #1:  (&__lockdep_no_validate__){......}, at: [<ffffffff81497b69>] __driver_attach+0x69/0xb0
 #2:  (drm_global_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa008a6dd>] drm_get_pci_dev+0xbd/0x2a0 [drm]
 #3:  (registration_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff813d93f5>] register_framebuffer+0x25/0x320
 #4:  (&fb_info->lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff813d8116>] lock_fb_info+0x26/0x60
 #5:  (console_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff813d95a4>] register_framebuffer+0x1d4/0x320
 #6:  ((fb_notifier_list).rwsem){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff8107aac6>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x56/0xc0

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 277 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 3.10.0-0+tip-xeon+lockdep #0+tip
Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision WorkStation T5400  /0RW203, BIOS A11 04/30/2012
 ffffffff8213e5e0 ffff8802aa2fb298 ffffffff81755f19 ffff8802aa2fb2e8
 ffffffff8174f506 ffff8802aa2fa000 ffff8802aa2fb378 ffff8802aa2ea8e8
 ffff8802aa2ea910 ffff8802aa2ea8e8 0000000000000006 0000000000000007
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff81755f19>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
 [<ffffffff8174f506>] print_circular_bug+0x1fb/0x20c
 [<ffffffff810b65c3>] __lock_acquire+0x1c43/0x1d30
 [<ffffffff810b775e>] ? mark_held_locks+0xae/0x120
 [<ffffffff810b78d5>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x105/0x1d0
 [<ffffffff810b6d62>] lock_acquire+0x92/0x1f0
 [<ffffffff81452656>] ? tty_do_resize+0x36/0xe0
 [<ffffffff8175b724>] down_write+0x44/0x70
 [<ffffffff81452656>] ? tty_do_resize+0x36/0xe0
 [<ffffffff81452656>] tty_do_resize+0x36/0xe0
 [<ffffffff8146c841>] vc_do_resize+0x3e1/0x4c0
 [<ffffffff8146c99f>] vc_resize+0x1f/0x30
 [<ffffffff813e4535>] fbcon_init+0x385/0x5a0
 [<ffffffff8146a4bc>] visual_init+0xbc/0x120
 [<ffffffff8146cd13>] do_bind_con_driver+0x163/0x320
 [<ffffffff8146cfa1>] do_take_over_console+0x61/0x70
 [<ffffffff813e2b93>] do_fbcon_takeover+0x63/0xc0
 [<ffffffff813e67a5>] fbcon_event_notify+0x715/0x820
 [<ffffffff81762f9d>] notifier_call_chain+0x5d/0x110
 [<ffffffff8107aadc>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x6c/0xc0
 [<ffffffff8107ab46>] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20
 [<ffffffff813d7c0b>] fb_notifier_call_chain+0x1b/0x20
 [<ffffffff813d95b2>] register_framebuffer+0x1e2/0x320
 [<ffffffffa01043e1>] drm_fb_helper_initial_config+0x371/0x540 [drm_kms_helper]
 [<ffffffff8173cbcb>] ? kmemleak_alloc+0x5b/0xc0
 [<ffffffff81198874>] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x104/0x290
 [<ffffffffa01035e1>] ? drm_fb_helper_single_add_all_connectors+0x81/0xf0 [drm_kms_helper]
 [<ffffffffa01bcb05>] nouveau_fbcon_init+0x105/0x140 [nouveau]
 [<ffffffffa01ad0af>] nouveau_drm_load+0x43f/0x610 [nouveau]
 [<ffffffffa008a79e>] drm_get_pci_dev+0x17e/0x2a0 [drm]
 [<ffffffffa01ad4da>] nouveau_drm_probe+0x25a/0x2a0 [nouveau]
 [<ffffffff8175f162>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x42/0x80
 [<ffffffff813b13db>] local_pci_probe+0x4b/0x80
 [<ffffffff813b1701>] pci_device_probe+0x111/0x120
 [<ffffffff814977eb>] driver_probe_device+0x8b/0x3a0
 [<ffffffff81497bab>] __driver_attach+0xab/0xb0
 [<ffffffff81497b00>] ? driver_probe_device+0x3a0/0x3a0
 [<ffffffff814956ad>] bus_for_each_dev+0x5d/0xa0
 [<ffffffff814971fe>] driver_attach+0x1e/0x20
 [<ffffffff81496cc1>] bus_add_driver+0x111/0x290
 [<ffffffffa022a000>] ? 0xffffffffa0229fff
 [<ffffffff814982b7>] driver_register+0x77/0x170
 [<ffffffffa022a000>] ? 0xffffffffa0229fff
 [<ffffffff813b0454>] __pci_register_driver+0x64/0x70
 [<ffffffffa008a9da>] drm_pci_init+0x11a/0x130 [drm]
 [<ffffffffa022a000>] ? 0xffffffffa0229fff
 [<ffffffffa022a000>] ? 0xffffffffa0229fff
 [<ffffffffa022a04d>] nouveau_drm_init+0x4d/0x1000 [nouveau]
 [<ffffffff810002ea>] do_one_initcall+0xea/0x1a0
 [<ffffffff810c54cb>] load_module+0x123b/0x1bf0
 [<ffffffff81399a50>] ? ddebug_proc_open+0xb0/0xb0
 [<ffffffff813855ae>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f
 [<ffffffff810c5f57>] SyS_init_module+0xd7/0x120
 [<ffffffff817677c2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
noglitch pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 13, 2014
We used to keep the port's char device structs and the /sys entries
around till the last reference to the port was dropped.  This is
actually unnecessary, and resulted in buggy behaviour:

1. Open port in guest
2. Hot-unplug port
3. Hot-plug a port with the same 'name' property as the unplugged one

This resulted in hot-plug being unsuccessful, as a port with the same
name already exists (even though it was unplugged).

This behaviour resulted in a warning message like this one:

-------------------8<---------------------------------------
WARNING: at fs/sysfs/dir.c:512 sysfs_add_one+0xc9/0x130() (Not tainted)
Hardware name: KVM
sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename
'/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:04.0/virtio0/virtio-ports/vport0p1'

Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff8106b607>] ? warn_slowpath_common+0x87/0xc0
 [<ffffffff8106b6f6>] ? warn_slowpath_fmt+0x46/0x50
 [<ffffffff811f2319>] ? sysfs_add_one+0xc9/0x130
 [<ffffffff811f23e8>] ? create_dir+0x68/0xb0
 [<ffffffff811f2469>] ? sysfs_create_dir+0x39/0x50
 [<ffffffff81273129>] ? kobject_add_internal+0xb9/0x260
 [<ffffffff812733d8>] ? kobject_add_varg+0x38/0x60
 [<ffffffff812734b4>] ? kobject_add+0x44/0x70
 [<ffffffff81349de4>] ? get_device_parent+0xf4/0x1d0
 [<ffffffff8134b389>] ? device_add+0xc9/0x650

-------------------8<---------------------------------------

Instead of relying on guest applications to release all references to
the ports, we should go ahead and unregister the port from all the core
layers.  Any open/read calls on the port will then just return errors,
and an unplug/plug operation on the host will succeed as expected.

This also caused buggy behaviour in case of the device removal (not just
a port): when the device was removed (which means all ports on that
device are removed automatically as well), the ports with active
users would clean up only when the last references were dropped -- and
it would be too late then to be referencing char device pointers,
resulting in oopses:

-------------------8<---------------------------------------
PID: 6162   TASK: ffff8801147ad500  CPU: 0   COMMAND: "cat"
 #0 [ffff88011b9d5a90] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103232b
 #1 [ffff88011b9d5af0] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b9322
 #2 [ffff88011b9d5bc0] oops_end at ffffffff814f4a50
 #3 [ffff88011b9d5bf0] die at ffffffff8100f26b
 #4 [ffff88011b9d5c20] do_general_protection at ffffffff814f45e2
 #5 [ffff88011b9d5c50] general_protection at ffffffff814f3db5
    [exception RIP: strlen+2]
    RIP: ffffffff81272ae2  RSP: ffff88011b9d5d00  RFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff880118901c18  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: ffff88011799982c  RSI: 00000000000000d0  RDI: 3a303030302f3030
    RBP: ffff88011b9d5d38   R8: 0000000000000006   R9: ffffffffa0134500
    R10: 0000000000001000  R11: 0000000000001000  R12: ffff880117a1cc10
    R13: 00000000000000d0  R14: 0000000000000017  R15: ffffffff81aff700
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #6 [ffff88011b9d5d00] kobject_get_path at ffffffff8126dc5d
 #7 [ffff88011b9d5d40] kobject_uevent_env at ffffffff8126e551
 #8 [ffff88011b9d5dd0] kobject_uevent at ffffffff8126e9eb
 #9 [ffff88011b9d5de0] device_del at ffffffff813440c7

-------------------8<---------------------------------------

So clean up when we have all the context, and all that's left to do when
the references to the port have dropped is to free up the port struct
itself.

CC: <[email protected]>
Reported-by: chayang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: YOGANANTH SUBRAMANIAN <[email protected]>
Reported-by: FuXiangChun <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Qunfang Zhang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sibiao Luo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Amit Shah <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
noglitch pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 13, 2014
In several places, this snippet is used when removing neigh entries:

	list_del(&neigh->list);
	ipoib_neigh_free(neigh);

The list_del() removes neigh from the associated struct ipoib_path, while
ipoib_neigh_free() removes neigh from the device's neigh entry lookup
table.  Both of these operations are protected by the priv->lock
spinlock.  The table however is also protected via RCU, and so naturally
the lock is not held when doing reads.

This leads to a race condition, in which a thread may successfully look
up a neigh entry that has already been deleted from neigh->list.  Since
the previous deletion will have marked the entry with poison, a second
list_del() on the object will cause a panic:

  #5 [ffff8802338c3c70] general_protection at ffffffff815108c5
     [exception RIP: list_del+16]
     RIP: ffffffff81289020  RSP: ffff8802338c3d20  RFLAGS: 00010082
     RAX: dead000000200200  RBX: ffff880433e60c88  RCX: 0000000000009e6c
     RDX: 0000000000000246  RSI: ffff8806012ca298  RDI: ffff880433e60c88
     RBP: ffff8802338c3d30   R8: ffff8806012ca2e8   R9: 00000000ffffffff
     R10: 0000000000000001  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ffff8804346b2020
     R13: ffff88032a3e7540  R14: ffff8804346b26e0  R15: 0000000000000246
     ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0000
  #6 [ffff8802338c3d38] ipoib_cm_tx_handler at ffffffffa066fe0a [ib_ipoib]
  #7 [ffff8802338c3d98] cm_process_work at ffffffffa05149a7 [ib_cm]
  #8 [ffff8802338c3de8] cm_work_handler at ffffffffa05161aa [ib_cm]
  #9 [ffff8802338c3e38] worker_thread at ffffffff81090e10
 #10 [ffff8802338c3ee8] kthread at ffffffff81096c66
 #11 [ffff8802338c3f48] kernel_thread at ffffffff8100c0ca

We move the list_del() into ipoib_neigh_free(), so that deletion happens
only once, after the entry has been successfully removed from the lookup
table.  This same behavior is already used in ipoib_del_neighs_by_gid()
and __ipoib_reap_neigh().

Signed-off-by: Jim Foraker <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Or Gerlitz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jack Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Shlomo Pongratz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <[email protected]>
noglitch pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 13, 2014
…ent()

Vince Weaver reports an oops in the ARM perf event code while
running his perf_fuzzer tool on a pandaboard running v3.11-rc4.

Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 73fd14cc
pgd = eca6c000
[73fd14cc] *pgd=00000000
Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] SMP ARM
Modules linked in: snd_soc_omap_hdmi omapdss snd_soc_omap_abe_twl6040 snd_soc_twl6040 snd_soc_omap snd_soc_omap_hdmi_card snd_soc_omap_mcpdm snd_soc_omap_mcbsp snd_soc_core snd_compress regmap_spi snd_pcm snd_page_alloc snd_timer snd soundcore
CPU: 1 PID: 2790 Comm: perf_fuzzer Not tainted 3.11.0-rc4 #6
task: eddcab80 ti: ed892000 task.ti: ed892000
PC is at armpmu_map_event+0x20/0x88
LR is at armpmu_event_init+0x38/0x280
pc : [<c001c3e4>]    lr : [<c001c17c>]    psr: 60000013
sp : ed893e40  ip : ecececec  fp : edfaec00
r10: 00000000  r9 : 00000000  r8 : ed8c3ac0
r7 : ed8c3b5c  r6 : edfaec00  r5 : 00000000  r4 : 00000000
r3 : 000000ff  r2 : c0496144  r1 : c049611c  r0 : edfaec00
Flags: nZCv  IRQs on  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment user
Control: 10c5387d  Table: aca6c04a  DAC: 00000015
Process perf_fuzzer (pid: 2790, stack limit = 0xed892240)
Stack: (0xed893e40 to 0xed894000)
3e40: 00000800 c001c17c 00000002 c008a748 00000001 00000000 00000000 c00bf078
3e60: 00000000 edfaee50 00000000 00000000 00000000 edfaec00 ed8c3ac0 edfaec00
3e80: 00000000 c073ffac ed893f20 c00bf180 00000001 00000000 c00bf078 ed893f20
3ea0: 00000000 ed8c3ac0 00000000 00000000 00000000 c0cb0818 eddcab80 c00bf440
3ec0: ed893f20 00000000 eddcab80 eca76800 00000000 eca76800 00000000 00000000
3ee0: 00000000 ec984c80 eddcab80 c00bfe68 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000080
3f00: 00000000 ed892000 00000000 ed892030 00000004 ecc7e3c8 ecc7e3c8 00000000
3f20: 00000000 00000048 ecececec 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
3f40: 00000000 00000000 00297810 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
3f60: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
3f80: 00000002 00000002 000103a4 00000002 0000016c c00128e8 ed892000 00000000
3fa0: 00090998 c0012700 00000002 000103a4 00090ab8 00000000 00000000 0000000f
3fc0: 00000002 000103a4 00000002 0000016c 00090ab0 00090ab8 000107a0 00090998
3fe0: bed92be0 bed92bd0 0000b785 b6e8f6d0 40000010 00090ab8 00000000 00000000
[<c001c3e4>] (armpmu_map_event+0x20/0x88) from [<c001c17c>] (armpmu_event_init+0x38/0x280)
[<c001c17c>] (armpmu_event_init+0x38/0x280) from [<c00bf180>] (perf_init_event+0x108/0x180)
[<c00bf180>] (perf_init_event+0x108/0x180) from [<c00bf440>] (perf_event_alloc+0x248/0x40c)
[<c00bf440>] (perf_event_alloc+0x248/0x40c) from [<c00bfe68>] (SyS_perf_event_open+0x4f4/0x8fc)
[<c00bfe68>] (SyS_perf_event_open+0x4f4/0x8fc) from [<c0012700>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48)
Code: 0a000005 e3540004 0a000016 e3540000 (0791010c)

This is because event->attr.config in armpmu_event_init()
contains a very large number copied directly from userspace and
is never checked against the size of the array indexed in
armpmu_map_hw_event(). Fix the problem by checking the value of
config before indexing the array and rejecting invalid config
values.

Reported-by: Vince Weaver <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Vince Weaver <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]>
noglitch pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 13, 2014
When booting secondary CPUs, announce_cpu() is called to show which cpu has
been brought up. For example:

[    0.402751] smpboot: Booting Node   0, Processors  #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 OK
[    0.525667] smpboot: Booting Node   1, Processors  #6 #7 #8 #9 #10 #11 OK
[    0.755592] smpboot: Booting Node   0, Processors  #12 #13 #14 #15 #16 #17 OK
[    0.890495] smpboot: Booting Node   1, Processors  #18 #19 #20 #21 #22 #23

But the last "OK" is lost, because 'nr_cpu_ids-1' represents the maximum
possible cpu id. It should use the maximum present cpu id in case not all
CPUs booted up.

Signed-off-by: Libin <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
[ tweaked the changelog, removed unnecessary line break, tweaked the format to align the fields vertically. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
noglitch pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 13, 2014
When parsing lines from objdump a line containing source code starting
with a numeric label is mistaken for a line of disassembly starting with
a memory address.

