Initialize README #1

PlaidCat · 2024-09-09T22:34:49Z

Basical Boiler Plate explination of how this repo will work.

gvrose8192

Thanks Maple!

jira LE-1907 cve CVE-2024-27014 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-4.18.0-553.5.1.el8_10 commit-author Carolina Jubran <[email protected]> commit fef9657 When disabling aRFS under the `priv->state_lock`, any scheduled aRFS works are canceled using the `cancel_work_sync` function, which waits for the work to end if it has already started. However, while waiting for the work handler, the handler will try to acquire the `state_lock` which is already acquired. The worker acquires the lock to delete the rules if the state is down, which is not the worker's responsibility since disabling aRFS deletes the rules. Add an aRFS state variable, which indicates whether the aRFS is enabled and prevent adding rules when the aRFS is disabled. Kernel log: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.7.0-rc4_net_next_mlx5_5483eb2 #1 Tainted: G I ------------------------------------------------------ ethtool/386089 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88810f21ce68 ((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 but task is already holding lock: ffff8884a1808cc0 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0x53/0x200 [mlx5_core] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x80/0xc90 arfs_handle_work+0x4b/0x3b0 [mlx5_core] process_one_work+0x1dc/0x4a0 worker_thread+0x1bf/0x3c0 kthread+0xd7/0x100 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x17b4/0x2c80 lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0 __flush_work+0x7a/0x4e0 __cancel_work_timer+0x131/0x1c0 arfs_del_rules+0x143/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_arfs_disable+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0xcb/0x200 [mlx5_core] ethnl_set_channels+0x28f/0x3b0 ethnl_default_set_doit+0xec/0x240 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120 genl_rcv_msg+0x188/0x2c0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x1a1/0x270 netlink_sendmsg+0x214/0x460 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60 __sys_sendto+0x113/0x170 __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&priv->state_lock); lock((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)); lock(&priv->state_lock); lock((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by ethtool/386089: #0: ffffffff82ea7210 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv+0x15/0x40 #1: ffffffff82e94c88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ethnl_default_set_doit+0xd3/0x240 #2: ffff8884a1808cc0 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0x53/0x200 [mlx5_core] stack backtrace: CPU: 15 PID: 386089 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G I 6.7.0-rc4_net_next_mlx5_5483eb2 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0xa0 check_noncircular+0x144/0x160 __lock_acquire+0x17b4/0x2c80 lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0 ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 ? save_trace+0x3e/0x360 ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 __flush_work+0x7a/0x4e0 ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 ? __lock_acquire+0xa78/0x2c80 ? lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0 ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70 __cancel_work_timer+0x131/0x1c0 ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70 arfs_del_rules+0x143/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_arfs_disable+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0xcb/0x200 [mlx5_core] ethnl_set_channels+0x28f/0x3b0 ethnl_default_set_doit+0xec/0x240 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120 genl_rcv_msg+0x188/0x2c0 ? ethnl_ops_begin+0xb0/0xb0 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0xf0/0xf0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x1a1/0x270 netlink_sendmsg+0x214/0x460 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60 __sys_sendto+0x113/0x170 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x53f/0x8f0 __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e </TASK> Fixes: 45bf454 ("net/mlx5e: Enabling aRFS mechanism") Signed-off-by: Carolina Jubran <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit fef9657) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

jira LE-1907 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-4.18.0-553.5.1.el8_10 commit-author Petr Pavlu <[email protected]> commit d559015 Empty-Commit: Cherry-Pick Conflicts during history rebuild. Will be included in final tarball splat. Ref for failed cherry-pick at: ciq/ciq_backports/kernel-4.18.0-553.5.1.el8_10/d5590152.failed When making a DNS query inside the kernel using dns_query(), the request code can in rare cases end up creating a duplicate index key in the assoc_array of the destination keyring. It is eventually found by a BUG_ON() check in the assoc_array implementation and results in a crash. Example report: [2158499.700025] kernel BUG at ../lib/assoc_array.c:652! [2158499.700039] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [2158499.700065] CPU: 3 PID: 31985 Comm: kworker/3:1 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.3.18-150300.59.90-default #1 SLE15-SP3 [2158499.700096] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020 [2158499.700351] Workqueue: cifsiod cifs_resolve_server [cifs] [2158499.700380] RIP: 0010:assoc_array_insert+0x85f/0xa40 [2158499.700401] Code: ff 74 2b 48 8b 3b 49 8b 45 18 4c 89 e6 48 83 e7 fe e8 95 ec 74 00 3b 45 88 7d db 85 c0 79 d4 0f 0b 0f 0b 0f 0b e8 41 f2 be ff <0f> 0b 0f 0b 81 7d 88 ff ff ff 7f 4c 89 eb 4c 8b ad 58 ff ff ff 0f [2158499.700448] RSP: 0018:ffffc0bd6187faf0 EFLAGS: 00010282 [2158499.700470] RAX: ffff9f1ea7da2fe8 RBX: ffff9f1ea7da2fc1 RCX: 0000000000000005 [2158499.700492] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: 0000000000000000 [2158499.700515] RBP: ffffc0bd6187fbb0 R08: ffff9f185faf1100 R09: 0000000000000000 [2158499.700538] R10: ffff9f1ea7da2cc0 R11: 000000005ed8cec8 R12: ffffc0bd6187fc28 [2158499.700561] R13: ffff9f15feb8d000 R14: ffff9f1ea7da2fc0 R15: ffff9f168dc0d740 [2158499.700585] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9f185fac0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [2158499.700610] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [2158499.700630] CR2: 00007fdd94fca238 CR3: 0000000809d8c006 CR4: 00000000003706e0 [2158499.700702] Call Trace: [2158499.700741] ? key_alloc+0x447/0x4b0 [2158499.700768] ? __key_link_begin+0x43/0xa0 [2158499.700790] __key_link_begin+0x43/0xa0 [2158499.700814] request_key_and_link+0x2c7/0x730 [2158499.700847] ? dns_resolver_read+0x20/0x20 [dns_resolver] [2158499.700873] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20 [2158499.700898] request_key_tag+0x43/0xa0 [2158499.700926] dns_query+0x114/0x2ca [dns_resolver] [2158499.701127] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x194/0x310 [cifs] [2158499.701164] ? scnprintf+0x49/0x90 [2158499.701190] ? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70 [2158499.701211] ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70 [2158499.701405] reconn_set_ipaddr_from_hostname+0x81/0x2a0 [cifs] [2158499.701603] cifs_resolve_server+0x4b/0xd0 [cifs] [2158499.701632] process_one_work+0x1f8/0x3e0 [2158499.701658] worker_thread+0x2d/0x3f0 [2158499.701682] ? process_one_work+0x3e0/0x3e0 [2158499.701703] kthread+0x10d/0x130 [2158499.701723] ? kthread_park+0xb0/0xb0 [2158499.701746] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40 The situation occurs as follows: * Some kernel facility invokes dns_query() to resolve a hostname, for example, "abcdef". The function registers its global DNS resolver cache as current->cred.thread_keyring and passes the query to request_key_net() -> request_key_tag() -> request_key_and_link(). * Function request_key_and_link() creates a keyring_search_context object. Its match_data.cmp method gets set via a call to type->match_preparse() (resolves to dns_resolver_match_preparse()) to dns_resolver_cmp(). * Function request_key_and_link() continues and invokes search_process_keyrings_rcu() which returns that a given key was not found. The control is then passed to request_key_and_link() -> construct_alloc_key(). * Concurrently to that, a second task similarly makes a DNS query for "abcdef." and its result gets inserted into the DNS resolver cache. * Back on the first task, function construct_alloc_key() first runs __key_link_begin() to determine an assoc_array_edit operation to insert a new key. Index keys in the array are compared exactly as-is, using keyring_compare_object(). The operation finds that "abcdef" is not yet present in the destination keyring. * Function construct_alloc_key() continues and checks if a given key is already present on some keyring by again calling search_process_keyrings_rcu(). This search is done using dns_resolver_cmp() and "abcdef" gets matched with now present key "abcdef.". * The found key is linked on the destination keyring by calling __key_link() and using the previously calculated assoc_array_edit operation. This inserts the "abcdef." key in the array but creates a duplicity because the same index key is already present. Fix the problem by postponing __key_link_begin() in construct_alloc_key() until an actual key which should be linked into the destination keyring is determined. [[email protected]: added a fixes tag and cc to stable] Cc: [email protected] # v5.3+ Fixes: df593ee ("keys: Hoist locking out of __key_link_begin()") Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Joey Lee <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit d559015) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]> # Conflicts: # security/keys/request_key.c

jira LE-1907 cve CVE-2024-26906 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-4.18.0-553.8.1.el8_10 commit-author Hou Tao <[email protected]> commit 32019c6 Empty-Commit: Cherry-Pick Conflicts during history rebuild. Will be included in final tarball splat. Ref for failed cherry-pick at: ciq/ciq_backports/kernel-4.18.0-553.8.1.el8_10/32019c65.failed When trying to use copy_from_kernel_nofault() to read vsyscall page through a bpf program, the following oops was reported: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffff600000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 3231067 P4D 3231067 PUD 3233067 PMD 3235067 PTE 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 1 PID: 20390 Comm: test_progs ...... 6.7.0+ #58 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) ...... RIP: 0010:copy_from_kernel_nofault+0x6f/0x110 ...... Call Trace: <TASK> ? copy_from_kernel_nofault+0x6f/0x110 bpf_probe_read_kernel+0x1d/0x50 bpf_prog_2061065e56845f08_do_probe_read+0x51/0x8d trace_call_bpf+0xc5/0x1c0 perf_call_bpf_enter.isra.0+0x69/0xb0 perf_syscall_enter+0x13e/0x200 syscall_trace_enter+0x188/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0xb5/0xe0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 </TASK> ...... ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- The oops is triggered when: 1) A bpf program uses bpf_probe_read_kernel() to read from the vsyscall page and invokes copy_from_kernel_nofault() which in turn calls __get_user_asm(). 2) Because the vsyscall page address is not readable from kernel space, a page fault exception is triggered accordingly. 3) handle_page_fault() considers the vsyscall page address as a user space address instead of a kernel space address. This results in the fix-up setup by bpf not being applied and a page_fault_oops() is invoked due to SMAP. Considering handle_page_fault() has already considered the vsyscall page address as a userspace address, fix the problem by disallowing vsyscall page read for copy_from_kernel_nofault(). Originally-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAG48ez06TZft=ATH1qh2c5mpS5BT8UakwNkzi6nvK5_djC-4Nw@mail.gmail.com Reported-by: xingwei lee <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CABOYnLynjBoFZOf3Z4BhaZkc5hx_kHfsjiW+UWLoB=w33LvScw@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Sohil Mehta <[email protected]> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 32019c6) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]> # Conflicts: # arch/x86/mm/maccess.c

jira LE-1907 cve CVE-2021-46972 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-4.18.0-553.8.1.el8_10 commit-author Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]> commit eaab1d4 Since commit 6815f47 ("ovl: use only uppermetacopy state in ovl_lookup()"), overlayfs doesn't put temporary dentry when there is a metacopy error, which leads to dentry leaks when shutting down the related superblock: overlayfs: refusing to follow metacopy origin for (/file0) ... BUG: Dentry (____ptrval____){i=3f33,n=file3} still in use (1) [unmount of overlay overlay] ... WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 432 at umount_check.cold+0x107/0x14d CPU: 1 PID: 432 Comm: unmount-overlay Not tainted 5.12.0-rc5 #1 ... RIP: 0010:umount_check.cold+0x107/0x14d ... Call Trace: d_walk+0x28c/0x950 ? dentry_lru_isolate+0x2b0/0x2b0 ? __kasan_slab_free+0x12/0x20 do_one_tree+0x33/0x60 shrink_dcache_for_umount+0x78/0x1d0 generic_shutdown_super+0x70/0x440 kill_anon_super+0x3e/0x70 deactivate_locked_super+0xc4/0x160 deactivate_super+0xfa/0x140 cleanup_mnt+0x22e/0x370 __cleanup_mnt+0x1a/0x30 task_work_run+0x139/0x210 do_exit+0xb0c/0x2820 ? __kasan_check_read+0x1d/0x30 ? find_held_lock+0x35/0x160 ? lock_release+0x1b6/0x660 ? mm_update_next_owner+0xa20/0xa20 ? reacquire_held_locks+0x3f0/0x3f0 ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4+0x22/0x30 do_group_exit+0x135/0x380 __do_sys_exit_group.isra.0+0x20/0x20 __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3c/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x45/0x70 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae ... VFS: Busy inodes after unmount of overlay. Self-destruct in 5 seconds. Have a nice day... This fix has been tested with a syzkaller reproducer. Cc: Amir Goldstein <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> # v5.8+ Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Fixes: 6815f47 ("ovl: use only uppermetacopy state in ovl_lookup()") Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Vivek Goyal <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit eaab1d4) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

jira LE-1907 cve CVE-2024-26859 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-4.18.0-553.8.1.el8_10 commit-author Thinh Tran <[email protected]> commit d27e2da Fix race condition leading to system crash during EEH error handling During EEH error recovery, the bnx2x driver's transmit timeout logic could cause a race condition when handling reset tasks. The bnx2x_tx_timeout() schedules reset tasks via bnx2x_sp_rtnl_task(), which ultimately leads to bnx2x_nic_unload(). In bnx2x_nic_unload() SGEs are freed using bnx2x_free_rx_sge_range(). However, this could overlap with the EEH driver's attempt to reset the device using bnx2x_io_slot_reset(), which also tries to free SGEs. This race condition can result in system crashes due to accessing freed memory locations in bnx2x_free_rx_sge() 799 static inline void bnx2x_free_rx_sge(struct bnx2x *bp, 800 struct bnx2x_fastpath *fp, u16 index) 801 { 802 struct sw_rx_page *sw_buf = &fp->rx_page_ring[index]; 803 struct page *page = sw_buf->page; .... where sw_buf was set to NULL after the call to dma_unmap_page() by the preceding thread. EEH: Beginning: 'slot_reset' PCI 0011:01:00.0#10000: EEH: Invoking bnx2x->slot_reset() bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14228(eth1)]IO slot reset initializing... bnx2x 0011:01:00.0: enabling device (0140 -> 0142) bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14244(eth1)]IO slot reset --> driver unload Kernel attempted to read user page (0) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0) BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000000 Faulting instruction address: 0xc0080000025065fc Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] ..... Call Trace: [c000000003c67a20] [c00800000250658c] bnx2x_io_slot_reset+0x204/0x610 [bnx2x] (unreliable) [c000000003c67af0] [c0000000000518a8] eeh_report_reset+0xb8/0xf0 [c000000003c67b60] [c000000000052130] eeh_pe_report+0x180/0x550 [c000000003c67c70] [c00000000005318c] eeh_handle_normal_event+0x84c/0xa60 [c000000003c67d50] [c000000000053a84] eeh_event_handler+0xf4/0x170 [c000000003c67da0] [c000000000194c58] kthread+0x1c8/0x1d0 [c000000003c67e10] [c00000000000cf64] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64 To solve this issue, we need to verify page pool allocations before freeing. Fixes: 4cace67 ("bnx2x: Alloc 4k fragment for each rx ring buffer element") Signed-off-by: Thinh Tran <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit d27e2da) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

jira LE-1907 cve CVE-2024-35959 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-4.18.0-553.8.1.el8_10 commit-author Carolina Jubran <[email protected]> commit ecb8294 When mlx5e_priv_init() fails, the cleanup flow calls mlx5e_selq_cleanup which calls mlx5e_selq_apply() that assures that the `priv->state_lock` is held using lockdep_is_held(). Acquire the state_lock in mlx5e_selq_cleanup(). Kernel log: ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.8.0-rc3_net_next_841a9b5 #1 Not tainted ----------------------------- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/selq.c:124 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 2 locks held by systemd-modules/293: #0: ffffffffa05067b0 (devices_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: ib_register_client+0x109/0x1b0 [ib_core] #1: ffff8881096c65c0 (&device->client_data_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: add_client_context+0x104/0x1c0 [ib_core] stack backtrace: CPU: 4 PID: 293 Comm: systemd-modules Not tainted 6.8.0-rc3_net_next_841a9b5 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x8a/0xa0 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x154/0x1a0 mlx5e_selq_apply+0x94/0xa0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_selq_cleanup+0x3a/0x60 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_priv_init+0x2be/0x2f0 [mlx5_core] mlx5_rdma_setup_rn+0x7c/0x1a0 [mlx5_core] rdma_init_netdev+0x4e/0x80 [ib_core] ? mlx5_rdma_netdev_free+0x70/0x70 [mlx5_core] ipoib_intf_init+0x64/0x550 [ib_ipoib] ipoib_intf_alloc+0x4e/0xc0 [ib_ipoib] ipoib_add_one+0xb0/0x360 [ib_ipoib] add_client_context+0x112/0x1c0 [ib_core] ib_register_client+0x166/0x1b0 [ib_core] ? 0xffffffffa0573000 ipoib_init_module+0xeb/0x1a0 [ib_ipoib] do_one_initcall+0x61/0x250 do_init_module+0x8a/0x270 init_module_from_file+0x8b/0xd0 idempotent_init_module+0x17d/0x230 __x64_sys_finit_module+0x61/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x71/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e </TASK> Fixes: 8bf30be ("net/mlx5e: Introduce select queue parameters") Signed-off-by: Carolina Jubran <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dragos Tatulea <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit ecb8294) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

jira LE-1907 cve CVE-2024-36004 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-4.18.0-553.8.1.el8_10 commit-author Sindhu Devale <[email protected]> commit 2cc7d15 Issue reported by customer during SRIOV testing, call trace: When both i40e and the i40iw driver are loaded, a warning in check_flush_dependency is being triggered. This seems to be because of the i40e driver workqueue is allocated with the WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag, and the i40iw one is not. Similar error was encountered on ice too and it was fixed by removing the flag. Do the same for i40e too. [Feb 9 09:08] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ +0.000004] workqueue: WQ_MEM_RECLAIM i40e:i40e_service_task [i40e] is flushing !WQ_MEM_RECLAIM infiniband:0x0 [ +0.000060] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 937 at kernel/workqueue.c:2966 check_flush_dependency+0x10b/0x120 [ +0.000007] Modules linked in: snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer snd_seq snd_timer snd_seq_device snd soundcore nls_utf8 cifs cifs_arc4 nls_ucs2_utils rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm cifs_md4 dns_resolver netfs qrtr rfkill sunrpc vfat fat intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common irdma intel_uncore_frequency intel_uncore_frequency_common ice ipmi_ssif isst_if_common skx_edac nfit libnvdimm x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp gnss coretemp ib_uverbs rapl intel_cstate ib_core iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support acpi_ipmi mei_me ipmi_si intel_uncore ioatdma i2c_i801 joydev pcspkr mei ipmi_devintf lpc_ich intel_pch_thermal i2c_smbus ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter acpi_pad xfs libcrc32c ast sd_mod drm_shmem_helper t10_pi drm_kms_helper sg ixgbe drm i40e ahci crct10dif_pclmul libahci crc32_pclmul igb crc32c_intel libata ghash_clmulni_intel i2c_algo_bit mdio dca wmi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse [ +0.000050] CPU: 0 PID: 937 Comm: kworker/0:3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.8.0-rc2-Feb-net_dev-Qiueue-00279-gbd43c5687e05 #1 [ +0.000003] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600BPB/S2600BPB, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0013.121520200651 12/15/2020 [ +0.000001] Workqueue: i40e i40e_service_task [i40e] [ +0.000024] RIP: 0010:check_flush_dependency+0x10b/0x120 [ +0.000003] Code: ff 49 8b 54 24 18 48 8d 8b b0 00 00 00 49 89 e8 48 81 c6 b0 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 b0 97 fa 9f c6 05 8a cc 1f 02 01 e8 35 b3 fd ff <0f> 0b e9 10 ff ff ff 80 3d 78 cc 1f 02 00 75 94 e9 46 ff ff ff 90 [ +0.000002] RSP: 0018:ffffbd294976bcf8 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ +0.000002] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff94d4c483c000 RCX: 0000000000000027 [ +0.000001] RDX: ffff94d47f620bc8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff94d47f620bc0 [ +0.000001] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffff7fff [ +0.000001] R10: ffffbd294976bb98 R11: ffffffffa0be65e8 R12: ffff94c5451ea180 [ +0.000001] R13: ffff94c5ab5e8000 R14: ffff94c5c20b6e05 R15: ffff94c5f1330ab0 [ +0.000001] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff94d47f600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ +0.000002] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ +0.000001] CR2: 00007f9e6f1fca70 CR3: 0000000038e20004 CR4: 00000000007706f0 [ +0.000000] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ +0.000001] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ +0.000001] PKRU: 55555554 [ +0.000001] Call Trace: [ +0.000001] <TASK> [ +0.000002] ? __warn+0x80/0x130 [ +0.000003] ? check_flush_dependency+0x10b/0x120 [ +0.000002] ? report_bug+0x195/0x1a0 [ +0.000005] ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70 [ +0.000003] ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70 [ +0.000002] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 [ +0.000006] ? check_flush_dependency+0x10b/0x120 [ +0.000002] ? check_flush_dependency+0x10b/0x120 [ +0.000002] __flush_workqueue+0x126/0x3f0 [ +0.000015] ib_cache_cleanup_one+0x1c/0xe0 [ib_core] [ +0.000056] __ib_unregister_device+0x6a/0xb0 [ib_core] [ +0.000023] ib_unregister_device_and_put+0x34/0x50 [ib_core] [ +0.000020] i40iw_close+0x4b/0x90 [irdma] [ +0.000022] i40e_notify_client_of_netdev_close+0x54/0xc0 [i40e] [ +0.000035] i40e_service_task+0x126/0x190 [i40e] [ +0.000024] process_one_work+0x174/0x340 [ +0.000003] worker_thread+0x27e/0x390 [ +0.000001] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000002] kthread+0xdf/0x110 [ +0.000002] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000002] ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 [ +0.000003] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000001] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 [ +0.000004] </TASK> [ +0.000001] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: 4d5957c ("i40e: remove WQ_UNBOUND and the task limit of our workqueue") Signed-off-by: Sindhu Devale <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Arkadiusz Kubalewski <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Mateusz Polchlopek <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <[email protected]> Tested-by: Robert Ganzynkowicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 2cc7d15) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

