Pull request #1

asj · 2015-10-07T06:23:27Z

Kindly consider to pull in these changes. These patch were individually submitted to the mailing list before. Thanks.

Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

This will return EIO when __bread() fails to read SB, instead of EINVAL. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

…INTK defined error handling logic behaves differently with or without CONFIG_PRINTK defined, since there are two copies of the same function which a bit of different logic One, when CONFIG_PRINTK is defined, code is __btrfs_std_error(..) { :: save_error_info(fs_info); if (sb->s_flags & MS_BORN) btrfs_handle_error(fs_info); } and two when CONFIG_PRINTK is not defined, the code is __btrfs_std_error(..) { :: if (sb->s_flags & MS_BORN) { save_error_info(fs_info); btrfs_handle_error(fs_info); } } I doubt if this was intentional ? and appear to have caused since we maintain two copies of the same function and they got diverged with commits. Now to decide which logic is correct reviewed changes as below, 533574c Commit added two copies of this function cf79ffb Commit made change to only one copy of the function and to the copy when CONFIG_PRINTK is defined. To fix this, instead of maintaining two copies of same function approach, maintain single function, and just put the extra portion of the code under CONFIG_PRINTK define. This patch just does that. And keeps code of with CONFIG_PRINTK defined. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

btrfs_error() and btrfs_std_error() does the same thing and calls _btrfs_std_error(), so consolidate them together. And the main motivation is that btrfs_error() is closely named with btrfs_err(), one handles error action the other is to log the error, so don't closely name them. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> Suggested-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

…ot found Use btrfs specific error code BTRFS_ERROR_DEV_MISSING_NOT_FOUND instead of -ENOENT. Next this removes the logging when user specifies "missing" and we don't find it in the kernel device list. Logging are for system events not for user input errors. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

This uses a chunk of code from btrfs_read_dev_super() and creates a function called btrfs_read_dev_one_super() so that next patch can use it for scratch superblock. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> [renamed bufhead to bh] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

This patch updates and renames btrfs_scratch_superblocks, (which is used by the replace device thread), with those fixes from the scratch superblock code section of btrfs_rm_device(). The fixes are: Scratch all copies of superblock Notify kobject that superblock has been changed Update time on the device So that btrfs_rm_device() can use the function btrfs_scratch_superblocks() instead of its own scratch code. And further replace deivce code which similarly releases device back to the system, will have the fixes from the btrfs device delete. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> [renamed to btrfs_scratch_superblock] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

By general rule of thumb there shouldn't be any way that user land could trigger a kernel operation just by sending wrong arguments. Here do commit cleanups after user input has been verified. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

Originally the message was not in a helper but ended up there. We should print error messages from callers instead. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> [reworded subject and changelog] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> [reworded subject and changelog] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

To avoid deadlock described in commit 084b6e7 ("btrfs: Fix a lockdep warning when running xfstest."), we should move kobj stuff out of dev_replace lock range. "It is because the btrfs_kobj_{add/rm}_device() will call memory allocation with GFP_KERNEL, which may flush fs page cache to free space, waiting for it self to do the commit, causing the deadlock. To solve the problem, move btrfs_kobj_{add/rm}_device() out of the dev_replace lock range, also involing split the btrfs_rm_dev_replace_srcdev() function into remove and free parts. Now only btrfs_rm_dev_replace_remove_srcdev() is called in dev_replace lock range, and kobj_{add/rm} and btrfs_rm_dev_replace_free_srcdev() are called out of the lock range." Signed-off-by: Liu Bo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> [added lockup description] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

This patch will log return value of add/del_qgroup_relation() and pass the err code of btrfs_run_qgroups to the btrfs_std_error(). Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

A part of code from btrfs_scan_one_device() is moved to a new function btrfs_read_disk_super(), so that former function looks cleaner and moves the code to ensure null terminating label to it as well. Further there is opportunity to merge various duplicate code on read disk super. Earlier attempt on this was highlighted that there was some issues for which there are multiple versions, however it was not clear what was issue. So until its worked out we can keep it in a separate function. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

Optional Label may or may not be set, or it might be set at some time later. However while debugging to search through the kernel logs the scripts would need the logs to be consistent, so logs search key words shouldn't depend on the optional variables, instead fsid is better. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

From the issue diagnosable point of view, log if the device path is changed. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

looks like oversight, call brelse() when checksum fails. further down the code in the non error path we do call brelse() and so we don't see brelse() in the goto error.. paths. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

optimize check for stale device to only be checked when there is device added or changed. If there is no update to the device, there is no need to call btrfs_free_stale_device(). Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

This adds an enhancement to show the seed fsid and its devices on the btrfs sysfs. The way sprouting handles fs_devices: clone seed fs_devices and add to the fs_uuids mem copy seed fs_devices and assign to fs_devices->seed (move dev_list) evacuate seed fs_devices contents to hold sprout fs devices contents So to be inline with this fs_devices changes during seeding, represent seed fsid under the sprout fsid, this is achieved by using the kobject_move() The end result will be, /sys/fs/btrfs/sprout-fsid/seed/level-1-seed-fsid/seed/(if)level-2-seed-fsid Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

We need fsid kobject to hold pool attributes however its created only when fs is mounted. So, this patch changes the life cycle of the fsid and devices kobjects /sys/fs/btrfs/<fsid> and /sys/fs/btrfs/<fsid>/devices, from created and destroyed by mount and unmount event to created and destroyed by scanned and module-unload events respectively. However this does not alter life cycle of fs attributes as such. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

move a section of btrfs_rm_device() code to check for min number of the devices into the function __check_raid_min_devices() v2: commit update and title renamed from Btrfs: move check for min number of devices to a function Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

__check_raid_min_device() which was pealed from btrfs_rm_device() maintianed its original code to show the block move. This patch cleans up __check_raid_min_device(). Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

The patch renames btrfs_dev_replace_find_srcdev() to btrfs_find_device_by_user_input() and moves it to volumes.c. so that delete device can use it. v2: changed title from 'Btrfs: create rename btrfs_dev_replace_find_srcdev()' and commit update Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

btrfs_rm_device() has a section of the code which can be replaced btrfs_find_device_by_user_input() Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

The operation of device replace and device delete follows same steps upto some depth with in btrfs kernel, however they don't share codes. This enhancement will help replace and delete to share codes. Btrfs: enhance check device_path in btrfs_find_device_by_user_input() Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

With the previous patches now the btrfs_scratch_superblocks() is ready to be used in btrfs_rm_device() so use it. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

This introduces new ioctl BTRFS_IOC_RM_DEV_V2, which uses enhanced struct btrfs_ioctl_vol_args_v2 to carry devid as an user argument. The patch won't delete the old ioctl interface and remains backward compatible with user land progs. Test case/script: echo "0 $(blockdev --getsz /dev/sdf) linear /dev/sdf 0" | dmsetup create bad_disk mkfs.btrfs -f -d raid1 -m raid1 /dev/sdd /dev/sde /dev/mapper/bad_disk mount /dev/sdd /btrfs dmsetup suspend bad_disk echo "0 $(blockdev --getsz /dev/sdf) error /dev/sdf 0" | dmsetup load bad_disk dmsetup resume bad_disk echo "bad disk failed. now deleting/replacing" btrfs dev del 3 /btrfs echo $? btrfs fi show /btrfs umount /btrfs btrfs-show-super /dev/sdd | egrep num_device dmsetup remove bad_disk wipefs -a /dev/sdf Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> Reported-by: Martin <[email protected]>

BPF CI testing report a UAF issue: [ 16.446633] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000003 0 [ 16.447134] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mod e [ 16.447516] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present pag e [ 16.447878] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 16.448063] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPT I [ 16.448409] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G OE 6.13.0-rc3-g89e8a75fda73-dirty #4 2 [ 16.449124] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODUL E [ 16.449502] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/201 4 [ 16.450201] Workqueue: smc_hs_wq smc_listen_wor k [ 16.450531] RIP: 0010:smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159 0 [ 16.452158] RSP: 0018:ffffb5ab40053d98 EFLAGS: 0001024 6 [ 16.452526] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 000000000000030 0 [ 16.452994] RDX: 0000000000000280 RSI: 00003513840053f0 RDI: 000000000000000 0 [ 16.453492] RBP: ffffa097808e3800 R08: ffffa09782dba1e0 R09: 000000000000000 5 [ 16.453987] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffa0978274640 0 [ 16.454497] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffa09782d4092 0 [ 16.454996] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa097bbc00000(0000) knlGS:000000000000000 0 [ 16.455557] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003 3 [ 16.455961] CR2: 0000000000000030 CR3: 0000000102788004 CR4: 0000000000770ef 0 [ 16.456459] PKRU: 5555555 4 [ 16.456654] Call Trace : [ 16.456832] <TASK > [ 16.456989] ? __die+0x23/0x7 0 [ 16.457215] ? page_fault_oops+0x180/0x4c 0 [ 16.457508] ? __lock_acquire+0x3e6/0x249 0 [ 16.457801] ? exc_page_fault+0x68/0x20 0 [ 16.458080] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x3 0 [ 16.458389] ? smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159 0 [ 16.458689] ? smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159 0 [ 16.458987] ? lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x10 0 [ 16.459284] process_one_work+0x1ea/0x6d 0 [ 16.459570] worker_thread+0x1c3/0x38 0 [ 16.459839] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x1 0 [ 16.460144] kthread+0xe0/0x11 0 [ 16.460372] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x1 0 [ 16.460640] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x5 0 [ 16.460896] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x1 0 [ 16.461166] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x3 0 [ 16.461453] </TASK > [ 16.461616] Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(OE) [last unloaded: bpf_testmod(OE) ] [ 16.462134] CR2: 000000000000003 0 [ 16.462380] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 16.462710] RIP: 0010:smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x1590 The direct cause of this issue is that after smc_listen_out_connected(), newclcsock->sk may be NULL since it will releases the smcsk. Therefore, if the application closes the socket immediately after accept, newclcsock->sk can be NULL. A possible execution order could be as follows: smc_listen_work | userspace ----------------------------------------------------------------- lock_sock(sk) | smc_listen_out_connected() | | \- smc_listen_out | | | \- release_sock | | |- sk->sk_data_ready() | | fd = accept(); | close(fd); | \- socket->sk = NULL; /* newclcsock->sk is NULL now */ SMC_STAT_SERV_SUCC_INC(sock_net(newclcsock->sk)) Since smc_listen_out_connected() will not fail, simply swapping the order of the code can easily fix this issue. Fixes: 3b2dec2 ("net/smc: restructure client and server code in af_smc") Signed-off-by: D. Wythe <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Guangguan Wang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexandra Winter <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dust Li <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