Current validation fails to recognise that the "memory address" is out
of range and calculates an invalid offset which later causes this
segfault:

Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x0000000000457315 in disasm__calc_percent (notes=0xc98970, evidx=0, offset=143705, end=2127526177, path=0x7fffffffbf50)
    at util/annotate.c:631
631				hits += h->addr[offset++];
(gdb) bt
 #0  0x0000000000457315 in disasm__calc_percent (notes=0xc98970, evidx=0, offset=143705, end=2127526177, path=0x7fffffffbf50)
    at util/annotate.c:631
 #1  0x00000000004d65e3 in annotate_browser__calc_percent (browser=0x7fffffffd130, evsel=0xa01da0) at ui/browsers/annotate.c:364
 #2  0x00000000004d7433 in annotate_browser__run (browser=0x7fffffffd130, evsel=0xa01da0, hbt=0x0) at ui/browsers/annotate.c:672
 #3  0x00000000004d80c9 in symbol__tui_annotate (sym=0xc989a0, map=0xa02660, evsel=0xa01da0, hbt=0x0) at ui/browsers/annotate.c:962
 #4  0x00000000004d7aa0 in hist_entry__tui_annotate (he=0xdf73f0, evsel=0xa01da0, hbt=0x0) at ui/browsers/annotate.c:823
 #5  0x00000000004dd648 in perf_evsel__hists_browse (evsel=0xa01da0, nr_events=1, helpline=
    0x58b768 "For a higher level overview, try: perf report --sort comm,dso", ev_name=0xa02cd0 "cycles", left_exits=false, hbt=
    0x0, min_pcnt=0, env=0xa011e0) at ui/browsers/hists.c:1659
 #6  0x00000000004de372 in perf_evlist__tui_browse_hists (evlist=0xa01520, help=
    0x58b768 "For a higher level overview, try: perf report --sort comm,dso", hbt=0x0, min_pcnt=0, env=0xa011e0)
    at ui/browsers/hists.c:1950
 #7  0x000000000042cf6b in __cmd_report (rep=0x7fffffffd6c0) at builtin-report.c:581
 #8  0x000000000042e25d in cmd_report (argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffe4b0, prefix=0x0) at builtin-report.c:965
 #9  0x000000000041a0e1 in run_builtin (p=0x801548, argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe4b0) at perf.c:319
 #10 0x000000000041a319 in handle_internal_command (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe4b0) at perf.c:376
 #11 0x000000000041a465 in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffe38c, argv=0x7fffffffe380) at perf.c:420
 #12 0x000000000041a707 in main (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe4b0) at perf.c:521

After the fix is applied the symbol can be annotated showing the
problematic line "1:      rep"

copy_user_generic_string  /usr/lib/debug/lib/modules/3.9.10-100.fc17.x86_64/vmlinux
             */
            ENTRY(copy_user_generic_string)
                    CFI_STARTPROC
                    ASM_STAC
                    andl %edx,%edx
              and    %edx,%edx
                    jz 4f
              je     37
                    cmpl $8,%edx
              cmp    $0x8,%edx
                    jb 2f           /* less than 8 bytes, go to byte copy loop */
              jb     33
                    ALIGN_DESTINATION
              mov    %edi,%ecx
              and    $0x7,%ecx
              je     28
              sub    $0x8,%ecx
              neg    %ecx
              sub    %ecx,%edx
        1a:   mov    (%rsi),%al
              mov    %al,(%rdi)
              inc    %rsi
              inc    %rdi
              dec    %ecx
              jne    1a
                    movl %edx,%ecx
        28:   mov    %edx,%ecx
                    shrl $3,%ecx
              shr    $0x3,%ecx
                    andl $7,%edx
              and    $0x7,%edx
            1:      rep
100.00        rep    movsq %ds:(%rsi),%es:(%rdi)
                    movsq
            2:      movl %edx,%ecx
        33:   mov    %edx,%ecx
            3:      rep
              rep    movsb %ds:(%rsi),%es:(%rdi)
                    movsb
            4:      xorl %eax,%eax
        37:   xor    %eax,%eax
              data32 xchg %ax,%ax
                    ASM_CLAC
                    ret
              retq

Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc: David Ahern <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
noglitch pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 13, 2014
Bug 60815 - Interface hangs in mwifiex_usb
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60815

[ 2.883807] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference
            at 0000000000000048
[ 2.883813] IP: [<ffffffff815a65e0>] pfifo_fast_enqueue+0x90/0x90

[ 2.883834] CPU: 1 PID: 3220 Comm: kworker/u8:90 Not tainted
            3.11.1-monotone-l0 #6
[ 2.883834] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Surface with
            Windows 8 Pro/Surface with Windows 8 Pro,
            BIOS 1.03.0450 03/29/2013

On Surface Pro, suspend to ram gives a NULL pointer dereference in
pfifo_fast_enqueue(). The stack trace reveals that the offending
call is clearing carrier in mwifiex_usb suspend handler.

Since commit 1499d9f "mwifiex: don't drop carrier flag over suspend"
has removed the carrier flag handling over suspend/resume in SDIO
and PCIe drivers, I'm removing it in USB driver too. This also fixes
the bug for Surface Pro.

Cc: <[email protected]> # 3.5+
Tested-by: Dmitry Khromov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bing Zhao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]>
noglitch pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 13, 2014
commit d16933b "i2c: s3c2410: Move
location of clk_prepare_enable() call in probe function" refactored
clk_enable and clk_disable calls yet neglected to remove the
clk_disable_unprepare call in the module's remove().

It helps remove warnings on an arndale during unbind:

echo 12c90000.i2c > /sys/bus/platform/devices/12c90000.i2c/driver/unbind

------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2548 at drivers/clk/clk.c:842 clk_disable+0x18/0x24()
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 2548 Comm: bash Not tainted 3.11.0-next-20130916-00003-gf4bddbc #6
[<c0014d48>] (unwind_backtrace+0x0/0xf8) from [<c00117d0>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c00117d0>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) from [<c0361be8>] (dump_stack+0x6c/0xac)
[<c0361be8>] (dump_stack+0x6c/0xac) from [<c001d864>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x64/0x88)
[<c001d864>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x64/0x88) from [<c001d8a4>] (warn_slowpath_null+0x1c/0x24)
[<c001d8a4>] (warn_slowpath_null+0x1c/0x24) from [<c02c4a64>] (clk_disable+0x18/0x24)
[<c02c4a64>] (clk_disable+0x18/0x24) from [<c028d0b0>] (s3c24xx_i2c_remove+0x28/0x70)
[<c028d0b0>] (s3c24xx_i2c_remove+0x28/0x70) from [<c0217a10>] (platform_drv_remove+0x18/0x1c)
[<c0217a10>] (platform_drv_remove+0x18/0x1c) from [<c0216358>] (__device_release_driver+0x58/0xb4)
[<c0216358>] (__device_release_driver+0x58/0xb4) from [<c02163d0>] (device_release_driver+0x1c/0x28)
[<c02163d0>] (device_release_driver+0x1c/0x28) from [<c02153c0>] (unbind_store+0x58/0x90)
[<c02153c0>] (unbind_store+0x58/0x90) from [<c0214c90>] (drv_attr_store+0x20/0x2c)
[<c0214c90>] (drv_attr_store+0x20/0x2c) from [<c01032c0>] (sysfs_write_file+0x168/0x198)
[<c01032c0>] (sysfs_write_file+0x168/0x198) from [<c00ae1c0>] (vfs_write+0xb0/0x194)
[<c00ae1c0>] (vfs_write+0xb0/0x194) from [<c00ae594>] (SyS_write+0x3c/0x70)
[<c00ae594>] (SyS_write+0x3c/0x70) from [<c000e3e0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x30)
---[ end trace 4c9f9403066f57a6 ]---
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2548 at drivers/clk/clk.c:751 clk_unprepare+0x14/0x1c()
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 2548 Comm: bash Tainted: G        W    3.11.0-next-20130916-00003-gf4bddbc #6
[<c0014d48>] (unwind_backtrace+0x0/0xf8) from [<c00117d0>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c00117d0>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) from [<c0361be8>] (dump_stack+0x6c/0xac)
[<c0361be8>] (dump_stack+0x6c/0xac) from [<c001d864>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x64/0x88)
[<c001d864>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x64/0x88) from [<c001d8a4>] (warn_slowpath_null+0x1c/0x24)
[<c001d8a4>] (warn_slowpath_null+0x1c/0x24) from [<c02c5834>] (clk_unprepare+0x14/0x1c)
[<c02c5834>] (clk_unprepare+0x14/0x1c) from [<c028d0b8>] (s3c24xx_i2c_remove+0x30/0x70)
[<c028d0b8>] (s3c24xx_i2c_remove+0x30/0x70) from [<c0217a10>] (platform_drv_remove+0x18/0x1c)
[<c0217a10>] (platform_drv_remove+0x18/0x1c) from [<c0216358>] (__device_release_driver+0x58/0xb4)
[<c0216358>] (__device_release_driver+0x58/0xb4) from [<c02163d0>] (device_release_driver+0x1c/0x28)
[<c02163d0>] (device_release_driver+0x1c/0x28) from [<c02153c0>] (unbind_store+0x58/0x90)
[<c02153c0>] (unbind_store+0x58/0x90) from [<c0214c90>] (drv_attr_store+0x20/0x2c)
[<c0214c90>] (drv_attr_store+0x20/0x2c) from [<c01032c0>] (sysfs_write_file+0x168/0x198)
[<c01032c0>] (sysfs_write_file+0x168/0x198) from [<c00ae1c0>] (vfs_write+0xb0/0x194)
[<c00ae1c0>] (vfs_write+0xb0/0x194) from [<c00ae594>] (SyS_write+0x3c/0x70)
[<c00ae594>] (SyS_write+0x3c/0x70) from [<c000e3e0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x30)
---[ end trace 4c9f9403066f57a7 ]---

Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <[email protected]>
noglitch pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 13, 2014
As the new x86 CPU bootup printout format code maintainer, I am
taking immediate action to improve and clean (and thus indulge
my OCD) the reporting of the cores when coming up online.

Fix padding to a right-hand alignment, cleanup code and bind
reporting width to the max number of supported CPUs on the
system, like this:

 [    0.074509] smpboot: Booting Node   0, Processors:      #1  #2  #3  #4  #5  #6  #7 OK
 [    0.644008] smpboot: Booting Node   1, Processors:  #8  #9 #10 #11 #12 #13 #14 #15 OK
 [    1.245006] smpboot: Booting Node   2, Processors: #16 #17 #18 #19 #20 #21 #22 #23 OK
 [    1.864005] smpboot: Booting Node   3, Processors: #24 #25 #26 #27 #28 #29 #30 #31 OK
 [    2.489005] smpboot: Booting Node   4, Processors: #32 #33 #34 #35 #36 #37 #38 #39 OK
 [    3.093005] smpboot: Booting Node   5, Processors: #40 #41 #42 #43 #44 #45 #46 #47 OK
 [    3.698005] smpboot: Booting Node   6, Processors: #48 #49 #50 #51 #52 #53 #54 #55 OK
 [    4.304005] smpboot: Booting Node   7, Processors: #56 #57 #58 #59 #60 #61 #62 #63 OK
 [    4.961413] Brought up 64 CPUs

and this:

 [    0.072367] smpboot: Booting Node   0, Processors:    #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 OK
 [    0.686329] Brought up 8 CPUs

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Libin <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
noglitch pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 13, 2014
Michael Semon reported that xfs/299 generated this lockdep warning:

=============================================
[ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ]
3.12.0-rc2+ #2 Not tainted
---------------------------------------------
touch/21072 is trying to acquire lock:
 (&xfs_dquot_other_class){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64

but task is already holding lock:
 (&xfs_dquot_other_class){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&xfs_dquot_other_class);
  lock(&xfs_dquot_other_class);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 May be due to missing lock nesting notation

7 locks held by touch/21072:
 #0:  (sb_writers#10){++++.+}, at: [<c11185b6>] mnt_want_write+0x1e/0x3e
 #1:  (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#4){+.+.+.}, at: [<c11078ee>] do_last+0x245/0xe40
 #2:  (sb_internal#2){++++.+}, at: [<c122c9e0>] xfs_trans_alloc+0x1f/0x35
 #3:  (&(&ip->i_lock)->mr_lock/1){+.+...}, at: [<c126cd1b>] xfs_ilock+0x100/0x1f1
 #4:  (&(&ip->i_lock)->mr_lock){++++-.}, at: [<c126cf52>] xfs_ilock_nowait+0x105/0x22f
 #5:  (&dqp->q_qlock){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64
 #6:  (&xfs_dquot_other_class){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64

The lockdep annotation for dquot lock nesting only understands
locking for user and "other" dquots, not user, group and quota
dquots. Fix the annotations to match the locking heirarchy we now
have.

Reported-by: Michael L. Semon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <[email protected]>
noglitch pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 13, 2014
Turn it into (for example):

[    0.073380] x86: Booting SMP configuration:
[    0.074005] .... node   #0, CPUs:          #1   #2   #3   #4   #5   #6   #7
[    0.603005] .... node   #1, CPUs:     #8   #9  #10  #11  #12  #13  #14  #15
[    1.200005] .... node   #2, CPUs:    #16  #17  #18  #19  #20  #21  #22  #23
[    1.796005] .... node   #3, CPUs:    #24  #25  #26  #27  #28  #29  #30  #31
[    2.393005] .... node   #4, CPUs:    #32  #33  #34  #35  #36  #37  #38  #39
[    2.996005] .... node   #5, CPUs:    #40  #41  #42  #43  #44  #45  #46  #47
[    3.600005] .... node   #6, CPUs:    #48  #49  #50  #51  #52  #53  #54  #55
[    4.202005] .... node   #7, CPUs:    #56  #57  #58  #59  #60  #61  #62  #63
[    4.811005] .... node   #8, CPUs:    #64  #65  #66  #67  #68  #69  #70  #71
[    5.421006] .... node   #9, CPUs:    #72  #73  #74  #75  #76  #77  #78  #79
[    6.032005] .... node  #10, CPUs:    #80  #81  #82  #83  #84  #85  #86  #87
[    6.648006] .... node  #11, CPUs:    #88  #89  #90  #91  #92  #93  #94  #95
[    7.262005] .... node  #12, CPUs:    #96  #97  #98  #99 #100 #101 #102 #103
[    7.865005] .... node  #13, CPUs:   #104 #105 #106 #107 #108 #109 #110 #111
[    8.466005] .... node  #14, CPUs:   #112 #113 #114 #115 #116 #117 #118 #119
[    9.073006] .... node  #15, CPUs:   #120 #121 #122 #123 #124 #125 #126 #127
[    9.679901] x86: Booted up 16 nodes, 128 CPUs

and drop useless elements.

Change num_digits() to hpa's division-avoiding, cell-phone-typed
version which he went at great lengths and pains to submit on a
Saturday evening.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
noglitch pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 13, 2014
Michael Semon reported that xfs/299 generated this lockdep warning:

=============================================
[ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ]
3.12.0-rc2+ #2 Not tainted
---------------------------------------------
touch/21072 is trying to acquire lock:
 (&xfs_dquot_other_class){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64

but task is already holding lock:
 (&xfs_dquot_other_class){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&xfs_dquot_other_class);
  lock(&xfs_dquot_other_class);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 May be due to missing lock nesting notation

7 locks held by touch/21072:
 #0:  (sb_writers#10){++++.+}, at: [<c11185b6>] mnt_want_write+0x1e/0x3e
 #1:  (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#4){+.+.+.}, at: [<c11078ee>] do_last+0x245/0xe40
 #2:  (sb_internal#2){++++.+}, at: [<c122c9e0>] xfs_trans_alloc+0x1f/0x35
 #3:  (&(&ip->i_lock)->mr_lock/1){+.+...}, at: [<c126cd1b>] xfs_ilock+0x100/0x1f1
 #4:  (&(&ip->i_lock)->mr_lock){++++-.}, at: [<c126cf52>] xfs_ilock_nowait+0x105/0x22f
 #5:  (&dqp->q_qlock){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64
 #6:  (&xfs_dquot_other_class){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64

The lockdep annotation for dquot lock nesting only understands
locking for user and "other" dquots, not user, group and quota
dquots. Fix the annotations to match the locking heirarchy we now
have.

Reported-by: Michael L. Semon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <[email protected]>

(cherry picked from commit f112a04)
noglitch pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 13, 2014
Andrey reported the following report:

ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address ffff8800359c99f3
ffff8800359c99f3 is located 0 bytes to the right of 243-byte region [ffff8800359c9900, ffff8800359c99f3)
Accessed by thread T13003:
  #0 ffffffff810dd2da (asan_report_error+0x32a/0x440)
  #1 ffffffff810dc6b0 (asan_check_region+0x30/0x40)
  #2 ffffffff810dd4d3 (__tsan_write1+0x13/0x20)
  #3 ffffffff811cd19e (ftrace_regex_release+0x1be/0x260)
  #4 ffffffff812a1065 (__fput+0x155/0x360)
  #5 ffffffff812a12de (____fput+0x1e/0x30)
  #6 ffffffff8111708d (task_work_run+0x10d/0x140)
  #7 ffffffff810ea043 (do_exit+0x433/0x11f0)
  #8 ffffffff810eaee4 (do_group_exit+0x84/0x130)
  #9 ffffffff810eafb1 (SyS_exit_group+0x21/0x30)
  #10 ffffffff81928782 (system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b)

Allocated by thread T5167:
  #0 ffffffff810dc778 (asan_slab_alloc+0x48/0xc0)
  #1 ffffffff8128337c (__kmalloc+0xbc/0x500)
  #2 ffffffff811d9d54 (trace_parser_get_init+0x34/0x90)
  #3 ffffffff811cd7b3 (ftrace_regex_open+0x83/0x2e0)
  #4 ffffffff811cda7d (ftrace_filter_open+0x2d/0x40)
  #5 ffffffff8129b4ff (do_dentry_open+0x32f/0x430)
  #6 ffffffff8129b668 (finish_open+0x68/0xa0)
  #7 ffffffff812b66ac (do_last+0xb8c/0x1710)
  #8 ffffffff812b7350 (path_openat+0x120/0xb50)
  #9 ffffffff812b8884 (do_filp_open+0x54/0xb0)
  #10 ffffffff8129d36c (do_sys_open+0x1ac/0x2c0)
  #11 ffffffff8129d4b7 (SyS_open+0x37/0x50)
  #12 ffffffff81928782 (system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b)

Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
  ffff8800359c9700: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd
  ffff8800359c9780: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  ffff8800359c9800: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  ffff8800359c9880: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  ffff8800359c9900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
=>ffff8800359c9980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[03]fb
  ffff8800359c9a00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  ffff8800359c9a80: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  ffff8800359c9b00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff8800359c9b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff8800359c9c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
  Addressable:           00
  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
  Heap redzone:          fa
  Heap kmalloc redzone:  fb
  Freed heap region:     fd
  Shadow gap:            fe

The out-of-bounds access happens on 'parser->buffer[parser->idx] = 0;'

Although the crash happened in ftrace_regex_open() the real bug
occurred in trace_get_user() where there's an incrementation to
parser->idx without a check against the size. The way it is triggered
is if userspace sends in 128 characters (EVENT_BUF_SIZE + 1), the loop
that reads the last character stores it and then breaks out because
there is no more characters. Then the last character is read to determine
what to do next, and the index is incremented without checking size.

Then the caller of trace_get_user() usually nulls out the last character
with a zero, but since the index is equal to the size, it writes a nul
character after the allocated space, which can corrupt memory.