jira LE-1907 cve CVE-2024-36886 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-4.18.0-553.16.1.el8_10 commit-author Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> commit 080cbb8 Sam Page (sam4k) working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative reported a UAF in the tipc_buf_append() error path: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kfree_skb_list_reason+0x47e/0x4c0 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1183 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88804d2a7c80 by task poc/8034 CPU: 1 PID: 8034 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.8.2 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-debian-1.16.0-5 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack linux/lib/dump_stack.c:88 dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x1b0 linux/lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description linux/mm/kasan/report.c:377 print_report+0xc4/0x620 linux/mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0xda/0x110 linux/mm/kasan/report.c:601 kfree_skb_list_reason+0x47e/0x4c0 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1183 skb_release_data+0x5af/0x880 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1026 skb_release_all linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1094 __kfree_skb linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1108 kfree_skb_reason+0x12d/0x210 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1144 kfree_skb linux/./include/linux/skbuff.h:1244 tipc_buf_append+0x425/0xb50 linux/net/tipc/msg.c:186 tipc_link_input+0x224/0x7c0 linux/net/tipc/link.c:1324 tipc_link_rcv+0x76e/0x2d70 linux/net/tipc/link.c:1824 tipc_rcv+0x45f/0x10f0 linux/net/tipc/node.c:2159 tipc_udp_recv+0x73b/0x8f0 linux/net/tipc/udp_media.c:390 udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0xad2/0x1850 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2108 udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x131/0xb00 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2186 udp_unicast_rcv_skb+0x165/0x3b0 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2346 __udp4_lib_rcv+0x2594/0x3400 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2422 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x30c/0x4e0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x2e4/0x520 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:314 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:308 ip_local_deliver+0x18e/0x1f0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254 dst_input linux/./include/net/dst.h:461 ip_rcv_finish linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:449 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:314 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:308 ip_rcv+0x2c5/0x5d0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:569 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x199/0x1e0 linux/net/core/dev.c:5534 __netif_receive_skb+0x1f/0x1c0 linux/net/core/dev.c:5648 process_backlog+0x101/0x6b0 linux/net/core/dev.c:5976 __napi_poll.constprop.0+0xba/0x550 linux/net/core/dev.c:6576 napi_poll linux/net/core/dev.c:6645 net_rx_action+0x95a/0xe90 linux/net/core/dev.c:6781 __do_softirq+0x21f/0x8e7 linux/kernel/softirq.c:553 do_softirq linux/kernel/softirq.c:454 do_softirq+0xb2/0xf0 linux/kernel/softirq.c:441 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0x100/0x120 linux/kernel/softirq.c:381 local_bh_enable linux/./include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 rcu_read_unlock_bh linux/./include/linux/rcupdate.h:851 __dev_queue_xmit+0x871/0x3ee0 linux/net/core/dev.c:4378 dev_queue_xmit linux/./include/linux/netdevice.h:3169 neigh_hh_output linux/./include/net/neighbour.h:526 neigh_output linux/./include/net/neighbour.h:540 ip_finish_output2+0x169f/0x2550 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:235 __ip_finish_output linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:313 __ip_finish_output+0x49e/0x950 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:295 ip_finish_output+0x31/0x310 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:323 NF_HOOK_COND linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:303 ip_output+0x13b/0x2a0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:433 dst_output linux/./include/net/dst.h:451 ip_local_out linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:129 ip_send_skb+0x3e5/0x560 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1492 udp_send_skb+0x73f/0x1530 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:963 udp_sendmsg+0x1a36/0x2b40 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:1250 inet_sendmsg+0x105/0x140 linux/net/ipv4/af_inet.c:850 sock_sendmsg_nosec linux/net/socket.c:730 __sock_sendmsg linux/net/socket.c:745 __sys_sendto+0x42c/0x4e0 linux/net/socket.c:2191 __do_sys_sendto linux/net/socket.c:2203 __se_sys_sendto linux/net/socket.c:2199 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe0/0x1c0 linux/net/socket.c:2199 do_syscall_x64 linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x270 linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 linux/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120 RIP: 0033:0x7f3434974f29 Code: 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 37 8f 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fff9154f2b8 EFLAGS: 00000212 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f3434974f29 RDX: 00000000000032c8 RSI: 00007fff9154f300 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fff915532e0 R08: 00007fff91553360 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000212 R12: 000055ed86d261d0 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> In the critical scenario, either the relevant skb is freed or its ownership is transferred into a frag_lists. In both cases, the cleanup code must not free it again: we need to clear the skb reference earlier. Fixes: 1149557 ("tipc: eliminate unnecessary linearization of incoming buffers") Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: [email protected] # ZDI-CAN-23852 Acked-by: Xin Long <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/752f1ccf762223d109845365d07f55414058e5a3.1714484273.git.pabeni@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 080cbb8) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

jira LE-1907 cve CVE-2023-52463 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-4.18.0-553.16.1.el8_10 commit-author Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]> commit 0e8d244 Empty-Commit: Cherry-Pick Conflicts during history rebuild. Will be included in final tarball splat. Ref for failed cherry-pick at: ciq/ciq_backports/kernel-4.18.0-553.16.1.el8_10/0e8d2444.failed If SetVariable at runtime is not supported by the firmware we never assign a callback for that function. At the same time mount the efivarfs as RO so no one can call that. However, we never check the permission flags when someone remounts the filesystem as RW. As a result this leads to a crash looking like this: $ mount -o remount,rw /sys/firmware/efi/efivars $ efi-updatevar -f PK.auth PK [ 303.279166] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 [ 303.280482] Mem abort info: [ 303.280854] ESR = 0x0000000086000004 [ 303.281338] EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 303.282016] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 303.282414] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 303.282821] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 303.283771] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=000000004258c000 [ 303.284913] [0000000000000000] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 [ 303.286076] Internal error: Oops: 0000000086000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 303.286936] Modules linked in: qrtr tpm_tis tpm_tis_core crct10dif_ce arm_smccc_trng rng_core drm fuse ip_tables x_tables ipv6 [ 303.288586] CPU: 1 PID: 755 Comm: efi-updatevar Not tainted 6.3.0-rc1-00108-gc7d0c4695c68 #1 [ 303.289748] Hardware name: Unknown Unknown Product/Unknown Product, BIOS 2023.04-00627-g88336918701d 04/01/2023 [ 303.291150] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 303.292123] pc : 0x0 [ 303.292443] lr : efivar_set_variable_locked+0x74/0xec [ 303.293156] sp : ffff800008673c10 [ 303.293619] x29: ffff800008673c10 x28: ffff0000037e8000 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 303.294592] x26: 0000000000000800 x25: ffff000002467400 x24: 0000000000000027 [ 303.295572] x23: ffffd49ea9832000 x22: ffff0000020c9800 x21: ffff000002467000 [ 303.296566] x20: 0000000000000001 x19: 00000000000007fc x18: 0000000000000000 [ 303.297531] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000aaaac807ab54 [ 303.298495] x14: ed37489f673633c0 x13: 71c45c606de13f80 x12: 47464259e219acf4 [ 303.299453] x11: ffff000002af7b01 x10: 0000000000000003 x9 : 0000000000000002 [ 303.300431] x8 : 0000000000000010 x7 : ffffd49ea8973230 x6 : 0000000000a85201 [ 303.301412] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffff0000020c9800 x3 : 00000000000007fc [ 303.302370] x2 : 0000000000000027 x1 : ffff000002467400 x0 : ffff000002467000 [ 303.303341] Call trace: [ 303.303679] 0x0 [ 303.303938] efivar_entry_set_get_size+0x98/0x16c [ 303.304585] efivarfs_file_write+0xd0/0x1a4 [ 303.305148] vfs_write+0xc4/0x2e4 [ 303.305601] ksys_write+0x70/0x104 [ 303.306073] __arm64_sys_write+0x1c/0x28 [ 303.306622] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114 [ 303.307156] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x44/0xec [ 303.307803] do_el0_svc+0x38/0x98 [ 303.308268] el0_svc+0x2c/0x84 [ 303.308702] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xf4/0x120 [ 303.309293] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 [ 303.309794] Code: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? (????????) [ 303.310612] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fix this by adding a .reconfigure() function to the fs operations which we can use to check the requested flags and deny anything that's not RO if the firmware doesn't implement SetVariable at runtime. Fixes: f88814c ("efi/efivars: Expose RT service availability via efivars abstraction") Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 0e8d244) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]> # Conflicts: # fs/efivarfs/super.c

jira LE-1907 cve CVE-2024-35938 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-4.18.0-553.16.1.el8_10 commit-author Baochen Qiang <[email protected]> commit 1cca1bd Currently buf_len field of ath11k_mhi_config_qca6390 is assigned with 0, making MHI use a default size, 64KB, to allocate channel buffers. This is likely to fail in some scenarios where system memory is highly fragmented and memory compaction or reclaim is not allowed. There is a fail report which is caused by it: kworker/u32:45: page allocation failure: order:4, mode:0x40c00(GFP_NOIO|__GFP_COMP), nodemask=(null),cpuset=/,mems_allowed=0 CPU: 0 PID: 19318 Comm: kworker/u32:45 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc3-1.gae4495f-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed (unreleased) 493b6d5b382c603654d7a81fc3c144d59a1dfceb Workqueue: events_unbound async_run_entry_fn Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x47/0x60 warn_alloc+0x13a/0x1b0 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __alloc_pages_direct_compact+0xab/0x210 __alloc_pages_slowpath.constprop.0+0xd3e/0xda0 __alloc_pages+0x32d/0x350 ? mhi_prepare_channel+0x127/0x2d0 [mhi 40df44e07c05479f7a6e7b90fba9f0e0031a7814] __kmalloc_large_node+0x72/0x110 __kmalloc+0x37c/0x480 ? mhi_map_single_no_bb+0x77/0xf0 [mhi 40df44e07c05479f7a6e7b90fba9f0e0031a7814] ? mhi_prepare_channel+0x127/0x2d0 [mhi 40df44e07c05479f7a6e7b90fba9f0e0031a7814] mhi_prepare_channel+0x127/0x2d0 [mhi 40df44e07c05479f7a6e7b90fba9f0e0031a7814] __mhi_prepare_for_transfer+0x44/0x80 [mhi 40df44e07c05479f7a6e7b90fba9f0e0031a7814] ? __pfx_____mhi_prepare_for_transfer+0x10/0x10 [mhi 40df44e07c05479f7a6e7b90fba9f0e0031a7814] device_for_each_child+0x5c/0xa0 ? __pfx_pci_pm_resume+0x10/0x10 ath11k_core_resume+0x65/0x100 [ath11k a5094e22d7223135c40d93c8f5321cf09fd85e4e] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ath11k_pci_pm_resume+0x32/0x60 [ath11k_pci 830b7bfc3ea80ebef32e563cafe2cb55e9cc73ec] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 dpm_run_callback+0x8c/0x1e0 device_resume+0x104/0x340 ? __pfx_dpm_watchdog_handler+0x10/0x10 async_resume+0x1d/0x30 async_run_entry_fn+0x32/0x120 process_one_work+0x168/0x330 worker_thread+0x2f5/0x410 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xe8/0x120 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> Actually those buffers are used only by QMI target -> host communication. And for WCN6855 and QCA6390, the largest packet size for that is less than 6KB. So change buf_len field to 8KB, which results in order 1 allocation if page size is 4KB. In this way, we can at least save some memory, and as well as decrease the possibility of allocation failure in those scenarios. Tested-on: WCN6855 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HSP.1.1-03125-QCAHSPSWPL_V1_V2_SILICONZ_LITE-3.6510.30 Reported-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/ath11k/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Baochen Qiang <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jeff Johnson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]> Link: https://msgid.link/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit 1cca1bd) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

jira LE-1907 cve CVE-2024-36904 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-4.18.0-553.16.1.el8_10 commit-author Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> commit f2db723 Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique() with nice analysis. Since commit ec94c26 ("tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation for timewait hashdance"), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket's sk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock. Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try to reuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique() for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt. If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwritten and sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-free somewhere else. To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false. [0]: refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023 RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8 RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027 RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0 RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0 R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84 R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0 FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80 RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885d Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885d RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0 R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK> Fixes: ec94c26 ("tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation for timewait hashdance") Reported-by: Anderson Nascimento <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/ Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit f2db723) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

jira LE-1907 cve CVE-2024-26870 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-4.18.0-553.16.1.el8_10 commit-author Jorge Mora <[email protected]> commit 251a658 A call to listxattr() with a buffer size = 0 returns the actual size of the buffer needed for a subsequent call. When size > 0, nfs4_listxattr() does not return an error because either generic_listxattr() or nfs4_listxattr_nfs4_label() consumes exactly all the bytes then size is 0 when calling nfs4_listxattr_nfs4_user() which then triggers the following kernel BUG: [ 99.403778] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102! [ 99.404063] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP [ 99.408463] CPU: 0 PID: 3310 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.6.0-61.fc40.aarch64 #1 [ 99.415827] Call trace: [ 99.415985] usercopy_abort+0x70/0xa0 [ 99.416227] __check_heap_object+0x134/0x158 [ 99.416505] check_heap_object+0x150/0x188 [ 99.416696] __check_object_size.part.0+0x78/0x168 [ 99.416886] __check_object_size+0x28/0x40 [ 99.417078] listxattr+0x8c/0x120 [ 99.417252] path_listxattr+0x78/0xe0 [ 99.417476] __arm64_sys_listxattr+0x28/0x40 [ 99.417723] invoke_syscall+0x78/0x100 [ 99.417929] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x48/0xf0 [ 99.418186] do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38 [ 99.418376] el0_svc+0x3c/0x110 [ 99.418554] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130 [ 99.418788] el0t_64_sync+0x194/0x198 [ 99.418994] Code: aa0003e3 d000a3e0 91310000 97f49bdb (d4210000) Issue is reproduced when generic_listxattr() returns 'system.nfs4_acl', thus calling lisxattr() with size = 16 will trigger the bug. Add check on nfs4_listxattr() to return ERANGE error when it is called with size > 0 and the return value is greater than size. Fixes: 012a211 ("NFSv4.2: hook in the user extended attribute handlers") Signed-off-by: Jorge Mora <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Benjamin Coddington <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 251a658) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

jira LE-1907 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-4.18.0-553.16.1.el8_10 commit-author Edward Adam Davis <[email protected]> commit 71733b4 [Syz report] kernel BUG at fs/gfs2/quota.c:1508! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 5060 Comm: syz-executor505 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc3-syzkaller-00134-g994d5c58e50e #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/10/2023 RIP: 0010:gfs2_quota_cleanup+0x6b5/0x6c0 fs/gfs2/quota.c:1508 Code: fe e9 cf fd ff ff 44 89 e9 80 e1 07 80 c1 03 38 c1 0f 8c 2d fe ff ff 4c 89 ef e8 b6 19 23 fe e9 20 fe ff ff e8 ec 11 c7 fd 90 <0f> 0b e8 84 9c 4f 07 0f 1f 40 00 66 0f 1f 00 55 41 57 41 56 41 54 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000409f9e0 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: ffffffff83c76854 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: ffff888026001dc0 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffffc9000409fb00 R08: ffffffff83c762b0 R09: 1ffff1100fd38015 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100fd38016 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: ffff88807e9c0828 R14: ffff888014693580 R15: ffff88807e9c0000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f16d1bd70f8 CR3: 0000000027199000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> gfs2_put_super+0x2e1/0x940 fs/gfs2/super.c:611 generic_shutdown_super+0x13a/0x2c0 fs/super.c:696 kill_block_super+0x44/0x90 fs/super.c:1667 deactivate_locked_super+0xc1/0x130 fs/super.c:484 cleanup_mnt+0x426/0x4c0 fs/namespace.c:1256 task_work_run+0x24a/0x300 kernel/task_work.c:180 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline] do_exit+0xa34/0x2750 kernel/exit.c:871 do_group_exit+0x206/0x2c0 kernel/exit.c:1021 __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1032 [inline] __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1030 [inline] __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3f/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1030 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x45/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b ... [pid 5060] fsconfig(4, FSCONFIG_CMD_RECONFIGURE, NULL, NULL, 0) = 0 [pid 5060] exit_group(1) = ? ... [Analysis] When the task exits, it will execute cleanup_mnt() to recycle the mounted gfs2 file system, but it performs a system call fsconfig(4, FSCONFIG_CMD_RECONFIGURE, NULL, NULL, 0) before executing the task exit operation. This will execute the following kernel path to complete the setting of SDF_JOURNAL_LIVE for sd_flags: SYSCALL_DEFINE5(fsconfig, ..)-> vfs_fsconfig_locked()-> vfs_cmd_reconfigure()-> gfs2_reconfigure()-> gfs2_make_fs_rw()-> set_bit(SDF_JOURNAL_LIVE, &sdp->sd_flags); [Fix] Add SDF_NORECOVERY check in gfs2_quota_cleanup() to avoid checking SDF_JOURNAL_LIVE on the path where gfs2 is being unmounted. Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected] Fixes: f66af88 ("gfs2: Stop using gfs2_make_fs_ro for withdraw") Signed-off-by: Edward Adam Davis <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 71733b4) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

