see if we can get kernel src rpm #5

bmastbergen · 2025-08-01T15:18:34Z

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jira VULN-8164 cve CVE-2023-6040 commit-author Phil Sutter <[email protected]> commit f1082dd An nftables family is merely a hollow container, its family just a number and such not reliant on compile-time options other than nftables support itself. Add an artificial check so attempts at using a family the kernel can't support fail as early as possible. This helps user space detect kernels which lack e.g. NFPROTO_INET. Signed-off-by: Phil Sutter <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit f1082dd) Signed-off-by: Marcin Wcisło <[email protected]>

jira VULN-6585 cve CVE-2023-3777 commit-author Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> commit 6eaf41e Skip bound chain when flushing table rules, the rule that owns this chain releases these objects. Otherwise, the following warning is triggered: WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1217 at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:2013 nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x1f7/0x210 [nf_tables] CPU: 2 PID: 1217 Comm: chain-flush Not tainted 6.1.39 #1 RIP: 0010:nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x1f7/0x210 [nf_tables] Fixes: d0e2c7d ("netfilter: nf_tables: add NFT_CHAIN_BINDING") Reported-by: Kevin Rich <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 6eaf41e) Signed-off-by: Anmol Jain <[email protected]>

jira VULN-334 cve CVE-2023-28464 commit-author ZhengHan Wang <[email protected]> commit a85fb91 syzbot reports a slab use-after-free in hci_conn_hash_flush [1]. After releasing an object using hci_conn_del_sysfs in the hci_conn_cleanup function, releasing the same object again using the hci_dev_put and hci_conn_put functions causes a double free. Here's a simplified flow: hci_conn_del_sysfs: hci_dev_put put_device kobject_put kref_put kobject_release kobject_cleanup kfree_const kfree(name) hci_dev_put: ... kfree(name) hci_conn_put: put_device ... kfree(name) This patch drop the hci_dev_put and hci_conn_put function call in hci_conn_cleanup function, because the object is freed in hci_conn_del_sysfs function. This patch also fixes the refcounting in hci_conn_add_sysfs() and hci_conn_del_sysfs() to take into account device_add() failures. This fixes CVE-2023-28464. Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=1bb51491ca5df96a5f724899d1dbb87afda61419 [1] Signed-off-by: ZhengHan Wang <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit a85fb91) Signed-off-by: Anmol Jain <[email protected]>

jira VULN-6760 cve CVE-2023-5717 commit-author Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> commit 32671e3 upstream-diff This patch causes kABI breakage due to a change in the struct perf_event layout after adding the group_generation field. Hence, to preserve kABI compatibility, use RH_KABI_EXTEND macro to safely append the new field without affecting the existing layout. Also, add an upstream patch 28a6c6e ("perf/core: Fix potential NULL deref") which fixes a NULL pointer deref issue in the existing CVE fix. Because group consistency is non-atomic between parent (filedesc) and children (inherited) events, it is possible for PERF_FORMAT_GROUP read() to try and sum non-matching counter groups -- with non-sensical results. Add group_generation to distinguish the case where a parent group removes and adds an event and thus has the same number, but a different configuration of events as inherited groups. This became a problem when commit fa8c269 ("perf/core: Invert perf_read_group() loops") flipped the order of child_list and sibling_list. Previously it would iterate the group (sibling_list) first, and for each sibling traverse the child_list. In this order, only the group composition of the parent is relevant. By flipping the order the group composition of the child (inherited) events becomes an issue and the mis-match in group composition becomes evident. That said; even prior to this commit, while reading of a group that is not equally inherited was not broken, it still made no sense. (Ab)use ECHILD as error return to indicate issues with child process group composition. Fixes: fa8c269 ("perf/core: Invert perf_read_group() loops") Reported-by: Budimir Markovic <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit 32671e3) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel <[email protected]>

jira VULN-6760 cve-bf CVE-2023-5717 commit-author Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> commit a71ef31 Smatch is awesome. Fixes: 32671e3 ("perf: Disallow mis-matched inherited group reads") Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit a71ef31) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel <[email protected]>

jira VULN-70868 cve CVE-2025-38052 commit-author Wang Liang <[email protected]> commit e279024 Syzbot reported a slab-use-after-free with the following call trace: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tipc_aead_encrypt_done+0x4bd/0x510 net/tipc/crypto.c:840 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88807a733000 by task kworker/1:0/25 Call Trace: kasan_report+0xd9/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:601 tipc_aead_encrypt_done+0x4bd/0x510 net/tipc/crypto.c:840 crypto_request_complete include/crypto/algapi.h:266 aead_request_complete include/crypto/internal/aead.h:85 cryptd_aead_crypt+0x3b8/0x750 crypto/cryptd.c:772 crypto_request_complete include/crypto/algapi.h:266 cryptd_queue_worker+0x131/0x200 crypto/cryptd.c:181 process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1b60 kernel/workqueue.c:3231 Allocated by task 8355: kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:778 tipc_crypto_start+0xcc/0x9e0 net/tipc/crypto.c:1466 tipc_init_net+0x2dd/0x430 net/tipc/core.c:72 ops_init+0xb9/0x650 net/core/net_namespace.c:139 setup_net+0x435/0xb40 net/core/net_namespace.c:343 copy_net_ns+0x2f0/0x670 net/core/net_namespace.c:508 create_new_namespaces+0x3ea/0xb10 kernel/nsproxy.c:110 unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xc0/0x1f0 kernel/nsproxy.c:228 ksys_unshare+0x419/0x970 kernel/fork.c:3323 __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3394 Freed by task 63: kfree+0x12a/0x3b0 mm/slub.c:4557 tipc_crypto_stop+0x23c/0x500 net/tipc/crypto.c:1539 tipc_exit_net+0x8c/0x110 net/tipc/core.c:119 ops_exit_list+0xb0/0x180 net/core/net_namespace.c:173 cleanup_net+0x5b7/0xbf0 net/core/net_namespace.c:640 process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1b60 kernel/workqueue.c:3231 After freed the tipc_crypto tx by delete namespace, tipc_aead_encrypt_done may still visit it in cryptd_queue_worker workqueue. I reproduce this issue by: ip netns add ns1 ip link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2 ip link set veth1 netns ns1 ip netns exec ns1 tipc bearer enable media eth dev veth1 ip netns exec ns1 tipc node set key this_is_a_master_key master ip netns exec ns1 tipc bearer disable media eth dev veth1 ip netns del ns1 The key of reproduction is that, simd_aead_encrypt is interrupted, leading to crypto_simd_usable() return false. Thus, the cryptd_queue_worker is triggered, and the tipc_crypto tx will be visited. tipc_disc_timeout tipc_bearer_xmit_skb tipc_crypto_xmit tipc_aead_encrypt crypto_aead_encrypt // encrypt() simd_aead_encrypt // crypto_simd_usable() is false child = &ctx->cryptd_tfm->base; simd_aead_encrypt crypto_aead_encrypt // encrypt() cryptd_aead_encrypt_enqueue cryptd_aead_enqueue cryptd_enqueue_request // trigger cryptd_queue_worker queue_work_on(smp_processor_id(), cryptd_wq, &cpu_queue->work) Fix this by holding net reference count before encrypt. Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c12726619ff85ce1f6 Fixes: fc1b6d6 ("tipc: introduce TIPC encryption & authentication") Signed-off-by: Wang Liang <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit e279024) Signed-off-by: Brett Mastbergen <[email protected]>

pert script tests fails with segmentation fault as below: 92: perf script tests: --- start --- test child forked, pid 103769 DB test [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] [ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.012 MB /tmp/perf-test-script.7rbftEpOzX/perf.data (9 samples) ] /usr/libexec/perf-core/tests/shell/script.sh: line 35: 103780 Segmentation fault (core dumped) perf script -i "${perfdatafile}" -s "${db_test}" --- Cleaning up --- ---- end(-1) ---- 92: perf script tests : FAILED! Backtrace pointed to : #0 0x0000000010247dd0 in maps.machine () #1 0x00000000101d178c in db_export.sample () #2 0x00000000103412c8 in python_process_event () #3 0x000000001004eb28 in process_sample_event () #4 0x000000001024fcd0 in machines.deliver_event () #5 0x000000001025005c in perf_session.deliver_event () #6 0x00000000102568b0 in __ordered_events__flush.part.0 () ctrliq#7 0x0000000010251618 in perf_session.process_events () ctrliq#8 0x0000000010053620 in cmd_script () ctrliq#9 0x00000000100b5a28 in run_builtin () ctrliq#10 0x00000000100b5f94 in handle_internal_command () ctrliq#11 0x0000000010011114 in main () Further investigation reveals that this occurs in the `perf script tests`, because it uses `db_test.py` script. This script sets `perf_db_export_mode = True`. With `perf_db_export_mode` enabled, if a sample originates from a hypervisor, perf doesn't set maps for "[H]" sample in the code. Consequently, `al->maps` remains NULL when `maps__machine(al->maps)` is called from `db_export__sample`. As al->maps can be NULL in case of Hypervisor samples , use thread->maps because even for Hypervisor sample, machine should exist. If we don't have machine for some reason, return -1 to avoid segmentation fault. Reported-by: Disha Goel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Aditya Bodkhe <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Tested-by: Disha Goel <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Suggested-by: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>