Receiving HSR frame with insufficient space to hold HSR tag in the skb can result in a crash (kernel BUG): [ 45.390915] skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff86f32cac len:26 put:14 head:ffff888042418000 data:ffff888042417ff4 tail:0xe end:0x180 dev:bridge_slave_1 [ 45.392559] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 45.392912] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:211! [ 45.393276] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI [ 45.393809] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2496 Comm: reproducer Not tainted 6.15.0 torvalds#12 PREEMPT(undef) [ 45.394433] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 45.395273] RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x15b/0x1d0 <snip registers, remove unreliable trace> [ 45.402911] Call Trace: [ 45.403105] <IRQ> [ 45.404470] skb_push+0xcd/0xf0 [ 45.404726] br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0x7c/0x6c0 [ 45.406513] br_forward_finish+0x128/0x260 [ 45.408483] __br_forward+0x42d/0x590 [ 45.409464] maybe_deliver+0x2eb/0x420 [ 45.409763] br_flood+0x174/0x4a0 [ 45.410030] br_handle_frame_finish+0xc7c/0x1bc0 [ 45.411618] br_handle_frame+0xac3/0x1230 [ 45.413674] __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x808/0x3df0 [ 45.422966] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xb4/0x1f0 [ 45.424478] __netif_receive_skb+0x22/0x170 [ 45.424806] process_backlog+0x242/0x6d0 [ 45.425116] __napi_poll+0xbb/0x630 [ 45.425394] net_rx_action+0x4d1/0xcc0 [ 45.427613] handle_softirqs+0x1a4/0x580 [ 45.427926] do_softirq+0x74/0x90 [ 45.428196] </IRQ> This issue was found by syzkaller. The panic happens in br_dev_queue_push_xmit() once it receives a corrupted skb with ETH header already pushed in linear data. When it attempts the skb_push() call, there's not enough headroom and skb_push() panics. The corrupted skb is put on the queue by HSR layer, which makes a sequence of unintended transformations when it receives a specific corrupted HSR frame (with incomplete TAG). Fix it by dropping and consuming frames that are not long enough to contain both ethernet and hsr headers. Alternative fix would be to check for enough headroom before skb_push() in br_dev_queue_push_xmit(). In the reproducer, this is injected via AF_PACKET, but I don't easily see why it couldn't be sent over the wire from adjacent network. Further Details: In the reproducer, the following network interface chain is set up: ┌────────────────┐ ┌────────────────┐ │ veth0_to_hsr ├───┤ hsr_slave0 ┼───┐ └────────────────┘ └────────────────┘ │ │ ┌──────┐ ├─┤ hsr0 ├───┐ │ └──────┘ │ ┌────────────────┐ ┌────────────────┐ │ │┌────────┐ │ veth1_to_hsr ┼───┤ hsr_slave1 ├───┘ └┤ │ └────────────────┘ └────────────────┘ ┌┼ bridge │ ││ │ │└────────┘ │ ┌───────┐ │ │ ... ├──────┘ └───────┘ To trigger the events leading up to crash, reproducer sends a corrupted HSR frame with incomplete TAG, via AF_PACKET socket on 'veth0_to_hsr'. The first HSR-layer function to process this frame is hsr_handle_frame(). It and then checks if the protocol is ETH_P_PRP or ETH_P_HSR. If it is, it calls skb_set_network_header(skb, ETH_HLEN + HSR_HLEN), without checking that the skb is long enough. For the crashing frame it is not, and hence the skb->network_header and skb->mac_len fields are set incorrectly, pointing after the end of the linear buffer. I will call this a BUG#1 and it is what is addressed by this patch. In the crashing scenario before the fix, the skb continues to go down the hsr path as follows. hsr_handle_frame() then calls this sequence hsr_forward_skb() fill_frame_info() hsr->proto_ops->fill_frame_info() hsr_fill_frame_info() hsr_fill_frame_info() contains a check that intends to check whether the skb actually contains the HSR header. But the check relies on the skb->mac_len field which was erroneously setup due to BUG#1, so the check passes and the execution continues back in the hsr_forward_skb(): hsr_forward_skb() hsr_forward_do() hsr->proto_ops->get_untagged_frame() hsr_get_untagged_frame() create_stripped_skb_hsr() In create_stripped_skb_hsr(), a copy of the skb is created and is further corrupted by operation that attempts to strip the HSR tag in a call to __pskb_copy(). The skb enters create_stripped_skb_hsr() with ethernet header pushed in linear buffer. The skb_pull(skb_in, HSR_HLEN) thus pulls 6 bytes of ethernet header into the headroom, creating skb_in with a headroom of size 8. The subsequent __pskb_copy() then creates an skb with headroom of just 2 and skb->len of just 12, this is how it looks after the copy: gdb) p skb->len $10 = 12 (gdb) p skb->data $11 = (unsigned char *) 0xffff888041e45382 "\252\252\252\252\252!\210\373", (gdb) p skb->head $12 = (unsigned char *) 0xffff888041e45380 "" It seems create_stripped_skb_hsr() assumes that ETH header is pulled in the headroom when it's entered, because it just pulls HSR header on top. But that is not the case in our code-path and we end up with the corrupted skb instead. I will call this BUG#2 *I got confused here because it seems that under no conditions can create_stripped_skb_hsr() work well, the assumption it makes is not true during the processing of hsr frames - since the skb_push() in hsr_handle_frame to skb_pull in hsr_deliver_master(). I wonder whether I missed something here.* Next, the execution arrives in hsr_deliver_master(). It calls skb_pull(ETH_HLEN), which just returns NULL - the SKB does not have enough space for the pull (as it only has 12 bytes in total at this point). *The skb_pull() here further suggests that ethernet header is meant to be pushed through the whole hsr processing and create_stripped_skb_hsr() should pull it before doing the HSR header pull.* hsr_deliver_master() then puts the corrupted skb on the queue, it is then picked up from there by bridge frame handling layer and finally lands in br_dev_queue_push_xmit where it panics. Cc: [email protected] Fixes: 48b491a ("net: hsr: fix mac_len checks") Reported-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Acs <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

Commit 3c7ac40 ("scsi: ufs: core: Delegate the interrupt service routine to a threaded IRQ handler") introduced an IRQ lock inversion issue. Fix this lock inversion by changing the spin_lock_irq() calls into spin_lock_irqsave() calls in code that can be called either from interrupt context or from thread context. This patch fixes the following lockdep complaint: WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected 6.12.30-android16-5-maybe-dirty-4k #1 Tainted: G W OE -------------------------------------------------------- kworker/u28:0/12 just changed the state of lock: ffffff881e29dd60 (&hba->clk_gating.lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: ufshcd_release_scsi_cmd+0x60/0x110 but this lock took another, HARDIRQ-unsafe lock in the past: (shost->host_lock){+.+.}-{2:2} and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them. other info that might help us debug this: Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(shost->host_lock); local_irq_disable(); lock(&hba->clk_gating.lock); lock(shost->host_lock); <Interrupt> lock(&hba->clk_gating.lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 4 locks held by kworker/u28:0/12: #0: ffffff8800ac6158 ((wq_completion)async){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1bc/0x65c #1: ffffffc085c93d70 ((work_completion)(&entry->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1e4/0x65c #2: ffffff881e29c0e0 (&shost->scan_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __scsi_add_device+0x74/0x120 #3: ffffff881960ea00 (&hwq->cq_lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0x28/0x104 the shortest dependencies between 2nd lock and 1st lock: -> (shost->host_lock){+.+.}-{2:2} { HARDIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4 _raw_spin_lock+0x48/0x64 ufshcd_sl_intr+0x4c/0xa08 ufshcd_threaded_intr+0x70/0x12c irq_thread_fn+0x48/0xa8 irq_thread+0x130/0x1ec kthread+0x110/0x134 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 SOFTIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4 _raw_spin_lock+0x48/0x64 ufshcd_sl_intr+0x4c/0xa08 ufshcd_threaded_intr+0x70/0x12c irq_thread_fn+0x48/0xa8 irq_thread+0x130/0x1ec kthread+0x110/0x134 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 INITIAL USE at: lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4 _raw_spin_lock+0x48/0x64 ufshcd_sl_intr+0x4c/0xa08 ufshcd_threaded_intr+0x70/0x12c irq_thread_fn+0x48/0xa8 irq_thread+0x130/0x1ec kthread+0x110/0x134 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 } ... key at: [<ffffffc085ba1a98>] scsi_host_alloc.__key+0x0/0x10 ... acquired at: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80 __ufshcd_release+0x78/0x118 ufshcd_send_uic_cmd+0xe4/0x118 ufshcd_dme_set_attr+0x88/0x1c8 ufs_google_phy_initialization+0x68/0x418 [ufs] ufs_google_link_startup_notify+0x78/0x27c [ufs] ufshcd_link_startup+0x84/0x720 ufshcd_init+0xf3c/0x1330 ufshcd_pltfrm_init+0x728/0x7d8 ufs_google_probe+0x30/0x84 [ufs] platform_probe+0xa0/0xe0 really_probe+0x114/0x454 __driver_probe_device+0xa4/0x160 driver_probe_device+0x44/0x23c __driver_attach_async_helper+0x60/0xd4 async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x17c process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c worker_thread+0x33c/0x498 kthread+0x110/0x134 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 -> (&hba->clk_gating.lock){-...}-{2:2} { IN-HARDIRQ-W at: lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80 ufshcd_release_scsi_cmd+0x60/0x110 ufshcd_compl_one_cqe+0x2c0/0x3f4 ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0xb0/0x104 ufs_google_mcq_intr+0x80/0xa0 [ufs] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x104/0x32c handle_irq_event+0x40/0x9c handle_fasteoi_irq+0x170/0x2e8 generic_handle_domain_irq+0x58/0x80 gic_handle_irq+0x48/0x104 call_on_irq_stack+0x3c/0x50 do_interrupt_handler+0x7c/0xd8 el1_interrupt+0x34/0x58 el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24 el1h_64_irq+0x68/0x6c _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x6c debug_object_assert_init+0x16c/0x21c __mod_timer+0x4c/0x48c schedule_timeout+0xd4/0x16c io_schedule_timeout+0x48/0x70 do_wait_for_common+0x100/0x194 wait_for_completion_io_timeout+0x48/0x6c blk_execute_rq+0x124/0x17c scsi_execute_cmd+0x18c/0x3f8 scsi_probe_and_add_lun+0x204/0xd74 __scsi_add_device+0xbc/0x120 ufshcd_async_scan+0x80/0x3c0 async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x17c process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c worker_thread+0x33c/0x498 kthread+0x110/0x134 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 INITIAL USE at: lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80 ufshcd_hold+0x34/0x14c ufshcd_send_uic_cmd+0x28/0x118 ufshcd_dme_set_attr+0x88/0x1c8 ufs_google_phy_initialization+0x68/0x418 [ufs] ufs_google_link_startup_notify+0x78/0x27c [ufs] ufshcd_link_startup+0x84/0x720 ufshcd_init+0xf3c/0x1330 ufshcd_pltfrm_init+0x728/0x7d8 ufs_google_probe+0x30/0x84 [ufs] platform_probe+0xa0/0xe0 really_probe+0x114/0x454 __driver_probe_device+0xa4/0x160 driver_probe_device+0x44/0x23c __driver_attach_async_helper+0x60/0xd4 async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x17c process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c worker_thread+0x33c/0x498 kthread+0x110/0x134 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 } ... key at: [<ffffffc085ba6fe8>] ufshcd_init.__key+0x0/0x10 ... acquired at: mark_lock+0x1c4/0x224 __lock_acquire+0x438/0x2e1c lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80 ufshcd_release_scsi_cmd+0x60/0x110 ufshcd_compl_one_cqe+0x2c0/0x3f4 ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0xb0/0x104 ufs_google_mcq_intr+0x80/0xa0 [ufs] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x104/0x32c handle_irq_event+0x40/0x9c handle_fasteoi_irq+0x170/0x2e8 generic_handle_domain_irq+0x58/0x80 gic_handle_irq+0x48/0x104 call_on_irq_stack+0x3c/0x50 do_interrupt_handler+0x7c/0xd8 el1_interrupt+0x34/0x58 el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24 el1h_64_irq+0x68/0x6c _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x6c debug_object_assert_init+0x16c/0x21c __mod_timer+0x4c/0x48c schedule_timeout+0xd4/0x16c io_schedule_timeout+0x48/0x70 do_wait_for_common+0x100/0x194 wait_for_completion_io_timeout+0x48/0x6c blk_execute_rq+0x124/0x17c scsi_execute_cmd+0x18c/0x3f8 scsi_probe_and_add_lun+0x204/0xd74 __scsi_add_device+0xbc/0x120 ufshcd_async_scan+0x80/0x3c0 async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x17c process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c worker_thread+0x33c/0x498 kthread+0x110/0x134 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 stack backtrace: CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/u28:0 Tainted: G W OE 6.12.30-android16-5-maybe-dirty-4k #1 ccd4020fe444bdf629efc3b86df6be920b8df7d0 Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: Spacecraft board based on MALIBU (DT) Workqueue: async async_run_entry_fn Call trace: dump_backtrace+0xfc/0x17c show_stack+0x18/0x28 dump_stack_lvl+0x40/0xa0 dump_stack+0x18/0x24 print_irq_inversion_bug+0x2fc/0x304 mark_lock_irq+0x388/0x4fc mark_lock+0x1c4/0x224 __lock_acquire+0x438/0x2e1c lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80 ufshcd_release_scsi_cmd+0x60/0x110 ufshcd_compl_one_cqe+0x2c0/0x3f4 ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0xb0/0x104 ufs_google_mcq_intr+0x80/0xa0 [ufs dd6f385554e109da094ab91d5f7be18625a2222a] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x104/0x32c handle_irq_event+0x40/0x9c handle_fasteoi_irq+0x170/0x2e8 generic_handle_domain_irq+0x58/0x80 gic_handle_irq+0x48/0x104 call_on_irq_stack+0x3c/0x50 do_interrupt_handler+0x7c/0xd8 el1_interrupt+0x34/0x58 el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24 el1h_64_irq+0x68/0x6c _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x6c debug_object_assert_init+0x16c/0x21c __mod_timer+0x4c/0x48c schedule_timeout+0xd4/0x16c io_schedule_timeout+0x48/0x70 do_wait_for_common+0x100/0x194 wait_for_completion_io_timeout+0x48/0x6c blk_execute_rq+0x124/0x17c scsi_execute_cmd+0x18c/0x3f8 scsi_probe_and_add_lun+0x204/0xd74 __scsi_add_device+0xbc/0x120 ufshcd_async_scan+0x80/0x3c0 async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x17c process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c worker_thread+0x33c/0x498 kthread+0x110/0x134 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Cc: Neil Armstrong <[email protected]> Cc: André Draszik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Peter Wang <[email protected]> Fixes: 3c7ac40 ("scsi: ufs: core: Delegate the interrupt service routine to a threaded IRQ handler") Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>