…mit_queues' jira LE-1907 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-4.18.0-553.16.1.el8_10 commit-author Yu Kuai <[email protected]> commit a2db328 Empty-Commit: Cherry-Pick Conflicts during history rebuild. Will be included in final tarball splat. Ref for failed cherry-pick at: ciq/ciq_backports/kernel-4.18.0-553.16.1.el8_10/a2db328b.failed Writing 'power' and 'submit_queues' concurrently will trigger kernel panic: Test script: modprobe null_blk nr_devices=0 mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/nullb/nullb0 while true; do echo 1 > submit_queues; echo 4 > submit_queues; done & while true; do echo 1 > power; echo 0 > power; done Test result: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000148 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x41d/0x28f0 Call Trace: <TASK> lock_acquire+0x121/0x450 down_write+0x5f/0x1d0 simple_recursive_removal+0x12f/0x5c0 blk_mq_debugfs_unregister_hctxs+0x7c/0x100 blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues+0x4a3/0x720 nullb_update_nr_hw_queues+0x71/0xf0 [null_blk] nullb_device_submit_queues_store+0x79/0xf0 [null_blk] configfs_write_iter+0x119/0x1e0 vfs_write+0x326/0x730 ksys_write+0x74/0x150 This is because del_gendisk() can concurrent with blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues(): nullb_device_power_store nullb_apply_submit_queues null_del_dev del_gendisk nullb_update_nr_hw_queues if (!dev->nullb) // still set while gendisk is deleted return 0 blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues dev->nullb = NULL Fix this problem by resuing the global mutex to protect nullb_device_power_store() and nullb_update_nr_hw_queues() from configfs. Fixes: 45919fb ("null_blk: Enable modifying 'submit_queues' after an instance has been configured") Reported-and-tested-by: Yi Zhang <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHj4cs9LgsHLnjg8z06LQ3Pr5cax-+Ps+xT7AP7TPnEjStuwZA@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit a2db328) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]> # Conflicts: # drivers/block/null_blk_main.c

jira LE-1907 cve CVE-2024-36905 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-4.18.0-553.16.1.el8_10 commit-author Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> commit 9406279 TCP_SYN_RECV state is really special, it is only used by cross-syn connections, mostly used by fuzzers. In the following crash [1], syzbot managed to trigger a divide by zero in tcp_rcv_space_adjust() A socket makes the following state transitions, without ever calling tcp_init_transfer(), meaning tcp_init_buffer_space() is also not called. TCP_CLOSE connect() TCP_SYN_SENT TCP_SYN_RECV shutdown() -> tcp_shutdown(sk, SEND_SHUTDOWN) TCP_FIN_WAIT1 To fix this issue, change tcp_shutdown() to not perform a TCP_SYN_RECV -> TCP_FIN_WAIT1 transition, which makes no sense anyway. When tcp_rcv_state_process() later changes socket state from TCP_SYN_RECV to TCP_ESTABLISH, then look at sk->sk_shutdown to finally enter TCP_FIN_WAIT1 state, and send a FIN packet from a sane socket state. This means tcp_send_fin() can now be called from BH context, and must use GFP_ATOMIC allocations. [1] divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 5084 Comm: syz-executor358 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6-syzkaller-00022-g98369dccd2f8 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 RIP: 0010:tcp_rcv_space_adjust+0x2df/0x890 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:767 Code: e3 04 4c 01 eb 48 8b 44 24 38 0f b6 04 10 84 c0 49 89 d5 0f 85 a5 03 00 00 41 8b 8e c8 09 00 00 89 e8 29 c8 48 0f af c3 31 d2 <48> f7 f1 48 8d 1c 43 49 8d 96 76 08 00 00 48 89 d0 48 c1 e8 03 48 RSP: 0018:ffffc900031ef3f0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0c677a10441f8f42 RBX: 000000004fb95e7e RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000027d4b11f R08: ffffffff89e535a4 R09: 1ffffffff25e6ab7 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff8135e920 R12: ffff88802a9f8d30 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88802a9f8d00 R15: 1ffff1100553f2da FS: 00005555775c0380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f1155bf2304 CR3: 000000002b9f2000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> tcp_recvmsg_locked+0x106d/0x25a0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2513 tcp_recvmsg+0x25d/0x920 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2578 inet6_recvmsg+0x16a/0x730 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:680 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1046 [inline] sock_recvmsg+0x109/0x280 net/socket.c:1068 ____sys_recvmsg+0x1db/0x470 net/socket.c:2803 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2845 [inline] do_recvmmsg+0x474/0xae0 net/socket.c:2939 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3018 [inline] __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3041 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3034 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x199/0x250 net/socket.c:3034 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7faeb6363db9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 c1 17 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffcc1997168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012b RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007faeb6363db9 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000bc0 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000001c R10: 0000000000000122 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 9406279) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

jira LE-1907 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-4.18.0-553.16.1.el8_10 commit-author Dong Chenchen <[email protected]> commit c83b493 As the call trace shows, skb_panic was caused by wrong skb->mac_header in nsh_gso_segment(): invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 3 PID: 2737 Comm: syz Not tainted 6.3.0-next-20230505 #1 RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0xda/0xe0 call Trace: skb_push+0x91/0xa0 nsh_gso_segment+0x4f3/0x570 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x19e/0x270 __skb_gso_segment+0x1e8/0x3c0 validate_xmit_skb+0x452/0x890 validate_xmit_skb_list+0x99/0xd0 sch_direct_xmit+0x294/0x7c0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x16f0/0x1d70 packet_xmit+0x185/0x210 packet_snd+0xc15/0x1170 packet_sendmsg+0x7b/0xa0 sock_sendmsg+0x14f/0x160 The root cause is: nsh_gso_segment() use skb->network_header - nhoff to reset mac_header in skb_gso_error_unwind() if inner-layer protocol gso fails. However, skb->network_header may be reset by inner-layer protocol gso function e.g. mpls_gso_segment. skb->mac_header reset by the inaccurate network_header will be larger than skb headroom. nsh_gso_segment nhoff = skb->network_header - skb->mac_header; __skb_pull(skb,nsh_len) skb_mac_gso_segment mpls_gso_segment skb_reset_network_header(skb);//skb->network_header+=nsh_len return -EINVAL; skb_gso_error_unwind skb_push(skb, nsh_len); skb->mac_header = skb->network_header - nhoff; // skb->mac_header > skb->headroom, cause skb_push panic Use correct mac_offset to restore mac_header and get rid of nhoff. Fixes: c411ed8 ("nsh: add GSO support") Reported-by: [email protected] Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit c83b493) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

jira LE-1907 cve CVE-2023-52784 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-4.18.0-553.16.1.el8_10 commit-author Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> commit 3cffa2d Commit 9eed321 ("net: lapbether: only support ethernet devices") has been able to keep syzbot away from net/lapb, until today. In the following splat [1], the issue is that a lapbether device has been created on a bonding device without members. Then adding a non ARPHRD_ETHER member forced the bonding master to change its type. The fix is to make sure we call dev_close() in bond_setup_by_slave() so that the potential linked lapbether devices (or any other devices having assumptions on the physical device) are removed. A similar bug has been addressed in commit 40baec2 ("bonding: fix panic on non-ARPHRD_ETHER enslave failure") [1] skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffff800089508810 len:44 put:40 head:ffff0000c78e7c00 data:ffff0000c78e7bea tail:0x16 end:0x140 dev:bond0 kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:192 ! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 6007 Comm: syz-executor383 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc3-syzkaller-gbf6547d8715b #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/04/2023 pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:188 [inline] pc : skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:202 lr : skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:188 [inline] lr : skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:202 sp : ffff800096a06aa0 x29: ffff800096a06ab0 x28: ffff800096a06ba0 x27: dfff800000000000 x26: ffff0000ce9b9b50 x25: 0000000000000016 x24: ffff0000c78e7bea x23: ffff0000c78e7c00 x22: 000000000000002c x21: 0000000000000140 x20: 0000000000000028 x19: ffff800089508810 x18: ffff800096a06100 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffff80008a629a3c x15: 0000000000000001 x14: 1fffe00036837a32 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000201 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : cb50b496c519aa00 x8 : cb50b496c519aa00 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 0000000000000001 x5 : ffff800096a063b8 x4 : ffff80008e280f80 x3 : ffff8000805ad11c x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000100000201 x0 : 0000000000000086 Call trace: skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:188 [inline] skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:202 skb_push+0xf0/0x108 net/core/skbuff.c:2446 ip6gre_header+0xbc/0x738 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:1384 dev_hard_header include/linux/netdevice.h:3136 [inline] lapbeth_data_transmit+0x1c4/0x298 drivers/net/wan/lapbether.c:257 lapb_data_transmit+0x8c/0xb0 net/lapb/lapb_iface.c:447 lapb_transmit_buffer+0x178/0x204 net/lapb/lapb_out.c:149 lapb_send_control+0x220/0x320 net/lapb/lapb_subr.c:251 __lapb_disconnect_request+0x9c/0x17c net/lapb/lapb_iface.c:326 lapb_device_event+0x288/0x4e0 net/lapb/lapb_iface.c:492 notifier_call_chain+0x1a4/0x510 kernel/notifier.c:93 raw_notifier_call_chain+0x3c/0x50 kernel/notifier.c:461 call_netdevice_notifiers_info net/core/dev.c:1970 [inline] call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2008 [inline] call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2022 [inline] __dev_close_many+0x1b8/0x3c4 net/core/dev.c:1508 dev_close_many+0x1e0/0x470 net/core/dev.c:1559 dev_close+0x174/0x250 net/core/dev.c:1585 lapbeth_device_event+0x2e4/0x958 drivers/net/wan/lapbether.c:466 notifier_call_chain+0x1a4/0x510 kernel/notifier.c:93 raw_notifier_call_chain+0x3c/0x50 kernel/notifier.c:461 call_netdevice_notifiers_info net/core/dev.c:1970 [inline] call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2008 [inline] call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2022 [inline] __dev_close_many+0x1b8/0x3c4 net/core/dev.c:1508 dev_close_many+0x1e0/0x470 net/core/dev.c:1559 dev_close+0x174/0x250 net/core/dev.c:1585 bond_enslave+0x2298/0x30cc drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:2332 bond_do_ioctl+0x268/0xc64 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:4539 dev_ifsioc+0x754/0x9ac dev_ioctl+0x4d8/0xd34 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:786 sock_do_ioctl+0x1d4/0x2d0 net/socket.c:1217 sock_ioctl+0x4e8/0x834 net/socket.c:1322 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:871 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:857 [inline] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x14c/0x1c8 fs/ioctl.c:857 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:37 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:51 el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:136 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:155 el0_svc+0x58/0x16c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:678 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:696 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:591 Code: aa1803e6 aa1903e7 a90023f5 94785b8b (d4210000) Fixes: 872254d ("net/bonding: Enable bonding to enslave non ARPHRD_ETHER") Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Hangbin Liu <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 3cffa2d) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

jira LE-1907 cve CVE-2023-52796 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-4.18.0-553.16.1.el8_10 commit-author Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> commit 18f0394 Empty-Commit: Cherry-Pick Conflicts during history rebuild. Will be included in final tarball splat. Ref for failed cherry-pick at: ciq/ciq_backports/kernel-4.18.0-553.16.1.el8_10/18f03942.failed Inspired by syzbot reports using a stack of multiple ipvlan devices. Reduce stack size needed in ipvlan_process_v6_outbound() by moving the flowi6 struct used for the route lookup in an non inlined helper. ipvlan_route_v6_outbound() needs 120 bytes on the stack, immediately reclaimed. Also make sure ipvlan_process_v4_outbound() is not inlined. We might also have to lower MAX_NEST_DEV, because only syzbot uses setups with more than four stacked devices. BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at ffffc9000e803ff8 (stack is ffffc9000e804000..ffffc9000e808000) stack guard page: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 13442 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.1.52-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/09/2023 RIP: 0010:kasan_check_range+0x4/0x2a0 mm/kasan/generic.c:188 Code: 48 01 c6 48 89 c7 e8 db 4e c1 03 31 c0 5d c3 cc 0f 0b eb 02 0f 0b b8 ea ff ff ff 5d c3 cc 00 00 cc cc 00 00 cc cc 55 48 89 e5 <41> 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 b0 01 48 85 f6 0f 84 a4 01 00 00 48 89 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000e804000 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff817e5bf2 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff887c6568 RBP: ffffc9000e804000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: dffffc0000000001 R12: 1ffff92001d0080c R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffffffff87e6b100 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fd0c55826c0(0000) GS:ffff8881f6800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffc9000e803ff8 CR3: 0000000170ef7000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <#DF> </#DF> <TASK> [<ffffffff81f281d1>] __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 mm/kasan/shadow.c:31 [<ffffffff817e5bf2>] instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:72 [inline] [<ffffffff817e5bf2>] _test_bit include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:141 [inline] [<ffffffff817e5bf2>] cpumask_test_cpu include/linux/cpumask.h:506 [inline] [<ffffffff817e5bf2>] cpu_online include/linux/cpumask.h:1092 [inline] [<ffffffff817e5bf2>] trace_lock_acquire include/trace/events/lock.h:24 [inline] [<ffffffff817e5bf2>] lock_acquire+0xe2/0x590 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5632 [<ffffffff8563221e>] rcu_lock_acquire+0x2e/0x40 include/linux/rcupdate.h:306 [<ffffffff8561464d>] rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:747 [inline] [<ffffffff8561464d>] ip6_pol_route+0x15d/0x1440 net/ipv6/route.c:2221 [<ffffffff85618120>] ip6_pol_route_output+0x50/0x80 net/ipv6/route.c:2606 [<ffffffff856f65b5>] pol_lookup_func include/net/ip6_fib.h:584 [inline] [<ffffffff856f65b5>] fib6_rule_lookup+0x265/0x620 net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:116 [<ffffffff85618009>] ip6_route_output_flags_noref+0x2d9/0x3a0 net/ipv6/route.c:2638 [<ffffffff8561821a>] ip6_route_output_flags+0xca/0x340 net/ipv6/route.c:2651 [<ffffffff838bd5a3>] ip6_route_output include/net/ip6_route.h:100 [inline] [<ffffffff838bd5a3>] ipvlan_process_v6_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:473 [inline] [<ffffffff838bd5a3>] ipvlan_process_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:529 [inline] [<ffffffff838bd5a3>] ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:602 [inline] [<ffffffff838bd5a3>] ipvlan_queue_xmit+0xc33/0x1be0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:677 [<ffffffff838c2909>] ipvlan_start_xmit+0x49/0x100 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c:229 [<ffffffff84d03900>] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4966 [inline] [<ffffffff84d03900>] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3644 [inline] [<ffffffff84d03900>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x320/0x980 net/core/dev.c:3660 [<ffffffff84d080e2>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x16b2/0x3370 net/core/dev.c:4324 [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3067 [inline] [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:529 [inline] [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:543 [inline] [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] ip6_finish_output2+0x160d/0x1ae0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:139 [<ffffffff855b8616>] __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:200 [inline] [<ffffffff855b8616>] ip6_finish_output+0x6c6/0xb10 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:211 [<ffffffff855b7e3c>] NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:298 [inline] [<ffffffff855b7e3c>] ip6_output+0x2bc/0x3d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:232 [<ffffffff8575d27f>] dst_output include/net/dst.h:444 [inline] [<ffffffff8575d27f>] ip6_local_out+0x10f/0x140 net/ipv6/output_core.c:161 [<ffffffff838bdae4>] ipvlan_process_v6_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:483 [inline] [<ffffffff838bdae4>] ipvlan_process_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:529 [inline] [<ffffffff838bdae4>] ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:602 [inline] [<ffffffff838bdae4>] ipvlan_queue_xmit+0x1174/0x1be0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:677 [<ffffffff838c2909>] ipvlan_start_xmit+0x49/0x100 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c:229 [<ffffffff84d03900>] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4966 [inline] [<ffffffff84d03900>] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3644 [inline] [<ffffffff84d03900>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x320/0x980 net/core/dev.c:3660 [<ffffffff84d080e2>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x16b2/0x3370 net/core/dev.c:4324 [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3067 [inline] [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:529 [inline] [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:543 [inline] [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] ip6_finish_output2+0x160d/0x1ae0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:139 [<ffffffff855b8616>] __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:200 [inline] [<ffffffff855b8616>] ip6_finish_output+0x6c6/0xb10 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:211 [<ffffffff855b7e3c>] NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:298 [inline] [<ffffffff855b7e3c>] ip6_output+0x2bc/0x3d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:232 [<ffffffff8575d27f>] dst_output include/net/dst.h:444 [inline] [<ffffffff8575d27f>] ip6_local_out+0x10f/0x140 net/ipv6/output_core.c:161 [<ffffffff838bdae4>] ipvlan_process_v6_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:483 [inline] [<ffffffff838bdae4>] ipvlan_process_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:529 [inline] [<ffffffff838bdae4>] ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:602 [inline] [<ffffffff838bdae4>] ipvlan_queue_xmit+0x1174/0x1be0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:677 [<ffffffff838c2909>] ipvlan_start_xmit+0x49/0x100 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c:229 [<ffffffff84d03900>] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4966 [inline] [<ffffffff84d03900>] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3644 [inline] [<ffffffff84d03900>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x320/0x980 net/core/dev.c:3660 [<ffffffff84d080e2>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x16b2/0x3370 net/core/dev.c:4324 [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3067 [inline] [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:529 [inline] [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:543 [inline] [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] ip6_finish_output2+0x160d/0x1ae0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:139 [<ffffffff855b8616>] __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:200 [inline] [<ffffffff855b8616>] ip6_finish_output+0x6c6/0xb10 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:211 [<ffffffff855b7e3c>] NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:298 [inline] [<ffffffff855b7e3c>] ip6_output+0x2bc/0x3d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:232 [<ffffffff8575d27f>] dst_output include/net/dst.h:444 [inline] [<ffffffff8575d27f>] ip6_local_out+0x10f/0x140 net/ipv6/output_core.c:161 [<ffffffff838bdae4>] ipvlan_process_v6_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:483 [inline] [<ffffffff838bdae4>] ipvlan_process_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:529 [inline] [<ffffffff838bdae4>] ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:602 [inline] [<ffffffff838bdae4>] ipvlan_queue_xmit+0x1174/0x1be0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:677 [<ffffffff838c2909>] ipvlan_start_xmit+0x49/0x100 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c:229 [<ffffffff84d03900>] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4966 [inline] [<ffffffff84d03900>] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3644 [inline] [<ffffffff84d03900>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x320/0x980 net/core/dev.c:3660 [<ffffffff84d080e2>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x16b2/0x3370 net/core/dev.c:4324 [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3067 [inline] [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:529 [inline] [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:543 [inline] [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] ip6_finish_output2+0x160d/0x1ae0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:139 [<ffffffff855b8616>] __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:200 [inline] [<ffffffff855b8616>] ip6_finish_output+0x6c6/0xb10 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:211 [<ffffffff855b7e3c>] NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:298 [inline] [<ffffffff855b7e3c>] ip6_output+0x2bc/0x3d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:232 [<ffffffff8575d27f>] dst_output include/net/dst.h:444 [inline] [<ffffffff8575d27f>] ip6_local_out+0x10f/0x140 net/ipv6/output_core.c:161 [<ffffffff838bdae4>] ipvlan_process_v6_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:483 [inline] [<ffffffff838bdae4>] ipvlan_process_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:529 [inline] [<ffffffff838bdae4>] ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:602 [inline] [<ffffffff838bdae4>] ipvlan_queue_xmit+0x1174/0x1be0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:677 [<ffffffff838c2909>] ipvlan_start_xmit+0x49/0x100 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c:229 [<ffffffff84d03900>] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4966 [inline] [<ffffffff84d03900>] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3644 [inline] [<ffffffff84d03900>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x320/0x980 net/core/dev.c:3660 [<ffffffff84d080e2>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x16b2/0x3370 net/core/dev.c:4324 [<ffffffff84d4a65e>] dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3067 [inline] [<ffffffff84d4a65e>] neigh_resolve_output+0x64e/0x750 net/core/neighbour.c:1560 [<ffffffff855ce503>] neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:545 [inline] [<ffffffff855ce503>] ip6_finish_output2+0x1643/0x1ae0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:139 [<ffffffff855b8616>] __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:200 [inline] [<ffffffff855b8616>] ip6_finish_output+0x6c6/0xb10 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:211 [<ffffffff855b7e3c>] NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:298 [inline] [<ffffffff855b7e3c>] ip6_output+0x2bc/0x3d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:232 [<ffffffff855b9ce4>] dst_output include/net/dst.h:444 [inline] [<ffffffff855b9ce4>] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:309 [inline] [<ffffffff855b9ce4>] ip6_xmit+0x11a4/0x1b20 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:352 [<ffffffff8597984e>] sctp_v6_xmit+0x9ae/0x1230 net/sctp/ipv6.c:250 [<ffffffff8594623e>] sctp_packet_transmit+0x25de/0x2bc0 net/sctp/output.c:653 [<ffffffff858f5142>] sctp_packet_singleton+0x202/0x310 net/sctp/outqueue.c:783 [<ffffffff858ea411>] sctp_outq_flush_ctrl net/sctp/outqueue.c:914 [inline] [<ffffffff858ea411>] sctp_outq_flush+0x661/0x3d40 net/sctp/outqueue.c:1212 [<ffffffff858f02f9>] sctp_outq_uncork+0x79/0xb0 net/sctp/outqueue.c:764 [<ffffffff8589f060>] sctp_side_effects net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1199 [inline] [<ffffffff8589f060>] sctp_do_sm+0x55c0/0x5c30 net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1170 [<ffffffff85941567>] sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE+0x97/0xc0 net/sctp/primitive.c:73 [<ffffffff859408b2>] sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc+0xf62/0x17b0 net/sctp/socket.c:1839 [<ffffffff85910b5e>] sctp_sendmsg+0x212e/0x33b0 net/sctp/socket.c:2029 [<ffffffff8544d559>] inet_sendmsg+0x149/0x310 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:849 [<ffffffff84c6c4d2>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:716 [inline] [<ffffffff84c6c4d2>] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:736 [inline] [<ffffffff84c6c4d2>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x572/0x8c0 net/socket.c:2504 [<ffffffff84c6ca91>] ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2558 [inline] [<ffffffff84c6ca91>] __sys_sendmsg+0x271/0x360 net/socket.c:2587 [<ffffffff84c6cbff>] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2596 [inline] [<ffffffff84c6cbff>] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2594 [inline] [<ffffffff84c6cbff>] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x7f/0x90 net/socket.c:2594 [<ffffffff85b32553>] do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] [<ffffffff85b32553>] do_syscall_64+0x53/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:84 [<ffffffff85c00087>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Fixes: 2ad7bf3 ("ipvlan: Initial check-in of the IPVLAN driver.") Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: Mahesh Bandewar <[email protected]> Cc: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 18f0394) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]> # Conflicts: # drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c