Without the change `perf `hangs up on charaster devices. On my system it's enough to run system-wide sampler for a few seconds to get the hangup: $ perf record -a -g --call-graph=dwarf $ perf report # hung `strace` shows that hangup happens on reading on a character device `/dev/dri/renderD128` $ strace -y -f -p 2780484 strace: Process 2780484 attached pread64(101</dev/dri/renderD128>, strace: Process 2780484 detached It's call trace descends into `elfutils`: $ gdb -p 2780484 (gdb) bt #0 0x00007f5e508f04b7 in __libc_pread64 (fd=101, buf=0x7fff9df7edb0, count=0, offset=0) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/pread64.c:25 #1 0x00007f5e52b79515 in read_file () from /<<NIX>>/elfutils-0.192/lib/libelf.so.1 #2 0x00007f5e52b25666 in libdw_open_elf () from /<<NIX>>/elfutils-0.192/lib/libdw.so.1 #3 0x00007f5e52b25907 in __libdw_open_file () from /<<NIX>>/elfutils-0.192/lib/libdw.so.1 #4 0x00007f5e52b120a9 in dwfl_report_elf@@ELFUTILS_0.156 () from /<<NIX>>/elfutils-0.192/lib/libdw.so.1 #5 0x000000000068bf20 in __report_module (al=al@entry=0x7fff9df80010, ip=ip@entry=139803237033216, ui=ui@entry=0x5369b5e0) at util/dso.h:537 #6 0x000000000068c3d1 in report_module (ip=139803237033216, ui=0x5369b5e0) at util/unwind-libdw.c:114 ctrliq#7 frame_callback (state=0x535aef10, arg=0x5369b5e0) at util/unwind-libdw.c:242 ctrliq#8 0x00007f5e52b261d3 in dwfl_thread_getframes () from /<<NIX>>/elfutils-0.192/lib/libdw.so.1 ctrliq#9 0x00007f5e52b25bdb in get_one_thread_cb () from /<<NIX>>/elfutils-0.192/lib/libdw.so.1 ctrliq#10 0x00007f5e52b25faa in dwfl_getthreads () from /<<NIX>>/elfutils-0.192/lib/libdw.so.1 ctrliq#11 0x00007f5e52b26514 in dwfl_getthread_frames () from /<<NIX>>/elfutils-0.192/lib/libdw.so.1 ctrliq#12 0x000000000068c6ce in unwind__get_entries (cb=cb@entry=0x5d4620 <unwind_entry>, arg=arg@entry=0x10cd5fa0, thread=thread@entry=0x1076a290, data=data@entry=0x7fff9df80540, max_stack=max_stack@entry=127, best_effort=best_effort@entry=false) at util/thread.h:152 ctrliq#13 0x00000000005dae95 in thread__resolve_callchain_unwind (evsel=0x106006d0, thread=0x1076a290, cursor=0x10cd5fa0, sample=0x7fff9df80540, max_stack=127, symbols=true) at util/machine.c:2939 ctrliq#14 thread__resolve_callchain_unwind (thread=0x1076a290, cursor=0x10cd5fa0, evsel=0x106006d0, sample=0x7fff9df80540, max_stack=127, symbols=true) at util/machine.c:2920 ctrliq#15 __thread__resolve_callchain (thread=0x1076a290, cursor=0x10cd5fa0, evsel=0x106006d0, evsel@entry=0x7fff9df80440, sample=0x7fff9df80540, parent=parent@entry=0x7fff9df804a0, root_al=root_al@entry=0x7fff9df80440, max_stack=127, symbols=true) at util/machine.c:2970 ctrliq#16 0x00000000005d0cb2 in thread__resolve_callchain (thread=<optimized out>, cursor=<optimized out>, evsel=0x7fff9df80440, sample=<optimized out>, parent=0x7fff9df804a0, root_al=0x7fff9df80440, max_stack=127) at util/machine.h:198 ctrliq#17 sample__resolve_callchain (sample=<optimized out>, cursor=<optimized out>, parent=parent@entry=0x7fff9df804a0, evsel=evsel@entry=0x106006d0, al=al@entry=0x7fff9df80440, max_stack=max_stack@entry=127) at util/callchain.c:1127 ctrliq#18 0x0000000000617e08 in hist_entry_iter__add (iter=iter@entry=0x7fff9df80480, al=al@entry=0x7fff9df80440, max_stack_depth=127, arg=arg@entry=0x7fff9df81ae0) at util/hist.c:1255 ctrliq#19 0x000000000045d2d0 in process_sample_event (tool=0x7fff9df81ae0, event=<optimized out>, sample=0x7fff9df80540, evsel=0x106006d0, machine=<optimized out>) at builtin-report.c:334 ctrliq#20 0x00000000005e3bb1 in perf_session__deliver_event (session=0x105ff2c0, event=0x7f5c7d735ca0, tool=0x7fff9df81ae0, file_offset=2914716832, file_path=0x105ffbf0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1367 ctrliq#21 0x00000000005e8d93 in do_flush (oe=0x105ffa50, show_progress=false) at util/ordered-events.c:245 ctrliq#22 __ordered_events__flush (oe=0x105ffa50, how=OE_FLUSH__ROUND, timestamp=<optimized out>) at util/ordered-events.c:324 ctrliq#23 0x00000000005e1f64 in perf_session__process_user_event (session=0x105ff2c0, event=0x7f5c7d752b18, file_offset=2914835224, file_path=0x105ffbf0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1419 ctrliq#24 0x00000000005e47c7 in reader__read_event (rd=rd@entry=0x7fff9df81260, session=session@entry=0x105ff2c0, --Type <RET> for more, q to quit, c to continue without paging-- quit prog=prog@entry=0x7fff9df81220) at util/session.c:2132 ctrliq#25 0x00000000005e4b37 in reader__process_events (rd=0x7fff9df81260, session=0x105ff2c0, prog=0x7fff9df81220) at util/session.c:2181 ctrliq#26 __perf_session__process_events (session=0x105ff2c0) at util/session.c:2226 ctrliq#27 perf_session__process_events (session=session@entry=0x105ff2c0) at util/session.c:2390 ctrliq#28 0x0000000000460add in __cmd_report (rep=0x7fff9df81ae0) at builtin-report.c:1076 ctrliq#29 cmd_report (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at builtin-report.c:1827 ctrliq#30 0x00000000004c5a40 in run_builtin (p=p@entry=0xd8f7f8 <commands+312>, argc=argc@entry=1, argv=argv@entry=0x7fff9df844b0) at perf.c:351 ctrliq#31 0x00000000004c5d63 in handle_internal_command (argc=argc@entry=1, argv=argv@entry=0x7fff9df844b0) at perf.c:404 ctrliq#32 0x0000000000442de3 in run_argv (argcp=<synthetic pointer>, argv=<synthetic pointer>) at perf.c:448 ctrliq#33 main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=0x7fff9df844b0) at perf.c:556 The hangup happens because nothing in` perf` or `elfutils` checks if a mapped file is easily readable. The change conservatively skips all non-regular files. Signed-off-by: Sergei Trofimovich <[email protected]> Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>