Luckily, only root user has write access to this file.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
noglitch pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 13, 2014
This work contains a lightweight BPF-based traffic classifier that can
serve as a flexible alternative to ematch-based tree classification, i.e.
now that BPF filter engine can also be JITed in the kernel. Naturally, tc
actions and policies are supported as well with cls_bpf. Multiple BPF
programs/filter can be attached for a class, or they can just as well be
written within a single BPF program, that's really up to the user how he
wishes to run/optimize the code, e.g. also for inversion of verdicts etc.
The notion of a BPF program's return/exit codes is being kept as follows:

     0: No match
    -1: Select classid given in "tc filter ..." command
  else: flowid, overwrite the default one

As a minimal usage example with iproute2, we use a 3 band prio root qdisc
on a router with sfq each as leave, and assign ssh and icmp bpf-based
filters to band 1, http traffic to band 2 and the rest to band 3. For the
first two bands we load the bytecode from a file, in the 2nd we load it
inline as an example:

echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_enable

tc qdisc del dev em1 root
tc qdisc add dev em1 root handle 1: prio bands 3 priomap 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

tc qdisc add dev em1 parent 1:1 sfq perturb 16
tc qdisc add dev em1 parent 1:2 sfq perturb 16
tc qdisc add dev em1 parent 1:3 sfq perturb 16

tc filter add dev em1 parent 1: bpf run bytecode-file /etc/tc/ssh.bpf flowid 1:1
tc filter add dev em1 parent 1: bpf run bytecode-file /etc/tc/icmp.bpf flowid 1:1
tc filter add dev em1 parent 1: bpf run bytecode-file /etc/tc/http.bpf flowid 1:2
tc filter add dev em1 parent 1: bpf run bytecode "`bpfc -f tc -i misc.ops`" flowid 1:3

BPF programs can be easily created and passed to tc, either as inline
'bytecode' or 'bytecode-file'. There are a couple of front-ends that can
compile opcodes, for example:

1) People familiar with tcpdump-like filters:

   tcpdump -iem1 -ddd port 22 | tr '\n' ',' > /etc/tc/ssh.bpf

2) People that want to low-level program their filters or use BPF
   extensions that lack support by libpcap's compiler:

   bpfc -f tc -i ssh.ops > /etc/tc/ssh.bpf

   ssh.ops example code:
   ldh [12]
   jne #0x800, drop
   ldb [23]
   jneq #6, drop
   ldh [20]
   jset #0x1fff, drop
   ldxb 4 * ([14] & 0xf)
   ldh [%x + 14]
   jeq #0x16, pass
   ldh [%x + 16]
   jne #0x16, drop
   pass: ret #-1
   drop: ret #0

It was chosen to load bytecode into tc, since the reverse operation,
tc filter list dev em1, is then able to show the exact commands again.
Possible follow-up work could also include a small expression compiler
for iproute2. Tested with the help of bmon. This idea came up during
the Netfilter Workshop 2013 in Copenhagen. Also thanks to feedback from
Eric Dumazet!

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Graf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
noglitch pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 13, 2014
…ux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 boot changes from Ingo Molnar:
 "Two changes that prettify and compactify the SMP bootup output from:

     smpboot: Booting Node   0, Processors  #1 #2 #3 OK
     smpboot: Booting Node   1, Processors  #4 #5 #6 #7 OK
     smpboot: Booting Node   2, Processors  #8 #9 #10 #11 OK
     smpboot: Booting Node   3, Processors  #12 #13 #14 #15 OK
     Brought up 16 CPUs

  to something like:

     x86: Booting SMP configuration:
     .... node  #0, CPUs:        #1  #2  #3
     .... node  #1, CPUs:    #4  #5  #6  #7
     .... node  #2, CPUs:    #8  #9 #10 #11
     .... node  #3, CPUs:   #12 #13 #14 #15
     x86: Booted up 4 nodes, 16 CPUs"

* 'x86-boot-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/boot: Further compress CPUs bootup message
  x86: Improve the printout of the SMP bootup CPU table
noglitch pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 13, 2014
…culation

Currently mx53 (CortexA8) running at 1GHz reports:
Calibrating delay loop... 663.55 BogoMIPS (lpj=3317760)

Tom Evans verified that alignments of 0x0 and 0x8 run the two instructions of __loop_delay in one clock cycle (1 clock/loop), while alignments of 0x4 and 0xc take 3 clocks to run the loop twice. (1.5 clock/loop)

The original object code looks like this:

00000010 <__loop_const_udelay>:
  10:	e3e01000 	mvn	r1, #0
  14:	e51f201c 	ldr	r2, [pc, #-28]	; 0 <__loop_udelay-0x8>
  18:	e5922000 	ldr	r2, [r2]
  1c:	e0800921 	add	r0, r0, r1, lsr #18
  20:	e1a00720 	lsr	r0, r0, #14
  24:	e0822b21 	add	r2, r2, r1, lsr #22
  28:	e1a02522 	lsr	r2, r2, #10
  2c:	e0000092 	mul	r0, r2, r0
  30:	e0800d21 	add	r0, r0, r1, lsr #26
  34:	e1b00320 	lsrs	r0, r0, #6
  38:	01a0f00e 	moveq	pc, lr

0000003c <__loop_delay>:
  3c:	e2500001 	subs	r0, r0, #1
  40:	8afffffe 	bhi	3c <__loop_delay>
  44:	e1a0f00e 	mov	pc, lr

After adding the 'align 3' directive to __loop_delay (align to 8 bytes):

00000010 <__loop_const_udelay>:
  10:	e3e01000 	mvn	r1, #0
  14:	e51f201c 	ldr	r2, [pc, #-28]	; 0 <__loop_udelay-0x8>
  18:	e5922000 	ldr	r2, [r2]
  1c:	e0800921 	add	r0, r0, r1, lsr #18
  20:	e1a00720 	lsr	r0, r0, #14
  24:	e0822b21 	add	r2, r2, r1, lsr #22
  28:	e1a02522 	lsr	r2, r2, #10
  2c:	e0000092 	mul	r0, r2, r0
  30:	e0800d21 	add	r0, r0, r1, lsr #26
  34:	e1b00320 	lsrs	r0, r0, #6
  38:	01a0f00e 	moveq	pc, lr
  3c:	e320f000 	nop	{0}

00000040 <__loop_delay>:
  40:	e2500001 	subs	r0, r0, #1
  44:	8afffffe 	bhi	40 <__loop_delay>
  48:	e1a0f00e 	mov	pc, lr
  4c:	e320f000 	nop	{0}

, which now reports:
Calibrating delay loop... 996.14 BogoMIPS (lpj=4980736)

Some more test results:

On mx31 (ARM1136) running at 532 MHz, before the patch:
Calibrating delay loop... 351.43 BogoMIPS (lpj=1757184)

On mx31 (ARM1136) running at 532 MHz after the patch:
Calibrating delay loop... 528.79 BogoMIPS (lpj=2643968)

Also tested on mx6 (CortexA9) and on mx27 (ARM926), which shows the same
BogoMIPS value before and after this patch.

Reported-by: Tom Evans <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Tom Evans <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]>
noglitch pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 13, 2014
Hayes Wang says:

====================
support new chip

Remove the trailing "/* CRC */" for patch #3.

Change the return value type of rtl_ops_init() from int to boolean
for patch #4.

Replace VENDOR_ID_SAMSUNG with SAMSUNG_VENDOR_ID for patch #6.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
noglitch pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 13, 2014
When we pull a received packet from a link's 'deferred packets' queue
for processing, its 'next' pointer is not cleared, and still refers to
the next packet in that queue, if any. This is incorrect, but caused
no harm before commit 40ba3cd ("tipc:
message reassembly using fragment chain") was introduced. After that
commit, it may sometimes lead to the following oops:

general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Modules linked in: tipc
CPU: 4 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/4 Tainted: G        W 3.13.0-rc2+ #6
Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2007
task: ffff880017af4880 ti: ffff880017aee000 task.ti: ffff880017aee000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81710694>]  [<ffffffff81710694>] skb_try_coalesce+0x44/0x3d0
RSP: 0018:ffff880016603a78  EFLAGS: 00010212
RAX: 6b6b6b6bd6d6d6d6 RBX: ffff880013106ac0 RCX: ffff880016603ad0
RDX: ffff880016603ad7 RSI: ffff88001223ed00 RDI: ffff880013106ac0
RBP: ffff880016603ab8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88001223ed00
R13: ffff880016603ad0 R14: 000000000000058c R15: ffff880012297650
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880016600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 000000000805b000 CR3: 0000000011f5d000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Stack:
 ffff880016603a88 ffffffff810a38ed ffff880016603aa8 ffff88001223ed00
 0000000000000001 ffff880012297648 ffff880016603b68 ffff880012297650
 ffff880016603b08 ffffffffa0006c51 ffff880016603b08 00ffffffa00005fc
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 [<ffffffff810a38ed>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
 [<ffffffffa0006c51>] tipc_link_recv_fragment+0xd1/0x1b0 [tipc]
 [<ffffffffa0007214>] tipc_recv_msg+0x4e4/0x920 [tipc]
 [<ffffffffa00016f0>] ? tipc_l2_rcv_msg+0x40/0x250 [tipc]
 [<ffffffffa000177c>] tipc_l2_rcv_msg+0xcc/0x250 [tipc]
 [<ffffffffa00016f0>] ? tipc_l2_rcv_msg+0x40/0x250 [tipc]
 [<ffffffff8171e65b>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x80b/0xd00
 [<ffffffff8171df94>] ? __netif_receive_skb_core+0x144/0xd00
 [<ffffffff8171eb76>] __netif_receive_skb+0x26/0x70
 [<ffffffff8171ed6d>] netif_receive_skb+0x2d/0x200
 [<ffffffff8171fe70>] napi_gro_receive+0xb0/0x130
 [<ffffffff815647c2>] e1000_clean_rx_irq+0x2c2/0x530
 [<ffffffff81565986>] e1000_clean+0x266/0x9c0
 [<ffffffff81985f7b>] ? notifier_call_chain+0x2b/0x160
 [<ffffffff8171f971>] net_rx_action+0x141/0x310
 [<ffffffff81051c1b>] __do_softirq+0xeb/0x480
 [<ffffffff819817bb>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2b/0x40
 [<ffffffff810b8c42>] ? handle_fasteoi_irq+0x72/0x100
 [<ffffffff81052346>] irq_exit+0x96/0xc0
 [<ffffffff8198cbc3>] do_IRQ+0x63/0xe0
 [<ffffffff81981def>] common_interrupt+0x6f/0x6f
 <EOI>

This happens when the last fragment of a message has passed through the
the receiving link's 'deferred packets' queue, and at least one other
packet was added to that queue while it was there. After the fragment
chain with the complete message has been successfully delivered to the
receiving socket, it is released. Since 'next' pointer of the last
fragment in the released chain now is non-NULL, we get the crash shown
above.

We fix this by clearing the 'next' pointer of all received packets,
including those being pulled from the 'deferred' queue, before they
undergo any further processing.

Fixes: 40ba3cd ("tipc: message reassembly using fragment chain")
Signed-off-by: Erik Hugne <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Ying Xue <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paul Gortmaker <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
noglitch pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 13, 2014
This patch should resolve the following bug.

=========================================================
[ INFO: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected ]
3.13.0-rc5.f2fs+ #6 Not tainted
---------------------------------------------------------
kswapd0/41 just changed the state of lock:
 (&sbi->gc_mutex){+.+.-.}, at: [<ffffffffa030503e>] f2fs_balance_fs+0xae/0xd0 [f2fs]
but this lock took another, RECLAIM_FS-READ-unsafe lock in the past:
 (&sbi->cp_rwsem){++++.?}

and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them.

other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
  &sbi->gc_mutex --> &sbi->cp_mutex --> &sbi->cp_rwsem

 Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&sbi->cp_rwsem);
                               local_irq_disable();
                               lock(&sbi->gc_mutex);
                               lock(&sbi->cp_mutex);
  <Interrupt>
    lock(&sbi->gc_mutex);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

This bug is due to the f2fs_balance_fs call in f2fs_write_data_page.
If f2fs_write_data_page is triggered by wbc->for_reclaim via kswapd, it should
not call f2fs_balance_fs which tries to get a mutex grabbed by original syscall
flow.

Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
noglitch pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 13, 2014
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.

Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy.  In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.

Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo

Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled.  Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.

BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[  473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[  473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[  474.027196] Modules linked in:
[  474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G      D   I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[  474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[  474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[  474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>]  [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[  474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38  EFLAGS: 00010246
[  474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[  474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[  474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[  474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[  474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[  474.453816] FS:  00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[  474.489254] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[  474.556058] Stack:
[  474.584325]  ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[  474.618913]  ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[  474.653955]  ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[  474.690461] Call Trace:
[  474.723779]  [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[  474.778049]  [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[  474.811398]  [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[  474.843813]  [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[  474.875694]  [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[  474.907370]  [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[  474.938726]  [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[  474.970036]  [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[  475.000618]  [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[  475.030402]  [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[  475.061097]  [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[  475.094595]  [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[  475.148405]  [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[  475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[  475.255884] RIP  [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[  475.296120]  RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[  475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---

Reported-by:  Matthew Thode <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
noglitch pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 13, 2014
We don't otherwise need j_list_lock during the rest of commit phase
#7, so add the transaction to the checkpoint list at the very end of
commit phase #6.  This allows us to drop j_list_lock earlier, which is
a good thing since it is a super hot lock.

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
noglitch pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 13, 2014
vmxnet3's netpoll driver is incorrectly coded.  It directly calls
vmxnet3_do_poll, which is the driver internal napi poll routine.  As the netpoll
controller method doesn't block real napi polls in any way, there is a potential
for race conditions in which the netpoll controller method and the napi poll
method run concurrently.  The result is data corruption causing panics such as this
one recently observed:
PID: 1371   TASK: ffff88023762caa0  CPU: 1   COMMAND: "rs:main Q:Reg"
 #0 [ffff88023abd5780] machine_kexec at ffffffff81038f3b
 #1 [ffff88023abd57e0] crash_kexec at ffffffff810c5d92
 #2 [ffff88023abd58b0] oops_end at ffffffff8152b570
 #3 [ffff88023abd58e0] die at ffffffff81010e0b
 #4 [ffff88023abd5910] do_trap at ffffffff8152add4
 #5 [ffff88023abd5970] do_invalid_op at ffffffff8100cf95
 #6 [ffff88023abd5a10] invalid_op at ffffffff8100bf9b
    [exception RIP: vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete+1968]
    RIP: ffffffffa00f1e80  RSP: ffff88023abd5ac8  RFLAGS: 00010086
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff88023b5dcee0  RCX: 00000000000000c0
    RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: 00000000000005f2  RDI: ffff88023b5dcee0
    RBP: ffff88023abd5b48   R8: 0000000000000000   R9: ffff88023a3b6048
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000002  R12: ffff8802398d4cd8
    R13: ffff88023af35140  R14: ffff88023b60c890  R15: 0000000000000000
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #7 [ffff88023abd5b50] vmxnet3_do_poll at ffffffffa00f204a [vmxnet3]
 #8 [ffff88023abd5b80] vmxnet3_netpoll at ffffffffa00f209c [vmxnet3]
 #9 [ffff88023abd5ba0] netpoll_poll_dev at ffffffff81472bb7

The fix is to do as other drivers do, and have the poll controller call the top
half interrupt handler, which schedules a napi poll properly to recieve frames

Tested by myself, successfully.

Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Shreyas Bhatewara <[email protected]>
CC: "VMware, Inc." <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Shreyas N Bhatewara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
noglitch pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 13, 2014
With EXT4FS_DEBUG ext4_count_free_clusters() will call
ext4_read_block_bitmap() without s_group_info initialized, so we need to
initialize multi-block allocator before.

And dependencies that must be solved, to allow this:
- multi-block allocator needs in group descriptors
- need to install s_op before initializing multi-block allocator,
  because in ext4_mb_init_backend() new inode is created.
- initialize number of group desc blocks (s_gdb_count) otherwise
  number of clusters returned by ext4_free_clusters_after_init() is not correct.
  (see ext4_bg_num_gdb_nometa())

Here is the stack backtrace:

(gdb) bt
 #0  ext4_get_group_info (group=0, sb=0xffff880079a10000) at ext4.h:2430
 #1  ext4_validate_block_bitmap (sb=sb@entry=0xffff880079a10000,
     desc=desc@entry=0xffff880056510000, block_group=block_group@entry=0,
     bh=bh@entry=0xffff88007bf2b2d8) at balloc.c:358
 #2  0xffffffff81232202 in ext4_wait_block_bitmap (sb=sb@entry=0xffff880079a10000,
     block_group=block_group@entry=0,
     bh=bh@entry=0xffff88007bf2b2d8) at balloc.c:476
 #3  0xffffffff81232eaf in ext4_read_block_bitmap (sb=sb@entry=0xffff880079a10000,
     block_group=block_group@entry=0) at balloc.c:489
 #4  0xffffffff81232fc0 in ext4_count_free_clusters (sb=sb@entry=0xffff880079a10000) at balloc.c:665
 #5  0xffffffff81259ffa in ext4_check_descriptors (first_not_zeroed=<synthetic pointer>,
     sb=0xffff880079a10000) at super.c:2143
 #6  ext4_fill_super (sb=sb@entry=0xffff880079a10000, data=<optimized out>,
     data@entry=0x0 <irq_stack_union>, silent=silent@entry=0) at super.c:3851
     ...

Signed-off-by: Azat Khuzhin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
alexandermorozov pushed a commit to goodwin-europe/linux-at91 that referenced this pull request Jul 11, 2014
The settimeofday01 test in the LTP testsuite effectively does

        gettimeofday(current time);
        settimeofday(Jan 1, 1970 + 100 seconds);
        settimeofday(current time);

This test causes a stack trace to be displayed on the console during the
setting of timeofday to Jan 1, 1970 + 100 seconds:

[  131.066751] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  131.096448] WARNING: at kernel/time/clockevents.c:209 clockevents_program_event+0x135/0x140()
[  131.104935] Hardware name: Dinar
[  131.108150] Modules linked in: sg nfsv3 nfs_acl nfsv4 auth_rpcgss nfs dns_resolver fscache lockd sunrpc nf_conntrack_netbios_ns nf_conntrack_broadcast ipt_MASQUERADE ip6table_mangle ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 iptable_nat nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat iptable_mangle ipt_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter ip_tables kvm_amd kvm sp5100_tco bnx2 i2c_piix4 crc32c_intel k10temp fam15h_power ghash_clmulni_intel amd64_edac_mod pcspkr serio_raw edac_mce_amd edac_core microcode xfs libcrc32c sr_mod sd_mod cdrom ata_generic crc_t10dif pata_acpi radeon i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper ttm drm ahci pata_atiixp libahci libata usb_storage i2c_core dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
[  131.176784] Pid: 0, comm: swapper/28 Not tainted 3.8.0+ linux4sam#6
[  131.182248] Call Trace:
[  131.184684]  <IRQ>  [<ffffffff810612af>] warn_slowpath_common+0x7f/0xc0
[  131.191312]  [<ffffffff8106130a>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20
[  131.197131]  [<ffffffff810b9fd5>] clockevents_program_event+0x135/0x140
[  131.203721]  [<ffffffff810bb584>] tick_program_event+0x24/0x30
[  131.209534]  [<ffffffff81089ab1>] hrtimer_interrupt+0x131/0x230
[  131.215437]  [<ffffffff814b9600>] ? cpufreq_p4_target+0x130/0x130
[  131.221509]  [<ffffffff81619119>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x69/0x99
[  131.227839]  [<ffffffff8161805d>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x6d/0x80
[  131.233816]  <EOI>  [<ffffffff81099745>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xc5/0x120
[  131.240267]  [<ffffffff814b9ff0>] ? cpuidle_wrap_enter+0x50/0xa0
[  131.246252]  [<ffffffff814b9fe9>] ? cpuidle_wrap_enter+0x49/0xa0
[  131.252238]  [<ffffffff814ba050>] cpuidle_enter_tk+0x10/0x20
[  131.257877]  [<ffffffff814b9c89>] cpuidle_idle_call+0xa9/0x260
[  131.263692]  [<ffffffff8101c42f>] cpu_idle+0xaf/0x120
[  131.268727]  [<ffffffff815f8971>] start_secondary+0x255/0x257
[  131.274449] ---[ end trace 1151a50552231615 ]---

When we change the system time to a low value like this, the value of
timekeeper->offs_real will be a negative value.