The mm/debug_vm_pagetable test allocates manually page table entries for the tests it runs, using also its manually allocated mm_struct. That in itself is ok, but when it exits, at destroy_args() it fails to clear those entries with the *_clear functions. The problem is that leaves stale entries. If another process allocates an mm_struct with a pgd at the same address, it may end up running into the stale entry. This is happening in practice on a debug kernel with CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_PGTABLE=y, for example this is the output with some extra debugging I added (it prints a warning trace if pgtables_bytes goes negative, in addition to the warning at check_mm() function): [ 2.539353] debug_vm_pgtable: [get_random_vaddr ]: random_vaddr is 0x7ea247140000 [ 2.539366] kmem_cache info [ 2.539374] kmem_cachep 0x000000002ce82385 - freelist 0x0000000000000000 - offset 0x508 [ 2.539447] debug_vm_pgtable: [init_args ]: args->mm is 0x000000002267cc9e (...) [ 2.552800] WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 116 at include/linux/mm.h:2841 free_pud_range+0x8bc/0x8d0 [ 2.552816] Modules linked in: [ 2.552843] CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 116 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.12.0-105.debug_vm2.el10.ppc64le+debug #1 VOLUNTARY [ 2.552859] Hardware name: IBM,9009-41A POWER9 (architected) 0x4e0202 0xf000005 of:IBM,FW910.00 (VL910_062) hv:phyp pSeries [ 2.552872] NIP: c0000000007eef3c LR: c0000000007eef30 CTR: c0000000003d8c90 [ 2.552885] REGS: c0000000622e73b0 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (6.12.0-105.debug_vm2.el10.ppc64le+debug) [ 2.552899] MSR: 800000000282b033 <SF,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 24002822 XER: 0000000a [ 2.552954] CFAR: c0000000008f03f0 IRQMASK: 0 [ 2.552954] GPR00: c0000000007eef30 c0000000622e7650 c000000002b1ac00 0000000000000001 [ 2.552954] GPR04: 0000000000000008 0000000000000000 c0000000007eef30 ffffffffffffffff [ 2.552954] GPR08: 00000000ffff00f5 0000000000000001 0000000000000048 0000000000004000 [ 2.552954] GPR12: 00000003fa440000 c000000017ffa300 c0000000051d9f80 ffffffffffffffdb [ 2.552954] GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000008 000000000000000a 60000000000000e0 [ 2.552954] GPR20: 4080000000000000 c0000000113af038 00007fffcf130000 0000700000000000 [ 2.552954] GPR24: c000000062a6a000 0000000000000001 8000000062a68000 0000000000000001 [ 2.552954] GPR28: 000000000000000a c000000062ebc600 0000000000002000 c000000062ebc760 [ 2.553170] NIP [c0000000007eef3c] free_pud_range+0x8bc/0x8d0 [ 2.553185] LR [c0000000007eef30] free_pud_range+0x8b0/0x8d0 [ 2.553199] Call Trace: [ 2.553207] [c0000000622e7650] [c0000000007eef30] free_pud_range+0x8b0/0x8d0 (unreliable) [ 2.553229] [c0000000622e7750] [c0000000007f40b4] free_pgd_range+0x284/0x3b0 [ 2.553248] [c0000000622e7800] [c0000000007f4630] free_pgtables+0x450/0x570 [ 2.553274] [c0000000622e78e0] [c0000000008161c0] exit_mmap+0x250/0x650 [ 2.553292] [c0000000622e7a30] [c0000000001b95b8] __mmput+0x98/0x290 [ 2.558344] [c0000000622e7a80] [c0000000001d1018] exit_mm+0x118/0x1b0 [ 2.558361] [c0000000622e7ac0] [c0000000001d141c] do_exit+0x2ec/0x870 [ 2.558376] [c0000000622e7b60] [c0000000001d1ca8] do_group_exit+0x88/0x150 [ 2.558391] [c0000000622e7bb0] [c0000000001d1db8] sys_exit_group+0x48/0x50 [ 2.558407] [c0000000622e7be0] [c00000000003d810] system_call_exception+0x1e0/0x4c0 [ 2.558423] [c0000000622e7e50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec (...) [ 2.558892] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 2.559022] BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:000000002267cc9e type:MM_ANONPAGES val:1 [ 2.559037] BUG: non-zero pgtables_bytes on freeing mm: -6144 Here the modprobe process ended up with an allocated mm_struct from the mm_struct slab that was used before by the debug_vm_pgtable test. That is not a problem, since the mm_struct is initialized again etc., however, if it ends up using the same pgd table, it bumps into the old stale entry when clearing/freeing the page table entries, so it tries to free an entry already gone (that one which was allocated by the debug_vm_pgtable test), which also explains the negative pgtables_bytes since it's accounting for not allocated entries in the current process. As far as I looked pgd_{alloc,free} etc. does not clear entries, and clearing of the entries is explicitly done in the free_pgtables-> free_pgd_range->free_p4d_range->free_pud_range->free_pmd_range-> free_pte_range path. However, the debug_vm_pgtable test does not call free_pgtables, since it allocates mm_struct and entries manually for its test and eg. not goes through page faults. So it also should clear manually the entries before exit at destroy_args(). This problem was noticed on a reboot X number of times test being done on a powerpc host, with a debug kernel with CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_PGTABLE enabled. Depends on the system, but on a 100 times reboot loop the problem could manifest once or twice, if a process ends up getting the right mm->pgd entry with the stale entries used by mm/debug_vm_pagetable. After using this patch, I couldn't reproduce/experience the problems anymore. I was able to reproduce the problem as well on latest upstream kernel (6.16). I also modified destroy_args() to use mmput() instead of mmdrop(), there is no reason to hold mm_users reference and not release the mm_struct entirely, and in the output above with my debugging prints I already had patched it to use mmput, it did not fix the problem, but helped in the debugging as well. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 3c9b84f ("mm/debug_vm_pgtable: introduce struct pgtable_debug_args") Signed-off-by: Herton R. Krzesinski <[email protected]> Cc: Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]> Cc: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]> Cc: Gavin Shan <[email protected]> Cc: Gerald Schaefer <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

syzbot reported the splat below. [0] When atmtcp_v_open() or atmtcp_v_close() is called via connect() or close(), atmtcp_send_control() is called to send an in-kernel special message. The message has ATMTCP_HDR_MAGIC in atmtcp_control.hdr.length. Also, a pointer of struct atm_vcc is set to atmtcp_control.vcc. The notable thing is struct atmtcp_control is uAPI but has a space for an in-kernel pointer. struct atmtcp_control { struct atmtcp_hdr hdr; /* must be first */ ... atm_kptr_t vcc; /* both directions */ ... } __ATM_API_ALIGN; typedef struct { unsigned char _[8]; } __ATM_API_ALIGN atm_kptr_t; The special message is processed in atmtcp_recv_control() called from atmtcp_c_send(). atmtcp_c_send() is vcc->dev->ops->send() and called from 2 paths: 1. .ndo_start_xmit() (vcc->send() == atm_send_aal0()) 2. vcc_sendmsg() The problem is sendmsg() does not validate the message length and userspace can abuse atmtcp_recv_control() to overwrite any kptr by atmtcp_control. Let's add a new ->pre_send() hook to validate messages from sendmsg(). [0]: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00200000ab: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x0000000100000558-0x000000010000055f] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5865 Comm: syz-executor331 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1-syzkaller-00215-gbab3ce404553 #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/12/2025 RIP: 0010:atmtcp_recv_control drivers/atm/atmtcp.c:93 [inline] RIP: 0010:atmtcp_c_send+0x1da/0x950 drivers/atm/atmtcp.c:297 Code: 4d 8d 75 1a 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 42 0f b6 04 20 84 c0 0f 85 15 06 00 00 41 0f b7 1e 4d 8d b7 60 05 00 00 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 20 84 c0 0f 85 13 06 00 00 66 41 89 1e 4d 8d 75 1c 4c RSP: 0018:ffffc90003f5f810 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: 00000000200000ab RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88802a510000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: ffff888030a6068c RBP: ffff88802699fb40 R08: ffff888030a606eb R09: 1ffff1100614c0dd R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff8718fc40 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: ffff888030a60680 R14: 000000010000055f R15: 00000000ffffffff FS: 00007f8d7e9236c0(0000) GS:ffff888125c1c000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000045ad50 CR3: 0000000075bde000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 Call Trace: <TASK> vcc_sendmsg+0xa10/0xc60 net/atm/common.c:645 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x219/0x270 net/socket.c:729 ____sys_sendmsg+0x505/0x830 net/socket.c:2614 ___sys_sendmsg+0x21f/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2668 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2700 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2705 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2703 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x19b/0x260 net/socket.c:2703 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f8d7e96a4a9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 51 18 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f8d7e923198 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f8d7e9f4308 RCX: 00007f8d7e96a4a9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000200000000240 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00007f8d7e9f4300 R08: 65732f636f72702f R09: 65732f636f72702f R10: 65732f636f72702f R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f8d7e9c10ac R13: 00007f8d7e9231a0 R14: 0000200000000200 R15: 0000200000000250 </TASK> Modules linked in: Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/ Tested-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

These iterations require the read lock, otherwise RCU lockdep will splat: ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.17.0-rc3-00014-g31419c045d64 #6 Tainted: G O ----------------------------- drivers/base/power/main.c:1333 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 5 locks held by rtcwake/547: #0: 00000000643ab418 (sb_writers#6){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: file_start_write+0x2b/0x3a #1: 0000000067a0ca88 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x181/0x24b #2: 00000000631eac40 (kn->active#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x191/0x24b #3: 00000000609a1308 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: pm_suspend+0xaf/0x30b #4: 0000000060c0fdb0 (device_links_srcu){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: device_links_read_lock+0x75/0x98 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 547 Comm: rtcwake Tainted: G O 6.17.0-rc3-00014-g31419c045d64 #6 VOLUNTARY Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE Stack: 223721b3a80 6089eac6 00000001 00000001 ffffff00 6089eac6 00000535 6086e528 721b3ac0 6003c294 00000000 60031fc0 Call Trace: [<600407ed>] show_stack+0x10e/0x127 [<6003c294>] dump_stack_lvl+0x77/0xc6 [<6003c2fd>] dump_stack+0x1a/0x20 [<600bc2f8>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x116/0x13e [<603d8ea1>] dpm_async_suspend_superior+0x117/0x17e [<603d980f>] device_suspend+0x528/0x541 [<603da24b>] dpm_suspend+0x1a2/0x267 [<603da837>] dpm_suspend_start+0x5d/0x72 [<600ca0c9>] suspend_devices_and_enter+0xab/0x736 [...] Add the fourth argument to the iteration to annotate this and avoid the splat. Fixes: 0679963 ("PM: sleep: Make async suspend handle suppliers like parents") Fixes: ed18738 ("PM: sleep: Make async resume handle consumers like children") Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250826134348.aba79f6e6299.I9ecf55da46ccf33778f2c018a82e1819d815b348@changeid Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>

If preparing a write bio fails then blk_zone_wplug_bio_work() calls bio_endio() with zwplug->lock held. If a device mapper driver is stacked on top of the zoned block device then this results in nested locking of zwplug->lock. The resulting lockdep complaint is a false positive because this is nested locking and not recursive locking. Suppress this false positive by calling blk_zone_wplug_bio_io_error() without holding zwplug->lock. This is safe because no code in blk_zone_wplug_bio_io_error() depends on zwplug->lock being held. This patch suppresses the following lockdep complaint: WARNING: possible recursive locking detected -------------------------------------------- kworker/3:0H/46 is trying to acquire lock: ffffff882968b830 (&zwplug->lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: blk_zone_write_plug_bio_endio+0x64/0x1f0 but task is already holding lock: ffffff88315bc230 (&zwplug->lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: blk_zone_wplug_bio_work+0x8c/0x48c other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&zwplug->lock); lock(&zwplug->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 3 locks held by kworker/3:0H/46: #0: ffffff8809486758 ((wq_completion)sdd_zwplugs){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1bc/0x65c #1: ffffffc085de3d70 ((work_completion)(&zwplug->bio_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1e4/0x65c #2: ffffff88315bc230 (&zwplug->lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: blk_zone_wplug_bio_work+0x8c/0x48c stack backtrace: CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 46 Comm: kworker/3:0H Tainted: G W OE 6.12.38-android16-5-maybe-dirty-4k #1 8b362b6f76e3645a58cd27d86982bce10d150025 Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: Spacecraft board based on MALIBU (DT) Workqueue: sdd_zwplugs blk_zone_wplug_bio_work Call trace: dump_backtrace+0xfc/0x17c show_stack+0x18/0x28 dump_stack_lvl+0x40/0xa0 dump_stack+0x18/0x24 print_deadlock_bug+0x38c/0x398 __lock_acquire+0x13e8/0x2e1c lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80 blk_zone_write_plug_bio_endio+0x64/0x1f0 bio_endio+0x9c/0x240 __dm_io_complete+0x214/0x260 clone_endio+0xe8/0x214 bio_endio+0x218/0x240 blk_zone_wplug_bio_work+0x204/0x48c process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c worker_thread+0x33c/0x498 kthread+0x110/0x134 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Cc: [email protected] Cc: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Fixes: dd291d7 ("block: Introduce zone write plugging") Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>

commit c652887 ("KVM: arm64: vgic-v3: Allow userspace to write GICD_TYPER2.nASSGIcap") makes the allocation of vPEs depend on nASSGIcap for GICv4.1 hosts. While the vGIC v4 initialization and teardown is handled correctly, it erroneously attempts to establish a vLPI mapping to a VM that has no vPEs allocated: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000a8 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000044 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000044, ISS2 = 0x00000000 CM = 0, WnR = 1, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000073a453b000 [00000000000000a8] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000044 [#1] SMP pstate: 23400009 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : its_irq_set_vcpu_affinity+0x58c/0x95c lr : its_irq_set_vcpu_affinity+0x1e0/0x95c sp : ffff8001029bb9e0 pmr_save: 00000060 x29: ffff8001029bba20 x28: ffff0001ca5e28c0 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff00019eee9f80 x24: ffff0001992b3f00 x23: ffff8001029bbab8 x22: ffff00001159fb80 x21: 00000000000024a7 x20: 00000000000024a7 x19: ffff00019eee9fb4 x18: 0000000000000494 x17: 000000000000000e x16: 0000000000000494 x15: 0000000000000002 x14: ffff0001a7f34600 x13: ffffccaad1203000 x12: 0000000000000018 x11: ffff000011991000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 00000000000000a2 x8 : 00000000000020a8 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000000000000003f x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000004 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff8001029bbab8 x0 : 00000000000000a8 Call trace: its_irq_set_vcpu_affinity+0x58c/0x95c irq_set_vcpu_affinity+0x74/0xc8 its_map_vlpi+0x4c/0x94 kvm_vgic_v4_set_forwarding+0x134/0x298 kvm_arch_irq_bypass_add_producer+0x28/0x34 irq_bypass_register_producer+0xf8/0x1d8 vfio_msi_set_vector_signal+0x2c8/0x308 vfio_pci_set_msi_trigger+0x198/0x2d4 vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl+0xf0/0x104 vfio_pci_core_ioctl+0x6ac/0xc5c vfio_device_fops_unl_ioctl+0x128/0x370 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x98/0xd0 el0_svc_common+0xd8/0x1d8 do_el0_svc+0x28/0x34 el0_svc+0x40/0xb8 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x70/0xbc el0t_64_sync+0x1a8/0x1ac Code: 321f0129 f940094a 8b08014 d1400900 (39000009) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fix it by moving the GICv4.1 special-casing to vgic_supports_direct_msis(), returning false if the user explicitly disabled nASSGIcap for the VM. Fixes: c652887 ("KVM: arm64: vgic-v3: Allow userspace to write GICD_TYPER2.nASSGIcap") Suggested-by: Oliver Upton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Raghavendra Rao Ananta <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <[email protected]>