Symbolize stack traces by creating a live machine. Add this functionality to dump_stack and switch dump_stack users to use it. Switch TUI to use it. Add stack traces to the child test function which can be useful to diagnose blocked code. Example output: ``` $ perf test -vv PERF_RECORD_ ... 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields: 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields : Running (1 active) ^C Signal (2) while running tests. Terminating tests with the same signal Internal test harness failure. Completing any started tests: : 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields: ---- unexpected signal (2) ---- #0 0x55788c6210a3 in child_test_sig_handler builtin-test.c:0 #1 0x7fc12fe49df0 in __restore_rt libc_sigaction.c:0 #2 0x7fc12fe99687 in __internal_syscall_cancel cancellation.c:64 #3 0x7fc12fee5f7a in clock_nanosleep@GLIBC_2.2.5 clock_nanosleep.c:72 #4 0x7fc12fef1393 in __nanosleep nanosleep.c:26 #5 0x7fc12ff02d68 in __sleep sleep.c:55 #6 0x55788c63196b in test__PERF_RECORD perf-record.c:0 ctrliq#7 0x55788c620fb0 in run_test_child builtin-test.c:0 ctrliq#8 0x55788c5bd18d in start_command run-command.c:127 ctrliq#9 0x55788c621ef3 in __cmd_test builtin-test.c:0 ctrliq#10 0x55788c6225bf in cmd_test ??:0 ctrliq#11 0x55788c5afbd0 in run_builtin perf.c:0 ctrliq#12 0x55788c5afeeb in handle_internal_command perf.c:0 ctrliq#13 0x55788c52b383 in main ??:0 ctrliq#14 0x7fc12fe33ca8 in __libc_start_call_main libc_start_call_main.h:74 ctrliq#15 0x7fc12fe33d65 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 libc-start.c:128 ctrliq#16 0x55788c52b9d1 in _start ??:0 ---- unexpected signal (2) ---- #0 0x55788c6210a3 in child_test_sig_handler builtin-test.c:0 #1 0x7fc12fe49df0 in __restore_rt libc_sigaction.c:0 #2 0x7fc12fea3a14 in pthread_sigmask@GLIBC_2.2.5 pthread_sigmask.c:45 #3 0x7fc12fe49fd9 in __GI___sigprocmask sigprocmask.c:26 #4 0x7fc12ff2601b in __longjmp_chk longjmp.c:36 #5 0x55788c6210c0 in print_test_result.isra.0 builtin-test.c:0 #6 0x7fc12fe49df0 in __restore_rt libc_sigaction.c:0 ctrliq#7 0x7fc12fe99687 in __internal_syscall_cancel cancellation.c:64 ctrliq#8 0x7fc12fee5f7a in clock_nanosleep@GLIBC_2.2.5 clock_nanosleep.c:72 ctrliq#9 0x7fc12fef1393 in __nanosleep nanosleep.c:26 ctrliq#10 0x7fc12ff02d68 in __sleep sleep.c:55 ctrliq#11 0x55788c63196b in test__PERF_RECORD perf-record.c:0 ctrliq#12 0x55788c620fb0 in run_test_child builtin-test.c:0 ctrliq#13 0x55788c5bd18d in start_command run-command.c:127 ctrliq#14 0x55788c621ef3 in __cmd_test builtin-test.c:0 ctrliq#15 0x55788c6225bf in cmd_test ??:0 ctrliq#16 0x55788c5afbd0 in run_builtin perf.c:0 ctrliq#17 0x55788c5afeeb in handle_internal_command perf.c:0 ctrliq#18 0x55788c52b383 in main ??:0 ctrliq#19 0x7fc12fe33ca8 in __libc_start_call_main libc_start_call_main.h:74 ctrliq#20 0x7fc12fe33d65 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 libc-start.c:128 ctrliq#21 0x55788c52b9d1 in _start ??:0 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields : Skip (permissions) ``` Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>

Calling perf top with branch filters enabled on Intel CPU's with branch counters logging (A.K.A LBR event logging [1]) support results in a segfault. $ perf top -e '{cpu_core/cpu-cycles/,cpu_core/event=0xc6,umask=0x3,frontend=0x11,name=frontend_retired_dsb_miss/}' -j any,counter ... Thread 27 "perf" received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. [Switching to Thread 0x7fffafff76c0 (LWP 949003)] perf_env__find_br_cntr_info (env=0xf66dc0 <perf_env>, nr=0x0, width=0x7fffafff62c0) at util/env.c:653 653 *width = env->cpu_pmu_caps ? env->br_cntr_width : (gdb) bt #0 perf_env__find_br_cntr_info (env=0xf66dc0 <perf_env>, nr=0x0, width=0x7fffafff62c0) at util/env.c:653 #1 0x00000000005b1599 in symbol__account_br_cntr (branch=0x7fffcc3db580, evsel=0xfea2d0, offset=12, br_cntr=8) at util/annotate.c:345 #2 0x00000000005b17fb in symbol__account_cycles (addr=5658172, start=5658160, sym=0x7fffcc0ee420, cycles=539, evsel=0xfea2d0, br_cntr=8) at util/annotate.c:389 #3 0x00000000005b1976 in addr_map_symbol__account_cycles (ams=0x7fffcd7b01d0, start=0x7fffcd7b02b0, cycles=539, evsel=0xfea2d0, br_cntr=8) at util/annotate.c:422 #4 0x000000000068d57f in hist__account_cycles (bs=0x110d288, al=0x7fffafff6540, sample=0x7fffafff6760, nonany_branch_mode=false, total_cycles=0x0, evsel=0xfea2d0) at util/hist.c:2850 #5 0x0000000000446216 in hist_iter__top_callback (iter=0x7fffafff6590, al=0x7fffafff6540, single=true, arg=0x7fffffff9e00) at builtin-top.c:737 #6 0x0000000000689787 in hist_entry_iter__add (iter=0x7fffafff6590, al=0x7fffafff6540, max_stack_depth=127, arg=0x7fffffff9e00) at util/hist.c:1359 ctrliq#7 0x0000000000446710 in perf_event__process_sample (tool=0x7fffffff9e00, event=0x110d250, evsel=0xfea2d0, sample=0x7fffafff6760, machine=0x108c968) at builtin-top.c:845 ctrliq#8 0x0000000000447735 in deliver_event (qe=0x7fffffffa120, qevent=0x10fc200) at builtin-top.c:1211 ctrliq#9 0x000000000064ccae in do_flush (oe=0x7fffffffa120, show_progress=false) at util/ordered-events.c:245 ctrliq#10 0x000000000064d005 in __ordered_events__flush (oe=0x7fffffffa120, how=OE_FLUSH__TOP, timestamp=0) at util/ordered-events.c:324 ctrliq#11 0x000000000064d0ef in ordered_events__flush (oe=0x7fffffffa120, how=OE_FLUSH__TOP) at util/ordered-events.c:342 ctrliq#12 0x00000000004472a9 in process_thread (arg=0x7fffffff9e00) at builtin-top.c:1120 ctrliq#13 0x00007ffff6e7dba8 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:448 ctrliq#14 0x00007ffff6f01b8c in __GI___clone3 () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone3.S:78 The cause is that perf_env__find_br_cntr_info tries to access a null pointer pmu_caps in the perf_env struct. A similar issue exists for homogeneous core systems which use the cpu_pmu_caps structure. Fix this by populating cpu_pmu_caps and pmu_caps structures with values from sysfs when calling perf top with branch stack sampling enabled. [1], LBR event logging introduced here: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Falcon <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>