jira LE-1907 cve CVE-2021-47408 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-4.18.0-553.16.1.el8_10 commit-author Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> commit e9edc18 Empty-Commit: Cherry-Pick Conflicts during history rebuild. Will be included in final tarball splat. Ref for failed cherry-pick at: ciq/ciq_backports/kernel-4.18.0-553.16.1.el8_10/e9edc188.failed Syzbot was able to trigger the following warning [1] No repro found by syzbot yet but I was able to trigger similar issue by having 2 scripts running in parallel, changing conntrack hash sizes, and: for j in `seq 1 1000` ; do unshare -n /bin/true >/dev/null ; done It would take more than 5 minutes for net_namespace structures to be cleaned up. This is because nf_ct_iterate_cleanup() has to restart everytime a resize happened. By adding a mutex, we can serialize hash resizes and cleanups and also make get_next_corpse() faster by skipping over empty buckets. Even without resizes in the picture, this patch considerably speeds up network namespace dismantles. [1] INFO: task syz-executor.0:8312 can't die for more than 144 seconds. task:syz-executor.0 state:R running task stack:25672 pid: 8312 ppid: 6573 flags:0x00004006 Call Trace: context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:4955 [inline] __schedule+0x940/0x26f0 kernel/sched/core.c:6236 preempt_schedule_common+0x45/0xc0 kernel/sched/core.c:6408 preempt_schedule_thunk+0x16/0x18 arch/x86/entry/thunk_64.S:35 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x109/0x120 kernel/softirq.c:390 local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:32 [inline] get_next_corpse net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:2252 [inline] nf_ct_iterate_cleanup+0x15a/0x450 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:2275 nf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list+0x14c/0x4f0 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:2469 ops_exit_list+0x10d/0x160 net/core/net_namespace.c:171 setup_net+0x639/0xa30 net/core/net_namespace.c:349 copy_net_ns+0x319/0x760 net/core/net_namespace.c:470 create_new_namespaces+0x3f6/0xb20 kernel/nsproxy.c:110 unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xc1/0x1f0 kernel/nsproxy.c:226 ksys_unshare+0x445/0x920 kernel/fork.c:3128 __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3202 [inline] __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3200 [inline] __x64_sys_unshare+0x2d/0x40 kernel/fork.c:3200 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f63da68e739 RSP: 002b:00007f63d7c05188 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000110 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f63da792f80 RCX: 00007f63da68e739 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000040000000 RBP: 00007f63da6e8cc4 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f63da792f80 R13: 00007fff50b75d3f R14: 00007f63d7c05300 R15: 0000000000022000 Showing all locks held in the system: 1 lock held by khungtaskd/27: #0: ffffffff8b980020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x53/0x260 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6446 2 locks held by kworker/u4:2/153: #0: ffff888010c69138 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: arch_atomic64_set arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:34 [inline] #0: ffff888010c69138 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: arch_atomic_long_set include/linux/atomic/atomic-long.h:41 [inline] #0: ffff888010c69138 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: atomic_long_set include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1198 [inline] #0: ffff888010c69138 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: set_work_data kernel/workqueue.c:634 [inline] #0: ffff888010c69138 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: set_work_pool_and_clear_pending kernel/workqueue.c:661 [inline] #0: ffff888010c69138 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x896/0x1690 kernel/workqueue.c:2268 #1: ffffc9000140fdb0 ((kfence_timer).work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x8ca/0x1690 kernel/workqueue.c:2272 1 lock held by systemd-udevd/2970: 1 lock held by in:imklog/6258: #0: ffff88807f970ff0 (&f->f_pos_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __fdget_pos+0xe9/0x100 fs/file.c:990 3 locks held by kworker/1:6/8158: 1 lock held by syz-executor.0/8312: 2 locks held by kworker/u4:13/9320: 1 lock held by syz-executor.5/10178: 1 lock held by syz-executor.4/10217: Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit e9edc18) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]> # Conflicts: # net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c

…oy_rcu() jira LE-1907 cve CVE-2024-36286 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-4.18.0-553.16.1.el8_10 commit-author Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> commit dc21c6c syzbot reported that nf_reinject() could be called without rcu_read_lock() : WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-02060-g5c1672705a1a #0 Not tainted net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:263 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 2 locks held by syz-executor.4/13427: #0: ffffffff8e334f60 (rcu_callback){....}-{0:0}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:329 [inline] #0: ffffffff8e334f60 (rcu_callback){....}-{0:0}, at: rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2190 [inline] #0: ffffffff8e334f60 (rcu_callback){....}-{0:0}, at: rcu_core+0xa86/0x1830 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2471 #1: ffff88801ca92958 (&inst->lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] #1: ffff88801ca92958 (&inst->lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: nfqnl_flush net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:405 [inline] #1: ffff88801ca92958 (&inst->lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: instance_destroy_rcu+0x30/0x220 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:172 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 13427 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-02060-g5c1672705a1a #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x221/0x340 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6712 nf_reinject net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:323 [inline] nfqnl_reinject+0x6ec/0x1120 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:397 nfqnl_flush net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:410 [inline] instance_destroy_rcu+0x1ae/0x220 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:172 rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2196 [inline] rcu_core+0xafd/0x1830 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2471 handle_softirqs+0x2d6/0x990 kernel/softirq.c:554 __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:588 [inline] invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:428 [inline] __irq_exit_rcu+0xf4/0x1c0 kernel/softirq.c:637 irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:649 instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1043 [inline] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa6/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1043 </IRQ> <TASK> Fixes: 9872bec ("[NETFILTER]: nfnetlink: use RCU for queue instances hash") Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Acked-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit dc21c6c) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

jira LE-1907 cve CVE-2024-36270 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-4.18.0-553.16.1.el8_10 commit-author Florian Westphal <[email protected]> commit 21a673b syzbot reports: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000003: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000018-0x000000000000001f] [..] RIP: 0010:nf_tproxy_laddr4+0xb7/0x340 net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_tproxy_ipv4.c:62 Call Trace: nft_tproxy_eval_v4 net/netfilter/nft_tproxy.c:56 [inline] nft_tproxy_eval+0xa9a/0x1a00 net/netfilter/nft_tproxy.c:168 __in_dev_get_rcu() can return NULL, so check for this. Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected] Fixes: cc6eb43 ("tproxy: use the interface primary IP address as a default value for --on-ip") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 21a673b) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

jira LE-1907 cve CVE-2024-38598 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-4.18.0-553.16.1.el8_10 commit-author Yu Kuai <[email protected]> commit f0e729a Is is reported that for dm-raid10, lvextend + lvchange --syncaction will trigger following softlockup: kernel:watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#3 stuck for 26s! [mdX_resync:6976] CPU: 7 PID: 3588 Comm: mdX_resync Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4-next-20240419 #1 RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x13/0x30 Call Trace: <TASK> md_bitmap_start_sync+0x6b/0xf0 raid10_sync_request+0x25c/0x1b40 [raid10] md_do_sync+0x64b/0x1020 md_thread+0xa7/0x170 kthread+0xcf/0x100 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 And the detailed process is as follows: md_do_sync j = mddev->resync_min while (j < max_sectors) sectors = raid10_sync_request(mddev, j, &skipped) if (!md_bitmap_start_sync(..., &sync_blocks)) // md_bitmap_start_sync set sync_blocks to 0 return sync_blocks + sectors_skippe; // sectors = 0; j += sectors; // j never change Root cause is that commit 301867b ("md/raid10: check slab-out-of-bounds in md_bitmap_get_counter") return early from md_bitmap_get_counter(), without setting returned blocks. Fix this problem by always set returned blocks from md_bitmap_get_counter"(), as it used to be. Noted that this patch just fix the softlockup problem in kernel, the case that bitmap size doesn't match array size still need to be fixed. Fixes: 301867b ("md/raid10: check slab-out-of-bounds in md_bitmap_get_counter") Reported-and-tested-by: Nigel Croxon <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Song Liu <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit f0e729a) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

jira LE-1907 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-4.18.0-553.16.1.el8_10 commit-author Paulo Alcantara <[email protected]> commit 41f1008 Empty-Commit: Cherry-Pick Conflicts during history rebuild. Will be included in final tarball splat. Ref for failed cherry-pick at: ciq/ciq_backports/kernel-4.18.0-553.16.1.el8_10/41f10081.failed Either mount(2) or automount might not have server->origin_fullpath set yet while refresh_cache_worker() is attempting to refresh DFS referrals. Add missing NULL check and locking around it. This fixes bellow crash: [ 1070.276835] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 1070.277676] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] [ 1070.278219] CPU: 1 PID: 8506 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Not tainted 5.18.0-rc3 #10 [ 1070.278701] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 [ 1070.279495] Workqueue: cifs-dfscache refresh_cache_worker [cifs] [ 1070.280044] RIP: 0010:strcasecmp+0x34/0x150 [ 1070.280359] Code: 00 00 00 fc ff df 41 54 55 48 89 fd 53 48 83 ec 10 eb 03 4c 89 fe 48 89 ef 48 83 c5 01 48 89 f8 48 89 fa 48 c1 e8 03 83 e2 07 <42> 0f b6 04 28 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 bc 00 00 00 0f b6 45 ff 44 [ 1070.281729] RSP: 0018:ffffc90008367958 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 1070.282114] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 1070.282691] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 1070.283273] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff873eda27 [ 1070.283857] R10: ffffc900083679a0 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88812624c000 [ 1070.284436] R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88810e6e9a88 R15: ffff888119bb9000 [ 1070.284990] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888151200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1070.285625] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1070.286100] CR2: 0000561a4d922418 CR3: 000000010aecc000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 [ 1070.286683] Call Trace: [ 1070.286890] <TASK> [ 1070.287070] refresh_cache_worker+0x895/0xd20 [cifs] [ 1070.287475] ? __refresh_tcon.isra.0+0xfb0/0xfb0 [cifs] [ 1070.287905] ? __lock_acquire+0xcd1/0x6960 [ 1070.288247] ? is_dynamic_key+0x1a0/0x1a0 [ 1070.288591] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x410/0x410 [ 1070.289012] ? lock_downgrade+0x6f0/0x6f0 [ 1070.289318] process_one_work+0x7bd/0x12d0 [ 1070.289637] ? worker_thread+0x160/0xec0 [ 1070.289970] ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x230/0x230 [ 1070.290318] ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x5e/0x90 [ 1070.290619] worker_thread+0x5ac/0xec0 [ 1070.290891] ? process_one_work+0x12d0/0x12d0 [ 1070.291199] kthread+0x2a5/0x350 [ 1070.291430] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 [ 1070.291770] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 1070.292050] </TASK> [ 1070.292223] Modules linked in: bpfilter cifs cifs_arc4 cifs_md4 [ 1070.292765] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 1070.293108] RIP: 0010:strcasecmp+0x34/0x150 [ 1070.293471] Code: 00 00 00 fc ff df 41 54 55 48 89 fd 53 48 83 ec 10 eb 03 4c 89 fe 48 89 ef 48 83 c5 01 48 89 f8 48 89 fa 48 c1 e8 03 83 e2 07 <42> 0f b6 04 28 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 bc 00 00 00 0f b6 45 ff 44 [ 1070.297718] RSP: 0018:ffffc90008367958 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 1070.298622] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 1070.299428] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 1070.300296] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff873eda27 [ 1070.301204] R10: ffffc900083679a0 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88812624c000 [ 1070.301932] R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88810e6e9a88 R15: ffff888119bb9000 [ 1070.302645] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888151200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1070.303462] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1070.304131] CR2: 0000561a4d922418 CR3: 000000010aecc000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 [ 1070.305004] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 1070.305711] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 1070.305971] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]--- Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 41f1008) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]> # Conflicts: # fs/cifs/connect.c # fs/cifs/dfs_cache.c

jira LE-1907 cve CVE-2024-39487 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-4.18.0-553.16.1.el8_10 commit-author Sam Sun <[email protected]> commit e271ff5 In function bond_option_arp_ip_targets_set(), if newval->string is an empty string, newval->string+1 will point to the byte after the string, causing an out-of-bound read. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in strlen+0x7d/0xa0 lib/string.c:418 Read of size 1 at addr ffff8881119c4781 by task syz-executor665/8107 CPU: 1 PID: 8107 Comm: syz-executor665 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc7 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:364 [inline] print_report+0xc1/0x5e0 mm/kasan/report.c:475 kasan_report+0xbe/0xf0 mm/kasan/report.c:588 strlen+0x7d/0xa0 lib/string.c:418 __fortify_strlen include/linux/fortify-string.h:210 [inline] in4_pton+0xa3/0x3f0 net/core/utils.c:130 bond_option_arp_ip_targets_set+0xc2/0x910 drivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c:1201 __bond_opt_set+0x2a4/0x1030 drivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c:767 __bond_opt_set_notify+0x48/0x150 drivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c:792 bond_opt_tryset_rtnl+0xda/0x160 drivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c:817 bonding_sysfs_store_option+0xa1/0x120 drivers/net/bonding/bond_sysfs.c:156 dev_attr_store+0x54/0x80 drivers/base/core.c:2366 sysfs_kf_write+0x114/0x170 fs/sysfs/file.c:136 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x337/0x500 fs/kernfs/file.c:334 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2020 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline] vfs_write+0x96a/0xd80 fs/read_write.c:584 ksys_write+0x122/0x250 fs/read_write.c:637 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x40/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b ---[ end trace ]--- Fix it by adding a check of string length before using it. Fixes: f9de11a ("bonding: add ip checks when store ip target") Signed-off-by: Yue Sun <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Hangbin Liu <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit e271ff5) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

jira LE-1907 cve CVE-2023-52648 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-4.18.0-553.16.1.el8_10 commit-author Zack Rusin <[email protected]> commit 27571c6 Switch to a new plane state requires unreferencing of all held surfaces. In the work required for mob cursors the mapped surfaces started being cached but the variable indicating whether the surface is currently mapped was not being reset. This leads to crashes as the duplicated state, incorrectly, indicates the that surface is mapped even when no surface is present. That's because after unreferencing the surface it's perfectly possible for the plane to be backed by a bo instead of a surface. Reset the surface mapped flag when unreferencing the plane state surface to fix null derefs in cleanup. Fixes crashes in KDE KWin 6.0 on Wayland: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 4 PID: 2533 Comm: kwin_wayland Not tainted 6.7.0-rc3-vmwgfx #2 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020 RIP: 0010:vmw_du_cursor_plane_cleanup_fb+0x124/0x140 [vmwgfx] Code: 00 00 00 75 3a 48 83 c4 10 5b 5d c3 cc cc cc cc 48 8b b3 a8 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 99 90 43 c0 e8 93 c5 db ca 48 8b 83 a8 00 00 00 <48> 8b 78 28 e8 e3 f> RSP: 0018:ffffb6b98216fa80 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff969d84cdcb00 RCX: 0000000000000027 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff969e75f21600 RBP: ffff969d4143dc50 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffb6b98216f920 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffff969e7feb3b10 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000000027b R15: ffff969d49c9fc00 FS: 00007f1e8f1b4180(0000) GS:ffff969e75f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000028 CR3: 0000000104006004 CR4: 00000000003706f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x23/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x171/0x4e0 ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x180 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? vmw_du_cursor_plane_cleanup_fb+0x124/0x140 [vmwgfx] drm_atomic_helper_cleanup_planes+0x9b/0xc0 commit_tail+0xd1/0x130 drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x11a/0x140 drm_atomic_commit+0x97/0xd0 ? __pfx___drm_printfn_info+0x10/0x10 drm_atomic_helper_update_plane+0xf5/0x160 drm_mode_cursor_universal+0x10e/0x270 drm_mode_cursor_common+0x102/0x230 ? __pfx_drm_mode_cursor2_ioctl+0x10/0x10 drm_ioctl_kernel+0xb2/0x110 drm_ioctl+0x26d/0x4b0 ? __pfx_drm_mode_cursor2_ioctl+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_drm_ioctl+0x10/0x10 vmw_generic_ioctl+0xa4/0x110 [vmwgfx] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x94/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x61/0xe0 ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0xaf/0xd0 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x2b/0x40 ? do_syscall_64+0x70/0xe0 ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0xaf/0xd0 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x2b/0x40 ? do_syscall_64+0x70/0xe0 ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 RIP: 0033:0x7f1e93f279ed Code: 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 c8 31 c0 48 8d 45 10 c7 45 b0 10 00 00 00 48 89 45 b8 48 8d 45 d0 48 89 45 c0 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <89> c2 3d 00 f0 ff f> RSP: 002b:00007ffca0faf600 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055db876ed2c0 RCX: 00007f1e93f279ed RDX: 00007ffca0faf6c0 RSI: 00000000c02464bb RDI: 0000000000000015 RBP: 00007ffca0faf650 R08: 000055db87184010 R09: 0000000000000007 R10: 000055db886471a0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffca0faf6c0 R13: 00000000c02464bb R14: 0000000000000015 R15: 00007ffca0faf790 </TASK> Modules linked in: snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer nf_conntrack_netbios_ns nf_conntrack_broadcast nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_ine> CR2: 0000000000000028 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:vmw_du_cursor_plane_cleanup_fb+0x124/0x140 [vmwgfx] Code: 00 00 00 75 3a 48 83 c4 10 5b 5d c3 cc cc cc cc 48 8b b3 a8 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 99 90 43 c0 e8 93 c5 db ca 48 8b 83 a8 00 00 00 <48> 8b 78 28 e8 e3 f> RSP: 0018:ffffb6b98216fa80 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff969d84cdcb00 RCX: 0000000000000027 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff969e75f21600 RBP: ffff969d4143dc50 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffb6b98216f920 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffff969e7feb3b10 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000000027b R15: ffff969d49c9fc00 FS: 00007f1e8f1b4180(0000) GS:ffff969e75f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000028 CR3: 0000000104006004 CR4: 00000000003706f0 Signed-off-by: Zack Rusin <[email protected]> Fixes: 485d98d ("drm/vmwgfx: Add support for CursorMob and CursorBypass 4") Reported-by: Stefan Hoffmeister <[email protected]> Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/misc/-/issues/34 Cc: Martin Krastev <[email protected]> Cc: Maaz Mombasawala <[email protected]> Cc: Ian Forbes <[email protected]> Cc: Broadcom internal kernel review list <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: <[email protected]> # v5.19+ Acked-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Maaz Mombasawala <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Martin Krastev <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit 27571c6) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