In gicv5_irs_of_init_affinity() a WARN_ON() is triggered if: 1) a phandle in the "cpus" property does not correspond to a valid OF node 2 a CPU logical id does not exist for a given OF cpu_node #1 is a firmware bug and should be reported as such but does not warrant a WARN_ON() backtrace. #2 is not necessarily an error condition (eg a kernel can be booted with nr_cpus=X limiting the number of cores artificially) and therefore there is no reason to clutter the kernel log with WARN_ON() output when the condition is hit. Rework the IRS affinity parsing code to remove undue WARN_ON()s thus making it less noisy. Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]

into HEAD KVM/riscv fixes for 6.17, take #1 - Fix pte settings within kvm_riscv_gstage_ioremap() - Fix comments in kvm_riscv_check_vcpu_requests() - Fix stack overrun when setting vlenb via ONE_REG

tee_shm_put have NULL pointer dereference: __optee_disable_shm_cache --> shm = reg_pair_to_ptr(...);//shm maybe return NULL tee_shm_free(shm); --> tee_shm_put(shm);//crash Add check in tee_shm_put to fix it. panic log: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000000000100cca Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000004 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000002049d07000 [0000000000100cca] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP CPU: 2 PID: 14442 Comm: systemd-sleep Tainted: P OE ------- ---- 6.6.0-39-generic torvalds#38 Source Version: 938b255f6cb8817c95b0dd5c8c2944acfce94b07 Hardware name: greatwall GW-001Y1A-FTH, BIOS Great Wall BIOS V3.0 10/26/2022 pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : tee_shm_put+0x24/0x188 lr : tee_shm_free+0x14/0x28 sp : ffff001f98f9faf0 x29: ffff001f98f9faf0 x28: ffff0020df543cc0 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: ffff001f811344a0 x25: ffff8000818dac00 x24: ffff800082d8d048 x23: ffff001f850fcd18 x22: 0000000000000001 x21: ffff001f98f9fb88 x20: ffff001f83e76218 x19: ffff001f83e761e0 x18: 000000000000ffff x17: 303a30303a303030 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000003 x14: 0000000000000001 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0101010101010101 x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000000001 x9 : ffff800080e08d0c x8 : ffff001f98f9fb88 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffff001f83e761e0 x1 : 00000000ffff001f x0 : 0000000000100cca Call trace: tee_shm_put+0x24/0x188 tee_shm_free+0x14/0x28 __optee_disable_shm_cache+0xa8/0x108 optee_shutdown+0x28/0x38 platform_shutdown+0x28/0x40 device_shutdown+0x144/0x2b0 kernel_power_off+0x3c/0x80 hibernate+0x35c/0x388 state_store+0x64/0x80 kobj_attr_store+0x14/0x28 sysfs_kf_write+0x48/0x60 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x128/0x1c0 vfs_write+0x270/0x370 ksys_write+0x6c/0x100 __arm64_sys_write+0x20/0x30 invoke_syscall+0x4c/0x120 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x44/0xf0 do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38 el0_svc+0x24/0x88 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x134/0x150 el0t_64_sync+0x14c/0x15 Fixes: dfd0743 ("tee: handle lookup of shm with reference count 0") Signed-off-by: Pei Xiao <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]>

When there are memory-only nodes (nodes without CPUs), these nodes are not properly initialized, causing kernel panic during boot. of_numa_init of_numa_parse_cpu_nodes node_set(nid, numa_nodes_parsed); of_numa_parse_memory_nodes In of_numa_parse_cpu_nodes, numa_nodes_parsed gets updated only for nodes containing CPUs. Memory-only nodes should have been updated in of_numa_parse_memory_nodes, but they weren't. Subsequently, when free_area_init() attempts to access NODE_DATA() for these uninitialized memory nodes, the kernel panics due to NULL pointer dereference. This can be reproduced on ARM64 QEMU with 1 CPU and 2 memory nodes: qemu-system-aarch64 \ -cpu host -nographic \ -m 4G -smp 1 \ -machine virt,accel=kvm,gic-version=3,iommu=smmuv3 \ -object memory-backend-ram,size=2G,id=mem0 \ -object memory-backend-ram,size=2G,id=mem1 \ -numa node,nodeid=0,memdev=mem0 \ -numa node,nodeid=1,memdev=mem1 \ -kernel $IMAGE \ -hda $DISK \ -append "console=ttyAMA0 root=/dev/vda rw earlycon" [ 0.000000] Booting Linux on physical CPU 0x0000000000 [0x481fd010] [ 0.000000] Linux version 6.17.0-rc1-00001-gabb4b3daf18c-dirty (yintirui@local) (gcc (GCC) 12.3.1, GNU ld (GNU Binutils) 2.41) #52 SMP PREEMPT Mon Aug 18 09:49:40 CST 2025 [ 0.000000] KASLR enabled [ 0.000000] random: crng init done [ 0.000000] Machine model: linux,dummy-virt [ 0.000000] efi: UEFI not found. [ 0.000000] earlycon: pl11 at MMIO 0x0000000009000000 (options '') [ 0.000000] printk: legacy bootconsole [pl11] enabled [ 0.000000] OF: reserved mem: Reserved memory: No reserved-memory node in the DT [ 0.000000] NODE_DATA(0) allocated [mem 0xbfffd9c0-0xbfffffff] [ 0.000000] node 1 must be removed before remove section 23 [ 0.000000] Zone ranges: [ 0.000000] DMA [mem 0x0000000040000000-0x00000000ffffffff] [ 0.000000] DMA32 empty [ 0.000000] Normal [mem 0x0000000100000000-0x000000013fffffff] [ 0.000000] Movable zone start for each node [ 0.000000] Early memory node ranges [ 0.000000] node 0: [mem 0x0000000040000000-0x00000000bfffffff] [ 0.000000] node 1: [mem 0x00000000c0000000-0x000000013fffffff] [ 0.000000] Initmem setup node 0 [mem 0x0000000040000000-0x00000000bfffffff] [ 0.000000] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000a0 [ 0.000000] Mem abort info: [ 0.000000] ESR = 0x0000000096000004 [ 0.000000] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 0.000000] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 0.000000] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 0.000000] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 0.000000] Data abort info: [ 0.000000] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 0.000000] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 0.000000] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 0.000000] [00000000000000a0] user address but active_mm is swapper [ 0.000000] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP [ 0.000000] Modules linked in: [ 0.000000] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1-00001-g760c6dabf762-dirty torvalds#54 PREEMPT [ 0.000000] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 0.000000] pstate: 800000c5 (Nzcv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 0.000000] pc : free_area_init+0x50c/0xf9c [ 0.000000] lr : free_area_init+0x5c0/0xf9c [ 0.000000] sp : ffffa02ca0f33c00 [ 0.000000] x29: ffffa02ca0f33cb0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 0.000000] x26: 4ec4ec4ec4ec4ec5 x25: 00000000000c0000 x24: 00000000000c0000 [ 0.000000] x23: 0000000000040000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffffa02ca0f3b368 [ 0.000000] x20: ffffa02ca14c7b98 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000002 [ 0.000000] x17: 000000000000cacc x16: 0000000000000001 x15: 0000000000000001 [ 0.000000] x14: 0000000080000000 x13: 0000000000000018 x12: 0000000000000002 [ 0.000000] x11: ffffa02ca0fd4f00 x10: ffffa02ca14bab20 x9 : ffffa02ca14bab38 [ 0.000000] x8 : 00000000000c0000 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 0000000000000002 [ 0.000000] x5 : 0000000140000000 x4 : ffffa02ca0f33c90 x3 : ffffa02ca0f33ca0 [ 0.000000] x2 : ffffa02ca0f33c98 x1 : 0000000080000000 x0 : 0000000000000001 [ 0.000000] Call trace: [ 0.000000] free_area_init+0x50c/0xf9c (P) [ 0.000000] bootmem_init+0x110/0x1dc [ 0.000000] setup_arch+0x278/0x60c [ 0.000000] start_kernel+0x70/0x748 [ 0.000000] __primary_switched+0x88/0x90 [ 0.000000] Code: d503201f b98093e0 52800016 f8607a93 (f9405260) [ 0.000000] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 0.000000] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill the idle task! [ 0.000000] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill the idle task! ]--- Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 7675076 ("arch_numa: switch over to numa_memblks") Signed-off-by: Yin Tirui <[email protected]> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kefeng Wang <[email protected]> Cc: Chen Jun <[email protected]> Cc: Dan Williams <[email protected]> Cc: Joanthan Cameron <[email protected]> Cc: Rob Herring <[email protected]> Cc: Saravana Kannan <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