It seems that the WARN occurs because an hrtimer has been started in the time
between the releasing of the timekeeper lock and the IPI call (via a call to
on_each_cpu) in clock_was_set() in the do_settimeofday() code.  The end result
is that a REALTIME_CLOCK timer has been added with softexpires = expires =
KTIME_MAX.  The hrtimer_interrupt() fires/is called and the loop at
kernel/hrtimer.c:1289 is executed.  In this loop the code subtracts the
clock base's offset (which was set to timekeeper->offs_real in
do_settimeofday()) from the current hrtimer_cpu_base->expiry value (which
was KTIME_MAX):

	KTIME_MAX - (a negative value) = overflow

A simple check for an overflow can resolve this problem.  Using KTIME_MAX
instead of the overflow value will result in the hrtimer function being run,
and the reprogramming of the timer after that.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava <[email protected]>
[jstultz: Tweaked commit subject]
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <[email protected]>
noglitch pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 10, 2021
[ Upstream commit e8bd76e ]

kernel panic trace looks like:

 #5 [ffffb9e08698fc80] do_page_fault at ffffffffb666e0d7
 #6 [ffffb9e08698fcb0] page_fault at ffffffffb70010fe
    [exception RIP: amp_read_loc_assoc_final_data+63]
    RIP: ffffffffc06ab54f  RSP: ffffb9e08698fd68  RFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff8c8845a5a000  RCX: 0000000000000004
    RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: ffff8c8b9153d000  RDI: ffff8c8845a5a000
    RBP: ffffb9e08698fe40   R8: 00000000000330e0   R9: ffffffffc0675c94
    R10: ffffb9e08698fe58  R11: 0000000000000001  R12: ffff8c8b9cbf6200
    R13: 0000000000000000  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: ffff8c8b2026da0b
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #7 [ffffb9e08698fda8] hci_event_packet at ffffffffc0676904 [bluetooth]
 #8 [ffffb9e08698fe50] hci_rx_work at ffffffffc06629ac [bluetooth]
 #9 [ffffb9e08698fe98] process_one_work at ffffffffb66f95e7

hcon->amp_mgr seems NULL triggered kernel panic in following line inside
function amp_read_loc_assoc_final_data

        set_bit(READ_LOC_AMP_ASSOC_FINAL, &mgr->state);

Fixed by checking NULL for mgr.

Signed-off-by: Gopal Tiwari <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
noglitch pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 11, 2021
[ Upstream commit c5c97ca ]

The ubsan reported the following error.  It was because sample's raw
data missed u32 padding at the end.  So it broke the alignment of the
array after it.

The raw data contains an u32 size prefix so the data size should have
an u32 padding after 8-byte aligned data.

27: Sample parsing  :util/synthetic-events.c:1539:4:
  runtime error: store to misaligned address 0x62100006b9bc for type
  '__u64' (aka 'unsigned long long'), which requires 8 byte alignment
0x62100006b9bc: note: pointer points here
  00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff  ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff  ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff  ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
              ^
    #0 0x561532a9fc96 in perf_event__synthesize_sample util/synthetic-events.c:1539:13
    #1 0x5615327f4a4f in do_test tests/sample-parsing.c:284:8
    #2 0x5615327f3f50 in test__sample_parsing tests/sample-parsing.c:381:9
    #3 0x56153279d3a1 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:424:9
    #4 0x56153279c836 in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:454:9
    #5 0x56153279b7eb in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:675:4
    #6 0x56153279abf0 in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:821:9
    #7 0x56153264e796 in run_builtin perf.c:312:11
    #8 0x56153264cf03 in handle_internal_command perf.c:364:8
    #9 0x56153264e47d in run_argv perf.c:408:2
    #10 0x56153264c9a9 in main perf.c:538:3
    #11 0x7f137ab6fbbc in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x38bbc)
    #12 0x561532596828 in _start ...

SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: misaligned-pointer-use
 util/synthetic-events.c:1539:4 in

Fixes: 045f8cd ("perf tests: Add a sample parsing test")
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
noglitch pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 11, 2021
[ Upstream commit e8bd76e ]

kernel panic trace looks like:

 #5 [ffffb9e08698fc80] do_page_fault at ffffffffb666e0d7
 #6 [ffffb9e08698fcb0] page_fault at ffffffffb70010fe
    [exception RIP: amp_read_loc_assoc_final_data+63]
    RIP: ffffffffc06ab54f  RSP: ffffb9e08698fd68  RFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff8c8845a5a000  RCX: 0000000000000004
    RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: ffff8c8b9153d000  RDI: ffff8c8845a5a000
    RBP: ffffb9e08698fe40   R8: 00000000000330e0   R9: ffffffffc0675c94
    R10: ffffb9e08698fe58  R11: 0000000000000001  R12: ffff8c8b9cbf6200
    R13: 0000000000000000  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: ffff8c8b2026da0b
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #7 [ffffb9e08698fda8] hci_event_packet at ffffffffc0676904 [bluetooth]
 #8 [ffffb9e08698fe50] hci_rx_work at ffffffffc06629ac [bluetooth]
 #9 [ffffb9e08698fe98] process_one_work at ffffffffb66f95e7

hcon->amp_mgr seems NULL triggered kernel panic in following line inside
function amp_read_loc_assoc_final_data

        set_bit(READ_LOC_AMP_ASSOC_FINAL, &mgr->state);

Fixed by checking NULL for mgr.

Signed-off-by: Gopal Tiwari <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
noglitch pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 11, 2021
commit 4d14c5c upstream

Calling btrfs_qgroup_reserve_meta_prealloc from
btrfs_delayed_inode_reserve_metadata can result in flushing delalloc
while holding a transaction and delayed node locks. This is deadlock
prone. In the past multiple commits:

 * ae5e070 ("btrfs: qgroup: don't try to wait flushing if we're
already holding a transaction")

 * 6f23277 ("btrfs: qgroup: don't commit transaction when we already
 hold the handle")

Tried to solve various aspects of this but this was always a
whack-a-mole game. Unfortunately those 2 fixes don't solve a deadlock
scenario involving btrfs_delayed_node::mutex. Namely, one thread
can call btrfs_dirty_inode as a result of reading a file and modifying
its atime:

  PID: 6963   TASK: ffff8c7f3f94c000  CPU: 2   COMMAND: "test"
  #0  __schedule at ffffffffa529e07d
  #1  schedule at ffffffffa529e4ff
  #2  schedule_timeout at ffffffffa52a1bdd
  #3  wait_for_completion at ffffffffa529eeea             <-- sleeps with delayed node mutex held
  #4  start_delalloc_inodes at ffffffffc0380db5
  #5  btrfs_start_delalloc_snapshot at ffffffffc0393836
  #6  try_flush_qgroup at ffffffffc03f04b2
  #7  __btrfs_qgroup_reserve_meta at ffffffffc03f5bb6     <-- tries to reserve space and starts delalloc inodes.
  #8  btrfs_delayed_update_inode at ffffffffc03e31aa      <-- acquires delayed node mutex
  #9  btrfs_update_inode at ffffffffc0385ba8
 #10  btrfs_dirty_inode at ffffffffc038627b               <-- TRANSACTIION OPENED
 #11  touch_atime at ffffffffa4cf0000
 #12  generic_file_read_iter at ffffffffa4c1f123
 #13  new_sync_read at ffffffffa4ccdc8a
 #14  vfs_read at ffffffffa4cd0849
 #15  ksys_read at ffffffffa4cd0bd1
 #16  do_syscall_64 at ffffffffa4a052eb
 #17  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffffa540008c

This will cause an asynchronous work to flush the delalloc inodes to
happen which can try to acquire the same delayed_node mutex:

  PID: 455    TASK: ffff8c8085fa4000  CPU: 5   COMMAND: "kworker/u16:30"
  #0  __schedule at ffffffffa529e07d
  #1  schedule at ffffffffa529e4ff
  #2  schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa529e80a
  #3  __mutex_lock at ffffffffa529fdcb                    <-- goes to sleep, never wakes up.
  #4  btrfs_delayed_update_inode at ffffffffc03e3143      <-- tries to acquire the mutex
  #5  btrfs_update_inode at ffffffffc0385ba8              <-- this is the same inode that pid 6963 is holding
  #6  cow_file_range_inline.constprop.78 at ffffffffc0386be7
  #7  cow_file_range at ffffffffc03879c1
  #8  btrfs_run_delalloc_range at ffffffffc038894c
  #9  writepage_delalloc at ffffffffc03a3c8f
 #10  __extent_writepage at ffffffffc03a4c01
 #11  extent_write_cache_pages at ffffffffc03a500b
 #12  extent_writepages at ffffffffc03a6de2
 #13  do_writepages at ffffffffa4c277eb
 #14  __filemap_fdatawrite_range at ffffffffa4c1e5bb
 #15  btrfs_run_delalloc_work at ffffffffc0380987         <-- starts running delayed nodes
 #16  normal_work_helper at ffffffffc03b706c
 #17  process_one_work at ffffffffa4aba4e4
 #18  worker_thread at ffffffffa4aba6fd
 #19  kthread at ffffffffa4ac0a3d
 #20  ret_from_fork at ffffffffa54001ff

To fully address those cases the complete fix is to never issue any
flushing while holding the transaction or the delayed node lock. This
patch achieves it by calling qgroup_reserve_meta directly which will
either succeed without flushing or will fail and return -EDQUOT. In the
latter case that return value is going to be propagated to
btrfs_dirty_inode which will fallback to start a new transaction. That's
fine as the majority of time we expect the inode will have
BTRFS_DELAYED_NODE_INODE_DIRTY flag set which will result in directly
copying the in-memory state.

Fixes: c53e965 ("btrfs: qgroup: try to flush qgroup space when we get -EDQUOT")
CC: [email protected] # 5.10+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
[sudip: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
noglitch pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 12, 2022
commit a80ced6 upstream.

As guest_irq is coming from KVM_IRQFD API call, it may trigger
crash in svm_update_pi_irte() due to out-of-bounds:

crash> bt
PID: 22218  TASK: ffff951a6ad74980  CPU: 73  COMMAND: "vcpu8"
 #0 [ffffb1ba6707fa40] machine_kexec at ffffffff8565b397
 #1 [ffffb1ba6707fa90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff85788a6d
 #2 [ffffb1ba6707fb58] crash_kexec at ffffffff8578995d
 #3 [ffffb1ba6707fb70] oops_end at ffffffff85623c0d
 #4 [ffffb1ba6707fb90] no_context at ffffffff856692c9
 #5 [ffffb1ba6707fbf8] exc_page_fault at ffffffff85f95b51
 #6 [ffffb1ba6707fc50] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff86000ace
    [exception RIP: svm_update_pi_irte+227]
    RIP: ffffffffc0761b53  RSP: ffffb1ba6707fd08  RFLAGS: 00010086
    RAX: ffffb1ba6707fd78  RBX: ffffb1ba66d91000  RCX: 0000000000000001
    RDX: 00003c803f63f1c0  RSI: 000000000000019a  RDI: ffffb1ba66db2ab8
    RBP: 000000000000019a   R8: 0000000000000040   R9: ffff94ca41b82200
    R10: ffffffffffffffcf  R11: 0000000000000001  R12: 0000000000000001
    R13: 0000000000000001  R14: ffffffffffffffcf  R15: 000000000000005f
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #7 [ffffb1ba6707fdb8] kvm_irq_routing_update at ffffffffc09f19a1 [kvm]
 #8 [ffffb1ba6707fde0] kvm_set_irq_routing at ffffffffc09f2133 [kvm]
 #9 [ffffb1ba6707fe18] kvm_vm_ioctl at ffffffffc09ef544 [kvm]
    RIP: 00007f143c36488b  RSP: 00007f143a4e04b8  RFLAGS: 00000246
    RAX: ffffffffffffffda  RBX: 00007f05780041d0  RCX: 00007f143c36488b
    RDX: 00007f05780041d0  RSI: 000000004008ae6a  RDI: 0000000000000020
    RBP: 00000000000004e8   R8: 0000000000000008   R9: 00007f05780041e0
    R10: 00007f0578004560  R11: 0000000000000246  R12: 00000000000004e0
    R13: 000000000000001a  R14: 00007f1424001c60  R15: 00007f0578003bc0
    ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010  CS: 0033  SS: 002b

Vmx have been fix this in commit 3a8b067 (KVM: VMX: Do not BUG() on
out-of-bounds guest IRQ), so we can just copy source from that to fix
this.

Co-developed-by: Yi Liu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yi Liu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yi Wang <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
noglitch pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 16, 2022
[ Upstream commit 447c799 ]

Noticed the below warning while running a pytorch workload on vega10
GPUs. Change to trylock to avoid conflicts with already held reservation
locks.

[  +0.000003] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[  +0.000003] 5.13.0-kfd-rajneesh #1030 Not tainted
[  +0.000004] --------------------------------------------
[  +0.000002] python/4822 is trying to acquire lock:
[  +0.000004] ffff932cd9a259f8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3},
at: amdgpu_bo_release_notify+0xc4/0x160 [amdgpu]
[  +0.000203]
              but task is already holding lock:
[  +0.000003] ffff932cbb7181f8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3},
at: ttm_eu_reserve_buffers+0x270/0x470 [ttm]
[  +0.000017]
              other info that might help us debug this:
[  +0.000002]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[  +0.000003]        CPU0
[  +0.000002]        ----
[  +0.000002]   lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex);
[  +0.000004]   lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex);
[  +0.000003]
               *** DEADLOCK ***

[  +0.000002]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation

[  +0.000003] 7 locks held by python/4822:
[  +0.000003]  #0: ffff932c4ac028d0 (&process->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
kfd_ioctl_map_memory_to_gpu+0x10b/0x320 [amdgpu]
[  +0.000232]  #1: ffff932c55e830a8 (&info->lock#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_map_memory_to_gpu+0x64/0xf60 [amdgpu]
[  +0.000241]  #2: ffff932cc45b5e68 (&(*mem)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_map_memory_to_gpu+0xdf/0xf60 [amdgpu]
[  +0.000236]  #3: ffffb2b35606fd28
(reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}, at:
amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_map_memory_to_gpu+0x232/0xf60 [amdgpu]
[  +0.000235]  #4: ffff932cbb7181f8
(reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
ttm_eu_reserve_buffers+0x270/0x470 [ttm]
[  +0.000015]  #5: ffffffffc045f700 (*(sspp++)){....}-{0:0}, at:
drm_dev_enter+0x5/0xa0 [drm]
[  +0.000038]  #6: ffff932c52da7078 (&vm->eviction_lock){+.+.}-{3:3},
at: amdgpu_vm_bo_update_mapping+0xd5/0x4f0 [amdgpu]
[  +0.000195]
              stack backtrace:
[  +0.000003] CPU: 11 PID: 4822 Comm: python Not tainted
5.13.0-kfd-rajneesh #1030
[  +0.000005] Hardware name: GIGABYTE MZ01-CE0-00/MZ01-CE0-00, BIOS F02
08/29/2018
[  +0.000003] Call Trace:
[  +0.000003]  dump_stack+0x6d/0x89
[  +0.000010]  __lock_acquire+0xb93/0x1a90
[  +0.000009]  lock_acquire+0x25d/0x2d0
[  +0.000005]  ? amdgpu_bo_release_notify+0xc4/0x160 [amdgpu]
[  +0.000184]  ? lock_is_held_type+0xa2/0x110
[  +0.000006]  ? amdgpu_bo_release_notify+0xc4/0x160 [amdgpu]
[  +0.000184]  __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.17+0xca/0x1060
[  +0.000007]  ? amdgpu_bo_release_notify+0xc4/0x160 [amdgpu]
[  +0.000183]  ? lock_release+0x13f/0x270
[  +0.000005]  ? lock_is_held_type+0xa2/0x110
[  +0.000006]  ? amdgpu_bo_release_notify+0xc4/0x160 [amdgpu]
[  +0.000183]  amdgpu_bo_release_notify+0xc4/0x160 [amdgpu]
[  +0.000185]  ttm_bo_release+0x4c6/0x580 [ttm]
[  +0.000010]  amdgpu_bo_unref+0x1a/0x30 [amdgpu]
[  +0.000183]  amdgpu_vm_free_table+0x76/0xa0 [amdgpu]
[  +0.000189]  amdgpu_vm_free_pts+0xb8/0xf0 [amdgpu]
[  +0.000189]  amdgpu_vm_update_ptes+0x411/0x770 [amdgpu]
[  +0.000191]  amdgpu_vm_bo_update_mapping+0x324/0x4f0 [amdgpu]
[  +0.000191]  amdgpu_vm_bo_update+0x251/0x610 [amdgpu]
[  +0.000191]  update_gpuvm_pte+0xcc/0x290 [amdgpu]
[  +0.000229]  ? amdgpu_vm_bo_map+0xd7/0x130 [amdgpu]
[  +0.000190]  amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_map_memory_to_gpu+0x912/0xf60
[amdgpu]
[  +0.000234]  kfd_ioctl_map_memory_to_gpu+0x182/0x320 [amdgpu]
[  +0.000218]  kfd_ioctl+0x2b9/0x600 [amdgpu]
[  +0.000216]  ? kfd_ioctl_unmap_memory_from_gpu+0x270/0x270 [amdgpu]
[  +0.000216]  ? lock_release+0x13f/0x270
[  +0.000006]  ? __fget_files+0x107/0x1e0
[  +0.000007]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8b/0xd0
[  +0.000007]  do_syscall_64+0x36/0x70
[  +0.000004]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[  +0.000007] RIP: 0033:0x7fbff90a7317
[  +0.000004] Code: b3 66 90 48 8b 05 71 4b 2d 00 64 c7 00 26 00 00 00
48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 b8 10 00 00 00 0f
05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 41 4b 2d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[  +0.000005] RSP: 002b:00007fbe301fe648 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX:
0000000000000010
[  +0.000006] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fbcc402d820 RCX:
00007fbff90a7317
[  +0.000003] RDX: 00007fbe301fe690 RSI: 00000000c0184b18 RDI:
0000000000000004
[  +0.000003] RBP: 00007fbe301fe690 R08: 0000000000000000 R09:
00007fbcc402d880
[  +0.000003] R10: 0000000002001000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12:
00000000c0184b18
[  +0.000003] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 00007fbf689593a0 R15:
00007fbcc402d820

Cc: Christian König <[email protected]>
Cc: Felix Kuehling <[email protected]>
Cc: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>

Reviewed-by: Christian König <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Felix Kuehling <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rajneesh Bhardwaj <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
noglitch pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 16, 2022
[ Upstream commit af68656 ]

While handling PCI errors (AER flow) driver tries to
disable NAPI [napi_disable()] after NAPI is deleted
[__netif_napi_del()] which causes unexpected system
hang/crash.