jira LE-1907 cve CVE-2024-26940 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-4.18.0-553.16.1.el8_10 commit-author Jocelyn Falempe <[email protected]> commit 4be9075 The driver creates /sys/kernel/debug/dri/0/mob_ttm even when the corresponding ttm_resource_manager is not allocated. This leads to a crash when trying to read from this file. Add a check to create mob_ttm, system_mob_ttm, and gmr_ttm debug file only when the corresponding ttm_resource_manager is allocated. crash> bt PID: 3133409 TASK: ffff8fe4834a5000 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "grep" #0 [ffffb954506b3b20] machine_kexec at ffffffffb2a6bec3 #1 [ffffb954506b3b78] __crash_kexec at ffffffffb2bb598a #2 [ffffb954506b3c38] crash_kexec at ffffffffb2bb68c1 #3 [ffffb954506b3c50] oops_end at ffffffffb2a2a9b1 #4 [ffffb954506b3c70] no_context at ffffffffb2a7e913 #5 [ffffb954506b3cc8] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffffb2a7ec8c #6 [ffffb954506b3d10] do_page_fault at ffffffffb2a7f887 #7 [ffffb954506b3d40] page_fault at ffffffffb360116e [exception RIP: ttm_resource_manager_debug+0x11] RIP: ffffffffc04afd11 RSP: ffffb954506b3df0 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffff8fe41a6d1200 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000940 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffc04b4338 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffffb954506b3e08 R8: ffff8fee3ffad000 R9: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff8fe41a76a000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 00000000ffffffff R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8fe5bb6f3900 R15: ffff8fe41a6d1200 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #8 [ffffb954506b3e00] ttm_resource_manager_show at ffffffffc04afde7 [ttm] #9 [ffffb954506b3e30] seq_read at ffffffffb2d8f9f3 RIP: 00007f4c4eda8985 RSP: 00007ffdbba9e9f8 RFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000037e000 RCX: 00007f4c4eda8985 RDX: 000000000037e000 RSI: 00007f4c41573000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 000000000037e000 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 000000000037fe30 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f4c41573000 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 00007f4c41572010 R15: 0000000000000003 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 CS: 0033 SS: 002b Signed-off-by: Jocelyn Falempe <[email protected]> Fixes: af4a25b ("drm/vmwgfx: Add debugfs entries for various ttm resource managers") Cc: <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Zack Rusin <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit 4be9075) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5d726c4 ] Following deadlock can be triggered easily by lockdep: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.17.0-rc3-00124-ga12c2658ced0 #1665 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ check/1334 is trying to acquire lock: ff1100011d9d0678 (&q->sysfs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: blk_unregister_queue+0x53/0x180 but task is already holding lock: ff1100011d9d00e0 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3){++++}-{0:0}, at: del_gendisk+0xba/0x110 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3){++++}-{0:0}: blk_queue_enter+0x40b/0x470 blkg_conf_prep+0x7b/0x3c0 tg_set_limit+0x10a/0x3e0 cgroup_file_write+0xc6/0x420 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x189/0x280 vfs_write+0x256/0x490 ksys_write+0x83/0x190 __x64_sys_write+0x21/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x4608/0x4630 do_syscall_64+0xdb/0x6b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #1 (&q->rq_qos_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0xd8/0xf50 mutex_lock_nested+0x2b/0x40 wbt_init+0x17e/0x280 wbt_enable_default+0xe9/0x140 blk_register_queue+0x1da/0x2e0 __add_disk+0x38c/0x5d0 add_disk_fwnode+0x89/0x250 device_add_disk+0x18/0x30 virtblk_probe+0x13a3/0x1800 virtio_dev_probe+0x389/0x610 really_probe+0x136/0x620 __driver_probe_device+0xb3/0x230 driver_probe_device+0x2f/0xe0 __driver_attach+0x158/0x250 bus_for_each_dev+0xa9/0x130 driver_attach+0x26/0x40 bus_add_driver+0x178/0x3d0 driver_register+0x7d/0x1c0 __register_virtio_driver+0x2c/0x60 virtio_blk_init+0x6f/0xe0 do_one_initcall+0x94/0x540 kernel_init_freeable+0x56a/0x7b0 kernel_init+0x2b/0x270 ret_from_fork+0x268/0x4c0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 (&q->sysfs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __lock_acquire+0x1835/0x2940 lock_acquire+0xf9/0x450 __mutex_lock+0xd8/0xf50 mutex_lock_nested+0x2b/0x40 blk_unregister_queue+0x53/0x180 __del_gendisk+0x226/0x690 del_gendisk+0xba/0x110 sd_remove+0x49/0xb0 [sd_mod] device_remove+0x87/0xb0 device_release_driver_internal+0x11e/0x230 device_release_driver+0x1a/0x30 bus_remove_device+0x14d/0x220 device_del+0x1e1/0x5a0 __scsi_remove_device+0x1ff/0x2f0 scsi_remove_device+0x37/0x60 sdev_store_delete+0x77/0x100 dev_attr_store+0x1f/0x40 sysfs_kf_write+0x65/0x90 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x189/0x280 vfs_write+0x256/0x490 ksys_write+0x83/0x190 __x64_sys_write+0x21/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x4608/0x4630 do_syscall_64+0xdb/0x6b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &q->sysfs_lock --> &q->rq_qos_mutex --> &q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3); lock(&q->rq_qos_mutex); lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3); lock(&q->sysfs_lock); Root cause is that queue_usage_counter is grabbed with rq_qos_mutex held in blkg_conf_prep(), while queue should be freezed before rq_qos_mutex from other context. The blk_queue_enter() from blkg_conf_prep() is used to protect against policy deactivation, which is already protected with blkcg_mutex, hence convert blk_queue_enter() to blkcg_mutex to fix this problem. Meanwhile, consider that blkcg_mutex is held after queue is freezed from policy deactivation, also convert blkg_alloc() to use GFP_NOIO. Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4c634b6 ] As noted in the kernel documentation [1], open-coded multiplication in allocator arguments is discouraged because it can lead to integer overflow. Use kcalloc() to gain built-in overflow protection, making memory allocation safer when calculating allocation size compared to explicit multiplication. Similarly, use size_add() instead of explicit addition for 'uobj_chunk_num + sobj_chunk_num'. Link: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/next/process/deprecated.html#open-coded-arithmetic-in-allocator-arguments #1 Signed-off-by: Qianfeng Rong <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]> Acked-by: Giovanni Cabiddu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

@002

[ Upstream commit 99d7181 ] There is race in amdgpu_amdkfd_device_fini_sw and interrupt. if amdgpu_amdkfd_device_fini_sw run in b/w kfd_cleanup_nodes and kfree(kfd), and KGD interrupt generated. kernel panic log: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000098 amdgpu 0000:c8:00.0: amdgpu: Requesting 4 partitions through PSP PGD d78c68067 P4D d78c68067 kfd kfd: amdgpu: Allocated 3969056 bytes on gart PUD 1465b8067 PMD @ Oops: @002 [#1] SMP NOPTI kfd kfd: amdgpu: Total number of KFD nodes to be created: 4 CPU: 115 PID: @ Comm: swapper/115 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S W OE K RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x12/0x40 Code: 89 e@ 41 5c c3 cc cc cc cc 66 66 2e Of 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 OF 1f 40 00 Of 1f 44% 00 00 41 54 9c 41 5c fa 31 cO ba 01 00 00 00 <fO> OF b1 17 75 Ba 4c 89 e@ 41 Sc 89 c6 e8 07 38 5d RSP: 0018: ffffc90@1a6b0e28 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000018 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff8883bb623e00 RDI: 0000000000000098 ffff8883bb000000 RO8: ffff888100055020 ROO: ffff888100055020 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0900000000000002 ffff888F2b97da0@ R14: @000000000000098 R15: ffff8883babdfo00 CS: 010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CRO: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000098 CR3: 0000000e7cae2006 CR4: 0000000002770ce0 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffeO7FO DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> kgd2kfd_interrupt+@x6b/0x1f@ [amdgpu] ? amdgpu_fence_process+0xa4/0x150 [amdgpu] kfd kfd: amdgpu: Node: 0, interrupt_bitmap: 3 YcpxFl Rant tErace amdgpu_irq_dispatch+0x165/0x210 [amdgpu] amdgpu_ih_process+0x80/0x100 [amdgpu] amdgpu: Virtual CRAT table created for GPU amdgpu_irq_handler+0x1f/@x60 [amdgpu] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x3d/0x170 amdgpu: Topology: Add dGPU node [0x74a2:0x1002] handle_irq_event+0x5a/@xco handle_edge_irq+0x93/0x240 kfd kfd: amdgpu: KFD node 1 partition @ size 49148M asm_call_irq_on_stack+0xf/@X20 </IRQ> common_interrupt+0xb3/0x130 asm_common_interrupt+0x1le/0x40 5.10.134-010.a1i5000.a18.x86_64 #1 Signed-off-by: Yifan Zhang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Philip Yang<[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 38f5024 ] With CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_LIST=y and by executing $ netcat -l --sctp & $ netcat --sctp localhost & $ ss --sctp one can trigger the following Lockdep-RCU splat(s): WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.18.0-rc1-00093-g7f864458e9a6 #5 Not tainted ----------------------------- net/sctp/diag.c:76 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 2 locks held by ss/215: #0: ffff9c740828bec0 (nlk_cb_mutex-SOCK_DIAG){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __netlink_dump_start+0x84/0x2b0 #1: ffff9c7401d72cd0 (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sctp_sock_dump+0x38/0x200 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 215 Comm: ss Not tainted 6.18.0-rc1-00093-g7f864458e9a6 #5 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x90 lockdep_rcu_suspicious.cold+0x4e/0xa3 inet_sctp_diag_fill.isra.0+0x4b1/0x5d0 sctp_sock_dump+0x131/0x200 sctp_transport_traverse_process+0x170/0x1b0 ? __pfx_sctp_sock_filter+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_sctp_sock_dump+0x10/0x10 sctp_diag_dump+0x103/0x140 __inet_diag_dump+0x70/0xb0 netlink_dump+0x148/0x490 __netlink_dump_start+0x1f3/0x2b0 inet_diag_handler_cmd+0xcd/0x100 ? __pfx_inet_diag_dump_start+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_inet_diag_dump+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_inet_diag_dump_done+0x10/0x10 sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x18e/0x320 ? __pfx_sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 netlink_rcv_skb+0x4d/0x100 netlink_unicast+0x1d7/0x2b0 netlink_sendmsg+0x203/0x450 ____sys_sendmsg+0x30c/0x340 ___sys_sendmsg+0x94/0xf0 __sys_sendmsg+0x83/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x390 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f ... </TASK> Fixes: 8f840e4 ("sctp: add the sctp_diag.c file") Signed-off-by: Stefan Wiehler <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Acked-by: Xin Long <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e120f46 ] Raw IP packets have no MAC header, leaving skb->mac_header uninitialized. This can trigger kernel panics on ARM64 when xfrm or other subsystems access the offset due to strict alignment checks. Initialize the MAC header to prevent such crashes. This can trigger kernel panics on ARM when running IPsec over the qmimux0 interface. Example trace: Internal error: Oops: 000000009600004f [#1] SMP CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.34-gbe78e49cb433 #1 Hardware name: LS1028A RDB Board (DT) pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : xfrm_input+0xde8/0x1318 lr : xfrm_input+0x61c/0x1318 sp : ffff800080003b20 Call trace: xfrm_input+0xde8/0x1318 xfrm6_rcv+0x38/0x44 xfrm6_esp_rcv+0x48/0xa8 ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x94/0x4b0 ip6_input_finish+0x44/0x70 ip6_input+0x44/0xc0 ipv6_rcv+0x6c/0x114 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x5c/0x8c __netif_receive_skb+0x18/0x60 process_backlog+0x78/0x17c __napi_poll+0x38/0x180 net_rx_action+0x168/0x2f0 Fixes: c6adf77 ("net: usb: qmi_wwan: add qmap mux protocol support") Signed-off-by: Qendrim Maxhuni <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 6dd97ce upstream. When a connector is connected but inactive (e.g., disabled by desktop environments), pipe_ctx->stream_res.tg will be destroyed. Then, reading odm_combine_segments causes kernel NULL pointer dereference. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 16 UID: 0 PID: 26474 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.17.0+ #2 PREEMPT(lazy) e6a17af9ee6db7c63e9d90dbe5b28ccab67520c6 Hardware name: LENOVO 21Q4/LNVNB161216, BIOS PXCN25WW 03/27/2025 RIP: 0010:odm_combine_segments_show+0x93/0xf0 [amdgpu] Code: 41 83 b8 b0 00 00 00 01 75 6e 48 98 ba a1 ff ff ff 48 c1 e0 0c 48 8d 8c 07 d8 02 00 00 48 85 c9 74 2d 48 8b bc 07 f0 08 00 00 <48> 8b 07 48 8b 80 08 02 00> RSP: 0018:ffffd1bf4b953c58 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000005000 RBX: ffff8e35976b02d0 RCX: ffff8e3aeed052d8 RDX: 00000000ffffffa1 RSI: ffff8e35a3120800 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff8e3580eb0000 R09: ffff8e35976b02d0 R10: ffffd1bf4b953c78 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffd1bf4b953d08 R13: 0000000000040000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f44d3f9f740(0000) GS:ffff8e3caa47f000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000006485c2000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> seq_read_iter+0x125/0x490 ? __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x18f/0x350 seq_read+0x12c/0x170 full_proxy_read+0x51/0x80 vfs_read+0xbc/0x390 ? __handle_mm_fault+0xa46/0xef0 ? do_syscall_64+0x71/0x900 ksys_read+0x73/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x71/0x900 ? count_memcg_events+0xc2/0x190 ? handle_mm_fault+0x1d7/0x2d0 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x21a/0x690 ? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74 RIP: 0033:0x7f44d4031687 Code: 48 89 fa 4c 89 df e8 58 b3 00 00 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 74 1a 5b c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 44 24 10 0f 05 <5b> c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00> RSP: 002b:00007ffdb4b5f0b0 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f44d3f9f740 RCX: 00007f44d4031687 RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: 00007f44d3f5e000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000040000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007f44d3f5e000 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000040000 </TASK> Modules linked in: tls tcp_diag inet_diag xt_mark ccm snd_hrtimer snd_seq_dummy snd_seq_midi snd_seq_oss snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi snd_seq snd_seq_device x> snd_hda_codec_atihdmi snd_hda_codec_realtek_lib lenovo_wmi_helpers think_lmi snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_soc_core kvm snd_compress uvcvideo sn> platform_profile joydev amd_pmc mousedev mac_hid sch_fq_codel uinput i2c_dev parport_pc ppdev lp parport nvme_fabrics loop nfnetlink ip_tables x_tables dm_cryp> CR2: 0000000000000000 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:odm_combine_segments_show+0x93/0xf0 [amdgpu] Code: 41 83 b8 b0 00 00 00 01 75 6e 48 98 ba a1 ff ff ff 48 c1 e0 0c 48 8d 8c 07 d8 02 00 00 48 85 c9 74 2d 48 8b bc 07 f0 08 00 00 <48> 8b 07 48 8b 80 08 02 00> RSP: 0018:ffffd1bf4b953c58 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000005000 RBX: ffff8e35976b02d0 RCX: ffff8e3aeed052d8 RDX: 00000000ffffffa1 RSI: ffff8e35a3120800 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff8e3580eb0000 R09: ffff8e35976b02d0 R10: ffffd1bf4b953c78 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffd1bf4b953d08 R13: 0000000000040000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f44d3f9f740(0000) GS:ffff8e3caa47f000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000006485c2000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Fix this by checking pipe_ctx->stream_res.tg before dereferencing. Fixes: 07926ba ("drm/amd/display: Add debugfs interface for ODM combine info") Signed-off-by: Rong Zhang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Mario Limoncello <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit f19bbecd34e3c15eed7e5e593db2ac0fc7a0e6d8) Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

jira VULN-155633 cve CVE-2022-50408 commit-author Alexander Coffin <[email protected]> commit 3f42faf > ret = brcmf_proto_tx_queue_data(drvr, ifp->ifidx, skb); may be schedule, and then complete before the line > ndev->stats.tx_bytes += skb->len; [ 46.912801] ================================================================== [ 46.920552] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in brcmf_netdev_start_xmit+0x718/0x8c8 [brcmfmac] [ 46.928673] Read of size 4 at addr ffffff803f5882e8 by task systemd-resolve/328 [ 46.935991] [ 46.937514] CPU: 1 PID: 328 Comm: systemd-resolve Tainted: G O 5.4.199-[REDACTED] #1 [ 46.947255] Hardware name: [REDACTED] [ 46.954568] Call trace: [ 46.957037] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x2b8 [ 46.960719] show_stack+0x24/0x30 [ 46.964052] dump_stack+0x128/0x194 [ 46.967557] print_address_description.isra.0+0x64/0x380 [ 46.972877] __kasan_report+0x1d4/0x240 [ 46.976723] kasan_report+0xc/0x18 [ 46.980138] __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x18/0x20 [ 46.985027] brcmf_netdev_start_xmit+0x718/0x8c8 [brcmfmac] [ 46.990613] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x1bc/0xda0 [ 46.994894] sch_direct_xmit+0x198/0xd08 [ 46.998827] __qdisc_run+0x37c/0x1dc0 [ 47.002500] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1528/0x21f8 [ 47.006692] dev_queue_xmit+0x24/0x30 [ 47.010366] neigh_resolve_output+0x37c/0x678 [ 47.014734] ip_finish_output2+0x598/0x2458 [ 47.018927] __ip_finish_output+0x300/0x730 [ 47.023118] ip_output+0x2e0/0x430 [ 47.026530] ip_local_out+0x90/0x140 [ 47.030117] igmpv3_sendpack+0x14c/0x228 [ 47.034049] igmpv3_send_cr+0x384/0x6b8 [ 47.037895] igmp_ifc_timer_expire+0x4c/0x118 [ 47.042262] call_timer_fn+0x1cc/0xbe8 [ 47.046021] __run_timers+0x4d8/0xb28 [ 47.049693] run_timer_softirq+0x24/0x40 [ 47.053626] __do_softirq+0x2c0/0x117c [ 47.057387] irq_exit+0x2dc/0x388 [ 47.060715] __handle_domain_irq+0xb4/0x158 [ 47.064908] gic_handle_irq+0x58/0xb0 [ 47.068581] el0_irq_naked+0x50/0x5c [ 47.072162] [ 47.073665] Allocated by task 328: [ 47.077083] save_stack+0x24/0xb0 [ 47.080410] __kasan_kmalloc.isra.0+0xc0/0xe0 [ 47.084776] kasan_slab_alloc+0x14/0x20 [ 47.088622] kmem_cache_alloc+0x15c/0x468 [ 47.092643] __alloc_skb+0xa4/0x498 [ 47.096142] igmpv3_newpack+0x158/0xd78 [ 47.099987] add_grhead+0x210/0x288 [ 47.103485] add_grec+0x6b0/0xb70 [ 47.106811] igmpv3_send_cr+0x2e0/0x6b8 [ 47.110657] igmp_ifc_timer_expire+0x4c/0x118 [ 47.115027] call_timer_fn+0x1cc/0xbe8 [ 47.118785] __run_timers+0x4d8/0xb28 [ 47.122457] run_timer_softirq+0x24/0x40 [ 47.126389] __do_softirq+0x2c0/0x117c [ 47.130142] [ 47.131643] Freed by task 180: [ 47.134712] save_stack+0x24/0xb0 [ 47.138041] __kasan_slab_free+0x108/0x180 [ 47.142146] kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18 [ 47.145904] slab_free_freelist_hook+0xa4/0x1b0 [ 47.150444] kmem_cache_free+0x8c/0x528 [ 47.154292] kfree_skbmem+0x94/0x108 [ 47.157880] consume_skb+0x10c/0x5a8 [ 47.161466] __dev_kfree_skb_any+0x88/0xa0 [ 47.165598] brcmu_pkt_buf_free_skb+0x44/0x68 [brcmutil] [ 47.171023] brcmf_txfinalize+0xec/0x190 [brcmfmac] [ 47.176016] brcmf_proto_bcdc_txcomplete+0x1c0/0x210 [brcmfmac] [ 47.182056] brcmf_sdio_sendfromq+0x8dc/0x1e80 [brcmfmac] [ 47.187568] brcmf_sdio_dpc+0xb48/0x2108 [brcmfmac] [ 47.192529] brcmf_sdio_dataworker+0xc8/0x238 [brcmfmac] [ 47.197859] process_one_work+0x7fc/0x1a80 [ 47.201965] worker_thread+0x31c/0xc40 [ 47.205726] kthread+0x2d8/0x370 [ 47.208967] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 [ 47.212546] [ 47.214051] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffffff803f588280 [ 47.214051] which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 208 [ 47.227086] The buggy address is located 104 bytes inside of [ 47.227086] 208-byte region [ffffff803f588280, ffffff803f588350) [ 47.238814] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 47.243618] page:ffffffff00dd6200 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffffff804b6bf800 index:0xffffff803f589900 compound_mapcount: 0 [ 47.255007] flags: 0x10200(slab|head) [ 47.258689] raw: 0000000000010200 ffffffff00dfa980 0000000200000002 ffffff804b6bf800 [ 47.266439] raw: ffffff803f589900 0000000080190018 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 47.274180] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 47.279752] [ 47.281251] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 47.286051] ffffff803f588180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 47.293277] ffffff803f588200: fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 47.300502] >ffffff803f588280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 47.307723] ^ [ 47.314343] ffffff803f588300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 47.321569] ffffff803f588380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 47.328789] ================================================================== Signed-off-by: Alexander Coffin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit 3f42faf) Signed-off-by: Roxana Nicolescu <[email protected]>