While working on the lazy MMU mode enablement for s390 I hit pretty curious issues in the kasan code. The first is related to a custom kasan-based sanitizer aimed at catching invalid accesses to PTEs and is inspired by [1] conversation. The kasan complains on valid PTE accesses, while the shadow memory is reported as unpoisoned: [ 102.783993] ================================================================== [ 102.784008] BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in set_pte_range+0x36c/0x390 [ 102.784016] Read of size 8 at addr 0000780084cf9608 by task vmalloc_test/0/5542 [ 102.784019] [ 102.784040] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5542 Comm: vmalloc_test/0 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.16.0-gcc-ipte-kasan-11657-gb2d930c4950e torvalds#340 PREEMPT [ 102.784047] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [ 102.784049] Hardware name: IBM 8561 T01 703 (LPAR) [ 102.784052] Call Trace: [ 102.784054] [<00007fffe0147ac0>] dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x140 [ 102.784059] [<00007fffe0112484>] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x34/0x2d0 [ 102.784066] [<00007fffe011282c>] print_report+0x10c/0x1f8 [ 102.784071] [<00007fffe090785a>] kasan_report+0xfa/0x220 [ 102.784078] [<00007fffe01d3dec>] set_pte_range+0x36c/0x390 [ 102.784083] [<00007fffe01d41c2>] leave_ipte_batch+0x3b2/0xb10 [ 102.784088] [<00007fffe07d3650>] apply_to_pte_range+0x2f0/0x4e0 [ 102.784094] [<00007fffe07e62e4>] apply_to_pmd_range+0x194/0x3e0 [ 102.784099] [<00007fffe07e820e>] __apply_to_page_range+0x2fe/0x7a0 [ 102.784104] [<00007fffe07e86d8>] apply_to_page_range+0x28/0x40 [ 102.784109] [<00007fffe090a3ec>] __kasan_populate_vmalloc+0xec/0x310 [ 102.784114] [<00007fffe090aa36>] kasan_populate_vmalloc+0x96/0x130 [ 102.784118] [<00007fffe0833a04>] alloc_vmap_area+0x3d4/0xf30 [ 102.784123] [<00007fffe083a8ba>] __get_vm_area_node+0x1aa/0x4c0 [ 102.784127] [<00007fffe083c4f6>] __vmalloc_node_range_noprof+0x126/0x4e0 [ 102.784131] [<00007fffe083c980>] __vmalloc_node_noprof+0xd0/0x110 [ 102.784135] [<00007fffe083ca32>] vmalloc_noprof+0x32/0x40 [ 102.784139] [<00007fff608aa336>] fix_size_alloc_test+0x66/0x150 [test_vmalloc] [ 102.784147] [<00007fff608aa710>] test_func+0x2f0/0x430 [test_vmalloc] [ 102.784153] [<00007fffe02841f8>] kthread+0x3f8/0x7a0 [ 102.784159] [<00007fffe014d8b4>] __ret_from_fork+0xd4/0x7d0 [ 102.784164] [<00007fffe299c00a>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x30 [ 102.784173] no locks held by vmalloc_test/0/5542. [ 102.784176] [ 102.784178] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 102.784186] page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x84cf9 [ 102.784198] flags: 0x3ffff00000000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1ffff) [ 102.784212] page_type: f2(table) [ 102.784225] raw: 3ffff00000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000122 0000000000000000 [ 102.784234] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 f200000000000001 0000000000000000 [ 102.784248] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 102.784250] [ 102.784252] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 102.784260] 0000780084cf9500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 102.784274] 0000780084cf9580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 102.784277] >0000780084cf9600: fd 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 102.784290] ^ [ 102.784293] 0000780084cf9680: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 102.784303] 0000780084cf9700: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 102.784306] ================================================================== The second issue hits when the custom sanitizer above is not implemented, but the kasan itself is still active: [ 1554.438028] Unable to handle kernel pointer dereference in virtual kernel address space [ 1554.438065] Failing address: 001c0ff0066f0000 TEID: 001c0ff0066f0403 [ 1554.438076] Fault in home space mode while using kernel ASCE. [ 1554.438103] AS:00000000059d400b R2:0000000ffec5c00b R3:00000000c6c9c007 S:0000000314470001 P:00000000d0ab413d [ 1554.438158] Oops: 0011 ilc:2 [#1]SMP [ 1554.438175] Modules linked in: test_vmalloc(E+) nft_fib_inet(E) nft_fib_ipv4(E) nft_fib_ipv6(E) nft_fib(E) nft_reject_inet(E) nf_reject_ipv4(E) nf_reject_ipv6(E) nft_reject(E) nft_ct(E) nft_chain_nat(E) nf_nat(E) nf_conntrack(E) nf_defrag_ipv6(E) nf_defrag_ipv4(E) nf_tables(E) sunrpc(E) pkey_pckmo(E) uvdevice(E) s390_trng(E) rng_core(E) eadm_sch(E) vfio_ccw(E) mdev(E) vfio_iommu_type1(E) vfio(E) sch_fq_codel(E) drm(E) loop(E) i2c_core(E) drm_panel_orientation_quirks(E) nfnetlink(E) ctcm(E) fsm(E) zfcp(E) scsi_transport_fc(E) diag288_wdt(E) watchdog(E) ghash_s390(E) prng(E) aes_s390(E) des_s390(E) libdes(E) sha3_512_s390(E) sha3_256_s390(E) sha512_s390(E) sha1_s390(E) sha_common(E) pkey(E) autofs4(E) [ 1554.438319] Unloaded tainted modules: pkey_uv(E):1 hmac_s390(E):2 [ 1554.438354] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1715 Comm: vmalloc_test/0 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 6.16.0-gcc-ipte-kasan-11657-gb2d930c4950e torvalds#350 PREEMPT [ 1554.438368] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [ 1554.438374] Hardware name: IBM 8561 T01 703 (LPAR) [ 1554.438381] Krnl PSW : 0704e00180000000 00007fffe1d3d6ae (memset+0x5e/0x98) [ 1554.438396] R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:2 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3 [ 1554.438409] Krnl GPRS: 0000000000000001 001c0ff0066f0000 001c0ff0066f0000 00000000000000f8 [ 1554.438418] 00000000000009fe 0000000000000009 0000000000000000 0000000000000002 [ 1554.438426] 0000000000005000 000078031ae655c8 00000feffdcf9f59 0000780258672a20 [ 1554.438433] 0000780243153500 00007f8033780000 00007fffe083a510 00007f7fee7cfa00 [ 1554.438452] Krnl Code: 00007fffe1d3d6a0: eb540008000c srlg %r5,%r4,8 00007fffe1d3d6a6: b9020055 ltgr %r5,%r5 #00007fffe1d3d6aa: a784000b brc 8,00007fffe1d3d6c0 >00007fffe1d3d6ae: 42301000 stc %r3,0(%r1) 00007fffe1d3d6b2: d2fe10011000 mvc 1(255,%r1),0(%r1) 00007fffe1d3d6b8: 41101100 la %r1,256(%r1) 00007fffe1d3d6bc: a757fff9 brctg %r5,00007fffe1d3d6ae 00007fffe1d3d6c0: 42301000 stc %r3,0(%r1) [ 1554.438539] Call Trace: [ 1554.438545] [<00007fffe1d3d6ae>] memset+0x5e/0x98 [ 1554.438552] ([<00007fffe083a510>] remove_vm_area+0x220/0x400) [ 1554.438562] [<00007fffe083a9d6>] vfree.part.0+0x26/0x810 [ 1554.438569] [<00007fff6073bd50>] fix_align_alloc_test+0x50/0x90 [test_vmalloc] [ 1554.438583] [<00007fff6073c73a>] test_func+0x46a/0x6c0 [test_vmalloc] [ 1554.438593] [<00007fffe0283ac8>] kthread+0x3f8/0x7a0 [ 1554.438603] [<00007fffe014d8b4>] __ret_from_fork+0xd4/0x7d0 [ 1554.438613] [<00007fffe299ac0a>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x30 [ 1554.438622] INFO: lockdep is turned off. [ 1554.438627] Last Breaking-Event-Address: [ 1554.438632] [<00007fffe1d3d65c>] memset+0xc/0x98 [ 1554.438644] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception: panic_on_oops This series fixes the above issues and is a pre-requisite for the s390 lazy MMU mode implementation. test_vmalloc was used to stress-test the fixes. This patch (of 2): When vmalloc shadow memory is established the modification of the corresponding page tables is not protected by any locks. Instead, the locking is done per-PTE. This scheme however has defects. kasan_populate_vmalloc_pte() - while ptep_get() read is atomic the sequence pte_none(ptep_get()) is not. Doing that outside of the lock might lead to a concurrent PTE update and what could be seen as a shadow memory corruption as result. kasan_depopulate_vmalloc_pte() - by the time a page whose address was extracted from ptep_get() read and cached in a local variable outside of the lock is attempted to get free, could actually be freed already. To avoid these put ptep_get() itself and the code that manipulates the result of the read under lock. In addition, move freeing of the page out of the atomic context. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/adb258634194593db294c0d1fb35646e894d6ead.1755528662.git.agordeev@linux.ibm.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/[email protected]/ [1] Fixes: 3c5c3cf ("kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow memory") Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]> Cc: Daniel Axtens <[email protected]> Cc: Marc Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Ryan Roberts <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

During our internal testing, we started observing intermittent boot failures when the machine uses 4-level paging and has a large amount of persistent memory: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffe70000000034 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI RIP: 0010:__init_single_page+0x9/0x6d Call Trace: <TASK> __init_zone_device_page+0x17/0x5d memmap_init_zone_device+0x154/0x1bb pagemap_range+0x2e0/0x40f memremap_pages+0x10b/0x2f0 devm_memremap_pages+0x1e/0x60 dev_dax_probe+0xce/0x2ec [device_dax] dax_bus_probe+0x6d/0xc9 [... snip ...] </TASK> It turns out that the kernel panics while initializing vmemmap (struct page array) when the vmemmap region spans two PGD entries, because the new PGD entry is only installed in init_mm.pgd, but not in the page tables of other tasks. And looking at __populate_section_memmap(): if (vmemmap_can_optimize(altmap, pgmap)) // does not sync top level page tables r = vmemmap_populate_compound_pages(pfn, start, end, nid, pgmap); else // sync top level page tables in x86 r = vmemmap_populate(start, end, nid, altmap); In the normal path, vmemmap_populate() in arch/x86/mm/init_64.c synchronizes the top level page table (See commit 9b86152 ("x86-64, mem: Update all PGDs for direct mapping and vmemmap mapping changes")) so that all tasks in the system can see the new vmemmap area. However, when vmemmap_can_optimize() returns true, the optimized path skips synchronization of top-level page tables. This is because vmemmap_populate_compound_pages() is implemented in core MM code, which does not handle synchronization of the top-level page tables. Instead, the core MM has historically relied on each architecture to perform this synchronization manually. We're not the first party to encounter a crash caused by not-sync'd top level page tables: earlier this year, Gwan-gyeong Mun attempted to address the issue [1] [2] after hitting a kernel panic when x86 code accessed the vmemmap area before the corresponding top-level entries were synced. At that time, the issue was believed to be triggered only when struct page was enlarged for debugging purposes, and the patch did not get further updates. It turns out that current approach of relying on each arch to handle the page table sync manually is fragile because 1) it's easy to forget to sync the top level page table, and 2) it's also easy to overlook that the kernel should not access the vmemmap and direct mapping areas before the sync. # The solution: Make page table sync more code robust and harder to miss To address this, Dave Hansen suggested [3] [4] introducing {pgd,p4d}_populate_kernel() for updating kernel portion of the page tables and allow each architecture to explicitly perform synchronization when installing top-level entries. With this approach, we no longer need to worry about missing the sync step, reducing the risk of future regressions. The new interface reuses existing ARCH_PAGE_TABLE_SYNC_MASK, PGTBL_P*D_MODIFIED and arch_sync_kernel_mappings() facility used by vmalloc and ioremap to synchronize page tables. pgd_populate_kernel() looks like this: static inline void pgd_populate_kernel(unsigned long addr, pgd_t *pgd, p4d_t *p4d) { pgd_populate(&init_mm, pgd, p4d); if (ARCH_PAGE_TABLE_SYNC_MASK & PGTBL_PGD_MODIFIED) arch_sync_kernel_mappings(addr, addr); } It is worth noting that vmalloc() and apply_to_range() carefully synchronizes page tables by calling p*d_alloc_track() and arch_sync_kernel_mappings(), and thus they are not affected by this patch series. This series was hugely inspired by Dave Hansen's suggestion and hence added Suggested-by: Dave Hansen. Cc stable because lack of this series opens the door to intermittent boot failures. This patch (of 3): Move ARCH_PAGE_TABLE_SYNC_MASK and arch_sync_kernel_mappings() to linux/pgtable.h so that they can be used outside of vmalloc and ioremap. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/[email protected] [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/[email protected] [2] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/[email protected] [3] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/[email protected] [4] Fixes: 8d40091 ("x86/vmemmap: handle unpopulated sub-pmd ranges") Signed-off-by: Harry Yoo <[email protected]> Acked-by: Kiryl Shutsemau <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: "Uladzislau Rezki (Sony)" <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <[email protected]> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Alistair Popple <[email protected]> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <[email protected]> Cc: Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]> Cc: bibo mao <[email protected]> Cc: Borislav Betkov <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter (Ampere) <[email protected]> Cc: Dennis Zhou <[email protected]> Cc: Dev Jain <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Gwan-gyeong Mun <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Jane Chu <[email protected]> Cc: Joao Martins <[email protected]> Cc: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]> Cc: John Hubbard <[email protected]> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <[email protected]> Cc: Liam Howlett <[email protected]> Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Xu <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Qi Zheng <[email protected]> Cc: Ryan Roberts <[email protected]> Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <[email protected]> Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleinxer <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Huth <[email protected]> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

…ings() Define ARCH_PAGE_TABLE_SYNC_MASK and arch_sync_kernel_mappings() to ensure page tables are properly synchronized when calling p*d_populate_kernel(). For 5-level paging, synchronization is performed via pgd_populate_kernel(). In 4-level paging, pgd_populate() is a no-op, so synchronization is instead performed at the P4D level via p4d_populate_kernel(). This fixes intermittent boot failures on systems using 4-level paging and a large amount of persistent memory: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffe70000000034 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI RIP: 0010:__init_single_page+0x9/0x6d Call Trace: <TASK> __init_zone_device_page+0x17/0x5d memmap_init_zone_device+0x154/0x1bb pagemap_range+0x2e0/0x40f memremap_pages+0x10b/0x2f0 devm_memremap_pages+0x1e/0x60 dev_dax_probe+0xce/0x2ec [device_dax] dax_bus_probe+0x6d/0xc9 [... snip ...] </TASK> It also fixes a crash in vmemmap_set_pmd() caused by accessing vmemmap before sync_global_pgds() [1]: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffeb3ff1200000 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI Tainted: [W]=WARN RIP: 0010:vmemmap_set_pmd+0xff/0x230 <TASK> vmemmap_populate_hugepages+0x176/0x180 vmemmap_populate+0x34/0x80 __populate_section_memmap+0x41/0x90 sparse_add_section+0x121/0x3e0 __add_pages+0xba/0x150 add_pages+0x1d/0x70 memremap_pages+0x3dc/0x810 devm_memremap_pages+0x1c/0x60 xe_devm_add+0x8b/0x100 [xe] xe_tile_init_noalloc+0x6a/0x70 [xe] xe_device_probe+0x48c/0x740 [xe] [... snip ...] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 8d40091 ("x86/vmemmap: handle unpopulated sub-pmd ranges") Signed-off-by: Harry Yoo <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/[email protected] [1] Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Acked-by: Kiryl Shutsemau <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <[email protected]> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Alistair Popple <[email protected]> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <[email protected]> Cc: Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]> Cc: bibo mao <[email protected]> Cc: Borislav Betkov <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter (Ampere) <[email protected]> Cc: Dennis Zhou <[email protected]> Cc: Dev Jain <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Jane Chu <[email protected]> Cc: Joao Martins <[email protected]> Cc: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]> Cc: John Hubbard <[email protected]> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <[email protected]> Cc: Liam Howlett <[email protected]> Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Xu <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Qi Zheng <[email protected]> Cc: Ryan Roberts <[email protected]> Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <[email protected]> Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleinxer <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Huth <[email protected]> Cc: "Uladzislau Rezki (Sony)" <[email protected]> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