System message log shows the following:
=======================================
[ 3222.537510] EEH: Detected PCI bus error on PHB#384-PE#800000 [ 3222.537511] EEH: This PCI device has failed 2 times in the last hour and will be permanently disabled after 5 failures.
[ 3222.537512] EEH: Notify device drivers to shutdown [ 3222.537513] EEH: Beginning: 'error_detected(IO frozen)'
[ 3222.537514] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): Invoking
bnx2x->error_detected(IO frozen)
[ 3222.537516] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_error_detected:14236(eth14)]IO error detected [ 3222.537650] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): bnx2x driver reports:
'need reset'
[ 3222.537651] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.1): Invoking
bnx2x->error_detected(IO frozen)
[ 3222.537651] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_error_detected:14236(eth13)]IO error detected [ 3222.537729] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.1): bnx2x driver reports:
'need reset'
[ 3222.537729] EEH: Finished:'error_detected(IO frozen)' with aggregate recovery state:'need reset'
[ 3222.537890] EEH: Collect temporary log [ 3222.583481] EEH: of node=0384:80:00.0 [ 3222.583519] EEH: PCI device/vendor: 168e14e4 [ 3222.583557] EEH: PCI cmd/status register: 00100140 [ 3222.583557] EEH: PCI-E capabilities and status follow:
[ 3222.583744] EEH: PCI-E 00: 00020010 012c8da 00095d5e 00455c82 [ 3222.583892] EEH: PCI-E 10: 10820000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.583893] EEH: PCI-E 20: 00000000 [ 3222.583893] EEH: PCI-E AER capability register set follows:
[ 3222.584079] EEH: PCI-E AER 00: 13c10001 00000000 00000000 00062030 [ 3222.584230] EEH: PCI-E AER 10: 00002000 000031c0 000001e0 00000000 [ 3222.584378] EEH: PCI-E AER 20: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584416] EEH: PCI-E AER 30: 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584416] EEH: of node=0384:80:00.1 [ 3222.584454] EEH: PCI device/vendor: 168e14e4 [ 3222.584491] EEH: PCI cmd/status register: 00100140 [ 3222.584492] EEH: PCI-E capabilities and status follow:
[ 3222.584677] EEH: PCI-E 00: 00020010 012c8da 00095d5e 00455c82 [ 3222.584825] EEH: PCI-E 10: 10820000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584826] EEH: PCI-E 20: 00000000 [ 3222.584826] EEH: PCI-E AER capability register set follows:
[ 3222.585011] EEH: PCI-E AER 00: 13c10001 00000000 00000000 00062030 [ 3222.585160] EEH: PCI-E AER 10: 00002000 000031c0 000001e0 00000000 [ 3222.585309] EEH: PCI-E AER 20: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.585347] EEH: PCI-E AER 30: 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.586872] RTAS: event: 5, Type: Platform Error (224), Severity: 2 [ 3222.586873] EEH: Reset without hotplug activity [ 3224.762767] EEH: Beginning: 'slot_reset'
[ 3224.762770] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): Invoking
bnx2x->slot_reset()
[ 3224.762771] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14271(eth14)]IO slot reset initializing...
[ 3224.762887] bnx2x 0384:80:00.0: enabling device (0140 -> 0142) [ 3224.768157] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14287(eth14)]IO slot reset
--> driver unload

Uninterruptible tasks
=====================
crash> ps | grep UN
     213      2  11  c000000004c89e00  UN   0.0       0      0  [eehd]
     215      2   0  c000000004c80000  UN   0.0       0      0
[kworker/0:2]
    2196      1  28  c000000004504f00  UN   0.1   15936  11136  wickedd
    4287      1   9  c00000020d076800  UN   0.0    4032   3008  agetty
    4289      1  20  c00000020d056680  UN   0.0    7232   3840  agetty
   32423      2  26  c00000020038c580  UN   0.0       0      0
[kworker/26:3]
   32871   4241  27  c0000002609ddd00  UN   0.1   18624  11648  sshd
   32920  10130  16  c00000027284a100  UN   0.1   48512  12608  sendmail
   33092  32987   0  c000000205218b00  UN   0.1   48512  12608  sendmail
   33154   4567  16  c000000260e51780  UN   0.1   48832  12864  pickup
   33209   4241  36  c000000270cb6500  UN   0.1   18624  11712  sshd
   33473  33283   0  c000000205211480  UN   0.1   48512  12672  sendmail
   33531   4241  37  c00000023c902780  UN   0.1   18624  11648  sshd

EEH handler hung while bnx2x sleeping and holding RTNL lock
===========================================================
crash> bt 213
PID: 213    TASK: c000000004c89e00  CPU: 11  COMMAND: "eehd"
  #0 [c000000004d477e0] __schedule at c000000000c70808
  #1 [c000000004d478b0] schedule at c000000000c70ee0
  #2 [c000000004d478e0] schedule_timeout at c000000000c76dec
  #3 [c000000004d479c0] msleep at c0000000002120cc
  #4 [c000000004d479f0] napi_disable at c000000000a06448
                                        ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
  #5 [c000000004d47a30] bnx2x_netif_stop at c0080000018dba94 [bnx2x]
  #6 [c000000004d47a60] bnx2x_io_slot_reset at c0080000018a551c [bnx2x]
  #7 [c000000004d47b20] eeh_report_reset at c00000000004c9bc
  #8 [c000000004d47b90] eeh_pe_report at c00000000004d1a8
  #9 [c000000004d47c40] eeh_handle_normal_event at c00000000004da64

And the sleeping source code
============================
crash> dis -ls c000000000a06448
FILE: ../net/core/dev.c
LINE: 6702

   6697  {
   6698          might_sleep();
   6699          set_bit(NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, &n->state);
   6700
   6701          while (test_and_set_bit(NAPI_STATE_SCHED, &n->state))
* 6702                  msleep(1);
   6703          while (test_and_set_bit(NAPI_STATE_NPSVC, &n->state))
   6704                  msleep(1);
   6705
   6706          hrtimer_cancel(&n->timer);
   6707
   6708          clear_bit(NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, &n->state);
   6709  }

EEH calls into bnx2x twice based on the system log above, first through
bnx2x_io_error_detected() and then bnx2x_io_slot_reset(), and executes
the following call chains:

bnx2x_io_error_detected()
  +-> bnx2x_eeh_nic_unload()
       +-> bnx2x_del_all_napi()
            +-> __netif_napi_del()

bnx2x_io_slot_reset()
  +-> bnx2x_netif_stop()
       +-> bnx2x_napi_disable()
            +->napi_disable()

Fix this by correcting the sequence of NAPI APIs usage,
that is delete the NAPI after disabling it.

Fixes: 7fa6f34 ("bnx2x: AER revised")
Reported-by: David Christensen <[email protected]>
Tested-by: David Christensen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Manish Chopra <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ariel Elior <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
noglitch pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 10, 2022
commit f485922 upstream.

Patch series "Fix data-races around epoll reported by KCSAN."

This series suppresses a false positive KCSAN's message and fixes a real
data-race.


This patch (of 2):

pipe_poll() runs locklessly and assigns 1 to poll_usage.  Once poll_usage
is set to 1, it never changes in other places.  However, concurrent writes
of a value trigger KCSAN, so let's make KCSAN happy.

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in pipe_poll / pipe_poll

write to 0xffff8880042f6678 of 4 bytes by task 174 on cpu 3:
 pipe_poll (fs/pipe.c:656)
 ep_item_poll.isra.0 (./include/linux/poll.h:88 fs/eventpoll.c:853)
 do_epoll_wait (fs/eventpoll.c:1692 fs/eventpoll.c:1806 fs/eventpoll.c:2234)
 __x64_sys_epoll_wait (fs/eventpoll.c:2246 fs/eventpoll.c:2241 fs/eventpoll.c:2241)
 do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80)
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:113)

write to 0xffff8880042f6678 of 4 bytes by task 177 on cpu 1:
 pipe_poll (fs/pipe.c:656)
 ep_item_poll.isra.0 (./include/linux/poll.h:88 fs/eventpoll.c:853)
 do_epoll_wait (fs/eventpoll.c:1692 fs/eventpoll.c:1806 fs/eventpoll.c:2234)
 __x64_sys_epoll_wait (fs/eventpoll.c:2246 fs/eventpoll.c:2241 fs/eventpoll.c:2241)
 do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80)
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:113)

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 177 Comm: epoll_race Not tainted 5.17.0-58927-gf443e374ae13 #6
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.0-2.amzn2 04/01/2014

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 3b84482 ("pipe: avoid unnecessary EPOLLET wakeups under normal loads")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Duyck <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
Cc: "Soheil Hassas Yeganeh" <[email protected]>
Cc: "Sridhar Samudrala" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
cristibirsan pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 19, 2022
commit c3ed222 upstream.

Send along the already-allocated fattr along with nfs4_fs_locations, and
drop the memcpy of fattr.  We end up growing two more allocations, but this
fixes up a crash as:

PID: 790    TASK: ffff88811b43c000  CPU: 0   COMMAND: "ls"
 #0 [ffffc90000857920] panic at ffffffff81b9bfde
 #1 [ffffc900008579c0] do_trap at ffffffff81023a9b
 #2 [ffffc90000857a10] do_error_trap at ffffffff81023b78
 #3 [ffffc90000857a58] exc_stack_segment at ffffffff81be1f45
 #4 [ffffc90000857a80] asm_exc_stack_segment at ffffffff81c009de
 #5 [ffffc90000857b08] nfs_lookup at ffffffffa0302322 [nfs]
 #6 [ffffc90000857b70] __lookup_slow at ffffffff813a4a5f
 #7 [ffffc90000857c60] walk_component at ffffffff813a86c4
 #8 [ffffc90000857cb8] path_lookupat at ffffffff813a9553
 #9 [ffffc90000857cf0] filename_lookup at ffffffff813ab86b

Suggested-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
Fixes: 9558a00 ("NFS: Remove the label from the nfs4_lookup_res struct")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Coddington <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
cristibirsan pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 19, 2022
commit 4f40a5b upstream.

This was missed in c3ed222 ("NFSv4: Fix free of uninitialized
nfs4_label on referral lookup.") and causes a panic when mounting
with '-o trunkdiscovery':

PID: 1604   TASK: ffff93dac3520000  CPU: 3   COMMAND: "mount.nfs"
 #0 [ffffb79140f738f8] machine_kexec at ffffffffaec64bee
 #1 [ffffb79140f73950] __crash_kexec at ffffffffaeda67fd
 #2 [ffffb79140f73a18] crash_kexec at ffffffffaeda76ed
 #3 [ffffb79140f73a30] oops_end at ffffffffaec2658d
 #4 [ffffb79140f73a50] general_protection at ffffffffaf60111e
    [exception RIP: nfs_fattr_init+0x5]
    RIP: ffffffffc0c18265  RSP: ffffb79140f73b08  RFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff93dac304a800  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: ffffb79140f73bb0  RSI: ffff93dadc8cbb40  RDI: d03ee11cfaf6bd50
    RBP: ffffb79140f73be8   R8: ffffffffc0691560   R9: 0000000000000006
    R10: ffff93db3ffd3df8  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ffff93dac4040000
    R13: ffff93dac2848e00  R14: ffffb79140f73b60  R15: ffffb79140f73b30
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #5 [ffffb79140f73b08] _nfs41_proc_get_locations at ffffffffc0c73d53 [nfsv4]
 #6 [ffffb79140f73bf0] nfs4_proc_get_locations at ffffffffc0c83e90 [nfsv4]
 #7 [ffffb79140f73c60] nfs4_discover_trunking at ffffffffc0c83fb7 [nfsv4]
 #8 [ffffb79140f73cd8] nfs_probe_fsinfo at ffffffffc0c0f95f [nfs]
 #9 [ffffb79140f73da0] nfs_probe_server at ffffffffc0c1026a [nfs]
    RIP: 00007f6254fce26e  RSP: 00007ffc69496ac8  RFLAGS: 00000246
    RAX: ffffffffffffffda  RBX: 0000000000000000  RCX: 00007f6254fce26e
    RDX: 00005600220a82a0  RSI: 00005600220a64d0  RDI: 00005600220a6520
    RBP: 00007ffc69496c50   R8: 00005600220a8710   R9: 003035322e323231
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000246  R12: 00007ffc69496c50
    R13: 00005600220a8440  R14: 0000000000000010  R15: 0000560020650ef9
    ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5  CS: 0033  SS: 002b

Fixes: c3ed222 ("NFSv4: Fix free of uninitialized nfs4_label on referral lookup.")
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
cristibirsan pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 19, 2023
[ Upstream commit 93c660c ]

ASAN reports an use-after-free in btf_dump_name_dups:

ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0xffff927006db at pc 0xaaaab5dfb618 bp 0xffffdd89b890 sp 0xffffdd89b928
READ of size 2 at 0xffff927006db thread T0
    #0 0xaaaab5dfb614 in __interceptor_strcmp.part.0 (test_progs+0x21b614)
    #1 0xaaaab635f144 in str_equal_fn tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:127
    #2 0xaaaab635e3e0 in hashmap_find_entry tools/lib/bpf/hashmap.c:143
    #3 0xaaaab635e72c in hashmap__find tools/lib/bpf/hashmap.c:212
    #4 0xaaaab6362258 in btf_dump_name_dups tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:1525
    #5 0xaaaab636240c in btf_dump_resolve_name tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:1552
    #6 0xaaaab6362598 in btf_dump_type_name tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:1567
    #7 0xaaaab6360b48 in btf_dump_emit_struct_def tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:912
    #8 0xaaaab6360630 in btf_dump_emit_type tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:798
    #9 0xaaaab635f720 in btf_dump__dump_type tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:282
    #10 0xaaaab608523c in test_btf_dump_incremental tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:236
    #11 0xaaaab6097530 in test_btf_dump tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:875
    #12 0xaaaab6314ed0 in run_one_test tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1062
    #13 0xaaaab631a0a8 in main tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1697
    #14 0xffff9676d214 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
    #15 0xaaaab5d65990  (test_progs+0x185990)

0xffff927006db is located 11 bytes inside of 16-byte region [0xffff927006d0,0xffff927006e0)
freed by thread T0 here:
    #0 0xaaaab5e2c7c4 in realloc (test_progs+0x24c7c4)
    #1 0xaaaab634f4a0 in libbpf_reallocarray tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_internal.h:191
    #2 0xaaaab634f840 in libbpf_add_mem tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:163
    #3 0xaaaab636643c in strset_add_str_mem tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:106
    #4 0xaaaab6366560 in strset__add_str tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:157
    #5 0xaaaab6352d70 in btf__add_str tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:1519
    #6 0xaaaab6353e10 in btf__add_field tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:2032
    #7 0xaaaab6084fcc in test_btf_dump_incremental tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:232
    #8 0xaaaab6097530 in test_btf_dump tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:875
    #9 0xaaaab6314ed0 in run_one_test tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1062
    #10 0xaaaab631a0a8 in main tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1697
    #11 0xffff9676d214 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
    #12 0xaaaab5d65990  (test_progs+0x185990)

previously allocated by thread T0 here:
    #0 0xaaaab5e2c7c4 in realloc (test_progs+0x24c7c4)
    #1 0xaaaab634f4a0 in libbpf_reallocarray tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_internal.h:191
    #2 0xaaaab634f840 in libbpf_add_mem tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:163
    #3 0xaaaab636643c in strset_add_str_mem tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:106
    #4 0xaaaab6366560 in strset__add_str tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:157
    #5 0xaaaab6352d70 in btf__add_str tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:1519
    #6 0xaaaab6353ff0 in btf_add_enum_common tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:2070
    #7 0xaaaab6354080 in btf__add_enum tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:2102
    #8 0xaaaab6082f50 in test_btf_dump_incremental tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:162
    #9 0xaaaab6097530 in test_btf_dump tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:875
    #10 0xaaaab6314ed0 in run_one_test tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1062
    #11 0xaaaab631a0a8 in main tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1697
    #12 0xffff9676d214 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
    #13 0xaaaab5d65990  (test_progs+0x185990)

The reason is that the key stored in hash table name_map is a string
address, and the string memory is allocated by realloc() function, when
the memory is resized by realloc() later, the old memory may be freed,
so the address stored in name_map references to a freed memory, causing
use-after-free.

Fix it by storing duplicated string address in name_map.