…terface [ Upstream commit a90b2a1 ] collect_md property on xfrm interfaces can only be set on device creation, thus xfrmi_changelink() should fail when called on such interfaces. The check to enforce this was done only in the case where the xi was returned from xfrmi_locate() which doesn't look for the collect_md interface, and thus the validation was never reached. Calling changelink would thus errornously place the special interface xi in the xfrmi_net->xfrmi hash, but since it also exists in the xfrmi_net->collect_md_xfrmi pointer it would lead to a double free when the net namespace was taken down [1]. Change the check to use the xi from netdev_priv which is available earlier in the function to prevent changes in xfrm collect_md interfaces. [1] resulting oops: [ 8.516540] kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:12029! [ 8.516552] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 8.516559] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/u80:0 Not tainted 6.15.0-virtme #5 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 8.516565] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 8.516569] Workqueue: netns cleanup_net [ 8.516579] RIP: 0010:unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x101/0xab0 [ 8.516590] Code: 90 0f 0b 90 48 8b b0 78 01 00 00 48 8b 90 80 01 00 00 48 89 56 08 48 89 32 4c 89 80 78 01 00 00 48 89 b8 80 01 00 00 eb ac 90 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 00 4c 8d a0 88 fe ff ff 48 39 c5 74 5c 41 80 bc 24 [ 8.516593] RSP: 0018:ffffa93b8006bd30 EFLAGS: 00010206 [ 8.516598] RAX: ffff98fe4226e000 RBX: ffffa93b8006bd58 RCX: ffffa93b8006bc60 [ 8.516601] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: dead000000000122 [ 8.516603] RBP: ffffa93b8006bdd8 R08: dead000000000100 R09: ffff98fe4133c100 [ 8.516605] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00000000000003d2 R12: ffffa93b8006be00 [ 8.516608] R13: ffffffff96c1a510 R14: ffffffff96c1a510 R15: ffffa93b8006be00 [ 8.516615] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff98fee73b7000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 8.516619] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 8.516622] CR2: 00007fcd2abd0700 CR3: 000000003aa40000 CR4: 0000000000752ef0 [ 8.516625] PKRU: 55555554 [ 8.516627] Call Trace: [ 8.516632] <TASK> [ 8.516635] ? rtnl_is_locked+0x15/0x20 [ 8.516641] ? unregister_netdevice_queue+0x29/0xf0 [ 8.516650] ops_undo_list+0x1f2/0x220 [ 8.516659] cleanup_net+0x1ad/0x2e0 [ 8.516664] process_one_work+0x160/0x380 [ 8.516673] worker_thread+0x2aa/0x3c0 [ 8.516679] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 8.516686] kthread+0xfb/0x200 [ 8.516690] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 8.516693] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 8.516697] ret_from_fork+0x82/0xf0 [ 8.516705] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 8.516709] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 8.516718] </TASK> Fixes: abc340b ("xfrm: interface: support collect metadata mode") Reported-by: Lonial Con <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Eyal Birger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

jira VULN-8190 cve CVE-2024-26598 commit-author Oliver Upton <[email protected]> commit ad362fe There is a potential UAF scenario in the case of an LPI translation cache hit racing with an operation that invalidates the cache, such as a DISCARD ITS command. The root of the problem is that vgic_its_check_cache() does not elevate the refcount on the vgic_irq before dropping the lock that serializes refcount changes. Have vgic_its_check_cache() raise the refcount on the returned vgic_irq and add the corresponding decrement after queueing the interrupt. Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit ad362fe) Signed-off-by: Marcin Wcisło <[email protected]>

profile allocation is wrongly setting the number of entries on the rules vector before any ruleset is assigned. If profile allocation fails between ruleset allocation and assigning the first ruleset, free_ruleset() will be called with a null pointer resulting in an oops. [ 107.350226] kernel BUG at mm/slub.c:545! [ 107.350912] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 107.351447] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 27 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 6.14.6-hwe-rlee287-dev+ #5 [ 107.353279] Hardware name:[ 107.350218] -QE-----------[ cutMU here ]--------- Ub--- [ 107.3502untu26] kernel BUG a 24t mm/slub.c:545.!04 P [ 107.350912]C ( Oops: invalid oi4pcode: 0000 [#1]40 PREEMPT SMP NOPFXTI + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 107.356054] RIP: 0010:__slab_free+0x152/0x340 [ 107.356444] Code: 00 4c 89 ff e8 0f ac df 00 48 8b 14 24 48 8b 4c 24 20 48 89 44 24 08 48 8b 03 48 c1 e8 09 83 e0 01 88 44 24 13 e9 71 ff ff ff <0f> 0b 41 f7 44 24 08 87 04 00 00 75 b2 eb a8 41 f7 44 24 08 87 04 [ 107.357856] RSP: 0018:ffffad4a800fbbb0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 107.358937] RAX: ffff97ebc2a88e70 RBX: ffffd759400aa200 RCX: 0000000000800074 [ 107.359976] RDX: ffff97ebc2a88e60 RSI: ffffd759400aa200 RDI: ffffad4a800fbc20 [ 107.360600] RBP: ffffad4a800fbc50 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffffff86f02cf2 [ 107.361254] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff97ecc0049400 [ 107.361934] R13: ffff97ebc2a88e60 R14: ffff97ecc0049400 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 107.362597] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff97ecfb200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 107.363332] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 107.363784] CR2: 000061c9545ac000 CR3: 0000000047aa6000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 [ 107.364331] PKRU: 55555554 [ 107.364545] Call Trace: [ 107.364761] <TASK> [ 107.364931] ? local_clock+0x15/0x30 [ 107.365219] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 107.365593] ? kfree_sensitive+0x32/0x70 [ 107.365900] kfree+0x29d/0x3a0 [ 107.366144] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 107.366510] ? local_clock_noinstr+0xe/0xd0 [ 107.366841] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 107.367209] kfree_sensitive+0x32/0x70 [ 107.367502] aa_free_profile.part.0+0xa2/0x400 [ 107.367850] ? rcu_do_batch+0x1e6/0x5e0 [ 107.368148] aa_free_profile+0x23/0x60 [ 107.368438] label_free_switch+0x4c/0x80 [ 107.368751] label_free_rcu+0x1c/0x50 [ 107.369038] rcu_do_batch+0x1e8/0x5e0 [ 107.369324] ? rcu_do_batch+0x157/0x5e0 [ 107.369626] rcu_core+0x1b0/0x2f0 [ 107.369888] rcu_core_si+0xe/0x20 [ 107.370156] handle_softirqs+0x9b/0x3d0 [ 107.370460] ? smpboot_thread_fn+0x26/0x210 [ 107.370790] run_ksoftirqd+0x3a/0x70 [ 107.371070] smpboot_thread_fn+0xf9/0x210 [ 107.371383] ? __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10 [ 107.371746] kthread+0x10d/0x280 [ 107.372010] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 107.372310] ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 [ 107.372655] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 107.372974] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 107.373316] </TASK> [ 107.373505] Modules linked in: af_packet_diag mptcp_diag tcp_diag udp_diag raw_diag inet_diag snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer snd_seq_midi snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_timer snd soundcore qrtr binfmt_misc intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common kvm_amd ccp kvm irqbypass polyval_clmulni polyval_generic ghash_clmulni_intel sha256_ssse3 sha1_ssse3 aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd i2c_piix4 i2c_smbus input_leds joydev sch_fq_codel msr parport_pc ppdev lp parport efi_pstore nfnetlink vsock_loopback vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vsock vmw_vmci dmi_sysfs qemu_fw_cfg ip_tables x_tables autofs4 hid_generic usbhid hid psmouse serio_raw floppy bochs pata_acpi [ 107.379086] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Don't set the count until a ruleset is actually allocated and guard against free_ruleset() being called with a null pointer. Reported-by: Ryan Lee <[email protected]> Fixes: 217af7e ("apparmor: refactor profile rules and attachments") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>

jira VULN-8056 cve CVE-2023-1652 commit-author Xingyuan Mo <[email protected]> commit e6cf91b If signal_pending() returns true, schedule_timeout() will not be executed, causing the waiting task to remain in the wait queue. Fixed by adding a call to finish_wait(), which ensures that the waiting task will always be removed from the wait queue. Fixes: f4e44b3 ("NFSD: delay unmount source's export after inter-server copy completed.") Signed-off-by: Xingyuan Mo <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit e6cf91b) Signed-off-by: Anmol Jain <[email protected]>

jira VULN-41185 cve CVE-2024-56601 commit-author Ignat Korchagin <[email protected]> commit 9365fa5 sock_init_data() attaches the allocated sk object to the provided sock object. If inet_create() fails later, the sk object is freed, but the sock object retains the dangling pointer, which may create use-after-free later. Clear the sk pointer in the sock object on error. Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 9365fa5) Signed-off-by: Anmol Jain <[email protected]>

This reverts commit 77d95ba.