sched_numa_find_nth_cpu() uses a bsearch to look for the 'closest' CPU in sched_domains_numa_masks and given cpus mask. However they might not intersect if all CPUs in the cpus mask are offline. bsearch will return NULL in that case, bail out instead of dereferencing a bogus pointer. The previous behaviour lead to this bug when using maxcpus=4 on an rk3399 (LLLLbb) (i.e. booting with all big CPUs offline): [ 1.422922] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffff8000000000 [ 1.423635] Mem abort info: [ 1.423889] ESR = 0x0000000096000006 [ 1.424227] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 1.424715] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 1.424995] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 1.425279] FSC = 0x06: level 2 translation fault [ 1.425735] Data abort info: [ 1.425998] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 1.426499] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 1.426952] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 1.427428] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000004a9f000 [ 1.428038] [ffffff8000000000] pgd=18000000f7fff403, p4d=18000000f7fff403, pud=18000000f7fff403, pmd=0000000000000000 [ 1.429014] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000006 [#1] SMP [ 1.429525] Modules linked in: [ 1.429813] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc4-dirty torvalds#343 PREEMPT [ 1.430559] Hardware name: Pine64 RockPro64 v2.1 (DT) [ 1.431012] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 1.431634] pc : sched_numa_find_nth_cpu+0x2a0/0x488 [ 1.432094] lr : sched_numa_find_nth_cpu+0x284/0x488 [ 1.432543] sp : ffffffc084e1b960 [ 1.432843] x29: ffffffc084e1b960 x28: ffffff80078a8800 x27: ffffffc0846eb1d0 [ 1.433495] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000 [ 1.434144] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: fffffffffff7f093 x21: ffffffc081de6378 [ 1.434792] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: 0000000ffff7f093 x18: 00000000ffffffff [ 1.435441] x17: 3030303866666666 x16: 66663d736b73616d x15: ffffffc104e1b5b7 [ 1.436091] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffffffc084712860 x12: 0000000000000372 [ 1.436739] x11: 0000000000000126 x10: ffffffc08476a860 x9 : ffffffc084712860 [ 1.437389] x8 : 00000000ffffefff x7 : ffffffc08476a860 x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 1.438036] x5 : 000000000000bff4 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 1.438683] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffffffc0846eb000 x0 : ffffff8000407b68 [ 1.439332] Call trace: [ 1.439559] sched_numa_find_nth_cpu+0x2a0/0x488 (P) [ 1.440016] smp_call_function_any+0xc8/0xd0 [ 1.440416] armv8_pmu_init+0x58/0x27c [ 1.440770] armv8_cortex_a72_pmu_init+0x20/0x2c [ 1.441199] arm_pmu_device_probe+0x1e4/0x5e8 [ 1.441603] armv8_pmu_device_probe+0x1c/0x28 [ 1.442007] platform_probe+0x5c/0xac [ 1.442347] really_probe+0xbc/0x298 [ 1.442683] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x12c [ 1.443087] driver_probe_device+0xdc/0x160 [ 1.443475] __driver_attach+0x94/0x19c [ 1.443833] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xd4 [ 1.444190] driver_attach+0x24/0x30 [ 1.444525] bus_add_driver+0xe4/0x208 [ 1.444874] driver_register+0x60/0x128 [ 1.445233] __platform_driver_register+0x24/0x30 [ 1.445662] armv8_pmu_driver_init+0x28/0x4c [ 1.446059] do_one_initcall+0x44/0x25c [ 1.446416] kernel_init_freeable+0x1dc/0x3bc [ 1.446820] kernel_init+0x20/0x1d8 [ 1.447151] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 1.447493] Code: 90022e21 f000e5f5 910de2b5 2a1703e2 (f8767803) [ 1.448040] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 1.448483] note: swapper/0[1] exited with preempt_count 1 [ 1.449047] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b [ 1.449741] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs [ 1.450105] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 1.450419] CPU features: 0x000000,00080000,20002001,0400421b [ 1.450935] Memory Limit: none [ 1.451217] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b ]--- Yury: with the fix, the function returns cpu == nr_cpu_ids, and later in smp_call_function_any -> smp_call_function_single -> generic_exec_single we test the cpu for '>= nr_cpu_ids' and return -ENXIO. So everything is handled correctly. Fixes: cd7f553 ("sched: add sched_numa_find_nth_cpu()") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Christian Loehle <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yury Norov (NVIDIA) <[email protected]>

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000002ec PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 28 UID: 0 PID: 343 Comm: kworker/28:1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.17.0-rc2+ #9 NONE Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: smc_hs_wq smc_listen_work [smc] RIP: 0010:smc_ib_is_sg_need_sync+0x9e/0xd0 [smc] ... Call Trace: <TASK> smcr_buf_map_link+0x211/0x2a0 [smc] __smc_buf_create+0x522/0x970 [smc] smc_buf_create+0x3a/0x110 [smc] smc_find_rdma_v2_device_serv+0x18f/0x240 [smc] ? smc_vlan_by_tcpsk+0x7e/0xe0 [smc] smc_listen_find_device+0x1dd/0x2b0 [smc] smc_listen_work+0x30f/0x580 [smc] process_one_work+0x18c/0x340 worker_thread+0x242/0x360 kthread+0xe7/0x220 ret_from_fork+0x13a/0x160 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> If the software RoCE device is used, ibdev->dma_device is a null pointer. As a result, the problem occurs. Null pointer detection is added to prevent problems. Fixes: 0ef69e7 ("net/smc: optimize for smc_sndbuf_sync_sg_for_device and smc_rmb_sync_sg_for_cpu") Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Guangguan Wang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: D. Wythe <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>

VXLAN FDB entries can point to either a remote destination or an FDB nexthop group. The latter is usually used in EVPN deployments where learning is disabled. However, when learning is enabled, an incoming packet might try to refresh an FDB entry that points to an FDB nexthop group and therefore does not have a remote. Such packets should be dropped, but they are only dropped after dereferencing the non-existent remote, resulting in a NPD [1] which can be reproduced using [2]. Fix by dropping such packets earlier. Remove the misleading comment from first_remote_rcu(). [1] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [...] CPU: 13 UID: 0 PID: 361 Comm: mausezahn Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1-virtme-g9f6b606b6b37 #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-4.fc41 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:vxlan_snoop+0x98/0x1e0 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> vxlan_encap_bypass+0x209/0x240 encap_bypass_if_local+0xb1/0x100 vxlan_xmit_one+0x1375/0x17e0 vxlan_xmit+0x6b4/0x15f0 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x5d/0x1c0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x246/0xfd0 packet_sendmsg+0x113a/0x1850 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x70 __sys_sendto+0x126/0x180 __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30 do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 [2] #!/bin/bash ip address add 192.0.2.1/32 dev lo ip address add 192.0.2.2/32 dev lo ip nexthop add id 1 via 192.0.2.3 fdb ip nexthop add id 10 group 1 fdb ip link add name vx0 up type vxlan id 10010 local 192.0.2.1 dstport 12345 localbypass ip link add name vx1 up type vxlan id 10020 local 192.0.2.2 dstport 54321 learning bridge fdb add 00:11:22:33:44:55 dev vx0 self static dst 192.0.2.2 port 54321 vni 10020 bridge fdb add 00:aa:bb:cc:dd:ee dev vx1 self static nhid 10 mausezahn vx0 -a 00:aa:bb:cc:dd:ee -b 00:11:22:33:44:55 -c 1 -q Fixes: 1274e1c ("vxlan: ecmp support for mac fdb entries") Reported-by: Marlin Cremers <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

Ido Schimmel says: ==================== vxlan: Fix NPDs when using nexthop objects With FDB nexthop groups, VXLAN FDB entries do not necessarily point to a remote destination but rather to an FDB nexthop group. This means that first_remote_{rcu,rtnl}() can return NULL and a few places in the driver were not ready for that, resulting in NULL pointer dereferences. Patches #1-#2 fix these NPDs. Note that vxlan_fdb_find_uc() still dereferences the remote returned by first_remote_rcu() without checking that it is not NULL, but this function is only invoked by a single driver which vetoes the creation of FDB nexthop groups. I will patch this in net-next to make the code less fragile. Patch #3 adds a selftests which exercises these code paths and tests basic Tx functionality with FDB nexthop groups. I verified that the test crashes the kernel without the first two patches. ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

When transmitting a PTP frame which is timestamp using 2 step, the following warning appears if CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING is enabled: ============================= [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] 6.17.0-rc1-00326-ge6160462704e torvalds#427 Not tainted ----------------------------- ptp4l/119 is trying to lock: c2a44ed4 (&vsc8531->ts_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: vsc85xx_txtstamp+0x50/0xac other info that might help us debug this: context-{4:4} 4 locks held by ptp4l/119: #0: c145f068 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x58/0x1440 #1: c29df974 (dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock){+...}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x5c4/0x1440 #2: c2aaaad0 (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sch_direct_xmit+0x108/0x350 #3: c2aac170 (&lan966x->tx_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: lan966x_port_xmit+0xd0/0x350 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 119 Comm: ptp4l Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1-00326-ge6160462704e torvalds#427 NONE Hardware name: Generic DT based system Call trace: unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x10/0x14 show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x7c/0xac dump_stack_lvl from __lock_acquire+0x8e8/0x29dc __lock_acquire from lock_acquire+0x108/0x38c lock_acquire from __mutex_lock+0xb0/0xe78 __mutex_lock from mutex_lock_nested+0x1c/0x24 mutex_lock_nested from vsc85xx_txtstamp+0x50/0xac vsc85xx_txtstamp from lan966x_fdma_xmit+0xd8/0x3a8 lan966x_fdma_xmit from lan966x_port_xmit+0x1bc/0x350 lan966x_port_xmit from dev_hard_start_xmit+0xc8/0x2c0 dev_hard_start_xmit from sch_direct_xmit+0x8c/0x350 sch_direct_xmit from __dev_queue_xmit+0x680/0x1440 __dev_queue_xmit from packet_sendmsg+0xfa4/0x1568 packet_sendmsg from __sys_sendto+0x110/0x19c __sys_sendto from sys_send+0x18/0x20 sys_send from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c Exception stack(0xf0b05fa8 to 0xf0b05ff0) 5fa0: 00000001 0000000 0000000 0004b47a 0000003a 00000000 5fc0: 00000001 0000000 00000000 00000121 0004af58 00044874 00000000 00000000 5fe0: 00000001 bee9d420 00025a10 b6e75c7c So, instead of using the ts_lock for tx_queue, use the spinlock that skb_buff_head has. Reviewed-by: Vadim Fedorenko <[email protected]> Fixes: 7d272e6 ("net: phy: mscc: timestamping and PHC support") Signed-off-by: Horatiu Vultur <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

The commit ced17ee ("Revert "virtio: reject shm region if length is zero"") exposes the following DAX page fault bug (this fix the failure that getting shm region alway returns false because of zero length): The commit 21aa65b ("mm: remove callers of pfn_t functionality") handles the DAX physical page address incorrectly: the removed macro 'phys_to_pfn_t()' should be replaced with 'PHYS_PFN()'. [ 1.390321] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffd3fb40000008 [ 1.390875] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 1.391257] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 1.391509] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 1.391626] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 1.391806] CPU: 6 UID: 1000 PID: 162 Comm: weston Not tainted 6.17.0-rc3-WSL2-STABLE #2 PREEMPT(none) [ 1.392361] RIP: 0010:dax_to_folio+0x14/0x60 [ 1.392653] Code: 52 c9 c3 00 66 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 c1 ef 05 48 c1 e7 06 48 03 3d 34 b5 31 01 <48> 8b 57 08 48 89 f8 f6 c2 01 75 2b 66 90 c3 cc cc cc cc f7 c7 ff [ 1.393727] RSP: 0000:ffffaf7d04407aa8 EFLAGS: 00010086 [ 1.394003] RAX: 000000a000000000 RBX: ffffaf7d04407bb0 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 1.394524] RDX: ffffd17b40000008 RSI: 0000000000000083 RDI: ffffd3fb40000000 [ 1.394967] RBP: 0000000000000011 R08: 000000a000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 1.395400] R10: 0000000000001000 R11: ffffaf7d04407c10 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 1.395806] R13: ffffa020557be9c0 R14: 0000014000000001 R15: 0000725970e94000 [ 1.396268] FS: 000072596d6d2ec0(0000) GS:ffffa0222dc59000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1.396715] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1.397100] CR2: ffffd3fb40000008 CR3: 000000011579c005 CR4: 0000000000372ef0 [ 1.397518] Call Trace: [ 1.397663] <TASK> [ 1.397900] dax_insert_entry+0x13b/0x390 [ 1.398179] dax_fault_iter+0x2a5/0x6c0 [ 1.398443] dax_iomap_pte_fault+0x193/0x3c0 [ 1.398750] __fuse_dax_fault+0x8b/0x270 [ 1.398997] ? vm_mmap_pgoff+0x161/0x210 [ 1.399175] __do_fault+0x30/0x180 [ 1.399360] do_fault+0xc4/0x550 [ 1.399547] __handle_mm_fault+0x8e3/0xf50 [ 1.399731] ? do_syscall_64+0x72/0x1e0 [ 1.399958] handle_mm_fault+0x192/0x2f0 [ 1.400204] do_user_addr_fault+0x20e/0x700 [ 1.400418] exc_page_fault+0x66/0x150 [ 1.400602] asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 [ 1.400831] RIP: 0033:0x72596d1bf703 [ 1.401076] Code: 31 f6 45 31 e4 48 8d 15 b3 73 00 00 e8 06 03 00 00 8b 83 68 01 00 00 e9 8e fa ff ff 0f 1f 00 48 8b 44 24 08 4c 89 ee 48 89 df <c7> 00 21 43 34 12 e8 72 09 00 00 e9 6a fa ff ff 0f 1f 44 00 00 e8 [ 1.402172] RSP: 002b:00007ffc350f6dc0 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 1.402488] RAX: 0000725970e94000 RBX: 00005b7c642c2560 RCX: 0000725970d359a7 [ 1.402898] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 00007ffc350f6dc0 RDI: 00005b7c642c2560 [ 1.403284] RBP: 00007ffc350f6e90 R08: 000000000000000d R09: 0000000000000000 [ 1.403634] R10: 00007ffc350f6dd8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 1.404078] R13: 00007ffc350f6dc0 R14: 0000725970e29ce0 R15: 0000000000000003 [ 1.404450] </TASK> [ 1.404570] Modules linked in: [ 1.404821] CR2: ffffd3fb40000008 [ 1.405029] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 1.405323] RIP: 0010:dax_to_folio+0x14/0x60 [ 1.405556] Code: 52 c9 c3 00 66 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 c1 ef 05 48 c1 e7 06 48 03 3d 34 b5 31 01 <48> 8b 57 08 48 89 f8 f6 c2 01 75 2b 66 90 c3 cc cc cc cc f7 c7 ff [ 1.406639] RSP: 0000:ffffaf7d04407aa8 EFLAGS: 00010086 [ 1.406910] RAX: 000000a000000000 RBX: ffffaf7d04407bb0 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 1.407379] RDX: ffffd17b40000008 RSI: 0000000000000083 RDI: ffffd3fb40000000 [ 1.407800] RBP: 0000000000000011 R08: 000000a000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 1.408246] R10: 0000000000001000 R11: ffffaf7d04407c10 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 1.408666] R13: ffffa020557be9c0 R14: 0000014000000001 R15: 0000725970e94000 [ 1.409170] FS: 000072596d6d2ec0(0000) GS:ffffa0222dc59000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1.409608] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1.409977] CR2: ffffd3fb40000008 CR3: 000000011579c005 CR4: 0000000000372ef0 [ 1.410437] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 1.410857] Kernel Offset: 0xc000000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) Fixes: 21aa65b ("mm: remove callers of pfn_t functionality") Signed-off-by: Haiyue Wang <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/[email protected] Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>