jira VULN-154549 cve CVE-2023-53232 commit-author Sean Wang <[email protected]> commit 12db28c The MT7921 driver no longer uses eeprom.data, but the relevant code has not been removed completely since commit 16d98b5 ("mt76: mt7921: rely on mcu_get_nic_capability"). This could result in potential invalid memory access. To fix the kernel panic issue in mt7921, it is necessary to avoid accessing unallocated eeprom.data which can lead to invalid memory access. Furthermore, it is possible to entirely eliminate the mt7921_mcu_parse_eeprom function and solely depend on mt7921_mcu_parse_response to divide the RxD header. [2.702735] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000550 [2.702740] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode [2.702741] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page [2.702743] PGD 0 P4D 0 [2.702747] Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [2.702755] RIP: 0010:mt7921_mcu_parse_response+0x147/0x170 [mt7921_common] [2.702758] RSP: 0018:ffffae7c00fef828 EFLAGS: 00010286 [2.702760] RAX: ffffa367f57be024 RBX: ffffa367cc7bf500 RCX: 0000000000000000 [2.702762] RDX: 0000000000000550 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffa367cc7bf500 [2.702763] RBP: ffffae7c00fef840 R08: ffffa367cb167000 R09: 0000000000000005 [2.702764] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffffc04702e4 R12: ffffa367e8329f40 [2.702766] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffffa367e8329f40 [2.702768] FS: 000079ee6cf20c40(0000) GS:ffffa36b2f940000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [2.702769] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [2.702775] CR2: 0000000000000550 CR3: 00000001233c6004 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 [2.702776] PKRU: 55555554 [2.702777] Call Trace: [2.702782] mt76_mcu_skb_send_and_get_msg+0xc3/0x11e [mt76 <HASH:1bc4 5>] [2.702785] mt7921_run_firmware+0x241/0x853 [mt7921_common <HASH:6a2f 6>] [2.702789] mt7921e_mcu_init+0x2b/0x56 [mt7921e <HASH:d290 7>] [2.702792] mt7921_register_device+0x2eb/0x5a5 [mt7921_common <HASH:6a2f 6>] [2.702795] ? mt7921_irq_tasklet+0x1d4/0x1d4 [mt7921e <HASH:d290 7>] [2.702797] mt7921_pci_probe+0x2d6/0x319 [mt7921e <HASH:d290 7>] [2.702799] pci_device_probe+0x9f/0x12a Fixes: 16d98b5 ("mt76: mt7921: rely on mcu_get_nic_capability") Signed-off-by: Sean Wang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 12db28c) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel <[email protected]>

jira VULN-154755 cve CVE-2022-50341 commit-author Paulo Alcantara <[email protected]> commit f7f291e upstream-diff Used 5.15 LT bf0543b but still had some conflicts due to context changes When running xfstests against Azure the following oops occurred on an arm64 system Unable to handle kernel write to read-only memory at virtual address ffff0001221cf000 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x9600004f EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x0f: level 3 permission fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x0000004f CM = 0, WnR = 1 swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000000294f3000 [ffff0001221cf000] pgd=18000001ffff8003, p4d=18000001ffff8003, pud=18000001ff82e003, pmd=18000001ff71d003, pte=00600001221cf787 Internal error: Oops: 9600004f [#1] PREEMPT SMP ... pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) pc : __memcpy+0x40/0x230 lr : scatterwalk_copychunks+0xe0/0x200 sp : ffff800014e92de0 x29: ffff800014e92de0 x28: ffff000114f9de80 x27: 0000000000000008 x26: 0000000000000008 x25: ffff800014e92e78 x24: 0000000000000008 x23: 0000000000000001 x22: 0000040000000000 x21: ffff000000000000 x20: 0000000000000001 x19: ffff0001037c4488 x18: 0000000000000014 x17: 235e1c0d6efa9661 x16: a435f9576b6edd6c x15: 0000000000000058 x14: 0000000000000001 x13: 0000000000000008 x12: ffff000114f2e590 x11: ffffffffffffffff x10: 0000040000000000 x9 : ffff8000105c3580 x8 : 2e9413b10000001a x7 : 534b4410fb86b005 x6 : 534b4410fb86b005 x5 : ffff0001221cf008 x4 : ffff0001037c4490 x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000000000000008 x1 : ffff0001037c4488 x0 : ffff0001221cf000 Call trace: __memcpy+0x40/0x230 scatterwalk_map_and_copy+0x98/0x100 crypto_ccm_encrypt+0x150/0x180 crypto_aead_encrypt+0x2c/0x40 crypt_message+0x750/0x880 smb3_init_transform_rq+0x298/0x340 smb_send_rqst.part.11+0xd8/0x180 smb_send_rqst+0x3c/0x100 compound_send_recv+0x534/0xbc0 smb2_query_info_compound+0x32c/0x440 smb2_set_ea+0x438/0x4c0 cifs_xattr_set+0x5d4/0x7c0 This is because in scatterwalk_copychunks(), we attempted to write to a buffer (@sign) that was allocated in the stack (vmalloc area) by crypt_message() and thus accessing its remaining 8 (x2) bytes ended up crossing a page boundary. To simply fix it, we could just pass @sign kmalloc'd from crypt_message() and then we're done. Luckily, we don't seem to pass any other vmalloc'd buffers in smb_rqst::rq_iov... Instead, let's map the correct pages and offsets from vmalloc buffers as well in cifs_sg_set_buf() and then avoiding such oopses. Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit f7f291e) Signed-off-by: Brett Mastbergen <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit f6286d5) Signed-off-by: Brett Mastbergen <[email protected]>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-119900 commit fee4d17 Author: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Date: Thu, 1 May 2025 11:47:47 +0100 arm64: errata: Add missing sentinels to Spectre-BHB MIDR arrays Commit a595138 ("arm64: errata: Add newer ARM cores to the spectre_bhb_loop_affected() lists") added some additional CPUs to the Spectre-BHB workaround, including some new arrays for designs that require new 'k' values for the workaround to be effective. Unfortunately, the new arrays omitted the sentinel entry and so is_midr_in_range_list() will walk off the end when it doesn't find a match. With UBSAN enabled, this leads to a crash during boot when is_midr_in_range_list() is inlined (which was more common prior to c8c2647 ("arm64: Make _midr_in_range_list() an exported function")): | Internal error: aarch64 BRK: 00000000f2000001 [#1] PREEMPT SMP | pstate: 804000c5 (Nzcv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) | pc : spectre_bhb_loop_affected+0x28/0x30 | lr : is_spectre_bhb_affected+0x170/0x190 | [...] | Call trace: | spectre_bhb_loop_affected+0x28/0x30 | update_cpu_capabilities+0xc0/0x184 | init_cpu_features+0x188/0x1a4 | cpuinfo_store_boot_cpu+0x4c/0x60 | smp_prepare_boot_cpu+0x38/0x54 | start_kernel+0x8c/0x478 | __primary_switched+0xc8/0xd4 | Code: 6b09011f 54000061 52801080 d65f03c0 (d4200020) | ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- | Kernel panic - not syncing: aarch64 BRK: Fatal exception Add the missing sentinel entries. Cc: Lee Jones <[email protected]> Cc: James Morse <[email protected]> Cc: Doug Anderson <[email protected]> Cc: Shameer Kolothum <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Reported-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Fixes: a595138 ("arm64: errata: Add newer ARM cores to the spectre_bhb_loop_affected() lists") Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Lee Jones <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <[email protected]>

When crashkernel is configured with a high reservation, shrinking its value below the low crashkernel reservation causes two issues: 1. Invalid crashkernel resource objects 2. Kernel crash if crashkernel shrinking is done twice For example, with crashkernel=200M,high, the kernel reserves 200MB of high memory and some default low memory (say 256MB). The reservation appears as: cat /proc/iomem | grep -i crash af000000-beffffff : Crash kernel 433000000-43f7fffff : Crash kernel If crashkernel is then shrunk to 50MB (echo 52428800 > /sys/kernel/kexec_crash_size), /proc/iomem still shows 256MB reserved: af000000-beffffff : Crash kernel Instead, it should show 50MB: af000000-b21fffff : Crash kernel Further shrinking crashkernel to 40MB causes a kernel crash with the following trace (x86): BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000038 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI <snip...> Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x27 ? page_fault_oops+0x15a/0x2f0 ? search_module_extables+0x19/0x60 ? search_bpf_extables+0x5f/0x80 ? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x180 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? __release_resource+0xd/0xb0 release_resource+0x26/0x40 __crash_shrink_memory+0xe5/0x110 crash_shrink_memory+0x12a/0x190 kexec_crash_size_store+0x41/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x141/0x1f0 vfs_write+0x294/0x460 ksys_write+0x6d/0xf0 <snip...> This happens because __crash_shrink_memory()/kernel/crash_core.c incorrectly updates the crashk_res resource object even when crashk_low_res should be updated. Fix this by ensuring the correct crashkernel resource object is updated when shrinking crashkernel memory. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 16c6006 ("kexec: enable kexec_crash_size to support two crash kernel regions") Signed-off-by: Sourabh Jain <[email protected]> Acked-by: Baoquan He <[email protected]> Cc: Zhen Lei <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

jira VULN-8642 cve CVE-2024-50154 commit-author Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> commit e8c526f Martin KaFai Lau reported use-after-free [0] in reqsk_timer_handler(). """ We are seeing a use-after-free from a bpf prog attached to trace_tcp_retransmit_synack. The program passes the req->sk to the bpf_sk_storage_get_tracing kernel helper which does check for null before using it. """ The commit 83fccfc ("inet: fix potential deadlock in reqsk_queue_unlink()") added timer_pending() in reqsk_queue_unlink() not to call del_timer_sync() from reqsk_timer_handler(), but it introduced a small race window. Before the timer is called, expire_timers() calls detach_timer(timer, true) to clear timer->entry.pprev and marks it as not pending. If reqsk_queue_unlink() checks timer_pending() just after expire_timers() calls detach_timer(), TCP will miss del_timer_sync(); the reqsk timer will continue running and send multiple SYN+ACKs until it expires. The reported UAF could happen if req->sk is close()d earlier than the timer expiration, which is 63s by default. The scenario would be 1. inet_csk_complete_hashdance() calls inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop(), but del_timer_sync() is missed 2. reqsk timer is executed and scheduled again 3. req->sk is accept()ed and reqsk_put() decrements rsk_refcnt, but reqsk timer still has another one, and inet_csk_accept() does not clear req->sk for non-TFO sockets 4. sk is close()d 5. reqsk timer is executed again, and BPF touches req->sk Let's not use timer_pending() by passing the caller context to __inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop(). Note that reqsk timer is pinned, so the issue does not happen in most use cases. [1] [0] BUG: KFENCE: use-after-free read in bpf_sk_storage_get_tracing+0x2e/0x1b0 Use-after-free read at 0x00000000a891fb3a (in kfence-#1): bpf_sk_storage_get_tracing+0x2e/0x1b0 bpf_prog_5ea3e95db6da0438_tcp_retransmit_synack+0x1d20/0x1dda bpf_trace_run2+0x4c/0xc0 tcp_rtx_synack+0xf9/0x100 reqsk_timer_handler+0xda/0x3d0 run_timer_softirq+0x292/0x8a0 irq_exit_rcu+0xf5/0x320 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6d/0x80 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 intel_idle_irq+0x5a/0xa0 cpuidle_enter_state+0x94/0x273 cpu_startup_entry+0x15e/0x260 start_secondary+0x8a/0x90 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xfa/0xfb kfence-#1: 0x00000000a72cc7b6-0x00000000d97616d9, size=2376, cache=TCPv6 allocated by task 0 on cpu 9 at 260507.901592s: sk_prot_alloc+0x35/0x140 sk_clone_lock+0x1f/0x3f0 inet_csk_clone_lock+0x15/0x160 tcp_create_openreq_child+0x1f/0x410 tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock+0x1da/0x700 tcp_check_req+0x1fb/0x510 tcp_v6_rcv+0x98b/0x1420 ipv6_list_rcv+0x2258/0x26e0 napi_complete_done+0x5b1/0x2990 mlx5e_napi_poll+0x2ae/0x8d0 net_rx_action+0x13e/0x590 irq_exit_rcu+0xf5/0x320 common_interrupt+0x80/0x90 asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40 cpuidle_enter_state+0xfb/0x273 cpu_startup_entry+0x15e/0x260 start_secondary+0x8a/0x90 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xfa/0xfb freed by task 0 on cpu 9 at 260507.927527s: rcu_core_si+0x4ff/0xf10 irq_exit_rcu+0xf5/0x320 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6d/0x80 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 cpuidle_enter_state+0xfb/0x273 cpu_startup_entry+0x15e/0x260 start_secondary+0x8a/0x90 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xfa/0xfb Fixes: 83fccfc ("inet: fix potential deadlock in reqsk_queue_unlink()") Reported-by: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/ [1] Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit e8c526f) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel <[email protected]>

jira VULN-80680 cve CVE-2025-38461 commit-author Michal Luczaj <[email protected]> commit 687aa0c Transport assignment may race with module unload. Protect new_transport from becoming a stale pointer. This also takes care of an insecure call in vsock_use_local_transport(); add a lockdep assert. BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff8056000 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN RIP: 0010:vsock_assign_transport+0x366/0x600 Call Trace: vsock_connect+0x59c/0xc40 __sys_connect+0xe8/0x100 __x64_sys_connect+0x6e/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x92/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 Fixes: c0cfa2d ("vsock: add multi-transports support") Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michal Luczaj <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 687aa0c) Signed-off-by: Roxana Nicolescu <[email protected]>

jira VULN-154549 cve CVE-2023-53232 commit-author Sean Wang <[email protected]> commit 12db28c The MT7921 driver no longer uses eeprom.data, but the relevant code has not been removed completely since commit 16d98b5 ("mt76: mt7921: rely on mcu_get_nic_capability"). This could result in potential invalid memory access. To fix the kernel panic issue in mt7921, it is necessary to avoid accessing unallocated eeprom.data which can lead to invalid memory access. Furthermore, it is possible to entirely eliminate the mt7921_mcu_parse_eeprom function and solely depend on mt7921_mcu_parse_response to divide the RxD header. [2.702735] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000550 [2.702740] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode [2.702741] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page [2.702743] PGD 0 P4D 0 [2.702747] Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [2.702755] RIP: 0010:mt7921_mcu_parse_response+0x147/0x170 [mt7921_common] [2.702758] RSP: 0018:ffffae7c00fef828 EFLAGS: 00010286 [2.702760] RAX: ffffa367f57be024 RBX: ffffa367cc7bf500 RCX: 0000000000000000 [2.702762] RDX: 0000000000000550 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffa367cc7bf500 [2.702763] RBP: ffffae7c00fef840 R08: ffffa367cb167000 R09: 0000000000000005 [2.702764] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffffc04702e4 R12: ffffa367e8329f40 [2.702766] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffffa367e8329f40 [2.702768] FS: 000079ee6cf20c40(0000) GS:ffffa36b2f940000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [2.702769] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [2.702775] CR2: 0000000000000550 CR3: 00000001233c6004 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 [2.702776] PKRU: 55555554 [2.702777] Call Trace: [2.702782] mt76_mcu_skb_send_and_get_msg+0xc3/0x11e [mt76 <HASH:1bc4 5>] [2.702785] mt7921_run_firmware+0x241/0x853 [mt7921_common <HASH:6a2f 6>] [2.702789] mt7921e_mcu_init+0x2b/0x56 [mt7921e <HASH:d290 7>] [2.702792] mt7921_register_device+0x2eb/0x5a5 [mt7921_common <HASH:6a2f 6>] [2.702795] ? mt7921_irq_tasklet+0x1d4/0x1d4 [mt7921e <HASH:d290 7>] [2.702797] mt7921_pci_probe+0x2d6/0x319 [mt7921e <HASH:d290 7>] [2.702799] pci_device_probe+0x9f/0x12a Fixes: 16d98b5 ("mt76: mt7921: rely on mcu_get_nic_capability") Signed-off-by: Sean Wang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 12db28c) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel <[email protected]>

jira VULN-155633 cve CVE-2022-50408 commit-author Alexander Coffin <[email protected]> commit 3f42faf > ret = brcmf_proto_tx_queue_data(drvr, ifp->ifidx, skb); may be schedule, and then complete before the line > ndev->stats.tx_bytes += skb->len; [ 46.912801] ================================================================== [ 46.920552] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in brcmf_netdev_start_xmit+0x718/0x8c8 [brcmfmac] [ 46.928673] Read of size 4 at addr ffffff803f5882e8 by task systemd-resolve/328 [ 46.935991] [ 46.937514] CPU: 1 PID: 328 Comm: systemd-resolve Tainted: G O 5.4.199-[REDACTED] #1 [ 46.947255] Hardware name: [REDACTED] [ 46.954568] Call trace: [ 46.957037] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x2b8 [ 46.960719] show_stack+0x24/0x30 [ 46.964052] dump_stack+0x128/0x194 [ 46.967557] print_address_description.isra.0+0x64/0x380 [ 46.972877] __kasan_report+0x1d4/0x240 [ 46.976723] kasan_report+0xc/0x18 [ 46.980138] __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x18/0x20 [ 46.985027] brcmf_netdev_start_xmit+0x718/0x8c8 [brcmfmac] [ 46.990613] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x1bc/0xda0 [ 46.994894] sch_direct_xmit+0x198/0xd08 [ 46.998827] __qdisc_run+0x37c/0x1dc0 [ 47.002500] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1528/0x21f8 [ 47.006692] dev_queue_xmit+0x24/0x30 [ 47.010366] neigh_resolve_output+0x37c/0x678 [ 47.014734] ip_finish_output2+0x598/0x2458 [ 47.018927] __ip_finish_output+0x300/0x730 [ 47.023118] ip_output+0x2e0/0x430 [ 47.026530] ip_local_out+0x90/0x140 [ 47.030117] igmpv3_sendpack+0x14c/0x228 [ 47.034049] igmpv3_send_cr+0x384/0x6b8 [ 47.037895] igmp_ifc_timer_expire+0x4c/0x118 [ 47.042262] call_timer_fn+0x1cc/0xbe8 [ 47.046021] __run_timers+0x4d8/0xb28 [ 47.049693] run_timer_softirq+0x24/0x40 [ 47.053626] __do_softirq+0x2c0/0x117c [ 47.057387] irq_exit+0x2dc/0x388 [ 47.060715] __handle_domain_irq+0xb4/0x158 [ 47.064908] gic_handle_irq+0x58/0xb0 [ 47.068581] el0_irq_naked+0x50/0x5c [ 47.072162] [ 47.073665] Allocated by task 328: [ 47.077083] save_stack+0x24/0xb0 [ 47.080410] __kasan_kmalloc.isra.0+0xc0/0xe0 [ 47.084776] kasan_slab_alloc+0x14/0x20 [ 47.088622] kmem_cache_alloc+0x15c/0x468 [ 47.092643] __alloc_skb+0xa4/0x498 [ 47.096142] igmpv3_newpack+0x158/0xd78 [ 47.099987] add_grhead+0x210/0x288 [ 47.103485] add_grec+0x6b0/0xb70 [ 47.106811] igmpv3_send_cr+0x2e0/0x6b8 [ 47.110657] igmp_ifc_timer_expire+0x4c/0x118 [ 47.115027] call_timer_fn+0x1cc/0xbe8 [ 47.118785] __run_timers+0x4d8/0xb28 [ 47.122457] run_timer_softirq+0x24/0x40 [ 47.126389] __do_softirq+0x2c0/0x117c [ 47.130142] [ 47.131643] Freed by task 180: [ 47.134712] save_stack+0x24/0xb0 [ 47.138041] __kasan_slab_free+0x108/0x180 [ 47.142146] kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18 [ 47.145904] slab_free_freelist_hook+0xa4/0x1b0 [ 47.150444] kmem_cache_free+0x8c/0x528 [ 47.154292] kfree_skbmem+0x94/0x108 [ 47.157880] consume_skb+0x10c/0x5a8 [ 47.161466] __dev_kfree_skb_any+0x88/0xa0 [ 47.165598] brcmu_pkt_buf_free_skb+0x44/0x68 [brcmutil] [ 47.171023] brcmf_txfinalize+0xec/0x190 [brcmfmac] [ 47.176016] brcmf_proto_bcdc_txcomplete+0x1c0/0x210 [brcmfmac] [ 47.182056] brcmf_sdio_sendfromq+0x8dc/0x1e80 [brcmfmac] [ 47.187568] brcmf_sdio_dpc+0xb48/0x2108 [brcmfmac] [ 47.192529] brcmf_sdio_dataworker+0xc8/0x238 [brcmfmac] [ 47.197859] process_one_work+0x7fc/0x1a80 [ 47.201965] worker_thread+0x31c/0xc40 [ 47.205726] kthread+0x2d8/0x370 [ 47.208967] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 [ 47.212546] [ 47.214051] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffffff803f588280 [ 47.214051] which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 208 [ 47.227086] The buggy address is located 104 bytes inside of [ 47.227086] 208-byte region [ffffff803f588280, ffffff803f588350) [ 47.238814] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 47.243618] page:ffffffff00dd6200 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffffff804b6bf800 index:0xffffff803f589900 compound_mapcount: 0 [ 47.255007] flags: 0x10200(slab|head) [ 47.258689] raw: 0000000000010200 ffffffff00dfa980 0000000200000002 ffffff804b6bf800 [ 47.266439] raw: ffffff803f589900 0000000080190018 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 47.274180] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 47.279752] [ 47.281251] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 47.286051] ffffff803f588180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 47.293277] ffffff803f588200: fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 47.300502] >ffffff803f588280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 47.307723] ^ [ 47.314343] ffffff803f588300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 47.321569] ffffff803f588380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 47.328789] ================================================================== Signed-off-by: Alexander Coffin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit 3f42faf) Signed-off-by: Roxana Nicolescu <[email protected]>