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-15711 Upstream status: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm.git Intel TDX protects guest VM's from malicious host and certain physical attacks. TDX introduces a new operation mode, Secure Arbitration Mode (SEAM) to isolate and protect guest VM's. A TDX guest VM runs in SEAM and, unlike VMX, direct control and interaction with the guest by the host VMM is not possible. Instead, Intel TDX Module, which also runs in SEAM, provides a SEAMCALL API. The SEAMCALL that provides the ability to enter a guest is TDH.VP.ENTER. The TDX Module processes TDH.VP.ENTER, and enters the guest via VMX VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME instructions. When a guest VM-exit requires host VMM interaction, the TDH.VP.ENTER SEAMCALL returns to the host VMM (KVM). Add tdh_vp_enter() to wrap the SEAMCALL invocation of TDH.VP.ENTER; tdh_vp_enter() needs to be noinstr because VM entry in KVM is noinstr as well, which is for two reasons: * marking the area as CT_STATE_GUEST via guest_state_enter_irqoff() and guest_state_exit_irqoff() * IRET must be avoided between VM-exit and NMI handling, in order to avoid prematurely releasing the NMI inhibit. TDH.VP.ENTER is different from other SEAMCALLs in several ways: it uses more arguments, and after it returns some host state may need to be restored. Therefore tdh_vp_enter() uses __seamcall_saved_ret() instead of __seamcall_ret(); since it is the only caller of __seamcall_saved_ret(), it can be made noinstr also. TDH.VP.ENTER arguments are passed through General Purpose Registers (GPRs). For the special case of the TD guest invoking TDG.VP.VMCALL, nearly any GPR can be used, as well as XMM0 to XMM15. Notably, RBP is not used, and Linux mandates the TDX Module feature NO_RBP_MOD, which is enforced elsewhere. Additionally, XMM registers are not required for the existing Guest Hypervisor Communication Interface and are handled by existing KVM code should they be modified by the guest. There are 2 input formats and 5 output formats for TDH.VP.ENTER arguments. Input #1 : Initial entry or following a previous async. TD Exit Input #2 : Following a previous TDCALL(TDG.VP.VMCALL) Output #1 : On Error (No TD Entry) Output #2 : Async. Exits with a VMX Architectural Exit Reason Output #3 : Async. Exits with a non-VMX TD Exit Status Output #4 : Async. Exits with Cross-TD Exit Details Output #5 : On TDCALL(TDG.VP.VMCALL) Currently, to keep things simple, the wrapper function does not attempt to support different formats, and just passes all the GPRs that could be used. The GPR values are held by KVM in the area set aside for guest GPRs. KVM code uses the guest GPR area (vcpu->arch.regs[]) to set up for or process results of tdh_vp_enter(). Therefore changing tdh_vp_enter() to use more complex argument formats would also alter the way KVM code interacts with tdh_vp_enter(). Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Message-ID: <[email protected]> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 69e23fa) Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-95318 commit c5b6aba Author: Maxim Levitsky <[email protected]> Date: Mon May 12 14:04:02 2025 -0400 locking/mutex: implement mutex_trylock_nested Despite the fact that several lockdep-related checks are skipped when calling trylock* versions of the locking primitives, for example mutex_trylock, each time the mutex is acquired, a held_lock is still placed onto the lockdep stack by __lock_acquire() which is called regardless of whether the trylock* or regular locking API was used. This means that if the caller successfully acquires more than MAX_LOCK_DEPTH locks of the same class, even when using mutex_trylock, lockdep will still complain that the maximum depth of the held lock stack has been reached and disable itself. For example, the following error currently occurs in the ARM version of KVM, once the code tries to lock all vCPUs of a VM configured with more than MAX_LOCK_DEPTH vCPUs, a situation that can easily happen on modern systems, where having more than 48 CPUs is common, and it's also common to run VMs that have vCPU counts approaching that number: [ 328.171264] BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! [ 328.175227] turning off the locking correctness validator. [ 328.180726] Please attach the output of /proc/lock_stat to the bug report [ 328.187531] depth: 48 max: 48! [ 328.190678] 48 locks held by qemu-kvm/11664: [ 328.194957] #0: ffff800086de5ba0 (&kvm->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_ioctl_create_device+0x174/0x5b0 [ 328.204048] #1: ffff0800e78800b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 [ 328.212521] #2: ffff07ffeee51e98 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 [ 328.220991] #3: ffff0800dc7d80b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 [ 328.229463] #4: ffff07ffe0c980b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 [ 328.237934] #5: ffff0800a3883c78 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 [ 328.246405] #6: ffff07fffbe480b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 Luckily, in all instances that require locking all vCPUs, the 'kvm->lock' is taken a priori, and that fact makes it possible to use the little known feature of lockdep, called a 'nest_lock', to avoid this warning and subsequent lockdep self-disablement. The action of 'nested lock' being provided to lockdep's lock_acquire(), causes the lockdep to detect that the top of the held lock stack contains a lock of the same class and then increment its reference counter instead of pushing a new held_lock item onto that stack. See __lock_acquire for more information. Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <[email protected]> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]> Message-ID: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-95318 commit b586c5d Author: Maxim Levitsky <[email protected]> Date: Mon May 12 14:04:06 2025 -0400 KVM: arm64: use kvm_trylock_all_vcpus when locking all vCPUs Use kvm_trylock_all_vcpus instead of a custom implementation when locking all vCPUs of a VM, to avoid triggering a lockdep warning, in the case in which the VM is configured to have more than MAX_LOCK_DEPTH vCPUs. This fixes the following false lockdep warning: [ 328.171264] BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! [ 328.175227] turning off the locking correctness validator. [ 328.180726] Please attach the output of /proc/lock_stat to the bug report [ 328.187531] depth: 48 max: 48! [ 328.190678] 48 locks held by qemu-kvm/11664: [ 328.194957] #0: ffff800086de5ba0 (&kvm->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_ioctl_create_device+0x174/0x5b0 [ 328.204048] #1: ffff0800e78800b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 [ 328.212521] #2: ffff07ffeee51e98 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 [ 328.220991] #3: ffff0800dc7d80b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 [ 328.229463] #4: ffff07ffe0c980b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 [ 328.237934] #5: ffff0800a3883c78 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 [ 328.246405] #6: ffff07fffbe480b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <[email protected]> Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]> Message-ID: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>