A crash was observed with the following output: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 92 Comm: osnoise_cpus Not tainted 6.17.0-rc4-00201-gd69eb204c255 torvalds#138 PREEMPT(voluntary) RIP: 0010:bitmap_parselist+0x53/0x3e0 Call Trace: <TASK> osnoise_cpus_write+0x7a/0x190 vfs_write+0xf8/0x410 ? do_sys_openat2+0x88/0xd0 ksys_write+0x60/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> This issue can be reproduced by below code: fd=open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/osnoise/cpus", O_WRONLY); write(fd, "0-2", 0); When user pass 'count=0' to osnoise_cpus_write(), kmalloc() will return ZERO_SIZE_PTR (16) and cpulist_parse() treat it as a normal value, which trigger the null pointer dereference. Add check for the parameter 'count'. Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/[email protected] Fixes: 17f8910 ("tracing/osnoise: Allow arbitrarily long CPU string") Signed-off-by: Wang Liang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>

Steven Rostedt reported a crash with "ftrace=function" kernel command line: [ 0.159269] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000001c [ 0.160254] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 0.160975] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 0.161697] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 0.162055] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 0.162619] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2-test-00006-g48d06e78b7cb-dirty #9 PREEMPT(undef) [ 0.164141] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 0.165439] RIP: 0010:kmem_cache_alloc_noprof (mm/slub.c:4237) [ 0.166186] Code: 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 49 89 fc 53 48 83 e4 f0 48 83 ec 20 8b 05 c9 b6 7e 01 <44> 8b 77 1c 65 4c 8b 2d b5 ea 20 02 4c 89 6c 24 18 41 89 f5 21 f0 [ 0.168811] RSP: 0000:ffffffffb2e03b30 EFLAGS: 00010086 [ 0.169545] RAX: 0000000001fff33f RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 0.170544] RDX: 0000000000002800 RSI: 0000000000002800 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 0.171554] RBP: ffffffffb2e03b80 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: ffffffffb2e03c90 [ 0.172549] R10: ffffffffb2e03c90 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 0.173544] R13: ffffffffb2e03c90 R14: ffffffffb2e03c90 R15: 0000000000000001 [ 0.174542] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9d2808114000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 0.175684] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 0.176486] CR2: 000000000000001c CR3: 000000007264c001 CR4: 00000000000200b0 [ 0.177483] Call Trace: [ 0.177828] <TASK> [ 0.178123] mas_alloc_nodes (lib/maple_tree.c:176 (discriminator 2) lib/maple_tree.c:1255 (discriminator 2)) [ 0.178692] mas_store_gfp (lib/maple_tree.c:5468) [ 0.179223] execmem_cache_add_locked (mm/execmem.c:207) [ 0.179870] execmem_alloc (mm/execmem.c:213 mm/execmem.c:313 mm/execmem.c:335 mm/execmem.c:475) [ 0.180397] ? ftrace_caller (arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S:169) [ 0.180922] ? __pfx_ftrace_caller (arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S:158) [ 0.181517] execmem_alloc_rw (mm/execmem.c:487) [ 0.182052] arch_ftrace_update_trampoline (arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c:266 arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c:344 arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c:474) [ 0.182778] ? ftrace_caller_op_ptr (arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S:182) [ 0.183388] ftrace_update_trampoline (kernel/trace/ftrace.c:7947) [ 0.184024] __register_ftrace_function (kernel/trace/ftrace.c:368) [ 0.184682] ftrace_startup (kernel/trace/ftrace.c:3048) [ 0.185205] ? __pfx_function_trace_call (kernel/trace/trace_functions.c:210) [ 0.185877] register_ftrace_function_nolock (kernel/trace/ftrace.c:8717) [ 0.186595] register_ftrace_function (kernel/trace/ftrace.c:8745) [ 0.187254] ? __pfx_function_trace_call (kernel/trace/trace_functions.c:210) [ 0.187924] function_trace_init (kernel/trace/trace_functions.c:170) [ 0.188499] tracing_set_tracer (kernel/trace/trace.c:5916 kernel/trace/trace.c:6349) [ 0.189088] register_tracer (kernel/trace/trace.c:2391) [ 0.189642] early_trace_init (kernel/trace/trace.c:11075 kernel/trace/trace.c:11149) [ 0.190204] start_kernel (init/main.c:970) [ 0.190732] x86_64_start_reservations (arch/x86/kernel/head64.c:307) [ 0.191381] x86_64_start_kernel (??:?) [ 0.191955] common_startup_64 (arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:419) [ 0.192534] </TASK> [ 0.192839] Modules linked in: [ 0.193267] CR2: 000000000000001c [ 0.193730] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- The crash happens because on x86 ftrace allocations from execmem require maple tree to be initialized. Move maple tree initialization that depends only on slab availability earlier in boot so that it will happen right after mm_core_init(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 5d79c2b ("x86/ftrace: enable EXECMEM_ROX_CACHE for ftrace allocations") Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <[email protected]> Reported-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Tested-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <[email protected]> Cc: Borislav Betkov <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleinxer <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

…on memory When I did memory failure tests, below panic occurs: page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PagePoisoned(page)) kernel BUG at include/linux/page-flags.h:616! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 3 PID: 720 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.10.0-rc1-00195-g148743902568 torvalds#40 RIP: 0010:unpoison_memory+0x2f3/0x590 RSP: 0018:ffffa57fc8787d60 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 0000000000000037 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff9be25fcdc9c8 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff9be25fcdc9c0 RBP: 0000000000300000 R08: ffffffffb4956f88 R09: 0000000000009ffb R10: 0000000000000284 R11: ffffffffb4926fa0 R12: ffffe6b00c000000 R13: ffff9bdb453dfd00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: fffffffffffffffe FS: 00007f08f04e4740(0000) GS:ffff9be25fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000564787a30410 CR3: 000000010d4e2000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> unpoison_memory+0x2f3/0x590 simple_attr_write_xsigned.constprop.0.isra.0+0xb3/0x110 debugfs_attr_write+0x42/0x60 full_proxy_write+0x5b/0x80 vfs_write+0xd5/0x540 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0xb9/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f08f0314887 RSP: 002b:00007ffece710078 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: 00007f08f0314887 RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 0000564787a30410 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000564787a30410 R08: 000000000000fefe R09: 000000007fffffff R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000009 R13: 00007f08f041b780 R14: 00007f08f0417600 R15: 00007f08f0416a00 </TASK> Modules linked in: hwpoison_inject ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:unpoison_memory+0x2f3/0x590 RSP: 0018:ffffa57fc8787d60 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 0000000000000037 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff9be25fcdc9c8 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff9be25fcdc9c0 RBP: 0000000000300000 R08: ffffffffb4956f88 R09: 0000000000009ffb R10: 0000000000000284 R11: ffffffffb4926fa0 R12: ffffe6b00c000000 R13: ffff9bdb453dfd00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: fffffffffffffffe FS: 00007f08f04e4740(0000) GS:ffff9be25fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000564787a30410 CR3: 000000010d4e2000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Kernel Offset: 0x31c00000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]--- The root cause is that unpoison_memory() tries to check the PG_HWPoison flags of an uninitialized page. So VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PagePoisoned(page)) is triggered. This can be reproduced by below steps: 1.Offline memory block: echo offline > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory12/state 2.Get offlined memory pfn: page-types -b n -rlN 3.Write pfn to unpoison-pfn echo <pfn> > /sys/kernel/debug/hwpoison/unpoison-pfn This scenario can be identified by pfn_to_online_page() returning NULL. And ZONE_DEVICE pages are never expected, so we can simply fail if pfn_to_online_page() == NULL to fix the bug. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: f1dd2cd ("mm, memory_hotplug: do not associate hotadded memory to zones until online") Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]> Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

Avoid below overlapping mappings by using a contiguous non-cacheable buffer. [ 4.077708] DMA-API: stm32_fmc2_nfc 48810000.nand-controller: cacheline tracking EEXIST, overlapping mappings aren't supported [ 4.089103] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 44 at kernel/dma/debug.c:568 add_dma_entry+0x23c/0x300 [ 4.097071] Modules linked in: [ 4.100101] CPU: 1 PID: 44 Comm: kworker/u4:2 Not tainted 6.1.82 #1 [ 4.106346] Hardware name: STMicroelectronics STM32MP257F VALID1 SNOR / MB1704 (LPDDR4 Power discrete) + MB1703 + MB1708 (SNOR MB1730) (DT) [ 4.118824] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func [ 4.124674] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 4.131624] pc : add_dma_entry+0x23c/0x300 [ 4.135658] lr : add_dma_entry+0x23c/0x300 [ 4.139792] sp : ffff800009dbb490 [ 4.143016] x29: ffff800009dbb4a0 x28: 0000000004008022 x27: ffff8000098a6000 [ 4.150174] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff8000099e7000 x24: ffff8000099e7de8 [ 4.157231] x23: 00000000ffffffff x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff8000098a6a20 [ 4.164388] x20: ffff000080964180 x19: ffff800009819ba0 x18: 0000000000000006 [ 4.171545] x17: 6361727420656e69 x16: 6c6568636163203a x15: 72656c6c6f72746e [ 4.178602] x14: 6f632d646e616e2e x13: ffff800009832f58 x12: 00000000000004ec [ 4.185759] x11: 00000000000001a4 x10: ffff80000988af58 x9 : ffff800009832f58 [ 4.192916] x8 : 00000000ffffefff x7 : ffff80000988af58 x6 : 80000000fffff000 [ 4.199972] x5 : 000000000000bff4 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 4.207128] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff0000812d2c40 [ 4.214185] Call trace: [ 4.216605] add_dma_entry+0x23c/0x300 [ 4.220338] debug_dma_map_sg+0x198/0x350 [ 4.224373] __dma_map_sg_attrs+0xa0/0x110 [ 4.228411] dma_map_sg_attrs+0x10/0x2c [ 4.232247] stm32_fmc2_nfc_xfer.isra.0+0x1c8/0x3fc [ 4.237088] stm32_fmc2_nfc_seq_read_page+0xc8/0x174 [ 4.242127] nand_read_oob+0x1d4/0x8e0 [ 4.245861] mtd_read_oob_std+0x58/0x84 [ 4.249596] mtd_read_oob+0x90/0x150 [ 4.253231] mtd_read+0x68/0xac Signed-off-by: Christophe Kerello <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Fixes: 2cd457f ("mtd: rawnand: stm32_fmc2: add STM32 FMC2 NAND flash controller driver") Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <[email protected]>