Fixes: 919d2b1 ("libbpf: Allow modification of BTF and add btf__add_str API")
Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
cristibirsan pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 19, 2023
[ Upstream commit cf2ea3c ]

I got a null-ptr-defer error report when I do the following tests
on the qemu platform:

make defconfig and CONFIG_PARPORT=m, CONFIG_PARPORT_PC=m,
CONFIG_SND_MTS64=m

Then making test scripts:
cat>test_mod1.sh<<EOF
modprobe snd-mts64
modprobe snd-mts64
EOF

Executing the script, perhaps several times, we will get a null-ptr-defer
report, as follow:

syzkaller:~# ./test_mod.sh
snd_mts64: probe of snd_mts64.0 failed with error -5
modprobe: ERROR: could not insert 'snd_mts64': No such device
 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
 #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
 PGD 0 P4D 0
 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
 CPU: 0 PID: 205 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.1.0-rc8-00588-g76dcd734eca2 #6
 Call Trace:
  <IRQ>
  snd_mts64_interrupt+0x24/0xa0 [snd_mts64]
  parport_irq_handler+0x37/0x50 [parport]
  __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x39/0x190
  handle_irq_event_percpu+0xa/0x30
  handle_irq_event+0x2f/0x50
  handle_edge_irq+0x99/0x1b0
  __common_interrupt+0x5d/0x100
  common_interrupt+0xa0/0xc0
  </IRQ>
  <TASK>
  asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40
 RIP: 0010:_raw_write_unlock_irqrestore+0x11/0x30
  parport_claim+0xbd/0x230 [parport]
  snd_mts64_probe+0x14a/0x465 [snd_mts64]
  platform_probe+0x3f/0xa0
  really_probe+0x129/0x2c0
  __driver_probe_device+0x6d/0xc0
  driver_probe_device+0x1a/0xa0
  __device_attach_driver+0x7a/0xb0
  bus_for_each_drv+0x62/0xb0
  __device_attach+0xe4/0x180
  bus_probe_device+0x82/0xa0
  device_add+0x550/0x920
  platform_device_add+0x106/0x220
  snd_mts64_attach+0x2e/0x80 [snd_mts64]
  port_check+0x14/0x20 [parport]
  bus_for_each_dev+0x6e/0xc0
  __parport_register_driver+0x7c/0xb0 [parport]
  snd_mts64_module_init+0x31/0x1000 [snd_mts64]
  do_one_initcall+0x3c/0x1f0
  do_init_module+0x46/0x1c6
  load_module+0x1d8d/0x1e10
  __do_sys_finit_module+0xa2/0xf0
  do_syscall_64+0x37/0x90
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
  </TASK>
 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
 Rebooting in 1 seconds..

The mts wa not initialized during interrupt,  we add check for
mts to fix this bug.

Fixes: 68ab801 ("[ALSA] Add snd-mts64 driver for ESI Miditerminal 4140")
Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
cristibirsan pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 19, 2023
…g the sock

[ Upstream commit 3cf7203 ]

There is a race condition in vxlan that when deleting a vxlan device
during receiving packets, there is a possibility that the sock is
released after getting vxlan_sock vs from sk_user_data. Then in
later vxlan_ecn_decapsulate(), vxlan_get_sk_family() we will got
NULL pointer dereference. e.g.

   #0 [ffffa25ec6978a38] machine_kexec at ffffffff8c669757
   #1 [ffffa25ec6978a90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c0a4d
   #2 [ffffa25ec6978b58] crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c1c48
   #3 [ffffa25ec6978b60] oops_end at ffffffff8c627f2b
   #4 [ffffa25ec6978b80] page_fault_oops at ffffffff8c678fcb
   #5 [ffffa25ec6978bd8] exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d109542
   #6 [ffffa25ec6978c00] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d200b62
      [exception RIP: vxlan_ecn_decapsulate+0x3b]
      RIP: ffffffffc1014e7b  RSP: ffffa25ec6978cb0  RFLAGS: 00010246
      RAX: 0000000000000008  RBX: ffff8aa000888000  RCX: 0000000000000000
      RDX: 000000000000000e  RSI: ffff8a9fc7ab803e  RDI: ffff8a9fd1168700
      RBP: ffff8a9fc7ab803e   R8: 0000000000700000   R9: 00000000000010ae
      R10: ffff8a9fcb748980  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ffff8a9fd1168700
      R13: ffff8aa000888000  R14: 00000000002a0000  R15: 00000000000010ae
      ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
   #7 [ffffa25ec6978ce8] vxlan_rcv at ffffffffc10189cd [vxlan]
   #8 [ffffa25ec6978d90] udp_queue_rcv_one_skb at ffffffff8cfb6507
   #9 [ffffa25ec6978dc0] udp_unicast_rcv_skb at ffffffff8cfb6e45
  #10 [ffffa25ec6978dc8] __udp4_lib_rcv at ffffffff8cfb8807
  #11 [ffffa25ec6978e20] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu at ffffffff8cf76951
  #12 [ffffa25ec6978e48] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff8cf76bde
  #13 [ffffa25ec6978ea0] __netif_receive_skb_one_core at ffffffff8cecde9b
  #14 [ffffa25ec6978ec8] process_backlog at ffffffff8cece139
  #15 [ffffa25ec6978f00] __napi_poll at ffffffff8ceced1a
  #16 [ffffa25ec6978f28] net_rx_action at ffffffff8cecf1f3
  #17 [ffffa25ec6978fa0] __softirqentry_text_start at ffffffff8d4000ca
  #18 [ffffa25ec6978ff0] do_softirq at ffffffff8c6fbdc3

Reproducer: https://github.com/Mellanox/ovs-tests/blob/master/test-ovs-vxlan-remove-tunnel-during-traffic.sh

Fix this by waiting for all sk_user_data reader to finish before
releasing the sock.

Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Jakub Sitnicki <[email protected]>
Fixes: 6a93cc9 ("udp-tunnel: Add a few more UDP tunnel APIs")
Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
cristibirsan pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 19, 2023
…g the sock

[ Upstream commit 3cf7203 ]

There is a race condition in vxlan that when deleting a vxlan device
during receiving packets, there is a possibility that the sock is
released after getting vxlan_sock vs from sk_user_data. Then in
later vxlan_ecn_decapsulate(), vxlan_get_sk_family() we will got
NULL pointer dereference. e.g.

   #0 [ffffa25ec6978a38] machine_kexec at ffffffff8c669757
   #1 [ffffa25ec6978a90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c0a4d
   #2 [ffffa25ec6978b58] crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c1c48
   #3 [ffffa25ec6978b60] oops_end at ffffffff8c627f2b
   #4 [ffffa25ec6978b80] page_fault_oops at ffffffff8c678fcb
   #5 [ffffa25ec6978bd8] exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d109542
   #6 [ffffa25ec6978c00] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d200b62
      [exception RIP: vxlan_ecn_decapsulate+0x3b]
      RIP: ffffffffc1014e7b  RSP: ffffa25ec6978cb0  RFLAGS: 00010246
      RAX: 0000000000000008  RBX: ffff8aa000888000  RCX: 0000000000000000
      RDX: 000000000000000e  RSI: ffff8a9fc7ab803e  RDI: ffff8a9fd1168700
      RBP: ffff8a9fc7ab803e   R8: 0000000000700000   R9: 00000000000010ae
      R10: ffff8a9fcb748980  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ffff8a9fd1168700
      R13: ffff8aa000888000  R14: 00000000002a0000  R15: 00000000000010ae
      ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
   #7 [ffffa25ec6978ce8] vxlan_rcv at ffffffffc10189cd [vxlan]
   #8 [ffffa25ec6978d90] udp_queue_rcv_one_skb at ffffffff8cfb6507
   #9 [ffffa25ec6978dc0] udp_unicast_rcv_skb at ffffffff8cfb6e45
  #10 [ffffa25ec6978dc8] __udp4_lib_rcv at ffffffff8cfb8807
  #11 [ffffa25ec6978e20] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu at ffffffff8cf76951
  #12 [ffffa25ec6978e48] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff8cf76bde
  #13 [ffffa25ec6978ea0] __netif_receive_skb_one_core at ffffffff8cecde9b
  #14 [ffffa25ec6978ec8] process_backlog at ffffffff8cece139
  #15 [ffffa25ec6978f00] __napi_poll at ffffffff8ceced1a
  #16 [ffffa25ec6978f28] net_rx_action at ffffffff8cecf1f3
  #17 [ffffa25ec6978fa0] __softirqentry_text_start at ffffffff8d4000ca
  #18 [ffffa25ec6978ff0] do_softirq at ffffffff8c6fbdc3

Reproducer: https://github.com/Mellanox/ovs-tests/blob/master/test-ovs-vxlan-remove-tunnel-during-traffic.sh

Fix this by waiting for all sk_user_data reader to finish before
releasing the sock.

Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Jakub Sitnicki <[email protected]>
Fixes: 6a93cc9 ("udp-tunnel: Add a few more UDP tunnel APIs")
Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
cristibirsan pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 19, 2023
[ Upstream commit e19c627 ]

The offset addition could overflow and pass the used size check given an
attribute with very large size (e.g., 0xffffff7f) while parsing MFT
attributes. This could lead to out-of-bound memory R/W if we try to
access the next attribute derived by Add2Ptr(attr, asize)

[   32.963847] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff956a83c76067
[   32.964301] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[   32.964526] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[   32.964893] PGD 4dc01067 P4D 4dc01067 PUD 0
[   32.965316] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[   32.965727] CPU: 0 PID: 243 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.19.0+ #6
[   32.966050] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[   32.966628] RIP: 0010:mi_enum_attr+0x44/0x110
[   32.967239] Code: 89 f0 48 29 c8 48 89 c1 39 c7 0f 86 94 00 00 00 8b 56 04 83 fa 17 0f 86 88 00 00 00 89 d0 01 ca 48 01 f0 8d 4a 08 39 f9a
[   32.968101] RSP: 0018:ffffba15c06a7c38 EFLAGS: 00000283
[   32.968364] RAX: ffff956a83c76067 RBX: ffff956983c76050 RCX: 000000000000006f
[   32.968651] RDX: 0000000000000067 RSI: ffff956983c760e8 RDI: 00000000000001c8
[   32.968963] RBP: ffffba15c06a7c38 R08: 0000000000000064 R09: 00000000ffffff7f
[   32.969249] R10: 0000000000000007 R11: ffff956983c760e8 R12: ffff95698225e000
[   32.969870] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffba15c06a7cd8 R15: ffff95698225e170
[   32.970655] FS:  00007fdab8189e40(0000) GS:ffff9569fdc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   32.971098] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   32.971378] CR2: ffff956a83c76067 CR3: 0000000002c58000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[   32.972098] Call Trace:
[   32.972842]  <TASK>
[   32.973341]  ni_enum_attr_ex+0xda/0xf0
[   32.974087]  ntfs_iget5+0x1db/0xde0
[   32.974386]  ? slab_post_alloc_hook+0x53/0x270
[   32.974778]  ? ntfs_fill_super+0x4c7/0x12a0
[   32.975115]  ntfs_fill_super+0x5d6/0x12a0
[   32.975336]  get_tree_bdev+0x175/0x270
[   32.975709]  ? put_ntfs+0x150/0x150
[   32.975956]  ntfs_fs_get_tree+0x15/0x20
[   32.976191]  vfs_get_tree+0x2a/0xc0
[   32.976374]  ? capable+0x19/0x20
[   32.976572]  path_mount+0x484/0xaa0
[   32.977025]  ? putname+0x57/0x70
[   32.977380]  do_mount+0x80/0xa0
[   32.977555]  __x64_sys_mount+0x8b/0xe0
[   32.978105]  do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[   32.978830]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[   32.979311] RIP: 0033:0x7fdab72e948a
[   32.980015] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008
[   32.981251] RSP: 002b:00007ffd15b87588 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[   32.981832] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000557de0aaf060 RCX: 00007fdab72e948a
[   32.982234] RDX: 0000557de0aaf260 RSI: 0000557de0aaf2e0 RDI: 0000557de0ab7ce0
[   32.982714] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000557de0aaf280 R09: 0000000000000020
[   32.983046] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000557de0ab7ce0
[   32.983494] R13: 0000557de0aaf260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff
[   32.984094]  </TASK>
[   32.984352] Modules linked in:
[   32.984753] CR2: ffff956a83c76067
[   32.985911] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[   32.986555] RIP: 0010:mi_enum_attr+0x44/0x110
[   32.987217] Code: 89 f0 48 29 c8 48 89 c1 39 c7 0f 86 94 00 00 00 8b 56 04 83 fa 17 0f 86 88 00 00 00 89 d0 01 ca 48 01 f0 8d 4a 08 39 f9a
[   32.988232] RSP: 0018:ffffba15c06a7c38 EFLAGS: 00000283
[   32.988532] RAX: ffff956a83c76067 RBX: ffff956983c76050 RCX: 000000000000006f
[   32.988916] RDX: 0000000000000067 RSI: ffff956983c760e8 RDI: 00000000000001c8
[   32.989356] RBP: ffffba15c06a7c38 R08: 0000000000000064 R09: 00000000ffffff7f
[   32.989994] R10: 0000000000000007 R11: ffff956983c760e8 R12: ffff95698225e000
[   32.990415] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffba15c06a7cd8 R15: ffff95698225e170
[   32.991011] FS:  00007fdab8189e40(0000) GS:ffff9569fdc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   32.991524] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   32.991936] CR2: ffff956a83c76067 CR3: 0000000002c58000 CR4: 00000000000006f0

This patch adds an overflow check

Signed-off-by: edward lo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
cristibirsan pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 19, 2023
commit 0fbcd8a upstream.

Mark arch_stack_walk() as noinstr instead of notrace and inline functions
called from arch_stack_walk() as __always_inline so that user does not
put any instrumentations on it, because this function can be used from
return_address() which is used by lockdep.

Without this, if the kernel built with CONFIG_LOCKDEP=y, just probing
arch_stack_walk() via <tracefs>/kprobe_events will crash the kernel on
arm64.

 # echo p arch_stack_walk >> ${TRACEFS}/kprobe_events
 # echo 1 > ${TRACEFS}/events/kprobes/enable
  kprobes: Failed to recover from reentered kprobes.
  kprobes: Dump kprobe:
  .symbol_name = arch_stack_walk, .offset = 0, .addr = arch_stack_walk+0x0/0x1c0
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c:241!
  kprobes: Failed to recover from reentered kprobes.
  kprobes: Dump kprobe:
  .symbol_name = arch_stack_walk, .offset = 0, .addr = arch_stack_walk+0x0/0x1c0
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c:241!
  PREEMPT SMP
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 0 PID: 17 Comm: migration/0 Tainted: G                 N 6.1.0-rc5+ #6
  Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
  Stopper: 0x0 <- 0x0
  pstate: 600003c5 (nZCv DAIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
  pc : kprobe_breakpoint_handler+0x178/0x17c
  lr : kprobe_breakpoint_handler+0x178/0x17c
  sp : ffff8000080d3090
  x29: ffff8000080d3090 x28: ffff0df5845798c0 x27: ffffc4f59057a774
  x26: ffff0df5ffbba770 x25: ffff0df58f420f18 x24: ffff49006f641000
  x23: ffffc4f590579768 x22: ffff0df58f420f18 x21: ffff8000080d31c0
  x20: ffffc4f590579768 x19: ffffc4f590579770 x18: 0000000000000006
  x17: 5f6b636174735f68 x16: 637261203d207264 x15: 64612e202c30203d
  x14: 2074657366666f2e x13: 30633178302f3078 x12: 302b6b6c61775f6b
  x11: 636174735f686372 x10: ffffc4f590dc5bd8 x9 : ffffc4f58eb31958
  x8 : 00000000ffffefff x7 : ffffc4f590dc5bd8 x6 : 80000000fffff000
  x5 : 000000000000bff4 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
  x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff0df5845798c0 x0 : 0000000000000064
  Call trace:
  kprobes: Failed to recover from reentered kprobes.
  kprobes: Dump kprobe:
  .symbol_name = arch_stack_walk, .offset = 0, .addr = arch_stack_walk+0x0/0x1c0
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c:241!