…e probe JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-90130 commit dcaeeb8 Author: Antonios Salios <[email protected]> Date: Fri Apr 25 13:17:45 2025 +0200 can: m_can: m_can_class_allocate_dev(): initialize spin lock on device probe The spin lock tx_handling_spinlock in struct m_can_classdev is not being initialized. This leads the following spinlock bad magic complaint from the kernel, eg. when trying to send CAN frames with cansend from can-utils: | BUG: spinlock bad magic on CPU#0, cansend/95 | lock: 0xff60000002ec1010, .magic: 00000000, .owner: <none>/-1, .owner_cpu: 0 | CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 95 Comm: cansend Not tainted 6.15.0-rc3-00032-ga79be02bba5c #5 NONE | Hardware name: MachineWare SIM-V (DT) | Call Trace: | [<ffffffff800133e0>] dump_backtrace+0x1c/0x24 | [<ffffffff800022f2>] show_stack+0x28/0x34 | [<ffffffff8000de3e>] dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x68 | [<ffffffff8000de70>] dump_stack+0x14/0x1c | [<ffffffff80003134>] spin_dump+0x62/0x6e | [<ffffffff800883ba>] do_raw_spin_lock+0xd0/0x142 | [<ffffffff807a6fcc>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x20/0x2c | [<ffffffff80536dba>] m_can_start_xmit+0x90/0x34a | [<ffffffff806148b0>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0xa6/0xee | [<ffffffff8065b730>] sch_direct_xmit+0x114/0x292 | [<ffffffff80614e2a>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x3b0/0xaa8 | [<ffffffff8073b8fa>] can_send+0xc6/0x242 | [<ffffffff8073d1c0>] raw_sendmsg+0x1a8/0x36c | [<ffffffff805ebf06>] sock_write_iter+0x9a/0xee | [<ffffffff801d06ea>] vfs_write+0x184/0x3a6 | [<ffffffff801d0a88>] ksys_write+0xa0/0xc0 | [<ffffffff801d0abc>] __riscv_sys_write+0x14/0x1c | [<ffffffff8079ebf8>] do_trap_ecall_u+0x168/0x212 | [<ffffffff807a830a>] handle_exception+0x146/0x152 Initializing the spin lock in m_can_class_allocate_dev solves that problem. Fixes: 1fa80e2 ("can: m_can: Introduce a tx_fifo_in_flight counter") Signed-off-by: Antonios Salios <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Vincent Mailhol <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Markus Schneider-Pargmann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Radu Rendec <[email protected]>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-71129 upstream ======== commit ea04fe1 Author: Aditya Bodkhe <[email protected]> Date: Tue Apr 29 12:21:32 2025 +0530 description =========== pert script tests fails with segmentation fault as below: 92: perf script tests: --- start --- test child forked, pid 103769 DB test [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] [ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.012 MB /tmp/perf-test-script.7rbftEpOzX/perf.data (9 samples) ] /usr/libexec/perf-core/tests/shell/script.sh: line 35: 103780 Segmentation fault (core dumped) perf script -i "${perfdatafile}" -s "${db_test}" --- Cleaning up --- ---- end(-1) ---- 92: perf script tests : FAILED! Backtrace pointed to : #0 0x0000000010247dd0 in maps.machine () #1 0x00000000101d178c in db_export.sample () #2 0x00000000103412c8 in python_process_event () #3 0x000000001004eb28 in process_sample_event () #4 0x000000001024fcd0 in machines.deliver_event () #5 0x000000001025005c in perf_session.deliver_event () #6 0x00000000102568b0 in __ordered_events__flush.part.0 () ctrliq#7 0x0000000010251618 in perf_session.process_events () ctrliq#8 0x0000000010053620 in cmd_script () ctrliq#9 0x00000000100b5a28 in run_builtin () ctrliq#10 0x00000000100b5f94 in handle_internal_command () ctrliq#11 0x0000000010011114 in main () Further investigation reveals that this occurs in the `perf script tests`, because it uses `db_test.py` script. This script sets `perf_db_export_mode = True`. With `perf_db_export_mode` enabled, if a sample originates from a hypervisor, perf doesn't set maps for "[H]" sample in the code. Consequently, `al->maps` remains NULL when `maps__machine(al->maps)` is called from `db_export__sample`. As al->maps can be NULL in case of Hypervisor samples , use thread->maps because even for Hypervisor sample, machine should exist. If we don't have machine for some reason, return -1 to avoid segmentation fault. Reported-by: Disha Goel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Aditya Bodkhe <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Tested-by: Disha Goel <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Suggested-by: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jakub Brnak <[email protected]>

jira VULN-50884 cve CVE-2022-49328 commit-author Felix Fietkau <[email protected]> commit 51fb127 Fixes an issue caught by KASAN about use-after-free in mt76_txq_schedule by protecting mtxq->wcid with rcu_lock between mt76_txq_schedule and sta_info_[alloc, free]. [18853.876689] ================================================================== [18853.876751] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mt76_txq_schedule+0x204/0xaf8 [mt76] [18853.876773] Read of size 8 at addr ffffffaf989a2138 by task mt76-tx phy0/883 [18853.876786] [18853.876810] CPU: 5 PID: 883 Comm: mt76-tx phy0 Not tainted 5.10.100-fix-510-56778d365941-kasan #5 0b01fbbcf41a530f52043508fec2e31a4215 [18853.876840] Call trace: [18853.876861] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x3ec [18853.876878] show_stack+0x20/0x2c [18853.876899] dump_stack+0x11c/0x1ac [18853.876918] print_address_description+0x74/0x514 [18853.876934] kasan_report+0x134/0x174 [18853.876948] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x44/0x50 [18853.876976] mt76_txq_schedule+0x204/0xaf8 [mt76 074e03e4640e97fe7405ee1fab547b81c4fa45d2] [18853.877002] mt76_txq_schedule_all+0x2c/0x48 [mt76 074e03e4640e97fe7405ee1fab547b81c4fa45d2] [18853.877030] mt7921_tx_worker+0xa0/0x1cc [mt7921_common f0875ebac9d7b4754e1010549e7db50fbd90a047] [18853.877054] __mt76_worker_fn+0x190/0x22c [mt76 074e03e4640e97fe7405ee1fab547b81c4fa45d2] [18853.877071] kthread+0x2f8/0x3b8 [18853.877087] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x30 [18853.877098] [18853.877112] Allocated by task 941: [18853.877131] kasan_save_stack+0x38/0x68 [18853.877147] __kasan_kmalloc+0xd4/0xfc [18853.877163] kasan_kmalloc+0x10/0x1c [18853.877177] __kmalloc+0x264/0x3c4 [18853.877294] sta_info_alloc+0x460/0xf88 [mac80211] [18853.877410] ieee80211_prep_connection+0x204/0x1ee0 [mac80211] [18853.877523] ieee80211_mgd_auth+0x6c4/0xa4c [mac80211] [18853.877635] ieee80211_auth+0x20/0x2c [mac80211] [18853.877733] rdev_auth+0x7c/0x438 [cfg80211] [18853.877826] cfg80211_mlme_auth+0x26c/0x390 [cfg80211] [18853.877919] nl80211_authenticate+0x6d4/0x904 [cfg80211] [18853.877938] genl_rcv_msg+0x748/0x93c [18853.877954] netlink_rcv_skb+0x160/0x2a8 [18853.877969] genl_rcv+0x3c/0x54 [18853.877985] netlink_unicast_kernel+0x104/0x1ec [18853.877999] netlink_unicast+0x178/0x268 [18853.878015] netlink_sendmsg+0x3cc/0x5f0 [18853.878030] sock_sendmsg+0xb4/0xd8 [18853.878043] ____sys_sendmsg+0x2f8/0x53c [18853.878058] ___sys_sendmsg+0xe8/0x150 [18853.878071] __sys_sendmsg+0xc4/0x1f4 [18853.878087] __arm64_compat_sys_sendmsg+0x88/0x9c [18853.878101] el0_svc_common+0x1b4/0x390 [18853.878115] do_el0_svc_compat+0x8c/0xdc [18853.878131] el0_svc_compat+0x10/0x1c [18853.878146] el0_sync_compat_handler+0xa8/0xcc [18853.878161] el0_sync_compat+0x188/0x1c0 [18853.878171] [18853.878183] Freed by task 10927: [18853.878200] kasan_save_stack+0x38/0x68 [18853.878215] kasan_set_track+0x28/0x3c [18853.878228] kasan_set_free_info+0x24/0x48 [18853.878244] __kasan_slab_free+0x11c/0x154 [18853.878259] kasan_slab_free+0x14/0x24 [18853.878273] slab_free_freelist_hook+0xac/0x1b0 [18853.878287] kfree+0x104/0x390 [18853.878402] sta_info_free+0x198/0x210 [mac80211] [18853.878515] __sta_info_destroy_part2+0x230/0x2d4 [mac80211] [18853.878628] __sta_info_flush+0x300/0x37c [mac80211] [18853.878740] ieee80211_set_disassoc+0x2cc/0xa7c [mac80211] [18853.878851] ieee80211_mgd_deauth+0x4a4/0x10a0 [mac80211] [18853.878962] ieee80211_deauth+0x20/0x2c [mac80211] [18853.879057] rdev_deauth+0x7c/0x438 [cfg80211] [18853.879150] cfg80211_mlme_deauth+0x274/0x414 [cfg80211] [18853.879243] cfg80211_mlme_down+0xe4/0x118 [cfg80211] [18853.879335] cfg80211_disconnect+0x218/0x2d8 [cfg80211] [18853.879427] __cfg80211_leave+0x17c/0x240 [cfg80211] [18853.879519] cfg80211_leave+0x3c/0x58 [cfg80211] [18853.879611] wiphy_suspend+0xdc/0x200 [cfg80211] [18853.879628] dpm_run_callback+0x58/0x408 [18853.879642] __device_suspend+0x4cc/0x864 [18853.879658] async_suspend+0x34/0xf4 [18853.879673] async_run_entry_fn+0xe0/0x37c [18853.879689] process_one_work+0x508/0xb98 [18853.879702] worker_thread+0x7f4/0xcd4 [18853.879717] kthread+0x2f8/0x3b8 [18853.879731] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x30 [18853.879741] [18853.879757] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffffffaf989a2000 [18853.879757] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8k of size 8192 [18853.879774] The buggy address is located 312 bytes inside of [18853.879774] 8192-byte region [ffffffaf989a2000, ffffffaf989a4000) [18853.879787] The buggy address belongs to the page: [18853.879807] page:000000004bda2a59 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1d89a0 [18853.879823] head:000000004bda2a59 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 [18853.879839] flags: 0x8000000000010200(slab|head) [18853.879857] raw: 8000000000010200 ffffffffbc89e208 ffffffffb7fb5208 ffffffaec000cc80 [18853.879873] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000010001 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [18853.879885] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [18853.879896] [18853.879907] Memory state around the buggy address: [18853.879922] ffffffaf989a2000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [18853.879935] ffffffaf989a2080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [18853.879948] >ffffffaf989a2100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [18853.879961] ^ [18853.879973] ffffffaf989a2180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [18853.879986] ffffffaf989a2200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [18853.879998] ================================================================== Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: Sean Wang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 51fb127) Signed-off-by: Pratham Patel <[email protected]>