Problem description =================== Lockdep reports a possible circular locking dependency (AB/BA) between &pl->state_mutex and &phy->lock, as follows. phylink_resolve() // acquires &pl->state_mutex -> phylink_major_config() -> phy_config_inband() // acquires &pl->phydev->lock whereas all the other call sites where &pl->state_mutex and &pl->phydev->lock have the locking scheme reversed. Everywhere else, &pl->phydev->lock is acquired at the top level, and &pl->state_mutex at the lower level. A clear example is phylink_bringup_phy(). The outlier is the newly introduced phy_config_inband() and the existing lock order is the correct one. To understand why it cannot be the other way around, it is sufficient to consider phylink_phy_change(), phylink's callback from the PHY device's phy->phy_link_change() virtual method, invoked by the PHY state machine. phy_link_up() and phy_link_down(), the (indirect) callers of phylink_phy_change(), are called with &phydev->lock acquired. Then phylink_phy_change() acquires its own &pl->state_mutex, to serialize changes made to its pl->phy_state and pl->link_config. So all other instances of &pl->state_mutex and &phydev->lock must be consistent with this order. Problem impact ============== I think the kernel runs a serious deadlock risk if an existing phylink_resolve() thread, which results in a phy_config_inband() call, is concurrent with a phy_link_up() or phy_link_down() call, which will deadlock on &pl->state_mutex in phylink_phy_change(). Practically speaking, the impact may be limited by the slow speed of the medium auto-negotiation protocol, which makes it unlikely for the current state to still be unresolved when a new one is detected, but I think the problem is there. Nonetheless, the problem was discovered using lockdep. Proposed solution ================= Practically speaking, the phy_config_inband() requirement of having phydev->lock acquired must transfer to the caller (phylink is the only caller). There, it must bubble up until immediately before &pl->state_mutex is acquired, for the cases where that takes place. Solution details, considerations, notes ======================================= This is the phy_config_inband() call graph: sfp_upstream_ops :: connect_phy() | v phylink_sfp_connect_phy() | v phylink_sfp_config_phy() | | sfp_upstream_ops :: module_insert() | | | v | phylink_sfp_module_insert() | | | | sfp_upstream_ops :: module_start() | | | | | v | | phylink_sfp_module_start() | | | | v v | phylink_sfp_config_optical() phylink_start() | | | phylink_resume() v v | | phylink_sfp_set_config() | | | v v v phylink_mac_initial_config() | phylink_resolve() | | phylink_ethtool_ksettings_set() v v v phylink_major_config() | v phy_config_inband() phylink_major_config() caller #1, phylink_mac_initial_config(), does not acquire &pl->state_mutex nor do its callers. It must acquire &pl->phydev->lock prior to calling phylink_major_config(). phylink_major_config() caller #2, phylink_resolve() acquires &pl->state_mutex, thus also needs to acquire &pl->phydev->lock. phylink_major_config() caller #3, phylink_ethtool_ksettings_set(), is completely uninteresting, because it only calls phylink_major_config() if pl->phydev is NULL (otherwise it calls phy_ethtool_ksettings_set()). We need to change nothing there. Other solutions =============== The lock inversion between &pl->state_mutex and &pl->phydev->lock has occurred at least once before, as seen in commit c718af2 ("net: phylink: fix ethtool -A with attached PHYs"). The solution there was to simply not call phy_set_asym_pause() under the &pl->state_mutex. That cannot be extended to our case though, where the phy_config_inband() call is much deeper inside the &pl->state_mutex section. Fixes: 5fd0f1a ("net: phylink: add negotiation of in-band capabilities") Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

If request_irq() in i40e_vsi_request_irq_msix() fails in an iteration later than the first, the error path wants to free the IRQs requested so far. However, it uses the wrong dev_id argument for free_irq(), so it does not free the IRQs correctly and instead triggers the warning: Trying to free already-free IRQ 173 WARNING: CPU: 25 PID: 1091 at kernel/irq/manage.c:1829 __free_irq+0x192/0x2c0 Modules linked in: i40e(+) [...] CPU: 25 UID: 0 PID: 1091 Comm: NetworkManager Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1+ #1 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: [...] RIP: 0010:__free_irq+0x192/0x2c0 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> free_irq+0x32/0x70 i40e_vsi_request_irq_msix.cold+0x63/0x8b [i40e] i40e_vsi_request_irq+0x79/0x80 [i40e] i40e_vsi_open+0x21f/0x2f0 [i40e] i40e_open+0x63/0x130 [i40e] __dev_open+0xfc/0x210 __dev_change_flags+0x1fc/0x240 netif_change_flags+0x27/0x70 do_setlink.isra.0+0x341/0xc70 rtnl_newlink+0x468/0x860 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x375/0x450 netlink_rcv_skb+0x5c/0x110 netlink_unicast+0x288/0x3c0 netlink_sendmsg+0x20d/0x430 ____sys_sendmsg+0x3a2/0x3d0 ___sys_sendmsg+0x99/0xe0 __sys_sendmsg+0x8a/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x2c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [...] </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Use the same dev_id for free_irq() as for request_irq(). I tested this with inserting code to fail intentionally. Fixes: 493fb30 ("i40e: Move q_vectors from pointer to array to array of pointers") Signed-off-by: Michal Schmidt <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Subbaraya Sundeep <[email protected]> Tested-by: Rinitha S <[email protected]> (A Contingent worker at Intel) Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>

Hangbin Liu says: ==================== hsr: fix lock warnings hsr_for_each_port is called in many places without holding the RCU read lock, this may trigger warnings on debug kernels like: [ 40.457015] [ T201] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [ 40.457020] [ T201] 6.17.0-rc2-virtme #1 Not tainted [ 40.457025] [ T201] ----------------------------- [ 40.457029] [ T201] net/hsr/hsr_main.c:137 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! [ 40.457036] [ T201] other info that might help us debug this: [ 40.457040] [ T201] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [ 40.457045] [ T201] 2 locks held by ip/201: [ 40.457050] [ T201] #0: ffffffff93040a40 (&ops->srcu){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: rtnl_link_ops_get+0xf2/0x280 [ 40.457080] [ T201] #1: ffffffff92e7f968 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_newlink+0x5e1/0xb20 [ 40.457102] [ T201] stack backtrace: [ 40.457108] [ T201] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 201 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2-virtme #1 PREEMPT(full) [ 40.457114] [ T201] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 [ 40.457117] [ T201] Call Trace: [ 40.457120] [ T201] <TASK> [ 40.457126] [ T201] dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xb0 [ 40.457136] [ T201] lockdep_rcu_suspicious.cold+0x4f/0xb1 [ 40.457148] [ T201] hsr_port_get_hsr+0xfe/0x140 [ 40.457158] [ T201] hsr_add_port+0x192/0x940 [ 40.457167] [ T201] ? __pfx_hsr_add_port+0x10/0x10 [ 40.457176] [ T201] ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x5c/0x270 [ 40.457189] [ T201] hsr_dev_finalize+0x4bc/0xbf0 [ 40.457204] [ T201] hsr_newlink+0x3c3/0x8f0 [ 40.457212] [ T201] ? __pfx_hsr_newlink+0x10/0x10 [ 40.457222] [ T201] ? rtnl_create_link+0x173/0xe40 [ 40.457233] [ T201] rtnl_newlink_create+0x2cf/0x750 [ 40.457243] [ T201] ? __pfx_rtnl_newlink_create+0x10/0x10 [ 40.457247] [ T201] ? __dev_get_by_name+0x12/0x50 [ 40.457252] [ T201] ? rtnl_dev_get+0xac/0x140 [ 40.457259] [ T201] ? __pfx_rtnl_dev_get+0x10/0x10 [ 40.457285] [ T201] __rtnl_newlink+0x22c/0xa50 [ 40.457305] [ T201] rtnl_newlink+0x637/0xb20 Adding rcu_read_lock() for all hsr_for_each_port() looks confusing. Introduce a new helper, hsr_for_each_port_rtnl(), that assumes the RTNL lock is held. This allows callers in suitable contexts to iterate ports safely without explicit RCU locking. Other code paths that rely on RCU protection continue to use hsr_for_each_port() with rcu_read_lock(). ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>

5da3d94 ("PCI: mvebu: Use for_each_of_range() iterator for parsing "ranges"") simplified code by using the for_each_of_range() iterator, but it broke PCI enumeration on Turris Omnia (and probably other mvebu targets). Issue #1: To determine range.flags, of_pci_range_parser_one() uses bus->get_flags(), which resolves to of_bus_pci_get_flags(), which already returns an IORESOURCE bit field, and NOT the original flags from the "ranges" resource. Then mvebu_get_tgt_attr() attempts the very same conversion again. Remove the misinterpretation of range.flags in mvebu_get_tgt_attr(), to restore the intended behavior. Issue #2: The driver needs target and attributes, which are encoded in the raw address values of the "/soc/pcie/ranges" resource. According to of_pci_range_parser_one(), the raw values are stored in range.bus_addr and range.parent_bus_addr, respectively. range.cpu_addr is a translated version of range.parent_bus_addr, and not relevant here. Use the correct range structure member, to extract target and attributes. This restores the intended behavior. Fixes: 5da3d94 ("PCI: mvebu: Use for_each_of_range() iterator for parsing "ranges"") Reported-by: Jan Palus <[email protected]> Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=220479 Signed-off-by: Klaus Kudielka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]> Tested-by: Tony Dinh <[email protected]> Tested-by: Jan Palus <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]

The function ceph_process_folio_batch() sets folio_batch entries to NULL, which is an illegal state. Before folio_batch_release() crashes due to this API violation, the function ceph_shift_unused_folios_left() is supposed to remove those NULLs from the array. However, since commit ce80b76 ("ceph: introduce ceph_process_folio_batch() method"), this shifting doesn't happen anymore because the "for" loop got moved to ceph_process_folio_batch(), and now the `i` variable that remains in ceph_writepages_start() doesn't get incremented anymore, making the shifting effectively unreachable much of the time. Later, commit 1551ec6 ("ceph: introduce ceph_submit_write() method") added more preconditions for doing the shift, replacing the `i` check (with something that is still just as broken): - if ceph_process_folio_batch() fails, shifting never happens - if ceph_move_dirty_page_in_page_array() was never called (because ceph_process_folio_batch() has returned early for some of various reasons), shifting never happens - if `processed_in_fbatch` is zero (because ceph_process_folio_batch() has returned early for some of the reasons mentioned above or because ceph_move_dirty_page_in_page_array() has failed), shifting never happens Since those two commits, any problem in ceph_process_folio_batch() could crash the kernel, e.g. this way: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000034 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 172 UID: 0 PID: 2342707 Comm: kworker/u778:8 Not tainted 6.15.10-cm4all1-es torvalds#714 NONE Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R7615/0G9DHV, BIOS 1.6.10 12/08/2023 Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-ceph-1) RIP: 0010:folios_put_refs+0x85/0x140 Code: 83 c5 01 39 e8 7e 76 48 63 c5 49 8b 5c c4 08 b8 01 00 00 00 4d 85 ed 74 05 41 8b 44 ad 00 48 8b 15 b0 > RSP: 0018:ffffb880af8db778 EFLAGS: 00010207 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000003 RDX: ffffe377cc3b0000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffb880af8db8c0 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000000000007d R09: 000000000102b86f R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000000000ac R12: ffffb880af8db8c0 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff9bd262c97000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9c8efc303000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000034 CR3: 0000000160958004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ceph_writepages_start+0xeb9/0x1410 The crash can be reproduced easily by changing the ceph_check_page_before_write() return value to `-E2BIG`. (Interestingly, the crash happens only if `huge_zero_folio` has already been allocated; without `huge_zero_folio`, is_huge_zero_folio(NULL) returns true and folios_put_refs() skips NULL entries instead of dereferencing them. That makes reproducing the bug somewhat unreliable. See https://lore.kernel.org/[email protected] for a discussion of this detail.) My suggestion is to move the ceph_shift_unused_folios_left() to right after ceph_process_folio_batch() to ensure it always gets called to fix up the illegal folio_batch state. Cc: [email protected] Fixes: ce80b76 ("ceph: introduce ceph_process_folio_batch() method") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ceph-devel/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>

asj and others added 30 commits September 29, 2015 16:29

Btrfs: rename btrfs_sysfs_add_one to btrfs_sysfs_add_mounted

96f3136

Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

Btrfs: rename btrfs_sysfs_remove_one to btrfs_sysfs_remove_mounted

6618a59

Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

Btrfs: rename btrfs_kobj_add_device to btrfs_sysfs_add_device_link

e3bd697

Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

Btrfs: rename btrfs_kobj_rm_device to btrfs_sysfs_rm_device_link

3257604

Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

Btrfs: rename super_kobj to fsid_kobj

c1b7e47

Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

Btrfs: SB read failure should return EIO for __bread failure

92fc03f

This will return EIO when __bread() fails to read SB, instead of EINVAL. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

Btrfs: add helper for closing one device

f190aa4

Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> [reworded subject and changelog] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

Btrfs: pass the error code to the btrfs_std_error and log ret

0aee754

This patch will log return value of add/del_qgroup_relation() and pass the err code of btrfs_run_qgroups to the btrfs_std_error(). Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

Btrfs: device path change must be logged

defa97a

From the issue diagnosable point of view, log if the device path is changed. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

Btrfs: add missing brelse when superblock checksum fails

e6aea8e

looks like oversight, call brelse() when checksum fails. further down the code in the non error path we do call brelse() and so we don't see brelse() in the goto error.. paths. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

Btrfs: optimize check for stale device

0812a51

optimize check for stale device to only be checked when there is device added or changed. If there is no update to the device, there is no need to call btrfs_free_stale_device(). Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

Btrfs: clean up and optimize __check_raid_min_device()

3f7d4c2

__check_raid_min_device() which was pealed from btrfs_rm_device() maintianed its original code to show the block move. This patch cleans up __check_raid_min_device(). Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

Btrfs: make use of btrfs_find_device_by_user_input()

b737e10

btrfs_rm_device() has a section of the code which can be replaced btrfs_find_device_by_user_input() Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

Btrfs: make use of btrfs_scratch_superblocks() in btrfs_rm_device()

cef4787

With the previous patches now the btrfs_scratch_superblocks() is ready to be used in btrfs_rm_device() so use it. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

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asj commented Oct 7, 2015

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