Fixes: 39ef362 ("arm64: Make return_address() use arch_stack_walk()")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166994751368.439920.3236636557520824664.stgit@devnote3
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
cristibirsan pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2023
[ Upstream commit e19c627 ]

The offset addition could overflow and pass the used size check given an
attribute with very large size (e.g., 0xffffff7f) while parsing MFT
attributes. This could lead to out-of-bound memory R/W if we try to
access the next attribute derived by Add2Ptr(attr, asize)

[   32.963847] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff956a83c76067
[   32.964301] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[   32.964526] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[   32.964893] PGD 4dc01067 P4D 4dc01067 PUD 0
[   32.965316] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[   32.965727] CPU: 0 PID: 243 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.19.0+ #6
[   32.966050] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[   32.966628] RIP: 0010:mi_enum_attr+0x44/0x110
[   32.967239] Code: 89 f0 48 29 c8 48 89 c1 39 c7 0f 86 94 00 00 00 8b 56 04 83 fa 17 0f 86 88 00 00 00 89 d0 01 ca 48 01 f0 8d 4a 08 39 f9a
[   32.968101] RSP: 0018:ffffba15c06a7c38 EFLAGS: 00000283
[   32.968364] RAX: ffff956a83c76067 RBX: ffff956983c76050 RCX: 000000000000006f
[   32.968651] RDX: 0000000000000067 RSI: ffff956983c760e8 RDI: 00000000000001c8
[   32.968963] RBP: ffffba15c06a7c38 R08: 0000000000000064 R09: 00000000ffffff7f
[   32.969249] R10: 0000000000000007 R11: ffff956983c760e8 R12: ffff95698225e000
[   32.969870] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffba15c06a7cd8 R15: ffff95698225e170
[   32.970655] FS:  00007fdab8189e40(0000) GS:ffff9569fdc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   32.971098] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   32.971378] CR2: ffff956a83c76067 CR3: 0000000002c58000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[   32.972098] Call Trace:
[   32.972842]  <TASK>
[   32.973341]  ni_enum_attr_ex+0xda/0xf0
[   32.974087]  ntfs_iget5+0x1db/0xde0
[   32.974386]  ? slab_post_alloc_hook+0x53/0x270
[   32.974778]  ? ntfs_fill_super+0x4c7/0x12a0
[   32.975115]  ntfs_fill_super+0x5d6/0x12a0
[   32.975336]  get_tree_bdev+0x175/0x270
[   32.975709]  ? put_ntfs+0x150/0x150
[   32.975956]  ntfs_fs_get_tree+0x15/0x20
[   32.976191]  vfs_get_tree+0x2a/0xc0
[   32.976374]  ? capable+0x19/0x20
[   32.976572]  path_mount+0x484/0xaa0
[   32.977025]  ? putname+0x57/0x70
[   32.977380]  do_mount+0x80/0xa0
[   32.977555]  __x64_sys_mount+0x8b/0xe0
[   32.978105]  do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[   32.978830]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[   32.979311] RIP: 0033:0x7fdab72e948a
[   32.980015] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008
[   32.981251] RSP: 002b:00007ffd15b87588 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[   32.981832] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000557de0aaf060 RCX: 00007fdab72e948a
[   32.982234] RDX: 0000557de0aaf260 RSI: 0000557de0aaf2e0 RDI: 0000557de0ab7ce0
[   32.982714] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000557de0aaf280 R09: 0000000000000020
[   32.983046] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000557de0ab7ce0
[   32.983494] R13: 0000557de0aaf260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff
[   32.984094]  </TASK>
[   32.984352] Modules linked in:
[   32.984753] CR2: ffff956a83c76067
[   32.985911] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[   32.986555] RIP: 0010:mi_enum_attr+0x44/0x110
[   32.987217] Code: 89 f0 48 29 c8 48 89 c1 39 c7 0f 86 94 00 00 00 8b 56 04 83 fa 17 0f 86 88 00 00 00 89 d0 01 ca 48 01 f0 8d 4a 08 39 f9a
[   32.988232] RSP: 0018:ffffba15c06a7c38 EFLAGS: 00000283
[   32.988532] RAX: ffff956a83c76067 RBX: ffff956983c76050 RCX: 000000000000006f
[   32.988916] RDX: 0000000000000067 RSI: ffff956983c760e8 RDI: 00000000000001c8
[   32.989356] RBP: ffffba15c06a7c38 R08: 0000000000000064 R09: 00000000ffffff7f
[   32.989994] R10: 0000000000000007 R11: ffff956983c760e8 R12: ffff95698225e000
[   32.990415] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffba15c06a7cd8 R15: ffff95698225e170
[   32.991011] FS:  00007fdab8189e40(0000) GS:ffff9569fdc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   32.991524] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   32.991936] CR2: ffff956a83c76067 CR3: 0000000002c58000 CR4: 00000000000006f0

This patch adds an overflow check

Signed-off-by: edward lo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
cristibirsan pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2023
[ Upstream commit b18cba0 ]

Commit 9130b8d ("SUNRPC: allow for upcalls for the same uid
but different gss service") introduced `auth` argument to
__gss_find_upcall(), but in gss_pipe_downcall() it was left as NULL
since it (and auth->service) was not (yet) determined.

When multiple upcalls with the same uid and different service are
ongoing, it could happen that __gss_find_upcall(), which returns the
first match found in the pipe->in_downcall list, could not find the
correct gss_msg corresponding to the downcall we are looking for.
Moreover, it might return a msg which is not sent to rpc.gssd yet.

We could see mount.nfs process hung in D state with multiple mount.nfs
are executed in parallel.  The call trace below is of CentOS 7.9
kernel-3.10.0-1160.24.1.el7.x86_64 but we observed the same hang w/
elrepo kernel-ml-6.0.7-1.el7.

PID: 71258  TASK: ffff91ebd4be0000  CPU: 36  COMMAND: "mount.nfs"
 #0 [ffff9203ca3234f8] __schedule at ffffffffa3b8899f
 #1 [ffff9203ca323580] schedule at ffffffffa3b88eb9
 #2 [ffff9203ca323590] gss_cred_init at ffffffffc0355818 [auth_rpcgss]
 #3 [ffff9203ca323658] rpcauth_lookup_credcache at ffffffffc0421ebc
[sunrpc]
 #4 [ffff9203ca3236d8] gss_lookup_cred at ffffffffc0353633 [auth_rpcgss]
 #5 [ffff9203ca3236e8] rpcauth_lookupcred at ffffffffc0421581 [sunrpc]
 #6 [ffff9203ca323740] rpcauth_refreshcred at ffffffffc04223d3 [sunrpc]
 #7 [ffff9203ca3237a0] call_refresh at ffffffffc04103dc [sunrpc]
 #8 [ffff9203ca3237b8] __rpc_execute at ffffffffc041e1c9 [sunrpc]
 #9 [ffff9203ca323820] rpc_execute at ffffffffc0420a48 [sunrpc]

The scenario is like this. Let's say there are two upcalls for
services A and B, A -> B in pipe->in_downcall, B -> A in pipe->pipe.

When rpc.gssd reads pipe to get the upcall msg corresponding to
service B from pipe->pipe and then writes the response, in
gss_pipe_downcall the msg corresponding to service A will be picked
because only uid is used to find the msg and it is before the one for
B in pipe->in_downcall.  And the process waiting for the msg
corresponding to service A will be woken up.

Actual scheduing of that process might be after rpc.gssd processes the
next msg.  In rpc_pipe_generic_upcall it clears msg->errno (for A).
The process is scheduled to see gss_msg->ctx == NULL and
gss_msg->msg.errno == 0, therefore it cannot break the loop in
gss_create_upcall and is never woken up after that.

This patch adds a simple check to ensure that a msg which is not
sent to rpc.gssd yet is not chosen as the matching upcall upon
receiving a downcall.

Signed-off-by: minoura makoto <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <[email protected]>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
Fixes: 9130b8d ("SUNRPC: allow for upcalls for same uid but different gss service")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
cristibirsan pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2023
commit 704f338 upstream.

Check carefully on root debugfs available when destroying vgpu,
e.g in remove case drm minor's debugfs root might already be destroyed,
which led to kernel oops like below.

Console: switching to colour dummy device 80x25
i915 0000:00:02.0: MDEV: Unregistering
intel_vgpu_mdev b1338b2d-a709-4c23-b766-cc436c36cdf0: Removing from iommu group 14
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000150
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 3 PID: 1046 Comm: driverctl Not tainted 6.1.0-rc2+ #6
Hardware name: HP HP ProDesk 600 G3 MT/829D, BIOS P02 Ver. 02.44 09/13/2022
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x5e2/0x1f90
Code: 87 ad 09 00 00 39 05 e1 1e cc 02 0f 82 f1 09 00 00 ba 01 00 00 00 48 83 c4 48 89 d0 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 45 31 ff <48> 81 3f 60 9e c2 b6 45 0f 45 f8 83 fe 01 0f 87 55 fa ff ff 89 f0
RSP: 0018:ffff9f770274f948 EFLAGS: 00010046
RAX: 0000000000000003 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000150
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8895d1173300 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000150 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  00007fc9b2ba0740(0000) GS:ffff889cdfcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000150 CR3: 000000010fd93005 CR4: 00000000003706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 lock_acquire+0xbf/0x2b0
 ? simple_recursive_removal+0xa5/0x2b0
 ? lock_release+0x13d/0x2d0
 down_write+0x2a/0xd0
 ? simple_recursive_removal+0xa5/0x2b0
 simple_recursive_removal+0xa5/0x2b0
 ? start_creating.part.0+0x110/0x110
 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x40
 debugfs_remove+0x40/0x60
 intel_gvt_debugfs_remove_vgpu+0x15/0x30 [kvmgt]
 intel_gvt_destroy_vgpu+0x60/0x100 [kvmgt]
 intel_vgpu_release_dev+0xe/0x20 [kvmgt]
 device_release+0x30/0x80
 kobject_put+0x79/0x1b0
 device_release_driver_internal+0x1b8/0x230
 bus_remove_device+0xec/0x160
 device_del+0x189/0x400
 ? up_write+0x9c/0x1b0
 ? mdev_device_remove_common+0x60/0x60 [mdev]
 mdev_device_remove_common+0x22/0x60 [mdev]
 mdev_device_remove_cb+0x17/0x20 [mdev]
 device_for_each_child+0x56/0x80
 mdev_unregister_parent+0x5a/0x81 [mdev]
 intel_gvt_clean_device+0x2d/0xe0 [kvmgt]
 intel_gvt_driver_remove+0x2e/0xb0 [i915]
 i915_driver_remove+0xac/0x100 [i915]
 i915_pci_remove+0x1a/0x30 [i915]
 pci_device_remove+0x31/0xa0
 device_release_driver_internal+0x1b8/0x230
 unbind_store+0xd8/0x100
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x156/0x210
 vfs_write+0x236/0x4a0
 ksys_write+0x61/0xd0
 do_syscall_64+0x55/0x80
 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
 ? lock_release+0x13d/0x2d0
 ? up_read+0x17/0x20
 ? lock_is_held_type+0xe3/0x140
 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
RIP: 0033:0x7fc9b2c9e0c4
Code: 15 71 7d 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d 3d 05 0e 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffec29c81c8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000d RCX: 00007fc9b2c9e0c4
RDX: 000000000000000d RSI: 0000559f8b5f48a0 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 0000559f8b5f48a0 R08: 0000559f8b5f3540 R09: 00007fc9b2d76d30
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000000000000000d
R13: 00007fc9b2d77780 R14: 000000000000000d R15: 00007fc9b2d72a00
 </TASK>
Modules linked in: sunrpc intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common intel_pmc_core_pltdrv intel_pmc_core intel_tcc_cooling x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel ee1004 igbvf rapl vfat fat intel_cstate intel_uncore pktcdvd i2c_i801 pcspkr wmi_bmof i2c_smbus acpi_pad vfio_pci vfio_pci_core vfio_virqfd zram fuse dm_multipath kvmgt mdev vfio_iommu_type1 vfio kvm irqbypass i915 nvme e1000e igb nvme_core crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel polyval_clmulni polyval_generic serio_raw ghash_clmulni_intel sha512_ssse3 dca drm_buddy intel_gtt video wmi drm_display_helper ttm
CR2: 0000000000000150
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Cc: Wang Zhi <[email protected]>
Cc: He Yu <[email protected]>
Cc: Alex Williamson <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Zhi Wang <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yu He <[email protected]>
Fixes: bc7b0be ("drm/i915/gvt: Add basic debugfs infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Zhenyu Wang <[email protected]>
Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
cristibirsan pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2023
commit c6ec929 upstream.

In Google internal bug 265639009 we've received an (as yet) unreproducible
crash report from an aarch64 GKI 5.10.149-android13 running device.

AFAICT the source code is at:
  https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/common/+/refs/tags/ASB-2022-12-05_13-5.10

The call stack is:
  ncm_close() -> ncm_notify() -> ncm_do_notify()
with the crash at:
  ncm_do_notify+0x98/0x270
Code: 79000d0b b9000a6c f940012a f9400269 (b9405d4b)

Which I believe disassembles to (I don't know ARM assembly, but it looks sane enough to me...):

  // halfword (16-bit) store presumably to event->wLength (at offset 6 of struct usb_cdc_notification)
  0B 0D 00 79    strh w11, [x8, #6]

  // word (32-bit) store presumably to req->Length (at offset 8 of struct usb_request)
  6C 0A 00 B9    str  w12, [x19, #8]

  // x10 (NULL) was read here from offset 0 of valid pointer x9
  // IMHO we're reading 'cdev->gadget' and getting NULL
  // gadget is indeed at offset 0 of struct usb_composite_dev
  2A 01 40 F9    ldr  x10, [x9]

  // loading req->buf pointer, which is at offset 0 of struct usb_request
  69 02 40 F9    ldr  x9, [x19]

  // x10 is null, crash, appears to be attempt to read cdev->gadget->max_speed
  4B 5D 40 B9    ldr  w11, [x10, #0x5c]

which seems to line up with ncm_do_notify() case NCM_NOTIFY_SPEED code fragment:

  event->wLength = cpu_to_le16(8);
  req->length = NCM_STATUS_BYTECOUNT;

  /* SPEED_CHANGE data is up/down speeds in bits/sec */
  data = req->buf + sizeof *event;
  data[0] = cpu_to_le32(ncm_bitrate(cdev->gadget));

My analysis of registers and NULL ptr deref crash offset
  (Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000000000000005c)
heavily suggests that the crash is due to 'cdev->gadget' being NULL when executing:
  data[0] = cpu_to_le32(ncm_bitrate(cdev->gadget));
which calls:
  ncm_bitrate(NULL)
which then calls:
  gadget_is_superspeed(NULL)
which reads
  ((struct usb_gadget *)NULL)->max_speed
and hits a panic.

AFAICT, if I'm counting right, the offset of max_speed is indeed 0x5C.
(remember there's a GKI KABI reservation of 16 bytes in struct work_struct)

It's not at all clear to me how this is all supposed to work...
but returning 0 seems much better than panic-ing...

Cc: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <[email protected]>
Cc: Carlos Llamas <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
cristibirsan pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2023
[ Upstream commit 6c4ca03 ]

During EEH error injection testing, a deadlock was encountered in the tg3
driver when tg3_io_error_detected() was attempting to cancel outstanding
reset tasks:

crash> foreach UN bt
...
PID: 159    TASK: c0000000067c6000  CPU: 8   COMMAND: "eehd"
...
 #5 [c00000000681f990] __cancel_work_timer at c00000000019fd18
 #6 [c00000000681fa30] tg3_io_error_detected at c00800000295f098 [tg3]
 #7 [c00000000681faf0] eeh_report_error at c00000000004e25c
...

PID: 290    TASK: c000000036e5f800  CPU: 6   COMMAND: "kworker/6:1"
...
 #4 [c00000003721fbc0] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8
 #5 [c00000003721fbe0] tg3_reset_task at c008000002969358 [tg3]
 #6 [c00000003721fc60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4
...

PID: 296    TASK: c000000037a65800  CPU: 21  COMMAND: "kworker/21:1"
...
 #4 [c000000037247bc0] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8
 #5 [c000000037247be0] tg3_reset_task at c008000002969358 [tg3]
 #6 [c000000037247c60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4
...

PID: 655    TASK: c000000036f49000  CPU: 16  COMMAND: "kworker/16:2"
...:1

 #4 [c0000000373ebbc0] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8
 #5 [c0000000373ebbe0] tg3_reset_task at c008000002969358 [tg3]
 #6 [c0000000373ebc60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4
...

Code inspection shows that both tg3_io_error_detected() and
tg3_reset_task() attempt to acquire the RTNL lock at the beginning of
their code blocks.  If tg3_reset_task() should happen to execute between
the times when tg3_io_error_deteced() acquires the RTNL lock and
tg3_reset_task_cancel() is called, a deadlock will occur.

Moving tg3_reset_task_cancel() call earlier within the code block, prior
to acquiring RTNL, prevents this from happening, but also exposes another
deadlock issue where tg3_reset_task() may execute AFTER
tg3_io_error_detected() has executed:

crash> foreach UN bt
PID: 159    TASK: c0000000067d2000  CPU: 9   COMMAND: "eehd"
...
 #4 [c000000006867a60] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8
 #5 [c000000006867a80] tg3_io_slot_reset at c0080000026c2ea8 [tg3]
 #6 [c000000006867b00] eeh_report_reset at c00000000004de88
...
PID: 363    TASK: c000000037564000  CPU: 6   COMMAND: "kworker/6:1"
...
 #3 [c000000036c1bb70] msleep at c000000000259e6c
 #4 [c000000036c1bba0] napi_disable at c000000000c6b848
 #5 [c000000036c1bbe0] tg3_reset_task at c0080000026d942c [tg3]
 #6 [c000000036c1bc60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4
...

This issue can be avoided by aborting tg3_reset_task() if EEH error
recovery is already in progress.

Fixes: db84bf4 ("tg3: tg3_reset_task() needs to use rtnl_lock to synchronize")
Signed-off-by: David Christensen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavan Chebbi <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
cristibirsan pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 30, 2023
commit 60eed1e upstream.

code path:

ocfs2_ioctl_move_extents
 ocfs2_move_extents
  ocfs2_defrag_extent
   __ocfs2_move_extent
    + ocfs2_journal_access_di
    + ocfs2_split_extent  //sub-paths call jbd2_journal_restart
    + ocfs2_journal_dirty //crash by jbs2 ASSERT

crash stacks:

PID: 11297  TASK: ffff974a676dcd00  CPU: 67  COMMAND: "defragfs.ocfs2"
 #0 [ffffb25d8dad3900] machine_kexec at ffffffff8386fe01
 #1 [ffffb25d8dad3958] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8395959d
 #2 [ffffb25d8dad3a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff8395a45d
 #3 [ffffb25d8dad3a38] oops_end at ffffffff83836d3f
 #4 [ffffb25d8dad3a58] do_trap at ffffffff83833205
 #5 [ffffb25d8dad3aa0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff83833aa6
 #6 [ffffb25d8dad3ac0] invalid_op at ffffffff84200d18
    [exception RIP: jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata+0x2ba]
    RIP: ffffffffc09ca54a  RSP: ffffb25d8dad3b70  RFLAGS: 00010207
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff9706eedc5248  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 0000000000000001  RSI: ffff97337029ea28  RDI: ffff9706eedc5250
    RBP: ffff9703c3520200   R8: 000000000f46b0b2   R9: 0000000000000000
    R10: 0000000000000001  R11: 00000001000000fe  R12: ffff97337029ea28
    R13: 0000000000000000  R14: ffff9703de59bf60  R15: ffff9706eedc5250
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #7 [ffffb25d8dad3ba8] ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc137fb95 [ocfs2]
 #8 [ffffb25d8dad3be8] __ocfs2_move_extent at ffffffffc139a950 [ocfs2]
 #9 [ffffb25d8dad3c80] ocfs2_defrag_extent at ffffffffc139b2d2 [ocfs2]

Analysis

This bug has the same root cause of 'commit 7f27ec9 ("ocfs2: call
ocfs2_journal_access_di() before ocfs2_journal_dirty() in
ocfs2_write_end_nolock()")'.  For this bug, jbd2_journal_restart() is
called by ocfs2_split_extent() during defragmenting.

How to fix

For ocfs2_split_extent() can handle journal operations totally by itself.
Caller doesn't need to call journal access/dirty pair, and caller only
needs to call journal start/stop pair.  The fix method is to remove
journal access/dirty from __ocfs2_move_extent().

The discussion for this patch:
https://oss.oracle.com/pipermail/ocfs2-devel/2023-February/000647.html

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Heming Zhao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Cc: Changwei Ge <[email protected]>
Cc: Gang He <[email protected]>
Cc: Jun Piao <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
cristibirsan pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 30, 2023
[ Upstream commit 4e264be ]

When a system with E810 with existing VFs gets rebooted the following
hang may be observed.