jira LE-1907 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-427.16.1.el9_4 commit-author Fenghua Yu <[email protected]> commit d3ea125 If CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled, copying completion record from event log cache to user triggers a kernel bug. [ 1987.159822] usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLUB object 'dsa0' (offset 74, size 31)! [ 1987.170845] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 1987.176086] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102! [ 1987.180946] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 1987.186866] CPU: 17 PID: 528 Comm: kworker/17:1 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc2+ #5 [ 1987.194537] Hardware name: Intel Corporation AvenueCity/AvenueCity, BIOS BHSDCRB1.86B.2492.D03.2307181620 07/18/2023 [ 1987.206405] Workqueue: wq0.0 idxd_evl_fault_work [idxd] [ 1987.212338] RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort+0x72/0x90 [ 1987.217381] Code: 58 65 9c 50 48 c7 c2 17 85 61 9c 57 48 c7 c7 98 fd 6b 9c 48 0f 44 d6 48 c7 c6 b3 08 62 9c 4c 89 d1 49 0f 44 f3 e8 1e 2e d5 ff <0f> 0b 49 c7 c1 9e 42 61 9c 4c 89 cf 4d 89 c8 eb a9 66 66 2e 0f 1f [ 1987.238505] RSP: 0018:ff62f5cf20607d60 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 1987.244423] RAX: 000000000000005f RBX: 000000000000001f RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 1987.252480] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff9c61429e RDI: 00000000ffffffff [ 1987.260538] RBP: ff62f5cf20607d78 R08: ff2a6a89ef3fffe8 R09: 00000000fffeffff [ 1987.268595] R10: ff2a6a89eed00000 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ff2a66934849c89a [ 1987.276652] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ff2a66934849c8b9 R15: ff2a66934849c899 [ 1987.284710] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff2a66b22fe40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1987.293850] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1987.300355] CR2: 00007fe291a37000 CR3: 000000010fbd4005 CR4: 0000000000f71ef0 [ 1987.308413] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 1987.316470] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 1987.324527] PKRU: 55555554 [ 1987.327622] Call Trace: [ 1987.330424] <TASK> [ 1987.332826] ? show_regs+0x6e/0x80 [ 1987.336703] ? die+0x3c/0xa0 [ 1987.339988] ? do_trap+0xd4/0xf0 [ 1987.343662] ? do_error_trap+0x75/0xa0 [ 1987.347922] ? usercopy_abort+0x72/0x90 [ 1987.352277] ? exc_invalid_op+0x57/0x80 [ 1987.356634] ? usercopy_abort+0x72/0x90 [ 1987.360988] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30 [ 1987.365734] ? usercopy_abort+0x72/0x90 [ 1987.370088] __check_heap_object+0xb7/0xd0 [ 1987.374739] __check_object_size+0x175/0x2d0 [ 1987.379588] idxd_copy_cr+0xa9/0x130 [idxd] [ 1987.384341] idxd_evl_fault_work+0x127/0x390 [idxd] [ 1987.389878] process_one_work+0x13e/0x300 [ 1987.394435] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 1987.399284] worker_thread+0x2f7/0x420 [ 1987.403544] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2b/0x50 [ 1987.409171] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 1987.414019] kthread+0x107/0x140 [ 1987.417693] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 1987.421954] ret_from_fork+0x3d/0x60 [ 1987.426019] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 1987.430281] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 [ 1987.434744] </TASK> The issue arises because event log cache is created using kmem_cache_create() which is not suitable for user copy. Fix the issue by creating event log cache with kmem_cache_create_usercopy(), ensuring safe user copy. Fixes: c2f156b ("dmaengine: idxd: create kmem cache for event log fault items") Reported-by: Tony Zhu <[email protected]> Tested-by: Tony Zhu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Lijun Pan <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit d3ea125) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

… __netif_rx() jira LE-1907 cve CVE-2024-42110 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-427.33.1.el9_4 commit-author Dave Jiang <[email protected]> commit e15a5d8 The following is emitted when using idxd (DSA) dmanegine as the data mover for ntb_transport that ntb_netdev uses. [74412.546922] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: irq/52-idxd-por/14526 [74412.556784] caller is netif_rx_internal+0x42/0x130 [74412.562282] CPU: 6 PID: 14526 Comm: irq/52-idxd-por Not tainted 6.9.5 #5 [74412.569870] Hardware name: Intel Corporation ArcherCity/ArcherCity, BIOS EGSDCRB1.E9I.1752.P05.2402080856 02/08/2024 [74412.581699] Call Trace: [74412.584514] <TASK> [74412.586933] dump_stack_lvl+0x55/0x70 [74412.591129] check_preemption_disabled+0xc8/0xf0 [74412.596374] netif_rx_internal+0x42/0x130 [74412.600957] __netif_rx+0x20/0xd0 [74412.604743] ntb_netdev_rx_handler+0x66/0x150 [ntb_netdev] [74412.610985] ntb_complete_rxc+0xed/0x140 [ntb_transport] [74412.617010] ntb_rx_copy_callback+0x53/0x80 [ntb_transport] [74412.623332] idxd_dma_complete_txd+0xe3/0x160 [idxd] [74412.628963] idxd_wq_thread+0x1a6/0x2b0 [idxd] [74412.634046] irq_thread_fn+0x21/0x60 [74412.638134] ? irq_thread+0xa8/0x290 [74412.642218] irq_thread+0x1a0/0x290 [74412.646212] ? __pfx_irq_thread_fn+0x10/0x10 [74412.651071] ? __pfx_irq_thread_dtor+0x10/0x10 [74412.656117] ? __pfx_irq_thread+0x10/0x10 [74412.660686] kthread+0x100/0x130 [74412.664384] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [74412.668639] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 [74412.672716] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [74412.676978] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [74412.681457] </TASK> The cause is due to the idxd driver interrupt completion handler uses threaded interrupt and the threaded handler is not hard or soft interrupt context. However __netif_rx() can only be called from interrupt context. Change the call to netif_rx() in order to allow completion via normal context for dmaengine drivers that utilize threaded irq handling. While the following commit changed from netif_rx() to __netif_rx(), baebdf4 ("net: dev: Makes sure netif_rx() can be invoked in any context."), the change should've been a noop instead. However, the code precedes this fix should've been using netif_rx_ni() or netif_rx_any_context(). Fixes: 548c237 ("net: Add support for NTB virtual ethernet device") Reported-by: Jerry Dai <[email protected]> Tested-by: Jerry Dai <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit e15a5d8) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