jira VULN-8201 cve-pre CVE-2024-26923 commit-author Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> commit 4d322dc syzbot reported a lockdep splat [1]. Blamed commit hinted about the possible lockdep violation, and code used unix_state_lock_nested() in an attempt to silence lockdep. It is not sufficient, because unix_state_lock_nested() is already used from unix_state_double_lock(). We need to use a separate subclass. This patch adds a distinct enumeration to make things more explicit. Also use swap() in unix_state_double_lock() as a clean up. v2: add a missing inline keyword to unix_state_lock_nested() [1] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.8.0-rc1-syzkaller-00356-g8a696a29c690 #0 Not tainted syz-executor.1/2542 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88808b5df9e8 (rlock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: skb_queue_tail+0x36/0x120 net/core/skbuff.c:3863 but task is already holding lock: ffff88808b5dfe70 (&u->lock/1){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: unix_dgram_sendmsg+0xfc7/0x2200 net/unix/af_unix.c:2089 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> ctrliq#1 (&u->lock/1){+.+.}-{2:2}: lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 _raw_spin_lock_nested+0x31/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:378 sk_diag_dump_icons net/unix/diag.c:87 [inline] sk_diag_fill+0x6ea/0xfe0 net/unix/diag.c:157 sk_diag_dump net/unix/diag.c:196 [inline] unix_diag_dump+0x3e9/0x630 net/unix/diag.c:220 netlink_dump+0x5c1/0xcd0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2264 __netlink_dump_start+0x5d7/0x780 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2370 netlink_dump_start include/linux/netlink.h:338 [inline] unix_diag_handler_dump+0x1c3/0x8f0 net/unix/diag.c:319 sock_diag_rcv_msg+0xe3/0x400 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1df/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543 sock_diag_rcv+0x2a/0x40 net/core/sock_diag.c:280 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1341 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x7e6/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1367 netlink_sendmsg+0xa37/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline] sock_write_iter+0x39a/0x520 net/socket.c:1160 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2085 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline] vfs_write+0xa74/0xca0 fs/read_write.c:590 ksys_write+0x1a0/0x2c0 fs/read_write.c:643 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b -> #0 (rlock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{2:2}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x1909/0x5ab0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1345/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xd5/0x120 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162 skb_queue_tail+0x36/0x120 net/core/skbuff.c:3863 unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x15d9/0x2200 net/unix/af_unix.c:2112 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x592/0x890 net/socket.c:2584 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline] __sys_sendmmsg+0x3b2/0x730 net/socket.c:2724 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2753 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2750 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xa0/0xb0 net/socket.c:2750 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&u->lock/1); lock(rlock-AF_UNIX); lock(&u->lock/1); lock(rlock-AF_UNIX); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz-executor.1/2542: #0: ffff88808b5dfe70 (&u->lock/1){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: unix_dgram_sendmsg+0xfc7/0x2200 net/unix/af_unix.c:2089 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 2542 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc1-syzkaller-00356-g8a696a29c690 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2d0 lib/dump_stack.c:106 check_noncircular+0x366/0x490 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x1909/0x5ab0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1345/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xd5/0x120 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162 skb_queue_tail+0x36/0x120 net/core/skbuff.c:3863 unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x15d9/0x2200 net/unix/af_unix.c:2112 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x592/0x890 net/socket.c:2584 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline] __sys_sendmmsg+0x3b2/0x730 net/socket.c:2724 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2753 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2750 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xa0/0xb0 net/socket.c:2750 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b RIP: 0033:0x7f26d887cda9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f26d95a60c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f26d89abf80 RCX: 00007f26d887cda9 RDX: 000000000000003e RSI: 00000000200bd000 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007f26d88c947a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000000008c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f26d89abf80 R15: 00007ffcfe081a68 Fixes: 2aac7a2 ("unix_diag: Pending connections IDs NLA") Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 4d322dc) Signed-off-by: Marcin Wcisło <[email protected]>

…nix_gc(). jira VULN-8201 cve-bf CVE-2024-26923 commit-author Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> commit 1971d13 syzbot reported a lockdep splat regarding unix_gc_lock and unix_state_lock(). One is called from recvmsg() for a connected socket, and another is called from GC for TCP_LISTEN socket. So, the splat is false-positive. Let's add a dedicated lock class for the latter to suppress the splat. Note that this change is not necessary for net-next.git as the issue is only applied to the old GC impl. [0]: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00007-g4d2008430ce8 #0 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- kworker/u8:1/11 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88807cea4e70 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] ffff88807cea4e70 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x117/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:261 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> ctrliq#1 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] unix_notinflight+0x13d/0x390 net/unix/garbage.c:140 unix_detach_fds net/unix/af_unix.c:1819 [inline] unix_destruct_scm+0x221/0x350 net/unix/af_unix.c:1876 skb_release_head_state+0x100/0x250 net/core/skbuff.c:1188 skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1200 [inline] __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:1216 [inline] kfree_skb_reason+0x16d/0x3b0 net/core/skbuff.c:1252 kfree_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1262 [inline] manage_oob net/unix/af_unix.c:2672 [inline] unix_stream_read_generic+0x1125/0x2700 net/unix/af_unix.c:2749 unix_stream_splice_read+0x239/0x320 net/unix/af_unix.c:2981 do_splice_read fs/splice.c:985 [inline] splice_file_to_pipe+0x299/0x500 fs/splice.c:1295 do_splice+0xf2d/0x1880 fs/splice.c:1379 __do_splice fs/splice.c:1436 [inline] __do_sys_splice fs/splice.c:1652 [inline] __se_sys_splice+0x331/0x4a0 fs/splice.c:1634 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa10/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(unix_gc_lock); lock(&u->lock); lock(unix_gc_lock); lock(&u->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by kworker/u8:1/11: #0: ffff888015089148 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] #0: ffff888015089148 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x8e0/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 ctrliq#1: ffffc90000107d00 (unix_gc_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3230 [inline] ctrliq#1: ffffc90000107d00 (unix_gc_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x91b/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 ctrliq#2: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] ctrliq#2: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x117/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:261 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00007-g4d2008430ce8 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 Workqueue: events_unbound __unix_gc Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114 check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa10/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 </TASK> Fixes: 47d8ac0 ("af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()") Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=fa379358c28cc87cc307 Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 1971d13) Signed-off-by: Marcin Wcisło <[email protected]>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-119901 commit fee4d17 Author: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Date: Thu, 1 May 2025 11:47:47 +0100 arm64: errata: Add missing sentinels to Spectre-BHB MIDR arrays Commit a595138 ("arm64: errata: Add newer ARM cores to the spectre_bhb_loop_affected() lists") added some additional CPUs to the Spectre-BHB workaround, including some new arrays for designs that require new 'k' values for the workaround to be effective. Unfortunately, the new arrays omitted the sentinel entry and so is_midr_in_range_list() will walk off the end when it doesn't find a match. With UBSAN enabled, this leads to a crash during boot when is_midr_in_range_list() is inlined (which was more common prior to c8c2647 ("arm64: Make _midr_in_range_list() an exported function")): | Internal error: aarch64 BRK: 00000000f2000001 [#1] PREEMPT SMP | pstate: 804000c5 (Nzcv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) | pc : spectre_bhb_loop_affected+0x28/0x30 | lr : is_spectre_bhb_affected+0x170/0x190 | [...] | Call trace: | spectre_bhb_loop_affected+0x28/0x30 | update_cpu_capabilities+0xc0/0x184 | init_cpu_features+0x188/0x1a4 | cpuinfo_store_boot_cpu+0x4c/0x60 | smp_prepare_boot_cpu+0x38/0x54 | start_kernel+0x8c/0x478 | __primary_switched+0xc8/0xd4 | Code: 6b09011f 54000061 52801080 d65f03c0 (d4200020) | ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- | Kernel panic - not syncing: aarch64 BRK: Fatal exception Add the missing sentinel entries. Cc: Lee Jones <[email protected]> Cc: James Morse <[email protected]> Cc: Doug Anderson <[email protected]> Cc: Shameer Kolothum <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Reported-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Fixes: a595138 ("arm64: errata: Add newer ARM cores to the spectre_bhb_loop_affected() lists") Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Lee Jones <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <[email protected]>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-119007 commit 60da1f6 Author: Jonathan Cameron <[email protected]> Date: Tue May 27 16:34:51 2025 +0100 cxl_test: Limit location for fake CFMWS to mappable range Some architectures (e.g. arm64) only support memory hotplug operations on a restricted set of physical addresses. This applies even when we are faking some CXL fixed memory windows for the purposes of cxl_test. That range can be queried with mhp_get_pluggable_range(true). Use the minimum of that the top of that range and iomem_resource.end to establish the 64GiB region used by cxl_test. From thread #2 which was related to the issue in #1. [ dj: Add CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG config check, from Alison ] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cxl/[email protected]/ #2 Reported-by: Itaru Kitayama <[email protected]> Closes: pmem/ndctl#278 #1 Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]> Tested-by: Itaru Kitayama <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> Tested-by: Marc Herbert <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-122019 commit 304c102 Author: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]> Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2025 08:25:42 +0200 Add missing DP PHY status and VCO clock configuration registers to fix configuring the VCO rate on SM8750. Without proper VCO rate setting, it works on after-reset half of rate which is not enough for DP over USB to work as seen on logs: [drm:msm_dp_ctrl_link_train_1_2] *ERROR* max v_level reached [drm:msm_dp_ctrl_link_train_1_2] *ERROR* link training #1 on phy 0 failed. ret=-11 Fixes: c436404 ("phy: qcom: qmp-combo: Add new PHY sequences for SM8750") Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Neil Armstrong <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Desnes Nunes <[email protected]>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-122019 CVE: CVE-2025-38555 commit 151c0aa Author: Tao Xue <[email protected]> Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2025 17:39:08 +0800 1. In func configfs_composite_bind() -> composite_os_desc_req_prepare(): if kmalloc fails, the pointer cdev->os_desc_req will be freed but not set to NULL. Then it will return a failure to the upper-level function. 2. in func configfs_composite_bind() -> composite_dev_cleanup(): it will checks whether cdev->os_desc_req is NULL. If it is not NULL, it will attempt to use it.This will lead to a use-after-free issue. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in composite_dev_cleanup+0xf4/0x2c0 Read of size 8 at addr 0000004827837a00 by task init/1 CPU: 10 PID: 1 Comm: init Tainted: G O 5.10.97-oh #1 kasan_report+0x188/0x1cc __asan_load8+0xb4/0xbc composite_dev_cleanup+0xf4/0x2c0 configfs_composite_bind+0x210/0x7ac udc_bind_to_driver+0xb4/0x1ec usb_gadget_probe_driver+0xec/0x21c gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store+0x264/0x27c Fixes: 37a3a53 ("usb: gadget: OS Feature Descriptors support") Cc: stable <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tao Xue <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Desnes Nunes <[email protected]>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-99998 commit 2b33eb8 Author: Guangguan Wang <[email protected]> Date: Wed Dec 11 17:21:16 2024 +0800 net/smc: protect link down work from execute after lgr freed link down work may be scheduled before lgr freed but execute after lgr freed, which may result in crash. So it is need to hold a reference before shedule link down work, and put the reference after work executed or canceled. The relevant crash call stack as follows: list_del corruption. prev->next should be ffffb638c9c0fe20, but was 0000000000000000 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:51! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 6 PID: 978112 Comm: kworker/6:119 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G #1 Hardware name: Alibaba Cloud Alibaba Cloud ECS, BIOS 2221b89 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events smc_link_down_work [smc] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid.cold+0x31/0x47 RSP: 0018:ffffb638c9c0fdd8 EFLAGS: 00010086 RAX: 0000000000000054 RBX: ffff942fb75e5128 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff943520930aa0 RSI: ffff94352091fc80 RDI: ffff94352091fc80 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffb638c9c0fc38 R10: ffffb638c9c0fc30 R11: ffffffffa015eb28 R12: 0000000000000002 R13: ffffb638c9c0fe20 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff942f9cd051c0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff943520900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f4f25214000 CR3: 000000025fbae004 CR4: 00000000007706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: rwsem_down_write_slowpath+0x17e/0x470 smc_link_down_work+0x3c/0x60 [smc] process_one_work+0x1ac/0x350 worker_thread+0x49/0x2f0 ? rescuer_thread+0x360/0x360 kthread+0x118/0x140 ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Fixes: 541afa1 ("net/smc: add smcr_port_err() and smcr_link_down() processing") Signed-off-by: Guangguan Wang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Tony Lu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mete Durlu <[email protected]>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-99998 commit 752e221 Author: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Date: Mon Apr 7 10:03:17 2025 -0700 smc: Fix lockdep false-positive for IPPROTO_SMC. SMC consists of two sockets: smc_sock and kernel TCP socket. Currently, there are two ways of creating the sockets, and syzbot reported a lockdep splat [0] for the newer way introduced by commit d25a92c ("net/smc: Introduce IPPROTO_SMC"). socket(AF_SMC , SOCK_STREAM, SMCPROTO_SMC or SMCPROTO_SMC6) socket(AF_INET or AF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_SMC) When a socket is allocated, sock_lock_init() sets a lockdep lock class to sk->sk_lock.slock based on its protocol family. In the IPPROTO_SMC case, AF_INET or AF_INET6 lock class is assigned to smc_sock. The repro sets IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST for IPv6 UDP and SMC socket and exercises smc_switch_to_fallback() for IPPROTO_SMC. 1. smc_switch_to_fallback() is called under lock_sock() and holds smc->clcsock_release_lock. sk_lock-AF_INET6 -> &smc->clcsock_release_lock (sk_lock-AF_SMC) 2. Setting IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST to SMC holds smc->clcsock_release_lock and calls setsockopt() for the kernel TCP socket, which holds RTNL and the kernel socket's lock_sock(). &smc->clcsock_release_lock -> rtnl_mutex (-> k-sk_lock-AF_INET6) 3. Setting IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST to UDP holds RTNL and lock_sock(). rtnl_mutex -> sk_lock-AF_INET6 Then, lockdep detects a false-positive circular locking, .-> sk_lock-AF_INET6 -> &smc->clcsock_release_lock -> rtnl_mutex -. `-----------------------------------------------------------------' but IPPROTO_SMC should have the same locking rule as AF_SMC. sk_lock-AF_SMC -> &smc->clcsock_release_lock -> rtnl_mutex -> k-sk_lock-AF_INET6 Let's set the same lock class for smc_sock. Given AF_SMC uses the same lock class for SMCPROTO_SMC and SMCPROTO_SMC6, we do not need to separate the class for AF_INET and AF_INET6. [0]: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.14.0-rc3-syzkaller-00267-gff202c5028a1 #0 Not tainted syz.4.1528/11571 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffff8fef8de8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ipv6_sock_ac_close+0xd9/0x110 net/ipv6/anycast.c:220 but task is already holding lock: ffff888027f596a8 (&smc->clcsock_release_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: smc_clcsock_release+0x75/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:30 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&smc->clcsock_release_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730 smc_switch_to_fallback+0x2d/0xa00 net/smc/af_smc.c:903 smc_sendmsg+0x13d/0x520 net/smc/af_smc.c:2781 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:718 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:733 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0xaaf/0xc90 net/socket.c:2573 ___sys_sendmsg+0x135/0x1e0 net/socket.c:2627 __sys_sendmsg+0x16e/0x220 net/socket.c:2659 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #1 (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}-{0:0}: lock_sock_nested+0x3a/0xf0 net/core/sock.c:3645 lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1624 [inline] sockopt_lock_sock net/core/sock.c:1133 [inline] sockopt_lock_sock+0x54/0x70 net/core/sock.c:1124 do_ipv6_setsockopt+0x2160/0x4520 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:567 ipv6_setsockopt+0xcb/0x170 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:993 udpv6_setsockopt+0x7d/0xd0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1850 do_sock_setsockopt+0x222/0x480 net/socket.c:2303 __sys_setsockopt+0x1a0/0x230 net/socket.c:2328 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2334 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2331 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xbd/0x160 net/socket.c:2331 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3163 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3282 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3906 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x249e/0x3c40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5228 lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x380 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730 ipv6_sock_ac_close+0xd9/0x110 net/ipv6/anycast.c:220 inet6_release+0x47/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:485 __sock_release net/socket.c:647 [inline] sock_release+0x8e/0x1d0 net/socket.c:675 smc_clcsock_release+0xb7/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:34 __smc_release+0x5c2/0x880 net/smc/af_smc.c:301 smc_release+0x1fc/0x5f0 net/smc/af_smc.c:344 __sock_release+0xb0/0x270 net/socket.c:647 sock_close+0x1c/0x30 net/socket.c:1398 __fput+0x3ff/0xb70 fs/file_table.c:464 task_work_run+0x14e/0x250 kernel/task_work.c:227 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:114 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:329 [inline] __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27b/0x2a0 kernel/entry/common.c:218 do_syscall_64+0xda/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: rtnl_mutex --> sk_lock-AF_INET6 --> &smc->clcsock_release_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&smc->clcsock_release_lock); lock(sk_lock-AF_INET6); lock(&smc->clcsock_release_lock); lock(rtnl_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by syz.4.1528/11571: #0: ffff888077e88208 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#10){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:877 [inline] #0: ffff888077e88208 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#10){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __sock_release+0x86/0x270 net/socket.c:646 #1: ffff888027f596a8 (&smc->clcsock_release_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: smc_clcsock_release+0x75/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:30 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 11571 Comm: syz.4.1528 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc3-syzkaller-00267-gff202c5028a1 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_circular_bug+0x490/0x760 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2076 check_noncircular+0x31a/0x400 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2208 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3163 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3282 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3906 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x249e/0x3c40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5228 lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x380 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730 ipv6_sock_ac_close+0xd9/0x110 net/ipv6/anycast.c:220 inet6_release+0x47/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:485 __sock_release net/socket.c:647 [inline] sock_release+0x8e/0x1d0 net/socket.c:675 smc_clcsock_release+0xb7/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:34 __smc_release+0x5c2/0x880 net/smc/af_smc.c:301 smc_release+0x1fc/0x5f0 net/smc/af_smc.c:344 __sock_release+0xb0/0x270 net/socket.c:647 sock_close+0x1c/0x30 net/socket.c:1398 __fput+0x3ff/0xb70 fs/file_table.c:464 task_work_run+0x14e/0x250 kernel/task_work.c:227 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:114 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:329 [inline] __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27b/0x2a0 kernel/entry/common.c:218 do_syscall_64+0xda/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f8b4b38d169 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffe4efd22d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001b4 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000000b14a3 RCX: 00007f8b4b38d169 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000001e RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f8b4b5a7ba0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 000000114efd25cf R10: 00007f8b4b200000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f8b4b5a5fac R13: 00007f8b4b5a5fa0 R14: ffffffffffffffff R15: 00007ffe4efd23f0 </TASK> Fixes: d25a92c ("net/smc: Introduce IPPROTO_SMC") Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=be6f4b383534d88989f7 Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Wenjia Zhang <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mete Durlu <[email protected]>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-99998 commit 60ada4f Author: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Date: Fri Jul 11 06:07:52 2025 +0000 smc: Fix various oops due to inet_sock type confusion. syzbot reported weird splats [0][1] in cipso_v4_sock_setattr() while freeing inet_sk(sk)->inet_opt. The address was freed multiple times even though it was read-only memory. cipso_v4_sock_setattr() did nothing wrong, and the root cause was type confusion. The cited commit made it possible to create smc_sock as an INET socket. The issue is that struct smc_sock does not have struct inet_sock as the first member but hijacks AF_INET and AF_INET6 sk_family, which confuses various places. In this case, inet_sock.inet_opt was actually smc_sock.clcsk_data_ready(), which is an address of a function in the text segment. $ pahole -C inet_sock vmlinux struct inet_sock { ... struct ip_options_rcu * inet_opt; /* 784 8 */ $ pahole -C smc_sock vmlinux struct smc_sock { ... void (*clcsk_data_ready)(struct sock *); /* 784 8 */ The same issue for another field was reported before. [2][3] At that time, an ugly hack was suggested [4], but it makes both INET and SMC code error-prone and hard to change. Also, yet another variant was fixed by a hacky commit 98d4435 ("net/smc: prevent NULL pointer dereference in txopt_get"). Instead of papering over the root cause by such hacks, we should not allow non-INET socket to reuse the INET infra. Let's add inet_sock as the first member of smc_sock. [0]: kvfree_call_rcu(): Double-freed call. rcu_head 000000006921da73 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6718 at mm/slab_common.c:1956 kvfree_call_rcu+0x94/0x3f0 mm/slab_common.c:1955 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 6718 Comm: syz.0.17 Tainted: G W 6.16.0-rc4-syzkaller-g7482bb149b9f #0 PREEMPT Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/07/2025 pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : kvfree_call_rcu+0x94/0x3f0 mm/slab_common.c:1955 lr : kvfree_call_rcu+0x94/0x3f0 mm/slab_common.c:1955 sp : ffff8000a03a7730 x29: ffff8000a03a7730 x28: 00000000fffffff5 x27: 1fffe000184823d3 x26: dfff800000000000 x25: ffff0000c2411e9e x24: ffff0000dd88da00 x23: ffff8000891ac9a0 x22: 00000000ffffffea x21: ffff8000891ac9a0 x20: ffff8000891ac9a0 x19: ffff80008afc2480 x18: 00000000ffffffff x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffff80008ae642c8 x15: ffff700011ede14c x14: 1ffff00011ede14c x13: 0000000000000004 x12: ffffffffffffffff x11: ffff700011ede14c x10: 0000000000ff0100 x9 : 5fa3c1ffaf0ff000 x8 : 5fa3c1ffaf0ff000 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 0000000000000001 x5 : ffff8000a03a7078 x4 : ffff80008f766c20 x3 : ffff80008054d360 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000201 x0 : 0000000000000000 Call trace: kvfree_call_rcu+0x94/0x3f0 mm/slab_common.c:1955 (P) cipso_v4_sock_setattr+0x2f0/0x3f4 net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c:1914 netlbl_sock_setattr+0x240/0x334 net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c:1000 smack_netlbl_add+0xa8/0x158 security/smack/smack_lsm.c:2581 smack_inode_setsecurity+0x378/0x430 security/smack/smack_lsm.c:2912 security_inode_setsecurity+0x118/0x3c0 security/security.c:2706 __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x174/0x5c4 fs/xattr.c:251 __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x1ec/0x218 fs/xattr.c:295 vfs_setxattr+0x158/0x2ac fs/xattr.c:321 do_setxattr fs/xattr.c:636 [inline] file_setxattr+0x1b8/0x294 fs/xattr.c:646 path_setxattrat+0x2ac/0x320 fs/xattr.c:711 __do_sys_fsetxattr fs/xattr.c:761 [inline] __se_sys_fsetxattr fs/xattr.c:758 [inline] __arm64_sys_fsetxattr+0xc0/0xdc fs/xattr.c:758 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49 el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151 el0_svc+0x58/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:879 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0x12c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:898 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:600 [1]: Unable to handle kernel write to read-only memory at virtual address ffff8000891ac9a8 KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x0000000448d64d40-0x0000000448d64d47] Mem abort info: ESR = 0x000000009600004e EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x0e: level 2 permission fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x0000004e, ISS2 = 0x00000000 CM = 0, WnR = 1, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000207144000 [ffff8000891ac9a8] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=100000020f950003, pud=100000020f951003, pmd=0040000201000781 Internal error: Oops: 000000009600004e [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 6946 Comm: syz.0.69 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc4-syzkaller-g7482bb149b9f #0 PREEMPT Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/07/2025 pstate: 604000c5 (nZCv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : kvfree_call_rcu+0x31c/0x3f0 mm/slab_common.c:1971 lr : add_ptr_to_bulk_krc_lock mm/slab_common.c:1838 [inline] lr : kvfree_call_rcu+0xfc/0x3f0 mm/slab_common.c:1963 sp : ffff8000a28a7730 x29: ffff8000a28a7730 x28: 00000000fffffff5 x27: 1fffe00018b09bb3 x26: 0000000000000001 x25: ffff80008f66e000 x24: ffff00019beaf498 x23: ffff00019beaf4c0 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff8000891ac9a0 x20: ffff8000891ac9a0 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 00000000ffffffff x17: ffff800093363000 x16: ffff80008052c6e4 x15: ffff700014514ecc x14: 1ffff00014514ecc x13: 0000000000000004 x12: ffffffffffffffff x11: ffff700014514ecc x10: 0000000000000001 x9 : 0000000000000001 x8 : ffff00019beaf7b4 x7 : ffff800080a94154 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : ffff8000935efa60 x4 : 0000000000000008 x3 : ffff80008052c7fc x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : ffff8000891ac9a0 x0 : 0000000000000001 Call trace: kvfree_call_rcu+0x31c/0x3f0 mm/slab_common.c:1967 (P) cipso_v4_sock_setattr+0x2f0/0x3f4 net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c:1914 netlbl_sock_setattr+0x240/0x334 net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c:1000 smack_netlbl_add+0xa8/0x158 security/smack/smack_lsm.c:2581 smack_inode_setsecurity+0x378/0x430 security/smack/smack_lsm.c:2912 security_inode_setsecurity+0x118/0x3c0 security/security.c:2706 __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x174/0x5c4 fs/xattr.c:251 __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x1ec/0x218 fs/xattr.c:295 vfs_setxattr+0x158/0x2ac fs/xattr.c:321 do_setxattr fs/xattr.c:636 [inline] file_setxattr+0x1b8/0x294 fs/xattr.c:646 path_setxattrat+0x2ac/0x320 fs/xattr.c:711 __do_sys_fsetxattr fs/xattr.c:761 [inline] __se_sys_fsetxattr fs/xattr.c:758 [inline] __arm64_sys_fsetxattr+0xc0/0xdc fs/xattr.c:758 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49 el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151 el0_svc+0x58/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:879 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0x12c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:898 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:600 Code: aa1f03e2 52800023 97ee1e8d b4000195 (f90006b4) Fixes: d25a92c ("net/smc: Introduce IPPROTO_SMC") Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Tested-by: [email protected] Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=271fed3ed6f24600c364 # [2] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/ # [3] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/ # [4] Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: D. Wythe <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Wang Liang <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mete Durlu <[email protected]>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-99998 commit d9cef55 Author: D. Wythe <[email protected]> Date: Mon Aug 18 13:46:18 2025 +0800 net/smc: fix UAF on smcsk after smc_listen_out() BPF CI testing report a UAF issue: [ 16.446633] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000003 0 [ 16.447134] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mod e [ 16.447516] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present pag e [ 16.447878] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 16.448063] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPT I [ 16.448409] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G OE 6.13.0-rc3-g89e8a75fda73-dirty #4 2 [ 16.449124] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODUL E [ 16.449502] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/201 4 [ 16.450201] Workqueue: smc_hs_wq smc_listen_wor k [ 16.450531] RIP: 0010:smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159 0 [ 16.452158] RSP: 0018:ffffb5ab40053d98 EFLAGS: 0001024 6 [ 16.452526] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 000000000000030 0 [ 16.452994] RDX: 0000000000000280 RSI: 00003513840053f0 RDI: 000000000000000 0 [ 16.453492] RBP: ffffa097808e3800 R08: ffffa09782dba1e0 R09: 000000000000000 5 [ 16.453987] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffa0978274640 0 [ 16.454497] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffa09782d4092 0 [ 16.454996] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa097bbc00000(0000) knlGS:000000000000000 0 [ 16.455557] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003 3 [ 16.455961] CR2: 0000000000000030 CR3: 0000000102788004 CR4: 0000000000770ef 0 [ 16.456459] PKRU: 5555555 4 [ 16.456654] Call Trace : [ 16.456832] <TASK > [ 16.456989] ? __die+0x23/0x7 0 [ 16.457215] ? page_fault_oops+0x180/0x4c 0 [ 16.457508] ? __lock_acquire+0x3e6/0x249 0 [ 16.457801] ? exc_page_fault+0x68/0x20 0 [ 16.458080] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x3 0 [ 16.458389] ? smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159 0 [ 16.458689] ? smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159 0 [ 16.458987] ? lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x10 0 [ 16.459284] process_one_work+0x1ea/0x6d 0 [ 16.459570] worker_thread+0x1c3/0x38 0 [ 16.459839] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x1 0 [ 16.460144] kthread+0xe0/0x11 0 [ 16.460372] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x1 0 [ 16.460640] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x5 0 [ 16.460896] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x1 0 [ 16.461166] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x3 0 [ 16.461453] </TASK > [ 16.461616] Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(OE) [last unloaded: bpf_testmod(OE) ] [ 16.462134] CR2: 000000000000003 0 [ 16.462380] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 16.462710] RIP: 0010:smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x1590 The direct cause of this issue is that after smc_listen_out_connected(), newclcsock->sk may be NULL since it will releases the smcsk. Therefore, if the application closes the socket immediately after accept, newclcsock->sk can be NULL. A possible execution order could be as follows: smc_listen_work | userspace ----------------------------------------------------------------- lock_sock(sk) | smc_listen_out_connected() | | \- smc_listen_out | | | \- release_sock | | |- sk->sk_data_ready() | | fd = accept(); | close(fd); | \- socket->sk = NULL; /* newclcsock->sk is NULL now */ SMC_STAT_SERV_SUCC_INC(sock_net(newclcsock->sk)) Since smc_listen_out_connected() will not fail, simply swapping the order of the code can easily fix this issue. Fixes: 3b2dec2 ("net/smc: restructure client and server code in af_smc") Signed-off-by: D. Wythe <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Guangguan Wang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexandra Winter <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dust Li <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mete Durlu <[email protected]>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-99998 commit ba1e942 Author: Liu Jian <[email protected]> Date: Thu Aug 28 20:41:17 2025 +0800 net/smc: fix one NULL pointer dereference in smc_ib_is_sg_need_sync() BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000002ec PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 28 UID: 0 PID: 343 Comm: kworker/28:1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.17.0-rc2+ #9 NONE Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: smc_hs_wq smc_listen_work [smc] RIP: 0010:smc_ib_is_sg_need_sync+0x9e/0xd0 [smc] ... Call Trace: <TASK> smcr_buf_map_link+0x211/0x2a0 [smc] __smc_buf_create+0x522/0x970 [smc] smc_buf_create+0x3a/0x110 [smc] smc_find_rdma_v2_device_serv+0x18f/0x240 [smc] ? smc_vlan_by_tcpsk+0x7e/0xe0 [smc] smc_listen_find_device+0x1dd/0x2b0 [smc] smc_listen_work+0x30f/0x580 [smc] process_one_work+0x18c/0x340 worker_thread+0x242/0x360 kthread+0xe7/0x220 ret_from_fork+0x13a/0x160 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> If the software RoCE device is used, ibdev->dma_device is a null pointer. As a result, the problem occurs. Null pointer detection is added to prevent problems. Fixes: 0ef69e7 ("net/smc: optimize for smc_sndbuf_sync_sg_for_device and smc_rmb_sync_sg_for_cpu") Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Guangguan Wang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: D. Wythe <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mete Durlu <[email protected]>