 Pid 1 is hung in iavf_remove(), part of a network driver:
 PID: 1        TASK: ffff965400e5a340  CPU: 24   COMMAND: "systemd-shutdow"
  #0 [ffffaad04005fa50] __schedule at ffffffff8b3239cb
  #1 [ffffaad04005fae8] schedule at ffffffff8b323e2d
  #2 [ffffaad04005fb00] schedule_hrtimeout_range_clock at ffffffff8b32cebc
  #3 [ffffaad04005fb80] usleep_range_state at ffffffff8b32c930
  #4 [ffffaad04005fbb0] iavf_remove at ffffffffc12b9b4c [iavf]
  #5 [ffffaad04005fbf0] pci_device_remove at ffffffff8add7513
  #6 [ffffaad04005fc10] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff8af08baa
  #7 [ffffaad04005fc40] pci_stop_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc5fc
  #8 [ffffaad04005fc60] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc81e
  #9 [ffffaad04005fc70] pci_iov_remove_virtfn at ffffffff8adf9429
 #10 [ffffaad04005fca8] sriov_disable at ffffffff8adf98e4
 #11 [ffffaad04005fcc8] ice_free_vfs at ffffffffc04bb2c8 [ice]
 #12 [ffffaad04005fd10] ice_remove at ffffffffc04778fe [ice]
 #13 [ffffaad04005fd38] ice_shutdown at ffffffffc0477946 [ice]
 #14 [ffffaad04005fd50] pci_device_shutdown at ffffffff8add58f1
 #15 [ffffaad04005fd70] device_shutdown at ffffffff8af05386
 #16 [ffffaad04005fd98] kernel_restart at ffffffff8a92a870
 #17 [ffffaad04005fda8] __do_sys_reboot at ffffffff8a92abd6
 #18 [ffffaad04005fee0] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317159
 #19 [ffffaad04005ff08] __context_tracking_enter at ffffffff8b31b6fc
 #20 [ffffaad04005ff18] syscall_exit_to_user_mode at ffffffff8b31b50d
 #21 [ffffaad04005ff28] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317169
 #22 [ffffaad04005ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8b40009b
     RIP: 00007f1baa5c13d7  RSP: 00007fffbcc55a98  RFLAGS: 00000202
     RAX: ffffffffffffffda  RBX: 0000000000000000  RCX: 00007f1baa5c13d7
     RDX: 0000000001234567  RSI: 0000000028121969  RDI: 00000000fee1dead
     RBP: 00007fffbcc55ca0   R8: 0000000000000000   R9: 00007fffbcc54e90
     R10: 00007fffbcc55050  R11: 0000000000000202  R12: 0000000000000005
     R13: 0000000000000000  R14: 00007fffbcc55af0  R15: 0000000000000000
     ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a9  CS: 0033  SS: 002b

During reboot all drivers PM shutdown callbacks are invoked.
In iavf_shutdown() the adapter state is changed to __IAVF_REMOVE.
In ice_shutdown() the call chain above is executed, which at some point
calls iavf_remove(). However iavf_remove() expects the VF to be in one
of the states __IAVF_RUNNING, __IAVF_DOWN or __IAVF_INIT_FAILED. If
that's not the case it sleeps forever.
So if iavf_shutdown() gets invoked before iavf_remove() the system will
hang indefinitely because the adapter is already in state __IAVF_REMOVE.

Fix this by returning from iavf_remove() if the state is __IAVF_REMOVE,
as we already went through iavf_shutdown().

Fixes: 9745780 ("iavf: Add waiting so the port is initialized in remove")
Fixes: a841733 ("iavf: Fix race condition between iavf_shutdown and iavf_remove")
Reported-by: Marius Cornea <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Assmann <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michal Kubiak <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
cristibirsan pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 30, 2023
commit 7ff8491 upstream.

Commit 6930bcb dropped the setting of the file_lock range when
decoding a nlm_lock off the wire. This causes the client side grant
callback to miss matching blocks and reject the lock, only to rerequest
it 30s later.

Add a helper function to set the file_lock range from the start and end
values that the protocol uses, and have the nlm_lock decoder call that to
set up the file_lock args properly.

Fixes: 6930bcb ("lockd: detect and reject lock arguments that overflow")
Reported-by: Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] #6.0
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
cristibirsan pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 28, 2023
[ Upstream commit 99d4850 ]

Found by leak sanitizer:
```
==1632594==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

Direct leak of 21 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f2953a7077b in __interceptor_strdup ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439
    #1 0x556701d6fbbf in perf_env__read_cpuid util/env.c:369
    #2 0x556701d70589 in perf_env__cpuid util/env.c:465
    #3 0x55670204bba2 in x86__is_amd_cpu arch/x86/util/env.c:14
    #4 0x5567020487a2 in arch__post_evsel_config arch/x86/util/evsel.c:83
    #5 0x556701d8f78b in evsel__config util/evsel.c:1366
    #6 0x556701ef5872 in evlist__config util/record.c:108
    #7 0x556701cd6bcd in test__PERF_RECORD tests/perf-record.c:112
    #8 0x556701cacd07 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:236
    #9 0x556701cacfac in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:265
    #10 0x556701cadddb in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:402
    #11 0x556701caf2aa in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:559
    #12 0x556701d3b557 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:323
    #13 0x556701d3bac8 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:377
    #14 0x556701d3be90 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:421
    #15 0x556701d3c3f8 in main tools/perf/perf.c:537
    #16 0x7f2952a46189 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 21 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).
```

Fixes: f7b58cb ("perf mem/c2c: Add load store event mappings for AMD")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ravi Bangoria <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
cristibirsan pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 28, 2023
[ Upstream commit b684c09 ]

ppc_save_regs() skips one stack frame while saving the CPU register states.
Instead of saving current R1, it pulls the previous stack frame pointer.

When vmcores caused by direct panic call (such as `echo c >
/proc/sysrq-trigger`), are debugged with gdb, gdb fails to show the
backtrace correctly. On further analysis, it was found that it was because
of mismatch between r1 and NIP.

GDB uses NIP to get current function symbol and uses corresponding debug
info of that function to unwind previous frames, but due to the
mismatching r1 and NIP, the unwinding does not work, and it fails to
unwind to the 2nd frame and hence does not show the backtrace.

GDB backtrace with vmcore of kernel without this patch:

---------
(gdb) bt
 #0  0xc0000000002a53e8 in crash_setup_regs (oldregs=<optimized out>,
    newregs=0xc000000004f8f8d8) at ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/kexec.h:69
 #1  __crash_kexec (regs=<optimized out>) at kernel/kexec_core.c:974
 #2  0x0000000000000063 in ?? ()
 #3  0xc000000003579320 in ?? ()
---------

Further analysis revealed that the mismatch occurred because
"ppc_save_regs" was saving the previous stack's SP instead of the current
r1. This patch fixes this by storing current r1 in the saved pt_regs.

GDB backtrace with vmcore of patched kernel:

--------
(gdb) bt
 #0  0xc0000000002a53e8 in crash_setup_regs (oldregs=0x0, newregs=0xc00000000670b8d8)
    at ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/kexec.h:69
 #1  __crash_kexec (regs=regs@entry=0x0) at kernel/kexec_core.c:974
 #2  0xc000000000168918 in panic (fmt=fmt@entry=0xc000000001654a60 "sysrq triggered crash\n")
    at kernel/panic.c:358
 #3  0xc000000000b735f8 in sysrq_handle_crash (key=<optimized out>) at drivers/tty/sysrq.c:155
 #4  0xc000000000b742cc in __handle_sysrq (key=key@entry=99, check_mask=check_mask@entry=false)
    at drivers/tty/sysrq.c:602
 #5  0xc000000000b7506c in write_sysrq_trigger (file=<optimized out>, buf=<optimized out>,
    count=2, ppos=<optimized out>) at drivers/tty/sysrq.c:1163
 #6  0xc00000000069a7bc in pde_write (ppos=<optimized out>, count=<optimized out>,
    buf=<optimized out>, file=<optimized out>, pde=0xc00000000362cb40) at fs/proc/inode.c:340
 #7  proc_reg_write (file=<optimized out>, buf=<optimized out>, count=<optimized out>,
    ppos=<optimized out>) at fs/proc/inode.c:352
 #8  0xc0000000005b3bbc in vfs_write (file=file@entry=0xc000000006aa6b00,
    buf=buf@entry=0x61f498b4f60 <error: Cannot access memory at address 0x61f498b4f60>,
    count=count@entry=2, pos=pos@entry=0xc00000000670bda0) at fs/read_write.c:582
 #9  0xc0000000005b4264 in ksys_write (fd=<optimized out>,
    buf=0x61f498b4f60 <error: Cannot access memory at address 0x61f498b4f60>, count=2)
    at fs/read_write.c:637
 #10 0xc00000000002ea2c in system_call_exception (regs=0xc00000000670be80, r0=<optimized out>)
    at arch/powerpc/kernel/syscall.c:171
 #11 0xc00000000000c270 in system_call_vectored_common ()
    at arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt_64.S:192
--------

Nick adds:
  So this now saves regs as though it was an interrupt taken in the
  caller, at the instruction after the call to ppc_save_regs, whereas
  previously the NIP was there, but R1 came from the caller's caller and
  that mismatch is what causes gdb's dwarf unwinder to go haywire.

Signed-off-by: Aditya Gupta <[email protected]>
Fixes: d16a58f ("powerpc: Improve ppc_save_regs()")
Reivewed-by: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Link: https://msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
cristibirsan pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 25, 2023
[ Upstream commit 7962ef1 ]

In 3cb4d5e ("perf trace: Free syscall tp fields in
evsel->priv") it only was freeing if strcmp(evsel->tp_format->system,
"syscalls") returned zero, while the corresponding initialization of
evsel->priv was being performed if it was _not_ zero, i.e. if the tp
system wasn't 'syscalls'.

Just stop looking for that and free it if evsel->priv was set, which
should be equivalent.

Also use the pre-existing evsel_trace__delete() function.

This resolves these leaks, detected with:

  $ make EXTRA_CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address" BUILD_BPF_SKEL=1 CORESIGHT=1 O=/tmp/build/perf-tools-next -C tools/perf install-bin

  =================================================================
  ==481565==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

  Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x7f7343cba097 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xba097)
      #1 0x987966 in zalloc (/home/acme/bin/perf+0x987966)
      #2 0x52f9b9 in evsel_trace__new /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:307
      #3 0x52f9b9 in evsel__syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:333
      #4 0x52f9b9 in evsel__init_raw_syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:458
      #5 0x52f9b9 in perf_evsel__raw_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:480
      #6 0x540e8b in trace__add_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3212
      #7 0x540e8b in trace__run /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3891
      #8 0x540e8b in cmd_trace /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5156
      #9 0x5ef262 in run_builtin /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:323
      #10 0x4196da in handle_internal_command /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:377
      #11 0x4196da in run_argv /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:421
      #12 0x4196da in main /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:537
      #13 0x7f7342c4a50f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2750f)

  Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x7f7343cba097 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xba097)
      #1 0x987966 in zalloc (/home/acme/bin/perf+0x987966)
      #2 0x52f9b9 in evsel_trace__new /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:307
      #3 0x52f9b9 in evsel__syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:333
      #4 0x52f9b9 in evsel__init_raw_syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:458
      #5 0x52f9b9 in perf_evsel__raw_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:480
      #6 0x540dd1 in trace__add_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3205
      #7 0x540dd1 in trace__run /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3891
      #8 0x540dd1 in cmd_trace /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5156
      #9 0x5ef262 in run_builtin /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:323
      #10 0x4196da in handle_internal_command /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:377
      #11 0x4196da in run_argv /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:421
      #12 0x4196da in main /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:537
      #13 0x7f7342c4a50f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2750f)

  SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 80 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s).
  [root@quaco ~]#

With this we plug all leaks with "perf trace sleep 1".

Fixes: 3cb4d5e ("perf trace: Free syscall tp fields in evsel->priv")
Acked-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Riccardo Mancini <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
cristibirsan pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 25, 2023
[ Upstream commit ef23cb5 ]

While debugging a segfault on 'perf lock contention' without an
available perf.data file I noticed that it was basically calling:

	perf_session__delete(ERR_PTR(-1))

Resulting in:

  (gdb) run lock contention
  Starting program: /root/bin/perf lock contention
  [Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled]
  Using host libthread_db library "/lib64/libthread_db.so.1".
  failed to open perf.data: No such file or directory  (try 'perf record' first)
  Initializing perf session failed

  Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
  0x00000000005e7515 in auxtrace__free (session=0xffffffffffffffff) at util/auxtrace.c:2858
  2858		if (!session->auxtrace)
  (gdb) p session
  $1 = (struct perf_session *) 0xffffffffffffffff
  (gdb) bt
  #0  0x00000000005e7515 in auxtrace__free (session=0xffffffffffffffff) at util/auxtrace.c:2858
  #1  0x000000000057bb4d in perf_session__delete (session=0xffffffffffffffff) at util/session.c:300
  #2  0x000000000047c421 in __cmd_contention (argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at builtin-lock.c:2161
  #3  0x000000000047dc95 in cmd_lock (argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at builtin-lock.c:2604
  #4  0x0000000000501466 in run_builtin (p=0xe597a8 <commands+552>, argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at perf.c:322
  #5  0x00000000005016d5 in handle_internal_command (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at perf.c:375
  #6  0x0000000000501824 in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffe02c, argv=0x7fffffffe020) at perf.c:419
  #7  0x0000000000501b11 in main (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at perf.c:535
  (gdb)

So just set it to NULL after using PTR_ERR(session) to decode the error
as perf_session__delete(NULL) is supported.

The same problem was found in 'perf top' after an audit of all
perf_session__new() failure handling.

Fixes: 6ef81c5 ("perf session: Return error code for perf_session__new() function on failure")
Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc: Jeremie Galarneau <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Kate Stewart <[email protected]>
Cc: Mamatha Inamdar <[email protected]>
Cc: Mukesh Ojha <[email protected]>
Cc: Nageswara R Sastry <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <[email protected]>
Cc: Shawn Landden <[email protected]>
Cc: Song Liu <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Tzvetomir Stoyanov <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
cristibirsan pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 25, 2023
[ Upstream commit 0bc36c0 ]

user->unix_inflight is changed under spin_lock(unix_gc_lock),
but too_many_unix_fds() reads it locklessly.

Let's annotate the write/read accesses to user->unix_inflight.

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in unix_attach_fds / unix_inflight

write to 0xffffffff8546f2d0 of 8 bytes by task 44798 on cpu 1:
 unix_inflight+0x157/0x180 net/unix/scm.c:66
 unix_attach_fds+0x147/0x1e0 net/unix/scm.c:123
 unix_scm_to_skb net/unix/af_unix.c:1827 [inline]
 unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x46a/0x14f0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1950
 unix_seqpacket_sendmsg net/unix/af_unix.c:2308 [inline]
 unix_seqpacket_sendmsg+0xba/0x130 net/unix/af_unix.c:2292
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:725 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0x148/0x160 net/socket.c:748
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x4e4/0x610 net/socket.c:2494
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xc6/0x140 net/socket.c:2548
 __sys_sendmsg+0x94/0x140 net/socket.c:2577
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2586 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2584 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x45/0x50 net/socket.c:2584
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8

read to 0xffffffff8546f2d0 of 8 bytes by task 44814 on cpu 0:
 too_many_unix_fds net/unix/scm.c:101 [inline]
 unix_attach_fds+0x54/0x1e0 net/unix/scm.c:110
 unix_scm_to_skb net/unix/af_unix.c:1827 [inline]
 unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x46a/0x14f0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1950
 unix_seqpacket_sendmsg net/unix/af_unix.c:2308 [inline]
 unix_seqpacket_sendmsg+0xba/0x130 net/unix/af_unix.c:2292
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:725 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0x148/0x160 net/socket.c:748
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x4e4/0x610 net/socket.c:2494
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xc6/0x140 net/socket.c:2548
 __sys_sendmsg+0x94/0x140 net/socket.c:2577
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2586 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2584 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x45/0x50 net/socket.c:2584
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8

value changed: 0x000000000000000c -> 0x000000000000000d

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 44814 Comm: systemd-coredum Not tainted 6.4.0-11989-g6843306689af #6
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014

Fixes: 712f4aa ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: syzkaller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
cristibirsan pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 25, 2023
[ Upstream commit afe8764 ]

sk->sk_shutdown is changed under unix_state_lock(sk), but
unix_dgram_sendmsg() calls two functions to read sk_shutdown locklessly.

  sock_alloc_send_pskb
  `- sock_wait_for_wmem

Let's use READ_ONCE() there.

Note that the writer side was marked by commit e1d09c2 ("af_unix:
Fix data races around sk->sk_shutdown.").

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in sock_alloc_send_pskb / unix_release_sock

write (marked) to 0xffff8880069af12c of 1 bytes by task 1 on cpu 1:
 unix_release_sock+0x75c/0x910 net/unix/af_unix.c:631
 unix_release+0x59/0x80 net/unix/af_unix.c:1053
 __sock_release+0x7d/0x170 net/socket.c:654
 sock_close+0x19/0x30 net/socket.c:1386
 __fput+0x2a3/0x680 fs/file_table.c:384
 ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:412
 task_work_run+0x116/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:179
 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:171 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x174/0x180 kernel/entry/common.c:204
 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:286 [inline]
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1a/0x30 kernel/entry/common.c:297
 do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8

read to 0xffff8880069af12c of 1 bytes by task 28650 on cpu 0:
 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xd2/0x620 net/core/sock.c:2767
 unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x2f8/0x14f0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1944
 unix_seqpacket_sendmsg net/unix/af_unix.c:2308 [inline]
 unix_seqpacket_sendmsg+0xba/0x130 net/unix/af_unix.c:2292
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:725 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0x148/0x160 net/socket.c:748
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x4e4/0x610 net/socket.c:2494
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xc6/0x140 net/socket.c:2548
 __sys_sendmsg+0x94/0x140 net/socket.c:2577
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2586 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2584 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x45/0x50 net/socket.c:2584
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8

value changed: 0x00 -> 0x03

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 28650 Comm: systemd-coredum Not tainted 6.4.0-11989-g6843306689af #6
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014

Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzkaller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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