jira LE-1907 cve CVE-2024-38601 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-427.37.1.el9_4 commit-author Petr Pavlu <[email protected]> commit c2274b9 The reader code in rb_get_reader_page() swaps a new reader page into the ring buffer by doing cmpxchg on old->list.prev->next to point it to the new page. Following that, if the operation is successful, old->list.next->prev gets updated too. This means the underlying doubly-linked list is temporarily inconsistent, page->prev->next or page->next->prev might not be equal back to page for some page in the ring buffer. The resize operation in ring_buffer_resize() can be invoked in parallel. It calls rb_check_pages() which can detect the described inconsistency and stop further tracing: [ 190.271762] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 190.271771] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 6186 at kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:1467 rb_check_pages.isra.0+0x6a/0xa0 [ 190.271789] Modules linked in: [...] [ 190.271991] Unloaded tainted modules: intel_uncore_frequency(E):1 skx_edac(E):1 [ 190.272002] CPU: 1 PID: 6186 Comm: cmd.sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 6.9.0-rc6-default #5 158d3e1e6d0b091c34c3b96bfd99a1c58306d79f [ 190.272011] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552c-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 [ 190.272015] RIP: 0010:rb_check_pages.isra.0+0x6a/0xa0 [ 190.272023] Code: [...] [ 190.272028] RSP: 0018:ffff9c37463abb70 EFLAGS: 00010206 [ 190.272034] RAX: ffff8eba04b6cb80 RBX: 0000000000000007 RCX: ffff8eba01f13d80 [ 190.272038] RDX: ffff8eba01f130c0 RSI: ffff8eba04b6cd00 RDI: ffff8eba0004c700 [ 190.272042] RBP: ffff8eba0004c700 R08: 0000000000010002 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 190.272045] R10: 00000000ffff7f52 R11: ffff8eba7f600000 R12: ffff8eba0004c720 [ 190.272049] R13: ffff8eba00223a00 R14: 0000000000000008 R15: ffff8eba067a8000 [ 190.272053] FS: 00007f1bd64752c0(0000) GS:ffff8eba7f680000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 190.272057] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 190.272061] CR2: 00007f1bd6662590 CR3: 000000010291e001 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 [ 190.272070] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 190.272073] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 190.272077] Call Trace: [ 190.272098] <TASK> [ 190.272189] ring_buffer_resize+0x2ab/0x460 [ 190.272199] __tracing_resize_ring_buffer.part.0+0x23/0xa0 [ 190.272206] tracing_resize_ring_buffer+0x65/0x90 [ 190.272216] tracing_entries_write+0x74/0xc0 [ 190.272225] vfs_write+0xf5/0x420 [ 190.272248] ksys_write+0x67/0xe0 [ 190.272256] do_syscall_64+0x82/0x170 [ 190.272363] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 190.272373] RIP: 0033:0x7f1bd657d263 [ 190.272381] Code: [...] [ 190.272385] RSP: 002b:00007ffe72b643f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 190.272391] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 00007f1bd657d263 [ 190.272395] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000555a6eb538e0 RDI: 0000000000000001 [ 190.272398] RBP: 0000555a6eb538e0 R08: 000000000000000a R09: 0000000000000000 [ 190.272401] R10: 0000555a6eb55190 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f1bd6662500 [ 190.272404] R13: 0000000000000002 R14: 00007f1bd6667c00 R15: 0000000000000002 [ 190.272412] </TASK> [ 190.272414] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Note that ring_buffer_resize() calls rb_check_pages() only if the parent trace_buffer has recording disabled. Recent commit d78ab79 ("tracing: Stop current tracer when resizing buffer") causes that it is now always the case which makes it more likely to experience this issue. The window to hit this race is nonetheless very small. To help reproducing it, one can add a delay loop in rb_get_reader_page(): ret = rb_head_page_replace(reader, cpu_buffer->reader_page); if (!ret) goto spin; for (unsigned i = 0; i < 1U << 26; i++) /* inserted delay loop */ __asm__ __volatile__ ("" : : : "memory"); rb_list_head(reader->list.next)->prev = &cpu_buffer->reader_page->list; .. and then run the following commands on the target system: echo 1 > /sys/kernel/tracing/events/sched/sched_switch/enable while true; do echo 16 > /sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_size_kb; sleep 0.1 echo 8 > /sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_size_kb; sleep 0.1 done & while true; do for i in /sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/*; do timeout 0.1 cat $i/trace_pipe; sleep 0.2 done done To fix the problem, make sure ring_buffer_resize() doesn't invoke rb_check_pages() concurrently with a reader operating on the same ring_buffer_per_cpu by taking its cpu_buffer->reader_lock. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/[email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <[email protected]> Fixes: 659f451 ("ring-buffer: Add integrity check at end of iter read") Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu <[email protected]> [ Fixed whitespace ] Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit c2274b9) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

jira LE-2015 cve CVE-2024-40904 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-427.42.1.el9_4 commit-author Alan Stern <[email protected]> commit 22f0081 The syzbot fuzzer found that the interrupt-URB completion callback in the cdc-wdm driver was taking too long, and the driver's immediate resubmission of interrupt URBs with -EPROTO status combined with the dummy-hcd emulation to cause a CPU lockup: cdc_wdm 1-1:1.0: nonzero urb status received: -71 cdc_wdm 1-1:1.0: wdm_int_callback - 0 bytes watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [syz-executor782:6625] CPU#0 Utilization every 4s during lockup: #1: 98% system, 0% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle #2: 98% system, 0% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle #3: 98% system, 0% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle #4: 98% system, 0% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle #5: 98% system, 1% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle Modules linked in: irq event stamp: 73096 hardirqs last enabled at (73095): [<ffff80008037bc00>] console_emit_next_record kernel/printk/printk.c:2935 [inline] hardirqs last enabled at (73095): [<ffff80008037bc00>] console_flush_all+0x650/0xb74 kernel/printk/printk.c:2994 hardirqs last disabled at (73096): [<ffff80008af10b00>] __el1_irq arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:533 [inline] hardirqs last disabled at (73096): [<ffff80008af10b00>] el1_interrupt+0x24/0x68 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:551 softirqs last enabled at (73048): [<ffff8000801ea530>] softirq_handle_end kernel/softirq.c:400 [inline] softirqs last enabled at (73048): [<ffff8000801ea530>] handle_softirqs+0xa60/0xc34 kernel/softirq.c:582 softirqs last disabled at (73043): [<ffff800080020de8>] __do_softirq+0x14/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:588 CPU: 0 PID: 6625 Comm: syz-executor782 Tainted: G W 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-g8867bbd4a056 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024 Testing showed that the problem did not occur if the two error messages -- the first two lines above -- were removed; apparently adding material to the kernel log takes a surprisingly large amount of time. In any case, the best approach for preventing these lockups and to avoid spamming the log with thousands of error messages per second is to ratelimit the two dev_err() calls. Therefore we replace them with dev_err_ratelimited(). Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Greg KH <[email protected]> Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/[email protected]/ Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/[email protected]/ Fixes: 9908a32 ("USB: remove err() macro from usb class drivers") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/[email protected]/ Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 22f0081) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

pvts-mat and others added 6 commits July 30, 2025 16:57

jainanmol84 and others added 5 commits August 6, 2025 21:46

switch to ubuntu latest

fb6c158

4 cpu

c9e6951

kabi check WIP

24baf67

bmastbergen force-pushed the ciqlts9_2-kabi-test branch from 82267de to fc95d99 Compare August 11, 2025 18:42

bmastbergen added 2 commits August 11, 2025 14:54

Break the kabi

77d95ba

echo kabi check output on failure

b877a99

bmastbergen force-pushed the ciqlts9_2-kabi-test branch from fc95d99 to b877a99 Compare August 11, 2025 18:54

bmastbergen added 2 commits August 11, 2025 16:02

simplify

1402bac

Revert "Break the kabi"

d174af9

This reverts commit 77d95ba.

bmastbergen closed this Aug 12, 2025

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