When emulating an nvme device on qemu with both logical_block_size and physical_block_size set to 8 KiB, but without format, a kernel panic was triggered during the early boot stage while attempting to mount a vfat filesystem. [95553.682035] EXT4-fs (nvme0n1): unable to set blocksize [95553.684326] EXT4-fs (nvme0n1): unable to set blocksize [95553.686501] EXT4-fs (nvme0n1): unable to set blocksize [95553.696448] ISOFS: unsupported/invalid hardware sector size 8192 [95553.697117] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [95553.697567] kernel BUG at fs/buffer.c:1582! [95553.697984] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [95553.698602] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 7212 Comm: mount Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.18.0-rc2+ #38 PREEMPT(voluntary) [95553.699511] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [95553.700534] RIP: 0010:folio_alloc_buffers+0x1bb/0x1c0 [95553.701018] Code: 48 8b 15 e8 93 18 02 65 48 89 35 e0 93 18 02 48 83 c4 10 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d 31 d2 31 c9 31 f6 31 ff c3 cc cc cc cc <0f> 0b 90 66 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f [95553.702648] RSP: 0018:ffffd1b0c676f990 EFLAGS: 00010246 [95553.703132] RAX: ffff8cfc4176d820 RBX: 0000000000508c48 RCX: 0000000000000001 [95553.703805] RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [95553.704481] RBP: ffffd1b0c676f9c8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [95553.705148] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001 [95553.705816] R13: 0000000000002000 R14: fffff8bc8257e800 R15: 0000000000000000 [95553.706483] FS: 000072ee77315840(0000) GS:ffff8cfdd2c8d000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [95553.707248] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [95553.707782] CR2: 00007d8f2a9e5a20 CR3: 0000000039d0c006 CR4: 0000000000772ef0 [95553.708439] PKRU: 55555554 [95553.708734] Call Trace: [95553.709015] <TASK> [95553.709266] __getblk_slow+0xd2/0x230 [95553.709641] ? find_get_block_common+0x8b/0x530 [95553.710084] bdev_getblk+0x77/0xa0 [95553.710449] __bread_gfp+0x22/0x140 [95553.710810] fat_fill_super+0x23a/0xfc0 [95553.711216] ? __pfx_setup+0x10/0x10 [95553.711580] ? __pfx_vfat_fill_super+0x10/0x10 [95553.712014] vfat_fill_super+0x15/0x30 [95553.712401] get_tree_bdev_flags+0x141/0x1e0 [95553.712817] get_tree_bdev+0x10/0x20 [95553.713177] vfat_get_tree+0x15/0x20 [95553.713550] vfs_get_tree+0x2a/0x100 [95553.713910] vfs_cmd_create+0x62/0xf0 [95553.714273] __do_sys_fsconfig+0x4e7/0x660 [95553.714669] __x64_sys_fsconfig+0x20/0x40 [95553.715062] x64_sys_call+0x21ee/0x26a0 [95553.715453] do_syscall_64+0x80/0x670 [95553.715816] ? __fs_parse+0x65/0x1e0 [95553.716172] ? fat_parse_param+0x103/0x4b0 [95553.716587] ? vfs_parse_fs_param_source+0x21/0xa0 [95553.717034] ? __do_sys_fsconfig+0x3d9/0x660 [95553.717548] ? __x64_sys_fsconfig+0x20/0x40 [95553.717957] ? x64_sys_call+0x21ee/0x26a0 [95553.718360] ? do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x670 [95553.718734] ? __x64_sys_fsconfig+0x20/0x40 [95553.719141] ? x64_sys_call+0x21ee/0x26a0 [95553.719545] ? do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x670 [95553.719922] ? x64_sys_call+0x1405/0x26a0 [95553.720317] ? do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x670 [95553.720702] ? __x64_sys_close+0x3e/0x90 [95553.721080] ? x64_sys_call+0x1b5e/0x26a0 [95553.721478] ? do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x670 [95553.721841] ? irqentry_exit+0x43/0x50 [95553.722211] ? exc_page_fault+0x90/0x1b0 [95553.722681] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [95553.723166] RIP: 0033:0x72ee774f3afe [95553.723562] Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 0a 33 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 af 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d da 32 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [95553.725188] RSP: 002b:00007ffe97148978 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001af [95553.725892] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005dcfe53d0080 RCX: 000072ee774f3afe [95553.726526] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: 0000000000000003 [95553.727176] RBP: 00007ffe97148ac0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000072ee775e7ac0 [95553.727818] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [95553.728459] R13: 00005dcfe53d04b0 R14: 000072ee77670b00 R15: 00005dcfe53d1a28 [95553.729086] </TASK> The panic occurs as follows: 1. logical_block_size is 8KiB, causing {struct super_block *sb}->s_blocksize is initialized to 0. vfat_fill_super - fat_fill_super - sb_min_blocksize - sb_set_blocksize //return 0 when size is 8KiB. 2. __bread_gfp is called with size == 0, causing folio_alloc_buffers() to compute an offset equal to folio_size(folio), which triggers a BUG_ON. fat_fill_super - sb_bread - __bread_gfp // size == {struct super_block *sb}->s_blocksize == 0 - bdev_getblk - __getblk_slow - grow_buffers - grow_dev_folio - folio_alloc_buffers // size == 0 - folio_set_bh //offset == folio_size(folio) and panic To fix this issue, add proper return value checks for sb_min_blocksize(). Cc: [email protected] # v6.15 Fixes: a64e5a5 ("bdev: add back PAGE_SIZE block size validation for sb_set_blocksize()") Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yongpeng Yang <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Acked-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>

jira VULN-154549 cve CVE-2023-53232 commit-author Sean Wang <[email protected]> commit 12db28c The MT7921 driver no longer uses eeprom.data, but the relevant code has not been removed completely since commit 16d98b5 ("mt76: mt7921: rely on mcu_get_nic_capability"). This could result in potential invalid memory access. To fix the kernel panic issue in mt7921, it is necessary to avoid accessing unallocated eeprom.data which can lead to invalid memory access. Furthermore, it is possible to entirely eliminate the mt7921_mcu_parse_eeprom function and solely depend on mt7921_mcu_parse_response to divide the RxD header. [2.702735] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000550 [2.702740] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode [2.702741] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page [2.702743] PGD 0 P4D 0 [2.702747] Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [2.702755] RIP: 0010:mt7921_mcu_parse_response+0x147/0x170 [mt7921_common] [2.702758] RSP: 0018:ffffae7c00fef828 EFLAGS: 00010286 [2.702760] RAX: ffffa367f57be024 RBX: ffffa367cc7bf500 RCX: 0000000000000000 [2.702762] RDX: 0000000000000550 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffa367cc7bf500 [2.702763] RBP: ffffae7c00fef840 R08: ffffa367cb167000 R09: 0000000000000005 [2.702764] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffffc04702e4 R12: ffffa367e8329f40 [2.702766] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffffa367e8329f40 [2.702768] FS: 000079ee6cf20c40(0000) GS:ffffa36b2f940000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [2.702769] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [2.702775] CR2: 0000000000000550 CR3: 00000001233c6004 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 [2.702776] PKRU: 55555554 [2.702777] Call Trace: [2.702782] mt76_mcu_skb_send_and_get_msg+0xc3/0x11e [mt76 <HASH:1bc4 5>] [2.702785] mt7921_run_firmware+0x241/0x853 [mt7921_common <HASH:6a2f 6>] [2.702789] mt7921e_mcu_init+0x2b/0x56 [mt7921e <HASH:d290 7>] [2.702792] mt7921_register_device+0x2eb/0x5a5 [mt7921_common <HASH:6a2f 6>] [2.702795] ? mt7921_irq_tasklet+0x1d4/0x1d4 [mt7921e <HASH:d290 7>] [2.702797] mt7921_pci_probe+0x2d6/0x319 [mt7921e <HASH:d290 7>] [2.702799] pci_device_probe+0x9f/0x12a Fixes: 16d98b5 ("mt76: mt7921: rely on mcu_get_nic_capability") Signed-off-by: Sean Wang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 12db28c) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel <[email protected]>

jira VULN-155243 cve CVE-2022-50356 commit-author Zhengchao Shao <[email protected]> commit 2a3fc78 When the default qdisc is sfb, if the qdisc of dev_queue fails to be inited during mqprio_init(), sfb_reset() is invoked to clear resources. In this case, the q->qdisc is NULL, and it will cause gpf issue. The process is as follows: qdisc_create_dflt() sfb_init() tcf_block_get() --->failed, q->qdisc is NULL ... qdisc_put() ... sfb_reset() qdisc_reset(q->qdisc) --->q->qdisc is NULL ops = qdisc->ops The following is the Call Trace information: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000003: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000018-0x000000000000001f] RIP: 0010:qdisc_reset+0x2b/0x6f0 Call Trace: <TASK> sfb_reset+0x37/0xd0 qdisc_reset+0xed/0x6f0 qdisc_destroy+0x82/0x4c0 qdisc_put+0x9e/0xb0 qdisc_create_dflt+0x2c3/0x4a0 mqprio_init+0xa71/0x1760 qdisc_create+0x3eb/0x1000 tc_modify_qdisc+0x408/0x1720 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x38e/0xac0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x12d/0x3a0 netlink_unicast+0x4a2/0x740 netlink_sendmsg+0x826/0xcc0 sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x100 ____sys_sendmsg+0x583/0x690 ___sys_sendmsg+0xe8/0x160 __sys_sendmsg+0xbf/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 RIP: 0033:0x7f2164122d04 </TASK> Fixes: e13e02a ("net_sched: SFB flow scheduler") Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 2a3fc78) Signed-off-by: Roxana Nicolescu <[email protected]>

Initialize README

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Basical Boiler Plate explination of how this repo will work.

gvrose8192 approved these changes Sep 10, 2024

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PlaidCat merged commit 2515a93 into main Sep 12, 2024

PlaidCat deleted the jmaple_readme branch September 12, 2024 14:59

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